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Abstract 
Current debates concerning the future of social security provision in advanced 
FDSLWDOLVWVWDWHVKDYHUDLVHGDFLWL]HQV¶EDVLFLQFRPH&%,DVDSRVVLEOHUHIRUPSDFNDJH
The proposal is based on the principles of individuality, universality and unconditionality 
and ensures a minimum income guarantee for all members of society. Implementing a 
CBI, thus, entails radical reform of existing patterns of welfare delivery and would bring 
into question the institutionalized relationship between work and welfare, upon which 
modern welfare states are premised. It follows that the practice of arguing for a CBI has 
tended to concentrate on issues regarding the role of the state in providing income 
security for all citizens and, in particular, to issues pertaining to the world of paid work. 
However such a concentration indicates bias in the approach to study and serves to 
confine the welfare reform agenda. The purpose of this thesis is to make a positive 
contribution to the CBI literature by examining the proposal from a feminist economics 
perspective. It is argued that a CBI has the potential to promote equal rights of freedom 
for men and women and provides the basis for the development and sustainability of new 
and liberating patterns of working and living. However, this particular aspect of the 
proposal will never be fully considered as long as the analytical framework employed is 
dominated by an adherence to neo-classical economic theory. Embracing a feminist 
economics perspective allows for the identification of the androcentric bias inherent 
within the neo-classical construct and further provides an alternative methodological 
approach that serves to open up the debate to incorporate a more realistic vision of the 
nature of modern socio-economic relationships. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Social Security Reform ± A Possible Strategy  
Introduction 
The provision of social security is considered a fundamental component of modern 
welfare states. Income maintenance measures, which shield individuals from the most 
adverse effects of economic depressions, can serve to promote economic efficiency. 
Systems can be designed in such a way that they act in preserving existing economic 
relationships. Although ultimately acting as a safety-net measure, benefits can also 
indirectly influence patterns of behaviour, particularly those relating to labour market 
activity and consumer spending. In addition state administered income maintenance 
policy primarily impacts on patterns of income distribution and can therefore be viewed 
as a tool for addressing income inequalities. Social security schemes can therefore also be 
associated with the goal of promoting social justice, the degree to which depends largely 
upon the actual design of the system. The payment of cash benefits, combined with the 
provision of various benefits in kind, can most notably be perceived as a mechanism for 
improving social welfare and promoting social citizenship rights in modern capitalist 
societies.  
The growing awareness amongst the academic community of the role social 
security plays in the development of modern capitalism is accompanied by emerging 
evidence of new social problems. Increasing levels of poverty, witnessed throughout the 
European Union, are often associated with changing labour market structures. Mass long-
term unemployment, widespread youth unemployment, a general fall in demand for 
skilled labour and the associated increasing demand for part-time, casual and unskilled 
labour are all characteristics of modern labour market processes. The problems of 
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marginalisation within the labour force or long-term exclusion from the labour market are 
affecting growing numbers of individuals with negative consequences in terms of their 
welfare and the welfare of their families and communities. Ageing populations and fluid 
family forms are well documented in the literature on the changing demographics of 
modern society. Furthermore, gender imbalances continue to dominate the social agenda 
both in the world of paid work and family life. The rights and obligations of the citizens 
of an integrated Europe are not well served by social security measures institutionalised 
LQ D UDGLFDOO\ GLIIHUHQW HUD &RQGLWLRQV GLFWDWH WKDW VRFLDO VHFXULW\ VHUYLFHV DUH µQHHGHG
QRZPRUHWKDQHYHUEHIRUH¶$EHO-Smith, 1985:34), but also that those services should be 
designed in light of modern demands. 
This thesis contributes to the debate on the future of state welfare provision by 
H[DPLQLQJWKHFLWL]HQV¶EDVLFLQFRPH&%,SURSRVDODVDSRVVLEOHUHIRUPSDFNDJHIURPD
feminist economics perspective. The purpose is, firstly to show that the values and ideals 
associated with mainstream economic theory thus far have dominated the debate, and 
secondly to demonstrate how a CBI conforms with a feminist economics approach to the 
policy process. A feminist economics perspective offers a new political economy 
framework for analysing the relationships between men and women in modern market 
economies. By critically examining the tools of analysis and the criteria used in policy 
design and evaluation processes, feminist economics seeks to illuminate the bias inherent 
within traditional approaches and to redress such. As a policy strategy for the reform of 
VRFLDO VHFXULW\ WKH&%, SURSRVDO LV UHJDUGHGDV µJHQGHUQHXWUDO¶ DVRSSRVHG WR µJHQGHU
EOLQG¶7KDW LVD&%,KDVWKHSRWHQWLDO WRSURPRWHHTXDOULJKWVRIIUHHGRPIRUPHQDQG
women, and provides the basis for the development and sustainability of new and 
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liberating patterns of living and working. However, the full potential of a CBI in 
achieving such a goal will never be realised, or even considered desirable, as long as the 
analytical framework employed remains unaltered. Embracing a feminist economics 
perspective is indicative of a move away from the status quo in that it represents an 
alternative methodological approach to policy analysis. Analysing a CBI within such an 
alternative framework is considered a necessary next step in the reform debate. By 
illustrating how a CBI would unite the goals of social justice and economic efficiency in 
contemporary society, the case is made that the application of feminist economic theory 
is a positive contributing factor in the welfare reform debate. Similarly, in arguing that a 
CBI promotes gender neutral social citizenship rights the belief is held that feminist 
economists should applaud the proposal in that it corresponds with a vision of the world 
in which women are afforded the same rights as men.  
The CBI debate has been, and continues to be, dominated by a focus on the world 
of paid work. This is not surprising given the effect a CBI might have on work 
incentives/disincentives. That is, the granting of an unconditional minimum income to all 
citizens can perceivably be associated with increased rates of non-participation in the 
labour market. Conversely, the security provided by the minimum income guarantee 
might actually improve work incentives in that it reduces the financial risks associated 
with precarious forms of employment. However, the choice between work and leisure in 
market based economies, although undoubtedly influenced by financial considerations, is 
fundamentally a reflection of individual preferences. A whole range of factors, which are 
just as, and in some instances more, important than issues concerning monetary gain, 
informs such preferences. Stated preferences may be more a result of adherence to 
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societal norms than a matter of unconstrained individual choice. In societies where 
IRUPDO HPSOR\PHQW UHPDLQV WKH SULQFLSOH IRUFH LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ µVRFLDO VWDWXV¶ PDQ\
LQGLYLGXDOVPD\ILQGWKHPVHOYHVLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKH\DUHµIRUFHG¶LQWRMREVUHJDUGOHVV
RIWKHLUOHYHORIµQRQ-eaUQHG¶LQFRPH)XUWKHUPRUHLQVRFLHWLHVZKHUHZRUNXQGHUWDNHQLQ
the home remains outwith the confines of formal economic activity, what is perceived to 
EHDVWDWHGSUHIHUHQFHIRUµOHLVXUH¶PD\DFWXDOO\EHHYLGHQFHRIDQDFFHSWHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\
for ensuring the efficient functioning of the domestic economy. Thus, it is argued that in 
considering the CBI proposal the incentives/disincentives dichotomy, with reference to 
paid work, is a more complex matter than initially perceived. What is immediately 
apparent though is that the CBI proposal is an option for state welfare reform that has the 
potential to promote individual freedom, while simultaneously encouraging efficiency 
gains.  
Despite the attractiveness of a policy that reconciles freedom with efficiency, the 
CBI concept remains a topic of debate. Furthermore, even when the desirability of a CBI 
is accepted in principle, questions concerning actual implementation have been difficult 
to resolve. Although the implementation process is a crucial element in the debate, it will 
be argued that prior to addressing such issues a further case must be made for a CBI on 
the grounds that it presents a valuable opportunity to reassess the way work is valued in 
modern economies. Thinking about a CBI in this way involves a broadening of the 
parameters, which are confining in current debates, and provides for a better 
understanding of how the proposal would serve to promote gender neutral social 
citizenship rights. Such a development will only be possible if the analytical process 
draws upon a feminist economics discourse. 
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$UJXLQJIRU$&LWL]HQV¶%DVLF,QFRPH 
The current debate between advocates and opponents of the introduction of a 
basic income, of a grant unconditionally paid to every adult citizen, 
constitutes, in my view, one of the most important controversies about the 
future of European welfare states. 
(Van Parijs, 1992c:215) 
A CBI is often viewed as an agenda for the reform of social security. However, the 
radical nature of the proposal implies a new perspective on the role of the state as a 
provider of welfare; a rethinking of the traditional work and pay relationship and a very 
different position on the rights and obligations of citizenship in modern state welfare 
regimes. For these reasons, a CBI should be viewed as a reform package that provides the 
framework for developing a new conceptual basis for the modern welfare state, rather 
than as an alternative proposal to existing social security measures. Understanding a CBI 
within these terms allows for clear links to be made with the proposal and the various 
µFULVLV¶ WKHRULHVZKLFKFXUUHQWO\GRPLQDWHGHEDWHVRQ WKH IXWXUHRI WKHPRGHUQZHOIDUH
state. This in turn facilitates an understanding of how the CBI proposal impacts on the 
numerous welfare functions of the state and how it indirectly promotes rights of 
citizenship other than those related to income security. 
A CBI will be clarified and distinguished from similar but distinct proposals. It will 
become evident that the concept itself is simple and appeals to a wide range of very 
different political and economic ideologies. Furthermore the idea has been proposed, in 
many different guises, for a considerable number of years. The argument to be made is 
that the introduction of a basic income for all would not only address the social problem 
of poverty but would also satisfy the debate between the dual and often conflicting 
objectives of economic efficiency and equity. A CBI would promote labour market 
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flexibility whilst at the same time erode the existing disincentives to work which 
currently arise from the interaction of the tax and benefit system. Furthermore a CBI 
would promote gender justice and is a policy option that does not discriminate in favour 
of a predetermined set of normative values regarding living arrangements. Rather a CBI 
would provide the foundations for a system of state welfare provision that allows 
individuals to make independent choices about the way they live. For all of these reasons 
a CBI should not be viewed as a proposal for the reform of social security but rather a 
policy instrument which recognises the inability to divorce the economic from the 
sociological and the political, and as a philosophy which serves to justify the modern 
welfare state. 
Within the current debate on the future of state supported income maintenance 
schemes the CBI proposal regularly emerges as an extreme option involving a radical 
transformation of existing social security and income tax arrangements (see for example 
Hills, 1993). The introduction of a CBI would not merely imply tinkering with existing 
systems in response to identified inadequacies or inefficiencies. The concept itself 
involves the acceptance of a whole new range of justifying principles regarding the 
nature of state supported income maintenance. The existing literature witnesses varied 
and convincing attempts at identifying and analysing such justifying principles (see for 
example Van Parijs, 1992). Despite these attempts the CBI proposal remains a theoretical 
µSLSH-GUHDP¶ \HW WR EH WUDQVODWHG LQto reality. Powerful and convincing arguments are 
postulated from both supporters and critics alike. The main objections raised are 
expressed in terms of financial cost and the negative economic impact such a scheme 
would have on work incentives. The common link emerging from these criticisms is that 
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the issue itself is misunderstood and the debate tends to centre on the idea of social 
security reform. Implicit within the CBI proposal is the acceptance of the 
interdependence of economic performance and social policy which in turn sets the stage 
for the building of new political alliances regarding the function of modern welfare states. 
A CBI is not merely an alternative to existing social security provision but rather a 
philosophy aimed at enhancing individual freedom and promoting social justice.    
It is difficult to escape the normative issues arising when attempting to justify such 
a philosophy. Also, as the acceptance of a CBI would render any current system of state 
income maintenance redundant it is attractive to view any such reform in terms of an 
either/or scenario. However, by adhering to positive economic analysis, critics of a CBI 
fail to recognise some of the more crucial long-term benefits to be gained. The 
contribution made by applying the tools of economic analysis to the study of social 
security policy is worthwhile in itself, but in terms of policy formation, it is a partial 
analysis. To fully appreciate and understand the nature of social security measures the 
debate must progress beyond the realms of determining an efficient allocation of 
resources and incorporate questions of social justice, citizenship rights and individual 
autonomy. Moreover, the process of resource allocation must recognise the influence of 
institutions and the state rather than relying solely upon the analysis of market 
interactions. It is claimed therefore that the theoretical basis for a CBI would be better 
served by appealing to a feminist political economy framework. 
1.2.  A Feminist Political Economy 
Analysing the CBI proposal within a feminist political economy framework 
involves developing an approach to study which views the world in terms of its inherent 
  
 8 
set of complex social and economic interactions. Furthermore these interactions should 
be viewed with consideration to the dynamics of socio-economic conditions. Developing 
such an approach allows for the recognition of the limitations of exclusive theorising 
premised on a homogenous and universal particular. Models of the body politic and the 
economy which are based on axioms determined by the theories, methods and institutions 
associated with the capitalist development of the Western world dominate the realm of 
VRFLDO WKHRULVLQJ 7KLV µ:HVWHUQ VFLHQWLILF ZRUOG YLHZ RU PLQG-VHW¶ +DUGLQJ 
effectively acts in constraining new modes of thought. The generation of new theories, 
which are both descriptive and prescriptive, becomes a technically difficult thing to do 
when attempted within a community dominated by a monolithic or determinist discourse.  
In considering the future dominance of the capitalist economy Gibson-Graham draws 
attention to the ways in which the discourse of capitalist hegemony limits our ability to 
articulate policy change; 
)RULIFDSLWDOLVP¶VLGHQWLW\LVHYHQSDUWLDOO\LPPRELOHRUIL[HG if it is the 
site of an inevitability like the logics of profitability or accumulation, then it 
will necessarily be seen to operate as a constraint or a limit...We see this 
today in both mainstream and left discussions of social and economic 
policy, where we are told that we may have democracy, or a pared-down 
welfare state, or prosperity, but only in the context of the >global capitalist@ 
economy and what it will permit. 
(Gibson-Graham, 1996:14) 
Analysing all social, political and economic processes within the specific boundaries of 
capitalist relationships serves to distort our view of the world. By accepting the 
immutable force of the capital accumulation process; the desire for profits; the supremacy 
of market based interactions in determining the efficient allocation of resources and the 
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rational choice model of both individual and collective action, we effectively categorise 
all human activity in an either/or scenario. That is, all interactions that can be explained 
within the confines of the model of the capitalist economy are positive, simply because 
they can be explained and therefore understood. This facilitates the descriptive and 
prescriptive processes of social theorising. Those actions or relationships which do not fit 
the model, and therefore are not understood, are subordinate to the norm and in a binary 
sense become negative. This type of theorising not only limits our understanding of the 
world but also informs our thinking on policy developments and limits the terms of 
reference for conceptualising new, or even existing, human relationships.  
The CBI concept is considered to be a radical approach to welfare reform in that it 
implies a radical departure from existing institutional arrangements. The process of 
developing theoretical justifications for such a policy will eventually hit a stumbling 
block if this process takes place within the parameters outlined above. In order to get over 
this hurdle, the constraints imposed by accepting a singular and closed conceptualisation 
of the economy, must be removed. Capitalism has developed as a view of how modern 
society does, and should operate, almost to the exclusion of all other views. However, 
although capitalist structures of power, control and ownership could be identified as the 
defining features of many social and economic interactions, they are not representative of 
all forms of relationships. Attempts to offer new explanations must first recognise that the 
dominance of the capitalist identity results from the social construction of ideas and it is 
those ideas that effectively act as a constraining force.  
It will be argued that the issue of welfare reform would be better understood if the 
approach to study initiated a critique of the monolithic discourse of capitalist relations. 
  
 10 
The privileging of a set of specific ideals over all others is a form of bias which 
influences the research agenda and subsequent policy prescriptions. It is essential that this 
bias be identified within the research process, which allows for the construction of a more 
objective approach to study. In attempting to do so it is fruitful to draw upon a feminist 
approach, particularly within the traditionally male dominated academic discipline of 
economics. Feminist economists have criticised their discipline for focusing exclusively 
on the analysis of choice, specifically the choices of independent rational economic 
actors aiming to maximise their own welfare with reference to scarce resources. This 
limiting definition of economics leads to the critique that; 
«HFRQRPLVWVKDYH not paid sufficient attention to relationships between men 
and women or parents and children, and that as a result, they have failed to 
provide a convincing analysis of economic development, political conflict, or 
social welfare. 
(Folbre, 1994:4) 
Accepting this critique opens the door to a new more inclusive economics. Feminist 
economists, faced with the task of incorporating what appear to be intangible factors, 
such as human and social relationships, into an almost impenetrable academic discipline, 
must first examine why and how the study of economics has come to be dominated by 
such narrow and limiting assumptions.  
In their critique of contemporary orthodox economics, feminist economists have 
drawn upon feminist scholarship concerning the social construction of gender and the 
social construction of academic disciplines. In exploring the hypothesis that 
contemporary economics has been heavily influenced by preconceived notions about 
what is considered worthy of study, and what is considered to be the most appropriate 
method of study, feminist economists have concluded that there is a determining link 
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between their discipline and socially constructed gender categories. By making this link, 
feminist economists not only reinforce the claim that economics is socially constructed, 
but also shed light on the bias inherent within the discipline by identifying the 
polarisation of gender associations. The understanding of gender in terms of the 
µPDVFXOLQH¶HTXDOVKDUGVWURQJVHSDUDWHVFLHQWLILFDQGµIHPLQLQH¶(equals soft, weak, 
connected, intuitive or emotional) dualism has been applied to the study of economics. A 
positive connection with all that is masculine and a negative connection with all that is 
feminine have subsequently influenced how the discipline of economics is understood. 
The privileging of the masculine model has not however occurred by accident. In 
discussing the development of the discipline, Ferber and Nelson argue that if we begin by 
rejecting the suggestion; 
«WKDWWKHLGHDOVDQGGHILQLWLRQof economics have been given to humankind 
through divine intervention...[and]... instead recognise that the discipline we 
call economics has been developed by particular human actors, it is hard to 
see how it could fail to be critically influenced by the limitations implicit in 
human cognition and by the social, cultural, economic, and political milieu in 
which it was created. 
(1993:1) 
Economics as an academic discipline has traditionally, and continues to be, dominated by 
men (see for example Palmer, 1995). Accepting the claim made by Ferber and Nelson 
UHJDUGLQJWKHLQIOXHQFHRQWKHGLVFLSOLQHE\WKHµOLPLWDWLRQVLPSOLFLWLQKXPDQFRJQLWLRQ¶
it could be argued that male economists would define the discipline in terms of what they 
understand; 
The subject of WKH HFRQRPLVW¶V PRGHO ZRUOG LV DQ LQGLYLGXDO ZKR LV VHOI-
interested, autonomous, rational, and whose active choices are the focus of 
interest, as opposed to one who would be social, other-interested, dependent, 
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emotional, and directed by an intrinsic nature. In many ways, this description 
UHVRQDWHVZLWKWKHHFRQRPLVW¶VVHOI-image as well. 
(Nelson, 1996:22-23) 
Economics has at its core the study of human behaviour and therefore it is a social 
science. However in their strive for accreditation in a hierarchical academic community 
economists have persisted in applying the tools of rigorous scientific analysis to their 
chosen fields of study, almost to the exclusion of all other methods. Quantitative 
approaches are favoured over qualitative methods and formal mathematical models are 
given supreme status over informal descriptive measures. This facilitates the economists 
ability to abstract, simplify, measure, and subsequently analyse, a subject matter which 
appears on the surface incredibly complex and difficult to predict. For Nelson; 
Economics, as a human endeavour, reflects human limitations in 
understanding a reality that is always beyond our grasp. Economics, as a 
social endeavour, reflects some points of view, favoured by the group that 
makes the rules for the discipline, and neglects others. 
(1996:23) 
Economics, then, as an academic discipline is socially constructed and dominated by a 
particular, and limited, conception of human interactions. Furthermore this dominant 
view is believed to incorporate a gender bias in that the discipline is constructed by men, 
studied by men and presents policy prescriptions which benefit men. The absence of 
women at all levels presents a particular problem for a discipline with such a wide social 
remit. Feminist economists endeavour to remedy this problem and to reorient the 
discipline in a more gender neutral direction. 
7KLV GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW IHPLQLVW HFRQRPLVWV µVHHN WR H[FLVH DOO RI WKH YDOXHV
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK VFLHQFH¶ EXW UDWKHU WKH\ ZLVK WR GUDZ DWWHQWLRQ to, and 
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UHPRYHµWKHELDVHVWKDWPD\DULVHIURPDQXQH[DPLQHGHPSKDVLVRQPDVFXOLQLW\¶)HUEHU
& Nelson, 1993:11). Their task, then, is not to refute all that is associated with a 
µPDVFXOLQH¶ HFRQRPLFV DQG WR UHSODFH LW ZLWK D QHZ µIHPLQLQH¶ HFRQRPLFV 6XFK an 
approach would be criticised for illustrating a gender bias in favour of women, an equally 
limiting and narrow approach to that which exists now. The goal is to practice a more 
objective science. However, objective in this sense does not mean value or interest free, 
since this would be almost impossible to achieve in a research community, and more 
importantly, the promotion of certain values and interests is an integral component of the 
research process. It is argued that a greater degree of objectivity would be achieved by 
developing an approach to the discipline which incorporates a range of values and 
interests representative of the population, rather than focusing on the particular at the 
exclusion of alternatives. This would allow for the inclusion of methods and topics 
previously ignored in the practice of economics, subsequently broadening the horizons of 
the discipline and improving the tools of economic analysis. Feminist economics is 
WKHUHIRUH QRW WR EH XQGHUVWRRG DV µZRPHQ GRLQJ HFRQRPLFV¶ EXW rather it should be 
regarded as a method of inquiry serving to shape the discipline of economics into a more 
useful and informative mechanism for understanding the complexities of human activity. 
,QDQHGLWRULDOZULWWHQIRUWKHILUVWLVVXHRIWKHMRXUQDOµ)HPLQLVW(FRQRPLFV¶ODXQFKHGLQ
1995, Diana Strassman confirms this as the strategy of feminist enquiry; 
By challenging the merits of narrowly situated economic theories and 
research agendas reinforcing the interests of adult men, feminists have 
therefore sought to enhance the visibility and perceived importance of the 
wide range of policy initiatives advocated and debated by feminists in 
economics and elsewhere. Whether engaged in discussing welfare reform, 
childcare, family planning, economic development, structural adjustment, 
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domestic abuse, sexual harassment, discrimination, affirmative action, pay 
equity, family leave, or the feminisation of poverty, feminists have initiated a 
sweeping debate on economic policy issues vital to the economic well being 
of the majority of humans. In so doing feminists have begun to challenge an 
economic practice that for too long has served the interests of a restricted and 
unrepresentative group of people. 
(Strassman, 1995:4) 
Drawing upon this strategy facilitates the development of a feminist political 
economy. Traditional approaches to analysing, and explaining, structures of power, 
ownership, control and collective identities are criticised from a feminist perspective for 
being incomplete and inconsistent. The over-riding emphasis on rational self-interested 
economic agents making informed, and free choices, and the uni-dimensional nature of 
class struggle, which effectively form the basis of contemporary theories of political 
economy are limited assumptions. That is, such assumptions fail to adequately account 
for the life experiences of many individuals and women in particular. To paint a more 
complete picture a new approach is required that accepts the insights to be gained from 
traditional theories but also broadens the realms of inquiry to include the influence of 
social institutions. Nancy Folbre, in stating a case for developing a feminist political 
economy, draws attention to the omissions in traditional theories;  
Feminist scholarship documents the ways in which groups based on gender, 
age, and sexual preference have forged their collective identities and pursued 
their collective interests. The evidence of persistent struggle is embedded in 
the historical silt of formal rules that have denied women, children and 
homosexuals rights over person and property and limited their ability to 
accumulate assets. Less tangible, but no less central, has been the 
reproduction of cultural norms and personal preferences that have 
legitimated adult male heterosexual authority. None of these mechanisms of 
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hierarchical constraint has ever been limited to the family, but they have 
remained largely invisible to those who placed the family outside the domain 
of political economy. 
(1994:48) 
Opening the doors to a new method of inquiry represents a starting point for 
deconstructing particular ideals and beliefs regarding the functioning of modern capitalist 
economies. Research which is premised on a set of given assumptions modelled in a 
different era for the primary purpose of explaining, and indeed justifying, a particular 
political and economic structure is criticised for illustrating a bias in favour of that 
structure. A feminist political economy provides a theoretical framework for dismantling 
the obstacle imposed by the capitalist identity and breaking from old traditions in creating 
a new discourse of economic difference. Within this framework a central focus is the 
analysis of socially constructed structures of constraint; how such constraints are 
informed and influenced over time; and how they impact on both individual and 
collective action. It is argued that this approach leads to a broader and richer 
conceptualisation of socio-economic relationships. Consequently, applying this approach 
to the area of welfare reform, and the CBI proposal in particular, results in a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issues and opens the doors to new measures 
representing radical departures from the past. 
1.3. Outline 
The thesis will begin by exploring the welfare reform agenda, with specific 
reference to income maintenance policy. The focus of this introductory section therefore 
is to identify the purpose, nature and structure of income transfers in modern welfare 
states. An examination of the theoretical framework employed in justifying state 
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supported benefit systems will demonstrate the relevance of mainstream economic 
analysis. However, it will be argued that neo-classical economic theory has tended to 
dominate the study of income maintenance policy and has resulted in benefit structures 
designed to conform to a particular set of ideals regarding the function of income 
transfers in a market based economy. This effectively serves to constrain reform debates 
by prioritising the objective of economic efficiency. Chapter three will build on this 
hypothesis by outlining the objectives and functions of income maintenance policy and 
the relationship between such measures and other areas of public policy. The distinction 
ZLOOEHPDGHEHWZHHQLQFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHSROLF\DQGWKHFRQFHSWRIµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶IRU
the purpose of demonstrating the broad range of objectives that can be associated with 
state action in the field of income redistribution. It will be argued that reform strategies 
should be assessed with reference to such objectives. The first step in the reform process 
should therefore involve an undertaking to explore the nature, and functions of, state 
supported income transfer schemes. Such an undertaking will serve to illustrate the 
prevalence of traditional economic theory in the policy design process, and subsequently, 
in setting the reform agenda. To further substantiate this claim chapter four will provide 
an overview of contemporary social security policy in Britain. Recent developments in 
the operation and design of the British system can arguably be identified with an 
approach to policy founded on assumptions akin to those central to neo-classical 
economic theory. It will be argued that these influences are common to modern advanced 
capitalist welfare regimes, albeit to lesser or greater degrees. Chapter five will introduce a 
CBI as a policy response to the perceived crisis in state supported welfare systems. An 
evaluation of the CBI proposal will be approached within a theoretical framework that 
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draws upon a feminist political economy model. It will be argued that although gender 
issues are central to any debate on social security reform, the potential benefits of a CBI 
in terms of promoting gender justice have been sadly overlooked. It is claimed that this is 
due to a continued acceptance of the governing principles associated with neo-classical 
economic theory in the research process. Providing evidence of such serves to 
demonstrate the inherent tensions in introducing a radical approach to reform within a 
traditionalist and institutionalised approach to policy analysis. Chapters six and seven 
will trace the historical development of minimum income guarantee proposals outlining 
their relationship to traditional debates on economic efficiency, and more contemporary 
debates on citizenship rights, particularly the issue of social exclusion. The purpose 
behind tracing the development of the CBI concept is to provide evidence of the 
continuing emphasis on preserving a traditional productivist work and pay relationship 
within the literature. This focus is criticised for illustrating a gender bias in that the life 
experiences of women are largely ignored. The CBI proposal remains firmly grounded in 
theoretical discussion with little prospect of transformation into policy, despite evidence 
tracing the variations of proposal as far back as the onset of modern capitalist 
development. The remainder of the thesis will argue that this situation can only be 
remedied by widening the parameters of analysis. Chapter seven will explore 
contemporary arguments in favour of a CBI, which have been framed in response to the 
crisis in welfare hypothesis. This will demonstrate the limitations in the debate thus far. 
Gender issues have remained at the periphery and any attempts to include women have 
been done without altering the analytical framework. Conjectures regarding individual 
responses to a CBI have been hypothesised within a model based on assumptions applied 
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exclusively to all members of society. It will be argued that such theorising follows the 
same pattern as the development of economics as an academic discipline, and as such 
fails to adequately address issues relating to gender inequalities. Chapter eight will 
develop a feminist economics perspective on the CBI proposal. This will entail 
deconstructing the traditional work/non-work polarisation in the same way that feminist 
economists have attempted to deconstruct the masculine/feminine distinction that has 
been applied in their discipline to the detriment of the understanding of economics. The 
application of feminist economic theory in the analysis of income maintenance policy 
serves to refine our understanding of the CBI proposal. Furthermore a feminist 
economics perspective contributes positively to the debate on social security reform by 
providing a further, convincing, theoretical justification for a CBI on the grounds of 
promoting gender justice.  
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Chapter 2: Justifying Income Transfers 
2.1 Introduction 
In the standard paradigm of orthodox economics resource endowments 
determine personal wealth and personal income distribution. These 
HQGRZPHQWV DUH WDNHQ DV ³JLYHQ´ H[RJHQRXV YDULDEOHV DW OHDVW WR
economists. Consequently remedies for inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth and income fall largely outside the purview of the positive science of 
neo-classical economics and can only be justified on normative non-
economic grounds. 
(Burkitt & Hutchison, 1994:19) 
Income transfer programs are a fundamental component of the welfare state 
in most, if not all, advanced western societies. We know this from the 
proportion of government budgets devoted to such programs; from their 
primary role in the establishment and subsequent development of the welfare 
state; and from the universal impact which social security and taxation have 
on the economic well-being of families and individuals. 
(Mitchell, 1991:1) 
Why are income transfer programs deemed necessary? What is the function of state 
supported income maintenance programs and how do these programs interact with other 
areas of state welfare provision? What types of programs can modern welfare states 
continue to financially sustain given the changing nature of the economy and in particular 
the structure of contemporary labour markets? Is there continued political will to support 
the public provision of income maintenance programs and if so should these programs be 
universal or selective? Have the problems that programs are designed to address been 
adequately identified and is there a mechanism to ensure that effective monitoring and 
evaluation takes place? Does existing income maintenance policy meet the conditions 
implied by the current emphasis on mainstreaming gender in all areas of public policy? 
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These questions are undeniably central to the reform debate on the future of income 
maintenance policy. However, what appears to be missing from that debate is an 
informed discussion focusing on what is understood by the concept of income 
maintenance.  
The provision of individual financial security is a principal function of the modern 
welfare state. How such security is provided, the adequacy of coverage and the actual 
levels of payments made, vary considerably from country to country. Diversity in design 
is largely a result of variations in the perceived or even stated goals of income transfer 
programs. In turn the goals or objectives of policy will be informed by ideological 
dogma. However, differences in systems apart, state supported income maintenance 
programs are an orthodox feature of the modern economy. Furthermore, the development 
of such programs occurred within a climate of political consensus regarding the crucial 
role of the state in securing and promoting social welfare. Throughout the post war era 
interventionist policies were generally accepted as an integral feature of modern capitalist 
development. As a consequence any talk of income maintenance policy reform was 
undertaken against a background of the need to support and maintain existing capitalist 
economic and social relations. Recent political, economic and social developments have 
OHGWRDEUHDNGRZQLQWKHµSRVWZDUFRQVHQVXV¶DQGVXEVHTXHQWHURVLRQRIVXSSRUWIRUWKH
mixed economy of welfare. Current debates are therefore no longer dominated by the 
RYHUDUFKLQJ WKHPH RI µVWDWH ZHOIDUH¶ EXW UDWKHU DUH FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH VHDUFK IRU
alternative structures believed to be more appropriate in meeting the exigencies of global, 
competitive economies. The emphasis has switched from tinkering with the design of 
systems to questioning the whole apparatus of modern welfare state activity and income 
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maintenance policy has not escaped attention. However, it is argued that the reform 
process itself has continued with the traditions of the past in that it has been prefaced, and 
hence informed, by the practice of prioritising the needs of a specific set of capitalist 
structures.  
Current debates on the future of income maintenance policy have been maintained 
within a framework of fixed parameters relating to the role of income transfer programs 
in the overall functioning of the modern economy. This in itself is a value judgement and 
serves to limit our understanding of income maintenance policy. What is required is an 
approach to study which effectively recognises the inherent biases within current debates 
and facilitates the development of a more inclusive framework for analysing policy. This 
chapter will set out the research agenda by examining the purpose, nature and structure of 
income transfers in modern welfare states. This will allow for criticism of the narrowly 
conceived notion that publicly provided cash benefits exist primarily to relieve poverty. 
Initially it will be argued that the theoretical framework employed to provide justification 
for benefit systems will depend upon how those systems are defined. Restricted 
definitions result in the adoption of limiting theoretical arguments. In turn this leads to 
rigidity in the reform process. 
The chapter begins by summarising the predominant theoretical arguments 
employed in justifying income maintenance programs. The need for state intervention in 
the transfer of incomes between individuals, or groups of individuals, has long been 
argued for on the grounds of economic efficiency. Drawing upon traditional economic 
theory, such arguments have proved convincing in justifying state supported benefit 
systems and have benefited from a general level of consensus amongst the academic 
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community and policy makers alike. However, the tendency for conventional economic 
arguments to dominate the theoretical background has resulted in benefit structures 
designed to conform to a particular set of ideals and beliefs regarding the nature of 
human behaviour. It will also be argued that the practice of analysing income 
maintenance policy has been dominated by adhering to a traditional political economy 
framework, thereby emphasising preconceived notions about the direct relationship 
between policy and overall economic performance. State financed, and delivered, income 
maintenance programs will obviously impact on the functioning of both the macro and 
micro economy. However, stressing the significance of such in the analytical framework 
serves to overshadow the multiplicity of functions associated with income maintenance 
policy. Identifying those functions allows for a broader conceptual understanding of the 
nature of policy and provides the foundation for developing a more comprehensive 
analytical framework. This process contributes positively to the reform debate by 
illustrating that policy options remain constrained by narrowly defined objectives. 
Removing those constraints would enable an expansion of the boundaries of the current 
debate to include a broader range of choices for the future.  
Despite the above noted observations, it is worth restating that the relevance of 
economics in the study of income maintenance policy is not to be denied. What is in 
question, however, is the merit bestowed upon a particular way of doing economics. A 
continued, and virtually exclusive, attachment to the assumptions and models associated 
with the neo-classical school of thought has meant that the practice of doing economics 
has become synonymous with the application of neo-classical theory. Any attempt to 
move the reform debate forward would therefore benefit from a process of identifying 
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how neo-classical thought is applied in the field of income maintenance policy and thus 
distinguishing such from alternative approaches. This will lay the foundations for 
developing a feminist economics perspective in the study of income transfer programs, in 
that it would provide evidence of the compelling influence of neo-classical economics in 
the design of systems. Furthermore, this would confirm the accusations made by feminist 
economists that their discipline has been effectively hijacked by the practice of 
privileging a set of ideals and norms pertaining to human interactions, which in itself is 
indicative of an approach constrained by value judgements. The reform of existing 
structures of income maintenance systems must therefore begin with an undertaking to 
investigate, and subsequently question, the leverage of traditional economic theory in the 
design process.  
2.2 Justifying the Benefit System - A Question of Economics? 
As a component of public policy, income transfer programs are subject to scrutiny 
with specific reference to economic efficiency, administrative feasibility and political 
acceptability. Furthermore, due to the direct impact such programs have on individual 
welfare, questions of social justice, gender equality and citizenship rights must also be 
addressed. What is less clear is how these questions should be prioritised and this tends to 
be where most of the controversy arises regarding future policy direction. Questions of 
setting and prioritising objectives are essentially normative and therefore will be 
informed by the value judgements of policy makers. It is difficult to escape such 
judgements in any policy analysis. What is essential however is that they are identified 
and recognised as potent contributory factors in the reform process. That is, value 
positions should be made explicit, thereby ensuring the transparency of the influence of 
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various institutional structures in the analytical process. Thus the positivist position, 
upheld by mainstream economists, is brought into question. Claims to objectivity are 
UHDOO\PRUHDERXWYDOXHµEOLQGQHVV¶ LQ WKHVHQVHWhat an assumed set of ideals permeate 
the research process unquestioned and invisible. Adopting a feminist economics approach 
ZRXOGVHUYHWRVZLWFKWKHIRFXVIURPµEOLQG¶WRµQHXWUDO¶E\HQVXULQJWKDWWKHLQIOXHQFHRI
value structures are identified at the outset, and adhered to where appropriate.. 
Historically, the development of income transfer programs has been associated with 
high employment levels and sustained periods of economic growth; 
Specifically, the welfare state was seen as strengthening economic 
performance because of two widely shared perceptions: the stabilising effect 
of social transfers on the economic cycle and the positive contribution of 
social insurance to workers adjusting to economic change. 
(Buti et al, 1998:17) 
More recently the dynamics of the international economic environment have led to a 
breakdown in the general consensus regarding the integral feature of income maintenance 
policy in the efficient functioning of the modern economy. Persistent high rates of 
unemployment, combined with various demographic changes, evident throughout the 
economies of the advanced western world, have placed new pressures on the public 
purse. Spiralling costs, coupled with a general slowing down in rates of economic 
growth, have raised concerns in many industrialised countries over the future 
sustainability of the modern welfare state. In response, most member states of the EU 
have been forced to review their respective welfare systems. Reform packages have been 
introduced within an atmosphere of caution and restraint. The emphasis has been on 
curbing further expenditure growth and limiting the dependence on deficit funding. In 
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turn, economists have increasingly found that the financing and delivery of publicly 
provided welfare services is an area deserving of their attention; 
The economics of the Welfare State is now centre stage, entering debates 
about the macro-economy and the wealth of nations. Reform of the Welfare 
State is seen as one of the key policy issues of the 1990s. 
(Atkinson,1995:1) 
Within the reform debate attention has primarily focused on the design and operation of 
income transfer programs. This is in main due to the direct impact such programs have on 
fiscal policy; the functioning of the labour market and costs to employers. Although 
priority has mainly been given to measures designed to cut spending, or at least to reduce 
the rate of growth in spending, questions of economic efficiency have come to 
increasingly dominate the debate on the future of state supported income transfer 
programs. 
2.3 Markets, Efficiency and Income Transfers: The Neo-Classical Approach 
Conventionally the study of economics has been dominated by the rational 
justification of policy options with reference to the goal of efficiency. The process of 
analysing and evaluating public policy within the economics profession generally focuses 
on questions of economic efficiency and policy effectiveness. That is, a particular policy 
is deemed acceptable if the social costs are minimised whilst the social benefits are 
maximised and the subsequent reallocation of resources will contribute positively to the 
overall welfare of society. Economists who study income transfer programs generally 
start from the premise that state supported income maintenance schemes are justified in 
terms of market failure. Simply put this means that where the market fails to provide 
adequate incomes, or appropriate insurance against loss of income, there exists a rationale 
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for state intervention to promote overall social welfare. For economists, the maximisation 
of social welfare will depend upon achieving both allocative and distributive efficiency in 
all sectors of the economy. Economists are therefore mainly concerned with analysing, 
and subsequently setting out, the necessary conditions for efficiency. However, it is 
important to note that this statement is a generalisation and should not be taken to imply 
that the process of economic analysis is exclusively driven by efficiency considerations. 
Nor is it to be assumed that all economists and indeed economics per se are to be 
associated with a defining unified methodology. What is being argued is that modern 
mainstream economics has come to be identified with a particular approach and within 
this approach the efficiency/inefficiency dichotomy has dominated the domain of policy 
analysis. Presenting a valid critique of this position requires a basic understanding of the 
principal assumptions inherent within mainstream, or what is referred to in the profession 
DV µQHR-FODVVLFDO¶ HFRQRPLF WKRXJKW 7KH IROOowing section, therefore, represents a 
summary of the main elements of neo-classical economic analysis traditionally employed 
in the study of state supported and/or regulated income transfer schemes. 
The Theoretical Background: A Non-Technical Overview 
The study of economics is primarily concerned with the problem of scarcity. The 
resources available to society are limited in supply whereas our material wants are 
unlimited. Hence the prevailing view of the human condition, within the discipline, is that 
our wants are always outstripped by our desire to fulfil them. Both production and 
consumption decisions have to be made as to which desires should be met and which 
should be left unfilled. The consumption of various goods and services in order to satisfy 
our wants yields positive economic benefits. Likewise, the more goods and services 
produced and available for consumption increases the amount of benefits to be enjoyed 
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overall. However any choice involves a cost in terms of the best alternative forgone and 
economists refer to this as the opportunity cost. For example the cost of spending more 
money on state provided income maintenance programs may involve sacrifices in terms 
of increased spending on government funded retraining schemes, hence the opportunity 
cost of employing more resources in the provision of income maintenance is the 
reduction in resources available for retraining. The government in this situation could be 
said to be making a trade off between investing in skills for the future and state financed 
income security in the present. The outcome of such a decision will depend upon the 
overall objectives of the government which will almost certainly be determined by 
political ideology. However orthodox economists have been preoccupied with the 
practice of building a theoretical framework, divorced from the influences of political 
processes, with which to analyse, evaluate and predict the outcome of alternative uses of 
our scarce resources; 
The methodology of neo-classical economics rests on two basic building 
blocks. The first is the idea that the economy is an analytically separate realm 
of society that can be understood in terms of its own internal dynamics. 
Economists are perfectly aware that economic behaviour is influenced by 
politics and culture, but they see these as exogenous factors that can safely be 
bracketed as one develops a framework that focuses on purely economic 
factors. 
(Block, 1990: 21)  
By applying objective scientific analysis to the study of human behaviour, economics as a 
social science attempts to build simplified models of the economy and in turn, through a 
process of deductive methodology, provides us with a tool for predicting and evaluating 
the outcome of various consumption and production decisions. Such a process is viewed 
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DVQHFHVVDU\LQWKDWGLYRUFLQJWKHPVHOYHVIURPWKHµQRUPDWLYH¶LVVXHVDULVLQJLQTXHVWLRQV
RI SROLF\ RSWLRQV HFRQRPLVWV DWWHPSW WR FRQWULEXWH LQ D µSRVLWLYH¶ ZD\ RQO\ 7KH
overarching approach to economics then is the positive, or rather scientific, analysis of 
choice in the resource allocation process for the purpose of providing direction as to the 
optimal utilisation of scarce resources with reference to the objective of maximising 
social welfare. If economics, as an academic discipline, is to be ascribed with a subject 
matter, accepting this description of the dominant economic approach means that it can 
be arguably identified as the scientific study of choice.  
It follows that the methodological underpinnings of the neo-classical tradition 
dictate that certain assumptions are made about the conduct of a wide variety of 
economic agents. At this point the student of economic theory is introduced to the 
concepts of rationality, self-interest, marginality and the overall objective of utility 
maximisation in the study of individual decision making. The hypothesis on which the 
conventional economic theory of human behaviour is based is that an individual, when 
faced with competing choices, will choose that course of action yielding the most 
economic benefit. The individual will gather all the necessary information required to 
make the appropriate choice and will always and everywhere attempt to maximise 
personal satisfaction or utility. Human behaviour, then, within the realms of economic 
theory, is determined by rational utility maximising economic agents. However, 
individuals do not only make choices as consumers but also as producers and as policy 
makers. Subsequently the assumption of rational utility maximising behaviour is applied 
to firms as well as to governments. It follows then, that if costs are incurred in the form of 
opportunity costs and benefits are received, the appropriate course of action for any 
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decision-maker is to weigh up all relevant costs and benefits, selecting the outcome 
where benefits are maximised and costs are minimised.  
Individual preferences aside, economists seek to ascertain how individuals reveal 
the values they assign to the associated costs and benefits of their actions. The choices 
made by rational utility maximising economic agents are, in practice, marginal choices. 
7KDW LV WKHPDMRULW\RIGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGHRQDµPRUHRU OHVV¶DVRSSRVHGWRDQµDOORU
QRWKLQJ¶EDVLV5HVRXUFHVZLOOEHDOORFDWHGWRWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVZLWKPDUJLQDOYDOXHVZKLFK
are greater than their respective marginal costs. The assertion is made that as 
consumption of a particular commodity increases the marginal benefits accruing to the 
individual will decrease. Subsequently the more an individual has of a certain item the 
lower its marginal value will be to him or her and substitutions will be made for products 
with a higher marginal value. Resources are therefore allocated on a marginal basis and 
substitution will cease when the marginal value, or utility gained, is equal to the marginal 
cost, or the price, for all goods or services consumed in any given time period.  
This is a highly simplified version of utility theory. In reality the study of 
consumption choices requires a more complex approach incorporating issues such as 
influences other than price which inform consumer preferences; imperfect knowledge in 
the market place; how prices are set and how values are assigned in the absence of any 
market price. However, by following a path of wholly abstract and logical reasoning the 
methodology of traditional economic theory facilitates the development of axioms or 
UDWKHU µODZV¶ ZKLFK JRYHUQ WKH VWXG\ RI KXPDQ EHKDYLRXU 7KH DSSURDFK LV KLJKO\
individualistic and reduces the complex nature of a whole range of human interactions 
into a few simple and unifying theories. For example; 
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The implication that MV HTXDOVSULFHLPSOLHVWKHVRFDOOHGµODZRIGHPDQG¶
The higher the personal cost of obtaining any entity , the less will be 
acquired in any period of time. It also implies that the prices voluntarily paid 
by individuals to gain an increment of a good, or receivable to compensate 
for the loss of a good, provides an observable measure of MV.
1
 
(Culyer, 1983:14) 
Developing a theory, which explains the process of individual resource allocation, proves 
invaluable in evaluating the impact of a whole range of public policies on individual 
behaviour. For instance the use of government taxes or subsidies principally act to alter 
the market determined prices of both consumption and production goods and services. 
Any change in price will subsequently alter the marginal cost/marginal benefit ratio faced 
by individuals in a given time period and will therefore result in a reallocation of 
resources. Consider an increase in price brought about by the imposition of a tax. The 
marginal cost to the consumer has increased and if no other factors have changed to 
influence the subjective marginal value attributed to the good or service by the individual 
then marginal cost is now greater than marginal benefit. The rational economic agent will 
act to decrease consumption thereby ensuring that, given the law of diminishing marginal 
utility, the marginal value increases. Changes in consumption patterns will cease when 
the marginal cost to the individual is once again equated with the marginal benefit 
gained. Accepting that consumer and producer choices are determined by appealing to 
the theory of marginal utility provides economists with a hypothetical framework for 
predicting the outcomes of policies that artificially distort market prices.  
With reference to income transfer programs this abstract approach is utilised to 
explain individual choices in allocating their time between work and leisure. Traditional 
                                                 
1
 MV represents marginal value. 
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neo-classical labour supply theory is derived directly from marginal utility theory. It 
seeks to explain the behaviour of individuals, with reference to their respective labour 
supply decisions, given the constraints imposed by a fixed number of hours available for 
allocation and market determined wage rates, which effectively allows for calculations to 
be made about the prices of work and leisure. The theory assumes that individuals are 
faced with an either/or scenario when allocating their time use, in that the only choice 
open to them is to consume work time or leisure time. The work option provides material 
benefits and is necessary in modern capitalist societies for economic survival and the 
leisure option is pleasurable, yielding positive benefits other than those associated with 
meeting basic economic needs. The theory implies that rational economic actors will; 
«VHHN WR ILQG WKH FRPELQDWLRQ RI WKH WZR ZKLFK JLYHV WKHP WKH JUHDWHVW
overall satisfaction (or utility), and (once basic survival has been achieved) 
yield leisure to work if, and only if, an increase in income results. 
(Mclaughlin, 1994:146) 
Premised on these few simple propositions, the traditional neo-classical theory of labour 
VXSSO\SURYLGHVHFRQRPLVWVZLWKDIUDPHZRUNWRDQDO\VHDQ\LQGLYLGXDO¶VGHVLUHWRZRUN
The process of logical reasoning leads to the conclusion that individuals will only be 
prepared to work additional hours if the wage to be derived from that work is higher than 
the value attributed to the associated sacrifice in leisure time. It follows that any income 
derived from sources other than formal paid work will impact on labour supply decisions, 
ceteris paribus. With a given level of desired income the need to enter into paid work is 
diminished for any individual when income levels are maintained via state supported 
income transfer programs. Such programs effectively alter the individuals budget 
constraint by raising the price of work relative to leisure. Assuming stable utility 
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functions, individuals will react to the availability of unearned income from the state by 
choosing less work and more leisure, thereby generating entitlement to state benefits.  
Although this is a very basic introduction to traditional neo-classical labour supply 
theory it proves sufficient to demonstrate the point that the process of purely abstract 
logical theorising, the dominating practice of traditional economists, results in the 
GHYHORSPHQW RI µODZV¶ ZKLFK DUH WKHQ HPSOR\HG WR SUHGLFW WKH RXWFRPHV RI SROLF\
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHVHµODZV¶DUHLQFUHDVLQJO\GUDZQXSRQWRLQIRUPSROLF\GHVLJQLQWKHDUHD
of state welfare provision. This is mainly a product of the developing awareness of the 
relevance of economic analysis in the study of social expenditure plans. However, it can 
also be argued that the case for widening the remit of applied economic theory is 
welcomed, and indeed strengthened, by the relative simplicity of the arguments. Abstract 
and unifying theories of human behaviour benefit from ease of understanding and hence 
translation. It follows that those charged with the responsibility of predicting the 
outcomes of possible reform packages, and/or evaluating the effectiveness of existing 
measures, are attracted by an analytical framework which presents a single integrative 
theory for analysing an individuals decision making processes when faced with 
competing choices. 
Much of the contemporary discussion on future of income transfer programs has 
found credence by appealing to orthodox economic theory. Debates on selectivity and 
targeting, as opposed to universality, have primarily focused on questions of economic 
efficiency with specific reference to the impact the benefit system has on individual work 
incentives; 
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The strength of the view that social security provision is inherently 
SUREOHPDWLF IRU UHDVRQV RI GLVLQFHQWLYHV«ILQGV LWV UDWLRQDO DSSHDO LQ DQG
seeks legitimacy from, neo-classical economic theory. 
(McLaughlin, 1994:145-146) 
The incentive/disincentive question has plagued current debates on state supported 
income transfer programs and the emphasis has been justified by appealing to the logic of 
neo-classical labour supply theory. The central tenet is that any form of income support 
on offer from the state carries with it the possibility that individual labour market activity 
will alter for the purpose of eligibility for benefits. This in turn will have a negative 
impact on overall economic welfare; 
In orthodox economic theory benefits allow an unemployed person to choose 
to enjoy leisure rather than return to work. While this might maximise that 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V ZHOO EHLQJ LW ORZHUV VRFLDO RXWSXW EHORZ ZKDW LW PLJKW KDYH
been in the absence of such benefits. A wedge is driven between individual 
utility maximising outcomes and socially efficient outcomes. Incentive 
problems may be created not just for the unemployed person but also for 
their spouse if benefits depend on the income of the family. If one partner 
works then the other may lose all rights to benefits. 
(Johnson, 1994:164) 
Thus, any form of cash benefit will diminish individual work effort with obvious 
negative consequences for overall economic performance. The acceptance of this 
hypothesis will inform the ultimate design of the benefit system. For example, generous 
cash benefits will be argued to have unacceptable adverse incentive effects; income tested 
programs should operate to ensure that the income gained from paid work is always 
positive thereby avoiding the disincentive effects of high marginal income tax rates; 
entitlement conditions for universal or contingent benefits should be set in such a way as 
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to avoid impacting on an individuals willingness to earn and/or save; and the cost 
effectiveness arguments for assessing benefit entitlement on a family income basis as 
opposed to individual income should not be offset by the disincentive effects such 
benefits have on all household members.  
Designing the tax and benefit system with these factors in mind raises questions 
about the trade off between the redistributional impact of income transfer programs in 
alleviating individual economic insecurity and the overall impact on economic efficiency. 
For economists the central concern is about net gains to society and accordingly any 
policy which involves a reallocation of resources from one individual, or groups of 
individuals, to another must be considered in terms of the potential contribution made to 
social welfare as a whole. For these reasons income transfer programs are considered 
with specific reference to the macro economic environment, alongside the micro 
economic issues regarding the impact measures have on individual labour market 
activity. For economists, then, the key aspect of any examination of state intervention in 
the area of income redistribution is to determine the effect such activity has on the 
functioning of capitalist economic structures, with particular reference to the world of 
paid work.  
This approach to policy analysis produces limiting arguments in determining the 
actual design of systems. Furthermore, the acceptance and indeed privileging of the 
capitalist model of economic organisation, inherent within the traditional economics 
approach to social policy, produces equally limiting theoretical justifications for publicly 
supported income redistribution schemes. An essential feature of traditional economic 
theory is the acceptance of a range of correctable imperfections in the workings of a 
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market economy. That is, the belief is held that the operation of the free market will not 
always lead to a socially optimal allocation and/or distribution of resources due to the 
existence of unavoidable market failures. The prices assigned to good and services in the 
market place will not always reflect their true respective values mainly due to the 
imperfect knowledge of producers and consumers and imperfect competition amongst 
both buyers and sellers. Natural tendencies towards monopoly production; powerful 
forms of collective action and time lags in the market signalling mechanism are intrinsic 
features of the free market and will lead to the distortion of market prices. Government 
intervention can rectify such failures by providing information (legislating on specific 
safety and quality standards); controlling and monitoring monopoly power (setting up 
various regulatory bodies); and actively supporting the flexibility of markets (establishing 
agencies that provide information on job availability). 
However, in addition to these failures, the free market in certain situations proves 
wholly ineffective in achieving the socially optimal price and output levels. The nature of 
many goods and services make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to be traded in a 
perfectly competitive market. Consider for example situations where the private 
production/consumption calculations of individual economic agents do not account for 
the social benefits to be derived, or the social costs incurred, as a result of their 
independent activities. This will result in levels of production or consumption that are not 
socially efficient therefore representing a welfare loss to society. The consumption of 
vaccinations against infectious diseases is a frequently cited example demonstrating the 
RXWFRPHV RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI µH[WHUQDOLWLHV¶ LQ PDUNHW WUDQVDFWLRQV $VVXPLQJ WKDW
individual consumption decisions are based on a utility maximising rule then the 
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individual, in choosing the amount of vaccinations to consume, will settle at the level 
where the marginal private costs incurred are equated with the marginal private benefits 
gained. By accepting that the consumption of vaccinations by any individual yields 
positive benefits for society as a whole and that the market determined price for any 
particular vaccination does not incorporate this societal benefit it can be concluded that 
there will be a disparity between rates of marginal private benefit and marginal social 
benefit at any given level of consumption. It follows that the consumption patterns of 
independent individual rational utility maximising agents will not realise these external 
benefits to society, resulting in underconsumption. In order to raise consumption and 
hence output levels some mechanism has to be found to internalise the social benefits of 
vaccinations. In this instance state intervention is justified for the purposes of assisting 
the market in reaching a socially efficient equilibrium level of output. The form of 
intervention will depend upon the extent of the external benefits to be realised. Subsidies 
will act to lower the market price for individuals, therefore increasing levels of demand. 
However if the intention is to enforce a minimum level of consumption some form of 
regulation could be employed, for example compulsory retirement insurance. In both 
cases the desired outcome of increasing consumption levels, and therefore production 
levels, is achieved whilst at the same time the fundamental principles of market allocation 
are retained. 
Closely related to the problems associated with externalities are those raised by 
public goods. Such goods display certain characteristics, which render them inappropriate 
for production and allocation in a free market. Economists distinguish between pure 
public goods and semi-public goods with the difference being determined by the extent to 
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which goods exhibit non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. Some goods 
when produced make it impossible to exclude others from consumption, giving rise to the 
free-rider problem, and in certain instances the consumption activities of some will not 
LPSLQJH RQ WKH DPRXQW OHIW IRU FRQVXPSWLRQ E\ RWKHUV 9HU\ IHZ µSXUH¶ SXEOLF JRRGV
exist, but if the potential for non-excludability and/or non-rivalry exists the market will 
generally not serve as an efficient means of production, and in many instances the good 
or service will not be produced at all. In these cases the most appropriate form of 
intervention is public production, thus ensuring the maximisation of social benefits and a 
mechanism for imposing relevant charges on users. 
State intervention is therefore justified in a number of instances and in a variety of 
ways with the prime purpose of correcting market failures, thereby ensuring the survival 
of the market mechanism as the primary meanVRIDOORFDWLQJVRFLHW\¶VVFDUFHUHVRXUFHV
As previously stated, within traditional economic theory justification for state 
intervention in the redistribution of incomes is founded on the principles of correctable 
market failures, particularly those relating to externalities and information problems. 
Individuals seeking to insure themselves against all possible contingent risks may find 
that the insurance market fails to supply the product they demand. This is primarily the 
result of asymmetric information, that is the consumer has more information than the 
supplier. The market therefore fails to produce an efficient level of output which is 
directly attributable to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard; 
The former arises where the purchaser is able to conceal from the carrier
2
 the 
fact that he is a high risk, e.g. in medical insurance, where it may be possible 
for people to conceal facts about their health. Moral hazard (slightly to 
                                                 
2
 That is the supplier. 
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oversimplify) occurs when the customer can costly manipulate the 
SUREDELOLW\RIWKHLQVXUHGHYHQWZLWKRXWWKHVXSSOLHU¶VNQRZOHGJH 
(Barr, 1993:118) 
These problems make it difficult, if not impossible, for insurance companies to 
distinguish between high risk and low risk clients and therefore unable to calculate the 
relevant premiums. If premiums are calculated on an average risk the tendency will be for 
low-risk individuals to opt out with obvious negative consequences in terms of the 
pooling of risks formula. Adverse selection means that private insurance markets will 
either fail to provide insurance at all or will prove to be inefficient in meeting consumer 
demand. Furthermore, if insured individuals can influence the probability of the risk they 
are protected against there exists an incentive to capitalise on insurance and not to take 
preventative action. The result is overconsumption of insurance; 
...people might drive less carefully if they are insured, or buy fewer fire 
extinguishers, since insurance reduces the cost to the insured individual of 
those unwelcome events...moral hazard does not make insurance impossible 
but causes inefficiency, in that people take less care than if they had to bear 
the full loss themselves. 
(Barr, 1993:121-122) 
and, depending on the nature of the event or risk insured, may lead to overconsumption 
of certain goods and services; 
In the case of medical care, for instance, if an insurance company pays all 
PHGLFDOFRVWVQHLWKHUSDWLHQWQRUGRFWRULVFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHSDWLHQW¶VDELOLW\
to pay. The marginal private cost of health care is zero for both doctor and 
patient, even though social cost is positive. The results of this form of moral 
hazard are twofold: because of the divergence between private and social 
costs, consumption of health care (and consequently the insurance payout) is 
larger than is efficient; and there is an upward bias in insurance premiums. 
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(ibid:122) 
The suppliers of insurance companies can adopt various measures to counteract the 
effects of asymmetric information. These include regulatory devices; for example the 
employment of insurance inspectors to determine the validity of claims or requiring 
medical examinations prior to accepting a potential client; or incentive mechanisms such 
as rewarding infrequent claims through the offer of lower premiums. Although such 
measures serve to reduce the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard in the market 
for insurance they do not fully address the problem of information failures. Furthermore, 
inefficiencies will persist due to the problems associated with externalities. 
For an efficient equilibrium to be attained in the private market for insurance some 
form of control mechanism is required on the demand side of the equation as well as the 
supply side. The demand for insurance requires that the rational maximising individual 
derive utility from the consumption of insurance. Assuming that the rational individual is 
risk-averse then it follows that satisfaction is derived from the knowledge that risk itself 
is abated. Thus the value assigned to certainty is equivalent to the price of insurance. 
However, individuals may be unwilling to purchase insurance in certain circumstances 
because the private costs outweigh the private benefits (consider the multiplicity of 
effects of informational problems discussed above). The specific problem of externalities 
can be identified when the process of adverse selection imposes external costs on low-
risk individuals, causing them to opt out or underinsure. Furthermore, non-insurance 
JLYHVULVHWR WKHµWKLUG-party payment problem which will generally create a divergence 
EHWZHHQ SULYDWH FRVWV DQG VRFLDO FRVWV¶ %DUU  ,Q VXFK LQVWDQFHV WKH FRVWV
arising from an eventuality will be borne by the individual alone. In many situations this 
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can be said to be an efficient outcome in that it is based on the rational choices of a utility 
maximising economic agent who has independently calculated that the benefits of 
certainty are not sufficient to merit the associated costs of the particular risk. Inefficiency, 
however, arises when the costs of non-insurance on the part of any single individual are 
borne by additional parties. An obvious example is the costs associated with car 
accidents. Quite often costs are imposed on other road users in terms of damage and/or 
personal injury. These costs are not included in the independent calculations of the non-
insured individual as they are external and the operation of the free market will provide 
no mechanism for ensuring that they are fully met by the responsible party. Not all 
external costs are readily identifiable when considering the unwillingness of individuals 
to consume insurance;  
The most obvious example of such a problem would be myopia when 
considering pension provision. It may well be that 25-year-old individuals 
would not make any voluntary provision for their retirement, but that they 
would regret their failure to do so when they reached retirement age. 
(Dilnot and Walker, 1989:5) 
The costs to the individual in this scenario are clear in that they will be without a secured 
income upon retiring from the formal labour market and, assuming that they have no 
alternative resources to draw upon, the risk of poverty is subsequently heightened. Less 
clear is how the independent actions of these 25-year-old individuals impose costs on 
others. The sight of old people dying on the streets of starvation is an unpleasant one and 
will cause disutility to those witnessing such scenes. Accepting then that the utility 
functions of many individuals will determine that they are motivated to alleviate the 
plight of the poor and their dependants (or at least to clean up the streets) demonstrates 
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the existence of external costs. Voluntarism in insurance markets, then, implies that the 
total costs to society of many eventualities will not be fully accounted for. This type of 
inefficiency can be addressed by making insurance compulsory, in particular insurance to 
cover the external costs imposed on third parties. 
However, such regulation assumes efficiency in the supply of private insurance. As 
previously argued the potential for informational problems with regard to some insurable 
risks means that this is not always the case. The question then becomes one of finding an 
appropriate mechanism for addressing simultaneous market failures on both the demand 
and supply sides of the equation. Private markets for unemployment, sickness, maternity 
and retirement insurance demonstrate the existence of both externalities and asymmetric 
information (albeit to differing degrees) and as such will not achieve a socially optimal 
equilibrium. Private insurance for these contingencies will not be provided in sufficient 
quantities, and for some individuals will not be available at all, nor will all individuals 
voluntarily consume it due to differences in independent assessments of risk. State 
intervention is therefore justified by appealing to economic efficiency arguments.  
The economic benefits of interventionist policies are best illustrated with the 
example of unemployment insurance. Combining the practice of compulsory membership 
with public provision forms the basis of national insurance schemes. With regard to 
unemployment such schemes are designed to protect all individuals in a society from the 
economic costs associated with job loss. The probability of unemployment is higher for 
some individuals than others. Furthermore unemployment is an inherent feature of 
modern capitalist economies and therefore, to a greater or lesser degree is often outwith 
the individuals control. The exogenous nature of unemployment combined with its 
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unpredictability renders the calculation of risk, both on the part of the supplier and the 
purchaser subject to imperfect information. The private market thus fails, resulting in 
efficiency arguments for state intervention. 
Although equipped with an analytical framework for justifying state involvement in 
the market for unemployment insurance little has been said about the actual nature of that 
involvement beyond compulsory membership and public provision. Questions remain 
regarding issues such as benefit levels, the conditions and duration of eligibility, 
contribution rates and additional payments for those individuals experiencing extra costs. 
Debates focusing on such issues will be determined by the stated objectives of policy and 
are therefore mainly normative in nature. That is, the relative merits of the options 
available will be judged in accordance with a range of possible social objectives, 
economic efficiency being only one such consideration. For example, income transfer 
programs may be supported by appealing to the potential they have for promoting equity. 
An efficient allocation of resources does not guarantee an equitable distribution of 
resources and in fact the efficient operation of a free market may actually require unequal 
outcomes. Mechanisms which redistribute resources from the rich to the poor can be 
viewed as a way of alleviating the worst aspects of free market allocation but whether or 
not this is a desirable outcome will depend upon the impact such mechanisms have on the 
primary goal of economic efficiency. In terms of justifying state involvement in income 
transfer programs, policy does not have to be redistributive in order to promote efficiency 
but it may be the case that equity is pursued as an indirect consequence of efficiency 
considerations. In stating the theoretical case for social insurance schemes Barr raises 
both efficiency and equity arguments;   
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The efficiency arguments rest on externalities, justifying compulsion, and 
technical (mainly information) failures on the supply side of the insurance 
PDUNHWMXVWLI\LQJSURYLVLRQRIWKHPDMRUEHQHILWV«,IZHLJQRUHFRQVXPSWLRQ
externalities, the main equity arguments are (a) that the poor may feel less 
stigmatised by insurance, and (b) that if insurance is publicly provided for 
efficiency reasons, it can then be used as a redistributive device. These 
arguments are compelling. 
(Barr, 1993:200-201) 
However he goes on to warn against confusion regarding the purpose of social insurance; 
There are good reasons for thinking of it both as a technical instrument for 
dealing with market failure and as a redistributive device. But the two cases 
are argued on very different grounds and should be carefully distinguished.  
(ibid:202) 
Social insurance schemes can therefore be justified on the grounds of economic 
efficiency but the extent to which they are redistributive will be a matter of policy design 
and will depend upon how objectives are prioritised. 
This distinction is crucial when considering the policy reform debate. The emphasis 
within the traditional economics approach is on providing the theoretical justification for 
state intervention of any kind and the overarching emphasis on efficiency will ultimately 
influence the form policy takes. Although other objectives may be considered this will 
take place within an efficiency/inefficiency dichotomy, with specific reference to the 
operation of the market economy. In considering the design of income maintenance 
policy, the application of mainstream economic analysis implies that state intervention is 
justified in terms of particular market failures and should operate so as to alleviate the 
worst aspects of unequal outcomes (only when such outcomes have efficiency 
implications) arising from the workings of the free market. However, equal attention 
  
 44 
should be given to the potential state supported schemes have in creating perverse 
incentives, discussed earlier. That is, systems should be designed so as not to adversely 
impact on individual incentives to save and earn, thus not posing a threat to the continued 
efficient workings of capitalist defined economic arrangements. In discussing the adverse 
incentive effects of both income based, and contingent based benefits, Dilnot and Walker 
identify some possible problems;   
...financial support tested against income may cause a disincentive effect to 
WKH H[WHQW WKDW LQFRPH PD\ EH XQGHU WKH UHFLSLHQW¶V FRQWURO YLD KLV RU KHU
labour supply decisions...provision for the elderly may cause individuals to 
save less during their working life. Similarly, income support for the 
unemployed may cause unemployed individuals to search less intensively for 
a new job and/or demand a higher paying new job; while employed 
individuals may take less care over behaviour that may lead to their dismissal 
- poor timekeeping for example. The same type of phenomenon may also be 
associated with income support contingent on sickness: compulsory sickness 
insurance may reduce self insuring behaviour such as eating a healthy diet.  
(1989:7) 
Thus supporters of the traditional economics approach to income maintenance systems 
would favour systems which provide minimal amounts of support; target benefits to those 
identified as being most in need over universal provision; and imposes restrictive 
eligibility conditions designed to promote self help and lessen welfare dependency. In 
their economic analysis of social insurance schemes, Creedy and Disney draw attention 
to the relevance of theory in the design process; 
«WKHSUREOHPRIPRUDOKD]DUGKDVXVXDOO\SUHRFFXSLHGWKHGHEDWHVRQVWDWH
support, whether iQ WKH IRUP RI WKH ROG 3RRU /DZ ZKLFK UHOLHG RQ µOHVV
HOLJLELOLW\¶DQGRQFORVHPRQLWRULQJE\WKHXVHRIWKHZRUNKRXVHRULQPRUH
modern forms of social insurance. Thus the payment of unemployment 
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EHQHILWKDVXVXDOO\EHHQOLQNHGZLWKDµZRUNWHVW¶LQYROving the use of labour 
exchanges, and individuals are disqualified from receiving benefits for a 
certain period if they are dismissed from their previous employment, leave 
voluntarily, or are on strike. 
(1985:17) 
The application of traditional methods of economic analysis to the study of income 
transfer programs, therefore, provides policy makers with powerful and convincing 
theoretical justifications for state intervention, and an analytical framework for judging 
the efficacy of different design packages. 
Historically, design of income transfer systems, at least in Britain, has been 
primarily influenced by the underlying philosophy of orthodox economic theory. It can 
be argued that the emphasis on the individual, encapsulated within the traditional 
economics approach, is clearly visible in the British system of income transfers. Although 
other influences can be identified, the dominant legacy has been one of safety-net type 
provision and self-help (Thane, 1996:279). This has been accompanied by an 
overwhelming preference for supporting the role of the labour market in determining and 
allocating incomes; 
The Beveridge Plan was the culmination of measures to relieve temporarily 
RFFXUULQJSRYHUW\GXH WR WUDQVLWLRQDO µIODZV¶ LQ WKHHFRQRPLFV\VWHP)URP
the Elizabethan Poor Laws through the National Insurance Act of 1911 to the 
measures advocated by Beveridge in 1942, the explicit assumption was that 
incomes are chiefly derived from employment. 
(Burkitt and Hutchison, 1994:19-20) 
An examination of policy initiatives undertaken in recent decades provides evidence that 
the reform process has been driven by a desire to eliminate adverse incentives from 
income transfer programs, particularly those relating to labour supply (see for example 
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Hemming, 1984:ch5; Lister, 1991; McLaughlin, 1994; HM Treasury, 1995). Measures 
introduced have resulted in the increased use of means-tested benefits; reductions in the 
real levels of benefits and a diversion of resources from out of work benefits to programs 
which supplement in work incomes. The over-riding purpose of such measures has been 
to reduce the replacement ratios of incomes in and out of work and to promote the 
efficient targeting of resources. The case for greater targeting is strengthened by the 
current economic climate, and the consequential pressures experienced by national 
governments to reduce public spending.  
The British experience with income maintenance policy demonstrates the 
fundamental influences of traditional economic theory. However, as previously argued, 
not all economists adhere to the traditional approach and, although the British experience 
is not unique, income transfer systems throughout the capitalist world are not 
homogenous. Differences in tradition, culture and political processes all contribute to 
diversity in design and the prioritising of objectives. The argument made at this point is 
that applying the tools of economic analysis proves useful in the study of state 
interventionist policies, particularly with regard to efficiency considerations. Common 
financial constraints coupled with the problems of escalating unemployment rates have 
led to an increasing emphasis on efficiency in all modern welfare states. Justifying real 
reductions in expenditure and promoting active labour market participation are therefore 
crucial elements in the policy reform debate. It then becomes obvious how increasing 
deference is bestowed upon an analytical framework, which presents income transfers as 
a function of capitalist models of organisation, particularly with reference to the world of 
work. 
  
 47 
However, it would be erroneous to accept this case scenario as implying that the 
future for state supported income transfer schemes is bleak. The relevance of neo-
classical theory in explaining the nature of income maintenance policy is not to be 
denied, but nor should it be assumed that it necessarily entails even greater targeting and 
a move towards residual safety-net type provision. Consider for example the arguments 
surrounding the adverse incentive effects of benefits. Assuming that an individual is 
secure in the knowledge that they are insured against ill health does not automatically 
OHDGWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKH\ZLOOµHQMR\¶SRRUKHDOWKDQGKHQFHEHOD[LQWKHLUDFWLRQV
to promote good health. That is, certain behavioural assumptions can simply not be made 
without first having prior knowledge of individual preferences. The process of traditional 
economic theorising ignores these preferences, beyond the overarching principle of 
rationality and utility maximising behaviour, thus the practice of simplification leads to 
erroneous results.  
Most of the research aimed at demonstrating the disincentive arguments contained 
within the neo-classical model have tended to focus on labour supply issues;  
Most economic work into the disincentive effects of benefits has not sought 
to demonstrate the existence of this effect (which is already assumed and 
intrinsic to subsequent modelling) but rather to estimate the size of the effect 
of social security provision on unemployment levels and durations. 
(McLaughlin, 1994:146) 
However, as McLaughlin goes on to claim, despite substantial research in this area the 
ILQGLQJVKDYHSURYHG LQFRQFOXVLYHDQG WKHUHIRUH µVRPHHFRQRPLVWVKDYHTXHVWLRQHG WKH
validity of the assumptions underlying this kind of modelling - that is, questioning the 
H[LVWHQFH UDWKHU WKDQ WKH VL]H RI D EHQHILW LQGXFHG GLVLQFHQWLYH¶ RS FLW ,Q WKH YDULHG
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criticisms attention has been drawn to a variety of factors, other than those associated 
with benefit levels, such as prevailing labour market conditions and social norms, which 
may influence individual choices with regard to formal labour market participation. 
Furthermore; 
«ILQDQFLDO LQFHQWLYHV IRU WKH XQHPSOR\HG WR WDNH D MRE VKRXOG QRW EH
summarized solely in terms of the nominal levels of income available in and 
out of work. Also of potential significance is the income risk which arises 
from making the transition into work, and which provides a disincentive to 
labour force participation for risk-averse individuals. There is a possible 
µHPSOR\PHQWORWWHU\¶QRWMXVWDQµHPSOR\PHQWWUDS¶ 
(Jenkins and Millar, 1989:149) 
On aggregate, the results of a large number of empirical studies indicate that both 
the level and structure of benefits combine to create possible disincentives to work, but 
the extent to which such occurs is not as substantial as neo-classical theory would 
suggest. The degree of generalisation assumed within the traditional model does not 
account for possible divergences between groups, or even within groups of individuals, in 
terms of their work behaviour. In fact Dilnot and Kell argue that the majority of research 
into the disincentive effects of income transfers have focused solely on the labour market 
decisions of men and they accurately state that the results should not be taken to imply 
that the behaviour of women would follow the same path (1989:153). In their study of the 
labour supply decisions of women married to unemployed men they found that the 
REVHUYHGZRUNSDWWHUQVRIVXFKZRPHQSURYHGµFRQVLVWHQWZLth the incentives implied by 
WKHWD[DQGEHQHILWV\VWHP¶LELG+RZHYHUWKH\JRRQWRVWDWHWKDW 
We are at pains to emphasize that other factors may lie behind our results. In 
particular, it seems highly plausible that women married to unemployed men 
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will be less likely to work because they have low education and skill levels 
(like their husbands), and because they live in areas of the country where 
there is a low demand for all types of labour, male and female. Sorting out 
the relevant importance of these and other explanations for the observed 
work behaviour of married women requires a detailed and carefully 
estimated econometric model of female labour supply, which is the longer 
run aim of our research. 
(ibid:153-4) 
From the above quote it is clear that the traditional economists preference for making 
simplified and generalised assertions based on limited observations is continued. The 
DVVXPSWLRQ RI µORZ OHYHOV RI HGXFDWLRQ DQG VNLOOV¶ SOXV UHVLGHQFH LQ XQHPSOR\PHQW
blackspots is taken to apply to all individuals who are out of work. However in this study 
DW OHDVW LW LV UHFRJQLVHG WKDW IXUWKHU UHVHDUFK LV UHTXLUHG LQRUGHU WRDVVHVV WKH µUHOHYDQW
LPSRUWDQFH¶RIWKHVHIDFWRUVDQGWRLGHQWLI\DQ\DOWHUQDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQV 
The case made then is that, even from within the discipline itself, the predicted 
outcomes arising from the application of traditional economic theory to policy analysis 
are to be treated with caution. Although it is recognised that the overall methodological 
framework can provide valuable insights into the nature of economic transactions, the 
potential for criticism arises when the traditional model is oversimplified and solely 
applied. However, the relevance of neo-classical theory in analysing the relative 
efficiencies of particular policy outcomes should not be dismissed. With a given set of 
capitalist based structures and a concurrent need to economise on the use of public 
resources, the tools of orthodox economic theory can be applied successfully in attempts 
to define and promote overall economic efficiency. Furthermore, the influence such an 
approach has had on both the formulation of objectives and the resulting policy design in 
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the field of income maintenance cannot be denied, either in a historical or contemporary 
sense. 
Due to the implications  state intervention in the transfer of incomes has for altering 
the allocation and distribution of resources, it follows that the study of income transfer 
programs is very much a question of economics. Income inequalities can pose a threat to 
the goal of economic efficiency, particularly if they arise as a result of market failure. 
5HWXUQLQJWRWKHRSHQLQJTXRWHLWFDQWKXVEHDUJXHGWKDWµUHPHGLHVIRULQHTXDOLWLHVLQWKH
GLVWULEXWLRQ RI ZHDOWK DQG LQFRPH¶ GR LQGHHG IDOO ZLWKLQ µWKH SRVLWLYH science of neo-
FODVVLFDOHFRQRPLFV¶7KHTXHVWLRQWKHQEHFRPHVLVWKHSRVLWLYHVFLHQFHRIQHR-classical 
economics an appropriate tool for explaining and predicting the outcomes of a range of 
policy options? With regard to income maintenance policy this question would appear to 
have a positive answer for those who adhere to the view that future policy direction 
requires an even greater targeting of resources alongside active measures to promote 
work incentives. As Hill argues; 
...an important feature of the economics approach has been its strong 
emphasis upon the targeting of social security policies. Advocates from this 
school of thought have therefore become very involved in examining ways of 
integrating taxation and benefits and ways of developing means-tests. By 
contrast to those influenced by the social administration approach, who have 
argued that general entitlements to benefit contribute to social solidarity, 
minimize stigma and maximize take-up of help by poor people, this group of 
students of the social security system have tended to emphasize what they 
see as inefficiency of universal benefit systems. 
(1990:8-9) 
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He goes on to criticise the core assumptions of the traditional economics approach, 
IRFXVLQJ RQ ZKDW KH UHIHUV WR DV WKH µQDLYHW\¶ LQ SUHVXSposing the superiority of 
efficiency considerations in the policy making process;  
The flaw in the approach to rationality used by this group of students of the 
social security system lies in a belief that policies operate exactly in the way 
in which they are intended to operate, and in the belief that citizens all 
EHKDYH DV µUDWLRQDO HFRQRPLF LQGLYLGXDOV¶ IXOO\ LQIRUPHG DERXW WKH RSWLRQV
available to them and able and willing to make calculations about the forms 
of behaviour that will benefit them most efficiently. 
(ibid:9)  
Dissent can therefore be identified from both within and outwith the discipline. 
This chapter has drawn attention, on a preliminary level, to the nature of that dissent. 
However, the purpose of this thesis is not to provide a general critique of neo-classical 
economic theory. Rather the arguments raised have sought to demonstrate the practical 
relevance of the economics approach to the study of income transfer programs whilst at 
the same time clarifying the problems associated with accepting the superiority of a 
particular set of beliefs and ideals regarding the nature of economic organisation. That is, 
by initially viewing the workings of the economy in terms of a capitalist framework, the 
traditional economics approach lacks validity in the claim that it represents a positive 
scientific approach. The starting point itself is normative in nature in that it incorporates a 
YLVLRQRIWKHµJRRGVRFLHW\¶,WIROORZVWKDWDQ\SROLF\DQDO\VLVZLOOEHLQIRUPHGE\WKLV
vision and therefore undertaken within a framework of a given set of values regarding 
ZKDWµRXJKW¶WREH 
Consequently any reform process will remain constrained by this approach. 
Questions regarding the future of income maintenance policy must therefore begin with 
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an explicit recognition of this constraining boundary. By illustrating that the objectives of 
policy are implied within the traditional economics model, the limiting and constraining 
nature of this approach has been identified. The implications for income maintenance 
policy, in particular, are that with a fixed framework employed in the setting of objectives 
WKH UHVXOWLQJ GHEDWHV RQ SROLF\ GHVLJQ DUH WRR QDUURZ $WNLQVRQ¶V DUJXPHQWV LQ KLV
examination of the theoretical case for targeting, exemplify the problems associated with 
adopting a limiting framework;   
...although politically fashionable, calls for greater targeting, need to be 
treated with caution. The argument in favour has to be made explicit and 
critically examined. Behind such policy recommendations lie views with 
regard to (a) the objectives of policy, (b) the range of instruments available to 
attain those objectives, and (c) the constraints under which policy has to 
operate (economic, political and social). All too often policy debate is based 
on implicit assumptions about the nature of objectives. It is tacitly assumed 
that the sole objective of policy is the reduction of poverty, whereas the 
typical social security programme in Western countries has a multiplicity of 
objectives. Even if the alleviation of poverty were the over-riding concern, 
the relative efficiency of different policies would depend on the precise way 
LQZKLFKSRYHUW\LVPHDVXUHGDQGRQWKHµVKDUSQHVV¶ZLWKZKLFKWKHSRYHUW\
objective is defined. 
(1995:223-4) 
For traditional economists the debates surrounding policy objectives are essentially 
normative and therefore not within their domain. However, it is evident that the 
application of economic analysis to income maintenance policy is an important, if not 
crucial, element of the reform process, not least because of the significant function state 
supported income transfer programs perform in the modern economy. Furthermore, 
scarcity in resources is given and therefore questions of efficiency can not be ignored. 
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With regard to income transfer programs, on a macro level efficiency considerations 
focus on the proportion of public spending dedicated to the welfare services and, on a 
micro level, questions of efficiency involve examining the effectiveness of existing 
and/or alternative programs, giveQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V RYHUDOO REMHFWLYHV DORQJVLGH DQ
analysis of the distribution of total resources between programs (Barr, 1993:8). An 
analysis of income transfer programs must therefore take account of the role such 
programs play in the overall functioning of the welfare state; how programs evolve and 
the various factors that inform the resulting design; the effects policies have on individual 
behaviour and on the workings of the economy as a whole; and finally how efficient 
(bearing in mind the dual aspect of the efficiency criteria) policies are in achieving the 
range of predetermined objectives. However, the methods employed by the narrowly 
defined traditional economics approach are limiting. The unrefutable focus on efficiency 
tends to leave questions of equity unresolved and prioritising objectives within a 
dominant framework of social welfare maximisation overshadows issues of social justice. 
State supported income transfer schemes impact, both in a negative and positive 
way on individual resource capabilities. As such the operation of such schemes have 
important social as well as economic implications. In market based economies the 
relative command over resources assumed by any one individual will in turn determine a 
whole range of social interactions for that individual. For these reasons income 
maintenance policy must be viewed in terms of the differences it makes to peoples lives 
and not just those implied by the relief of absolute poverty. By assuming that state 
intervention in the redistribution of incomes is primarily a response to identified market 
failures these issues are ignored. As Dilnot and Walker argue; 
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Far too often, social security policy is discussed without a serious 
consideration of why we have a social security system and what we want it to 
achieve. 
(1989:5) 
He goes on to claim that although all income transfers (at least in Britain) can, in 
principle, be justified in terms of market failure in the resource allocation process, and/or 
in terms of the related objective of achieving a socially optimal level of distribution; 
What appears to be lacking is an adequate consideration of which objectives 
should have priority, and of whether the current mix of benefit regimes is 
likely to achieve these objectives most effectively. 
(ibid:6) 
2.4 Conclusion 
The technical aspects of traditional economic theory prove enlightening when 
applied to an examination of the relative successes of governments and/or the market in 
achieving various goals. However, the overwhelming emphasis on economic efficiency is 
in itself a value judgement and serves to diminish the importance of debates on 
alternative goals. In a traditional sense, applying the tools of economic analysis to the 
study of income maintenance policy means that questions of choice, efficiency and 
optimality in the resource allocation process take precedence over questions of justice or 
fairness. Allowing the reform debate to progress beyond the current confining parameters 
requires an approach to study that incorporates a multiplicity of objectives and recognises 
the multi-disciplinary nature of public policy analysis. Any serious consideration of the 
range of policy options available must accept as a starting point that design is a function 
of predetermined policy goals. It is crucial then that these goals are made explicit and 
remain transparent throughout the reform process. 
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Identifying the biases inherent within the traditional economics approach to income 
maintenance policy has explained the rationale for concentrating on the direct 
relationship between policy and the formal labour market. However, accepting this as a 
criticism does not justify a full-scale rejection of this approach but rather indicates that 
any future application of the theory should bear the reasons for such concentration in 
mind. Whether it is considered desirable to remove this bias, thus opening up the debate 
to other influences depends on the view taken regarding the purpose of income transfers. 
Attempts at resolving this issue requires an inquiry into the actual nature of income 
maintenance policy and an examination of the range of possible outcomes. This in turn 
facilitates the development of a broader conceptual understanding of policy objectives 
and thus paves the way for a more informed discussion on possible reform packages. 
That is, understanding income maintenance measures in terms of their wider remit in 
SURPRWLQJ µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ LV FRQVLGHUHG DQ HVVHQWLDO ILUVW VWHS LQ WKH UHIRUP SURFHVV
However, as long as the superficial application of neo-classical economic theory 
continues to dominate policy debates this step will be a difficult one to take. Overcoming 
this hurdle can be viewed as part of a feminist economics agenda. The following chapter 
therefore sets out to redress the criticism that social security policy is all too often 
discussed without due consideration given to the questions of why we have a system and 
what is it we want it to achieve. 
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Chapter 3: Social Security or Income Maintenance Policy? A Question 
of Definitions. 
3.1 Introduction 
Cash transfer programs are usually classified within the area of state welfare 
SURYLVLRQNQRZQDVµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVFKDSWHULVWRH[SORUHWKHXVHRI
WKHWHUPµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶DVLWLVXVHGLQUHODWLRQWRPRGHUQZHOIDUHVWDWHDFWLYLW\DQGWR
set it apart from actual income maintenance policy. The rationale for doing so is to 
demonstrate the relevance of differences in policy goals in setting the agenda for reform 
debates. It has already been argued that the assumed objectives of policy serve to inform 
the resulting policy design. It follows that limited conceptions of objectives will result in 
equally limiting discussions regarding policy options. An attempt to open up the reform 
debate to include a wider range of choices, therefore, requires that the nature of 
objectives be fully understood.  
Emphasising the part that assumed objectives have played in the forming of policy 
is representative of initiating a feminist economics approach. That is, the purpose is to 
demonstrate the dominant influence neo-classical theory has had, and continues to have, 
in the design of income maintenance policy. As argued in the previous chapter, in any 
traditional economic analysis, the orthodox approach is to initially assume the prevalence 
of a particular set of structures which form the basis of all economic and social 
interactions. Within neo-classical theory the structures assumed, and accepted as all 
embracing, are those associated with a capitalist model of economic organisation. From 
this starting point, the goal of economic efficiency emerges as superior over all other 
possible policy objectives. This is not to say that objectives such as equity or justice are 
considered irrelevant. Rather, within a given framework of scarce resources, freedom of 
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choice and market based transactions, the strive for efficiency is considered essential in 
ensuring economic prosperity. Thus, it is assumed that once efficiency in the production, 
allocation and distribution processes is achieved, the focus can then turn to questions 
relating to a range of further objectives. The practice of ranking objectives in this manner 
serves to limit policy options 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the significance of efficiency considerations 
in the design process should not be denied. However, what is in question, with regard to 
the future direction of income maintenance measures, is the prioritising of efficiency 
above all else. Furthermore, the concept of efficiency itself is a particular one in that it is 
generally assumed to refer to the goal of maximising benefits and minimising costs in all 
economic and social exchanges. It is argued that this practice will continue as long as the 
analytical framework employed is that associated with an adherence to traditional 
economic theorising. One way of reversing this trend is to begin by questioning the 
validity of such a framework. This is what a feminist economics perspective sets out to 
achieve. Rather than embarking on the reform process with a predefined set of objectives 
in place, a more informative approach would involve examining the actual nature of 
policy in terms of what it can and will do. Once this has been established decisions can 
than be made on the relative merits of particular policy options on the basis of their 
impact on stated objectives. Thus, the practice of making value judgements regarding 
objectives is still very much a part of the process, but it is now more transparent in the 
debate. That is, objectives do not dictate the terms of policy options but rather serve to 
influence decisions regarding which policy to adopt. This is a turn around in terms of 
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approaches in that it involves starting from a base of examining what income transfers 
actually do rather than setting out with an agenda of what we would like them to do.  
It follows then that, adopting this different approach allows for a broader range of 
policy options to be introduced to the analysis. In terms of the reform process this 
represents an important move forward in that the debate is no longer constrained by an 
unweilding attachment to particular and narrowly construed considerations of economic 
efficiency. Applying this approach to the study of income maintenance reform, therefore, 
requires that the various policy tools available and/or currently employed are initially 
identified and subsequently examined in terms of their operating structures and possible 
outcomes. By doing so it will become clear that income maintenance policy can promote 
a wide range of objectives and serves as a potent feature in the operation of modern 
capitalist economies. Furthermore, it will underpin the ensuing discussion on the 
advantages of a CBI in that the focus on the variety of objectives indicates the merits of a 
CBI when compared with existing schemes. That is, the analytical approach adopted 
serves to refine our understanding of the operational nature of income maintenance 
policy, which aids in the process of realising the full potential of a CBI. However, such 
an investigation into the nature, purpose and outcomes of income transfers will also serve 
to shed light on conventional practices regarding the design and implementation of 
income maintenance policy, thereby providing evidence of a continual focus on narrowly 
defined economic outcomes. 
Are income transfers primarily a mechanism for maintaining the incomes of those 
individuals deemed to have insufficient resources or are they to be considered as part of a 
UDQJHRIPHDVXUHVGHVLJQHG WRSURPRWH WKHµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶RIDOOFLWL]HQV"$QVZHUV WR
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this question will be largely informed by ideological considerations. However, drawing 
the distinction and identifying the dual purpose of state intervention in this area allows 
for a broader conceptual understanding of the multiplicity of policy objectives. This 
chapter begins therefore by explRULQJWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶LQDQDWWHPSWWR
establish a working definition of the concept. The second section will examine the actual 
design of social security policy, identifying the dominant factors influencing policy 
formation within an historical context. A further section will outline the functions and 
objectives of social security policy alongside illustrative examples of current policy. The 
conclusion will be drawn that contemporary policy developments, and the subsequent 
reform agenda, continue to be predominately informed by the governing principles 
associated with a neo-classical approach to social welfare issues.  
3.2 Defining Social Security 
The concept of income maintenance refers to the provision of transfer 
incomes by the central or local state, to a wide range of people, who are 
unlikely to be able to obtain adequate incomes in other ways. 
(Hill, 1996:61) 
Social security is not only a form of income maintenance; it also constitutes a major 
element of the provision of welfare within many countries, and, no less important, a 
significant aspect of their economic structure. 
(Spicker, 1993:103) 
Attempting a definition of social security is problematic in that the expression itself 
has come to be associated with various forms of state welfare policy and not just those 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK GLUHFW FDVK WUDQVIHUV ,Q WKH %ULWLVK FRQWH[W WKH H[SUHVVLRQ µVRFLDO
VHFXULW\¶LVXVHGWRUHIHUWRWKHµZKROHUDQJHRIVWDWHLQFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHSROLFLHV¶+LOO
+RZHYHU LQ$PHULFD µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ UHIHUV WR WKHV\VWHPRI VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH
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DQG WKH WHUP µZHOIDUH¶ LV XVHG WR GHQRWH VWDWH VXSSRUWHG PHDQV-tested benefits (Hill, 
1996:61). Throughout the European Union the coverage and definition of what 
FRQVWLWXWHVµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶YDULHVFRQVLGHUDEO\, although when used it normally includes 
the public provision of health care (see for example Keithley, 1991). Studies of social 
security policy involving international comparisons normally make use of figures relating 
WR µVRFLDO SURWHFWLRQ¶ VHH IRU H[DPple DSS, 1993). This term refers to the public 
provision of contributory and means-tested benefits; health care; compulsory 
occupational pensions and personal social services
1
. The International Labour 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ,/2KDYHVWDWHGWKDWWKHWHUPµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶FDQ 
...basically be taken to mean the protection which society provides for its 
members, through a series of public measures, against the economic and 
social distress that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial 
reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; 
and the provision of subsidies for families with children. 
(ILO, 1984:2) 
This definition of social security includes benefits in kind as well as cash benefits and 
WKHUHIRUHHQFRPSDVVHVWKRVHSXEOLFPHDVXUHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHFDWHJRU\µVRFLDOSURWHFWLRQ¶
                                                 
1
 µ6RFLDO3URWHFWLRQLQWKHVHQVHRIWKH6WDWHDVVXPLQJXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHKHDOWKDQGZHOIDUH
of its citizens is very much a European invention...Beginning in Germany in the 1870s, governments 
throughout Europe, accepting the principle - and indeed necessity - of state intervention to tackle these 
problems, gradually took action to alleviate the poverty and hardship caused when workers, deprived of 
access to the land, became incapable of working and earning a wage...All Member States provide their 
citizens with income support during old-age, sickness, invalidity, maternity and unemployment, as well as 
when caring for children, and provide access to IUHHRUKLJKO\VXEVLGLVHGKHDOWKFDUH¶(&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mentioned above. However, the ILO appear to adopt an even wider concept of social 
security when discussing the origins of the term itself; 
7KHWHUP³VRFLDOVHFXULW\´ZDVILUVWRIILFLDOO\XVHGLQWKHWLWOHRIWKH8QLWHG
States legislation - the Social Security Act of 1935 - even though this Act 
initiated programs to meet the risks of old age, death, disability and 
unemployment only. It appeared again in an Act passed in New Zealand in 
1938 which brought together a number of existing and new social security 
benefits. It was used in 1941 in the wartime document known as the Atlantic 
Charter. The ILO was quick to adopt the term, impressed by its value as a 
simple and arresting expression of one of the deepest and most widespread 
aspirations of people all around the world. (own emphasis) 
(ibid:3) 
,Q WKLV FRQWH[W WKH WHUP µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ LPSOLHV DQ LGHRORJLFDO JRDO RI HQVXULQJ DQG
maintaining the protection of all citizens from economic insecurity and recognising the 
importance of the desire of all citizens to be secure in the knowledge that such public 
protection exists. The term social security, therefore, can be associated with a set of 
ideological objectives as opposed to the narrower definition which refers to actual income 
maintenance policy. 
Accepting this wider definition of social security has important implications when 
analysing policy; 
There are many policies that may be employed to improve the degree of such 
(social) security, including asset redistribution, labour market interventions, 
agricultural reform, food programs and public works. 
(Atkinson, 1989:99) 
Social security policy hence encompasses a whole range of public policies, which 
contribute positively to social welfare, and any policy analysis would involve examining 
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any form of government activity in the provision of welfare. Furthermore, policy 
evaluation would entail reference to the overall objective of providing µVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶LQ
an ideological sense and determining the success or otherwise of the particular policy, 
which in turn would inform future reform proposals. The subject of analysis will 
WKHUHIRUHEHGHWHUPLQHGE\KRZWKHFRQFHSWRIµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶Ls used.  
)RU WKHSXUSRVHRI WKLVVWXG\ WKH WHUPµVRFLDOVHFXULW\¶ LVYLHZHGDVGLVWLQFW IURP
social security policy, which is used to refer to state supported schemes providing 
financial assistance in times of need. The practical focus will be on social security policy. 
That is, the definition accepted is the narrower concept, which is normally associated 
with direct income maintenance policies or cash transfer schemes. Adopting this 
definition allows for a thorough examination of one specific policy area, income 
maintenance policy, which is the central focus of the thesis. Furthermore in the British 
experience the term is normally used in this context. However the approach adopted in 
WKLV VWXG\ GUDZV XSRQ WKH EURDGHU FRQFHSW RI µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ 'LUHFW FDVh transfer 
programs do not operate in isolation but rather inter-relate with other areas of government 
policy and have both direct and indirect effects on overall economic activity. For example 
PHWKRGVRIILQDQFLQJZLOOLQIOXHQFHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDOVWance; levels of benefit will 
influence patterns of consumer spending, and both the type and level of support may 
influence work incentives which will have an impact on labour market activity. It follows 
that any policy analysis must take these effects into account which implies that social 
security policy should be viewed in terms of its impact on the structure of the economy as 
a whole; 
In particular, there is a wide range of ways in which social security interacts 
with taxation policies. Policies which provide relief from taxation under 
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certain circumstances - for example, relief from taxation of mortgage interest 
payments or pension contributions - have an important impact on individual 
incomes and therefore cannot be considered entirely separately from the 
more direct income maintenance policies. 
(Hill, 1990:2) 
Considering these impacts and the role that they play in the functioning of both the social 
security system and the economy in general requires an understanding of the objectives 
of government policy. The transfer of incomes within groups is the main source of 
finance for modern state welfare provision and has come to play an increasingly 
important role in economic and social policy. The social security budget in Britain is the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V ODUJHVW expenditure programme, representing nearly 30% of all public 
expenditure and over 11% of GDP in 1998/99 (DSS, 2000:1). Since the system was 
introduced in 1948 spending on social security has risen continuously, both in real terms 
and as a share of GDP, reaching a level in 1998/99 which was eight times the original 
amount in 1949-50, the first full year of operation of the post war Beveridge scheme 
(ibid:14). Reasons for this growth, particularly from 1978/79, have been attributed to 
demographic and social factors, economic performance, and political policy 
commitments (DSS, 1993a:9, DSS, 2000:ch2). Considering the significant amount of 
public resources dedicated to programs and the central role social security plays in 
modern welfare states evaluating state supported income maintenance schemes in 
isolation is a partial analysis. This analysis will therefore focus on the operation, function 
and design of social security policy in the narrow sense, that is income maintenance 
policy, but will also incorporate the broader concept by examining the wider objectives of 
such policies and how they interact with related areas of government policy. 
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3.3 Defining Income Maintenance Policy 
In practice, the welfare state of almost every industrialised country is based 
on a mix of different kinds of benefit. Benefits can be classified according to 
their purpose or according to the basis on which they are awarded. In terms 
of purpose, some benefits are designed to provide an income during periods 
of our life when we cannot rely on earnings. Others are designed to help meet 
additional costs faced by some groups of people at every income level (eg 
child benefit), while others are designed to relieve poverty (e.g. income 
support). In terms of the basis of payment, some benefits are based on 
national insurance contributions; others are means-tested; a third group are 
neither means-tested nor contributions based. 
(CSJ, 1993:1) 
In addition to direct cash benefits provided by the state, income maintenance 
programs also involve the employment of various tax allowances and or reliefs which 
effectively act as a form of income supplement. Furthermore, various forms of private 
schemes exist which contribute to individual income by either insuring individuals 
against contingent risks such as ill-KHDOWK RU VHUYLQJ WR µLQFRPH VPRRWK¶ DFURVV WKH
lifecycle such as private or occupational pension schemes, employer based insurance 
arrangements or private life insurance policies. Although provided within the private 
sector such schemes are intrinsically linked to government policy. This can be either 
through the support of public finance via subsidies or individual tax relief; through 
government legislation which dictates the types of arrangements that can be entered into 
DQGRU WKURXJK WKH VWDWH¶V UROe in regulating such schemes to prevent abuse by either 
provider or beneficiary (Hill, 1990:3; CSJ, 1993:2). Finally individual incomes are 
affected by government activity in the housing market; the public provision of free or 
highly subsidised health care and education; and government policy in the field of 
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employment. All of these factors along with the role of private provision and the 
operation of the tax system are important considerations when examining the design of 
income maintenance schemes. However, the purpose of this section is to identify the 
principles of justification for income maintenance policy and how these principles 
influence the type of policy adopted. The primary focus then is to identify the purpose 
and basis of publicly operated direct cash transfer mechanisms.  
Income maintenance offered by the private sector or related government policy in 
the form of subsidies, benefits in kind and taxation measures primarily affect patterns of 
income distribution which indirectly influences individual incomes. However, the 
intrinsic purpose of the aforementioned activities is not direct income maintenance but 
rather the outcomes of policy merge with the outcomes associated with the more direct 
forms of cash transfer mechanisms, that is income redistribution. When examining the 
effectiveness of direct income maintenance policies in relation to the goal of income 
redistribution it is therefore essential that the affects of those indirect measures mentioned 
above are taken into account. However, this section of the analysis is concerned with 
identifying the justifying principles for the public provision of direct income 
maintenance; explaining how such principles inform the basis of delivery and finance; 
and outlining the various functions of income transfer programs. 
The rationale for state supported income transfer payments covers a range of 
objectives which can be categorised under four main headings: 
1. Poor Relief 
State supported income maintenance provides people with financial assistance in times of 
need and therefore is often directly associated with the social problem of poverty (see for 
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example Alcock, 1987; Brown and Payne, 1994:ch2; Atkinson, 1989; Deacon, 1995; 
Spicker, 1993). However, cash transfer mechanisms can also be employed to enable 
individuals to spread their income over the lifecycle and to insure against financially 
risky situations such as unemployment or ill health. The actual design of policy will 
determine whether the intention is to relieve poverty, defined in its narrowest sense as 
being without an income, or to prevent poverty by influencing consumption behaviour. 
2. Reductions in inequality  
Both cash benefits and tax reliefs or allowances have redistributive effects and therefore 
it is possible to associate such policy with the goal of equality, or rather with the goal of 
reducing income inequalities  (Barr and Coulter, 1995:274-275; Mitchell, 1991:11).  
3. Promoting Social Solidarity 
Beneficiaries of cash benefits may not be poor and likewise all of those who contribute to 
the funding of those benefits may not be rich. State provision of benefits to the elderly 
and those with young families acknowledge the fact that various stages in the lifecycle 
are more financially demanding than others. This example of policies aimed at preventing 
SRYHUW\DQGSURPRWLQJHFRQRPLFVHFXULW\DOVRUHIOHFWWKHµZD\LQZKLFKVRFLDOVHFXULW\
V\VWHPVHQIRUFHVROLGDULW\EHWZHHQJHQHUDWLRQV¶6SLFNHU&KLOG%HQHILW&%
in Britain, which is tax-funded, exemplifies this notion of solidarity in that people in 
work without children contribute to a scheme which provides guaranteed financial 
support, regardless of other means, to families. 
4. Supporting the Market Economy 
The design and delivery of income maintenance measures can play a crucial role in 
supporting, and thus preserving, the political and economic structures associated with 
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advanced capitalism (see for example Hill, 1990:3; Piven and Cloward, 1993; Dean, 
1991). Linking income maintenance policy with particular patterns of behaviour assumes 
a set of social relationships compatible with market based economies and industrial 
progress. Policies which emphasise labour market participation and encourage, or even 
reinforce, particular family structures, typifies the function of social security in producing 
EHKDYLRXUZKLFKFRQIRUPVWRµGRPLQDQWQRUPV¶6SLFNHU 
The relative weightings attached to the aforementioned objectives will determine the 
actual design of income maintenance policy. That is, the perceived purpose of the policy 
will influence the actual basis of delivery and finance. However, before any analysis of 
the link between the objectives and the design of policy can be made it is essential to lay 
out the options currently available for the transfer of incomes from the state to 
individuals. In developing a taxonomy of approaches to the public provision of income 
maintenance Hill lists the following options; 
1. Approaches involving entitlement if specific demographic, social or  
      health status criteria are fulfilled, without reference to contribution   
      conditions or means-tests. 
2.  Approaches involving previous contribution conditions, such as social   
     insurance. 
3.  Approaches involving means-tests, such as social assistance 
4.  Approaches providing relief from taxation - notably because of       
    commitments to dependants or contributions to private income        
    maintenance schemes. 
    (1996:75) 
The first three approaches are associated with the award and payment of cash benefits. 
Tax expenditures, such as specific tax reliefs or personal tax allowances, are implicit 
transfers in that they do not involve an actual cash payment but rather a reduction in tax 
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liability (Barr, 1993:170). This is reflected by the fact that in Britain, unlike cash benefits, 
the proportion of public money allocated to these implicit transfers do not appear in the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VRIILFLDOILJXUHVRQSXEOLFVSHQGLQJ$VZLWKDOOWD[H[SHQGLWXUHWKHVHIRUPV
RI WUDQVIHU DUH DQ µLQYLVLEOH LWHP LQ JRYHUQPHQW DFFRXQWV¶ LQ WKDW WKH\ Dre viewed as 
negative revenue due to the reductions they make in income tax receipts (ibid:182).
2
  
+RZHYHU WKLV LV QRW DQ LQGLFDWLRQ WKDW WD[ H[SHQGLWXUHV DUH DQ µLQYLVLEOH¶ HOHPHQW RI
income maintenance policy.  
Income Tax reliefs or allowances play a crucial role in the operation of income 
maintenance policy in two particular ways. The tax system is used to promote various 
forms of savings with the intention of reducing overall government spending in the 
future. The current practice in Britain of applying tax relief to interest payments on a 
PRUWJDJH DQG FRQWULEXWLRQV WR µWD[ DSSURYHG¶ SHQVLRQ SODQV H[HPSOLI\ WKLV IXQFWLRQ
Income tax allowances, on the other hand, effectively complement cash benefits designed 
to provide financial assistance to those on low incomes. Incomes in and out of work are 
primarily determined by the structure of taxes and benefits. Individuals on the margins of 
social security and income tax will experience high marginal tax rates (MTRs). That is, 
the proportion of increased gross income that is lost through a combination of benefit 
withdrawal and increased income tax liability. High rates of benefit withdrawal, 
combined with low wages and low tax thresholds serve to effectively trap people in 
situations of welfare dependency. Tax allowances or reliefs are therefore a fundamental 
                                                 
2
 This type of accounting practice is crucial when considering the political acceptability of reform 
proposals, particularly the citizens basic income model, due to the implications such a policy has for 
GLVWRUWLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DFFRXQWV E\ VKRZLQJ DQ H[RUELWDQW LQFUHDVH LQ VSHQGLQJ VHH IRU H[DPSOH
Monkton, 1993). 
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component of state supported income transfer measures and should be considered when 
analysing the design and operation of explicit transfers, that is state funded and provided 
cash benefits. 
The three approaches to the payment of cash benefits, identified by Hill above, 
form the basis of explicit transfer mechanisms within modern welfare states (see Eardley 
et al, 1996:2; Brown and Payne, 1994:21-23; Atkinson, 1989:100). Payments can be 
categorised as either universal or non-contributory contingency based benefits, 
contributory benefits or means-tested benefits. In practice a social security program can 
employ any single approach or any combination of the three. The actual design of policy 
will be a direct resuOW RI SROLF\ PDNHUV¶ UHODWLYH SUHIHUHQFHV ZKLFK ZLOO EH LQGLUHFWO\
influenced by the prevailing political, economic and social environment. Decisions 
regarding policy design will therefore be influenced predominately by normative issues 
such as perceptions regarding which categories of individuals should or ought to be 
supported and which life situations are more financially risky than others. Attempts to 
form arguments of justification for state income maintenance policy must, however, 
consider the rationale for claim as well as the rationale for payment. Before going on to 
outline the actual structure of the three approaches it is essential that the claiming 
rationale is understood. Accepting this duality of purpose allows for a more positive 
approach to be applied in analysing policy. 
Rainwater et al identify three principles of the modern welfare state upon which 
individuals make income claims against the state and upon which the state in turn makes 
the necessary claims on individuals and business in order to finance their social welfare 
commitments (1986:126). They assert that;  
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«WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHZHOIDUHVWDWHLVDKLVWRU\RIWKHGLIIHUHQWLDOUHOLDQFHXSRQ
the three principles of contribution for specific contingent-risks, universal 
citizen rights, and need (with the endless subtleties of meaning in each 
principle) in order to make the welfare state acceptable to different groups 
in society. 
(op cit) 
They go on to claim that these three principles determine the nature of claims, which in 
turn determine the patterns of delivery and the financing arrangements of actual cash 
transfers. Table 3.1 establishes a framework of principle, basis and purpose of income 
maintenance policy options, identifying examples of actual benefits operating in Britain 
that conform to the typology. 
The three approaches to cash payments can be readily identified within the table, 
and within this framework, the actual purpose of policy is directly associated with the 
claiming principle. Justifying policy in terms of recognising the responsibility of the state 
to maintain the incomes of those citizens who find themselves experiencing financial 
difficulties, is not only a partial analysis but can be criticised for relying too heavily on 
value judgements regarding the role of the state. By explicitly linking the basis of benefit 
structures with their purpose, a more comprehensive understanding of social security 
policy evolves. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 A typology of approaches to income maintenance policy 
Principle Benefit Basis Purpose of Benefit 
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Contributory Social Insurance To compensate for 
lost earnings 
e.g. Job Seekers 
Allowance-
contributory (JSA) 
Individual Need Means-testing or 
Social Assistance 
To specifically relieve 
poverty and provide a 
safety net of provision 
which no individual 
should fall through 
e.g. Income Support 
(IS) 
Universal Citizenship 
Rights 
Categorical, 
Conditional or 
Unconditional 
Benefits 
To promote common 
citizenship by helping 
to meet additional 
costs specific 
categories of people 
are faced with  
e.g.CB 
Contributory /Social Insurance 
Social insurance is based on the principle that benefits are a form of return for 
contributions paid whilst in paid work. Individuals insure themselves against loss of 
income, which can be either temporary or permanent, by contributing to a state supported 
insurance fund. The basis of entitlement is past contribution records, that is evidence of 
paid social security contributions by both employee and employer, and benefits can be 
either wage-related (Bismarkian)
3
 or flat rate and uniform (Beveridgian). Social or 
national insurance implies a pooling of risks and avoids the problems of adverse 
selection. Workers are protected against contingencies, such as sickness, old age or 
unemployment which might interrupt their income. The purpose of social insurance is to 
                                                 
3
  The Bismarkian model of social insurance refers to one of the earliest schemes of compulsory 
insurance established in Germany by Chancellor Bismark between the years 1883 and 1889 (ILO, 1984:3). 
%LVPDUN¶VVFKHPHIRUVRFLDOLQVXUDQFHZDVILQDQFHGE\FRQWULEXWLRQVZKLFKZHUHJUDGXDWHGZLWKUHIHUHQFH
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provide social protection and to aid economic stability for individuals when their capacity 
to earn is threatened by either circumstances beyond their control or by a foreseeable 
contingency such as retirement.  
The main advantages of social insurance schemes are that they incorporate a 
notion of 'rights' to benefits and in theory they can be designed to ensure that they are 
largely self financing. However, social insurance is limited in its ability to provide social 
protection for all citizens. The eligibility criteria involves a test of contributions and so a 
test of previous work experience. This effectively excludes large numbers of individuals 
who may require social protection but fail to meet the qualifying conditions, for example 
young single mothers with limited work histories or earnings below the contribution 
threshold (Spicker, 1993: 137). Consequently this approach to income maintenance 
policy demonstrates the principle of universality only when the contribution condition is 
satisfied. It does not aid those individuals who have never had an income to loose or 
never will have an income from which they can make sufficient contributions. National 
LQVXUDQFH LV µHVVHQWLDOO\ DQ DSSURDFK JHDUHG WR WKH DYHUDJH QHHGV RI WKH ZRUNLQJ
populaWLRQDVVRFLHW\LQWHUSUHWVWKHVHDWDQ\JLYHQWLPH¶%URZQDQG3D\QH,Q
this instance normative issues arise in the analysis in that the decision to implement social 
insurance policies may be influenced by the opinions of policy makers on the structure of 
VRFLHW\DQGWKHLUUHVXOWLQJLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIµQHHG¶7KLVLVDFUXFLDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQZKHQ
discussing reform options and the effectiveness of social insurance measures. However 
the point made at this juncture is simply that social insurance is based on the contributory 
principle and the purpose is to deal positively with contingent risks. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to wage levels and likewise benefit payments were linked to previous earnings (Wilson and Wilson, 
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Individual Need/ Means-testing or Social Assistance  
The positive analytical framework of associating the claiming principle of 
individual need with income tested benefits can be questioned in that conceptual 
GHILQLWLRQVRI µKXPDQQHHG¶ LVDKLJKO\FRQWURYHUVLDODQGVXEMHFWLYHVXEMHFWPDWWHU VHH
for example Doyal and Gough, 1991). However by assuming that individual need is 
µLQGLYLGXDOO\GHWHUPLQHG¶5DLQZDWHUHt al, 1986:127), the rationale for claiming income 
or means-tested benefits is expressly linked with the principle of need without having to 
consider the various interpretations of what constitutes human need. 
Means-tested benefits often exist alongside social insurance programs and serve 
to fill the gaps in coverage. Benefits are conditional in that they are awarded on the basis 
of a test of existing income or capital. Recipients are deemed to be lacking access to 
sufficient economic resources. Entitlement criteria requires categorising individuals as 
poor or being in need of assistance and therefore means-tested benefits are associated 
with the principle of targeting resources. Mean-WHVWHG VFKHPHV UHSUHVHQW D µVDIHW\-QHW¶
income which theoretically no-one should fall through. Social assistance or means-tested 
benefits are therefore often associated with the provision of a minimum income 
guarantee. In practice systems differ in their level of generosity and qualifying 
conditions. However, common to all means-tested schemes is the identification and 
agreement of a minimum level of income guarantee and the requirement to categorise 
individuals as poor or being in need of assistance. Benefits which involve a means-test 
are therefore associated with the principle of vertical redistribution in that resources are 
                                                                                                                                                 
1993:358). 
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targeted towards those identified as being most in need and if financed via a progressive 
tax mechanism the result is a transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. 
The main criticisms of means-tested benefits are that they stigmatise the poor; 
they involve establishing an explicit poverty line and depending upon the system of 
delivery, they can be complex and difficult to administer. Furthermore any system of aid 
which is subject to a test of existing economic resources requires investigation into 
individual circumstances in order to determine eligibility. Such necessary intrusion serves 
WR ZHDNHQ DQ\ NLQG RI QRWLRQ RI D µULJKW¶ WR D PLQLPXP LQFRPH DQG SURPRWHV IXUWKHU
stigmatisation of the needy. This can serve to put claimants off from applying, making 
low take up rates an inherent feature of means-testing. Depending upon the nature of the 
system and the specific rules governing receipt the distinction between actual resources 
and access to resources can become blurred. Problems arise regarding the classification 
of diverse individual circumstances and the dynamics of social living. Government 
departments assigned the task of administering the means-test can interpret the rules at 
their discretion which will inevitably result in inequalities in treatment. Means-testing can 
therefore be criticised in terms of its ability to relieve poverty, reduce inequalities and 
promote social cohesion. The minimum income guarantee is not a right within such 
systems in that it 'is not based on either past contribution or universal entitlement, but on 
political discretion' (Rainwater et al, 1986:131). 
Universal Citizenship Rights/ Categorical Benefits 
The third principle justifying state supported cash benefits is that which enshrines 
the notion of universal citizenship rights. Social insurance is limited in coverage and 
therefore will only promote the citizenship rights of those afforded access to the labour 
  
 75 
market. Means-testing does not advance the rights of citizenship in that systems are 
discretionary, stigmatising and may not effectively reach the intended target group. 
Reliance on either mechanism, or a combination of both, will not automatically ensure 
comprehensive cover and hence will advance the citizenship rights of some whilst at the 
same time deny those of others. Beneficiaries will not always be easily identified in that 
different groups of individuals will benefit at different stages throughout their lifecycle. 
These individuals will not benefit by way of being citizens but rather as members of a 
predefined group, that is categorised as a worker or as poor. Claims for income assistance 
from the state may legitimately be made by individuals outwith these categories. 
When discussing social security policy, universalism implies universal 
entitlement. That is, benefits are available to everyone with no qualifying test such as 
paid contributions or the demonstration of need. A program of universal benefits would 
involve the granting of benefit to every resident of the country, financed from general 
taxation. The link between contribution and receipt is indirect in that although citizens 
contribute to the program through their individual tax liability, payment of taxes is not a 
condition of entitlement and subsequently there is no barrier to entitlement for non-
taxpayers. Universal programs are therefore based on the notion of common citizenship 
and the principle of government responsibility in securing independent income 
guarantees. Universalism is hence associated with comprehensive coverage and ease of 
delivery.  
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The rationale for universal entitlement is quite distinct from that for contributory 
entitlement. The Beveridge model of social insurance
4
 based on flat rate benefits, flat rate 
contributions and universal coverage encapsulates a particular principle of universalism. 
Such a scheme can be claimed to promote 'equality of status' in that all 'citizens are 
endowed with similar rights, irrespective of class or market position' (Esping-Anderson, 
1991:25). The principle of universal coverage was the principal reason the scheme 
benefited from widespread public support.
5
 The concept of universality, however, was in 
essence a 'myth' as many people were excluded from the scheme due to insufficient 
contributions or the fact that specific client groups were simply not eligible for benefits 
(Ginsburg, 1992:144; Alcock, 1987:ch6). Benefit entitlement linked to contributions 
meant that only those who participated in the formal labour market would be in a position 
to contribute to the scheme and hence social insurance would be unavailable to 
individuals not afforded access to the labour market. This included groups such as the 
disabled, children, pensioners, the unemployable and married women dependent on the 
financial support of their working husbands. The Beveridge model of social insurance 
can thus be said to display the characteristic of selective egalitarian universalism in that 
once the contribution condition was satisfied all recipients were treated equally. 
Furthermore the universality inherent within the Beveridge scheme explicitly promoted 
the citizenship rights of the male worker. Unpaid work was not recognised in terms of 
                                                 
4
 This model is generally identified as forming the basis of the post war scheme for social security 
provision in Britain. 
5
 For the Wilsons, the simplicity inherent within the Beverage proposals in terms of uniformity and 
universal coverage is what distinguished the British system of social insurance from those of other 
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access to social insurance and women were assumed to be financially dependent upon 
their male partners. Women who did engage in paid work were deemed to relinquish their 
rights to benefit upon marriage and to subsequently rely upon their husbands 
contributions and hence entitlements. 
Considering those schemes where the principle of universalism is adopted as a 
justification for social security provision outwith the social insurance model, entitlement 
is not based on citizenship alone. The payment of a universal grant (often referred to as a 
demogrant) to every citizen of a society is not yet a reality but many current schemes 
provide categorical universalism. That is, certain benefits are universal in the sense that 
they are paid to all members of a particular demographic category with no other 
qualifying test than belonging to the selected category. Benefits are paid regardless of 
income or contribution but recipients must belong to the stipulated category. 
Benefits illustrating a degree of universality are disability benefits which have no 
qualifying test of eligibility other than satisfying the predefined disability criteria. British 
examples include Attendance Allowance for people over the age of 65 and the Disability 
Living Allowance Mobility Component. The principle of universalism witnessed by these 
benefits is similar to that discussed above with regard to universal social insurance in that 
it is a form of selective universalism. Qualifying criteria are determined by perceptions of 
the needs associated with varying degrees of disability and therefore presuppose a 
normative judgement on what constitutes 'disability'. Entitlement is not automatic but 
must be supported by actual evidence of the specified disability. Subsequently, as with 
means-tested benefits there is scope for discretion and benefits may not actually reach the 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries and the belief that a single contribution covering all risks would effectively prevent poverty is 
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targeted group. Where ill health is concerned, individual circumstances are diverse and 
volatile therefore delivery becomes complex and affects take-up rates. For these reasons 
it can be concluded that non-contributory, non-means-tested benefits are universal in the 
sense that once in receipt all claimants are treated equally but inequalities arise in 
determining entitlement, undermining the principle of universality. 
Benefits paid for children and to the elderly are currently the closest 
approximation to a universal system of social security. However, arguments for these 
benefits involve factors other than the advancement of universal citizenship rights. 
Firstly, age based categorical universal benefits are easy to administer in that the target 
group is readily identifiable and remains stable over a period of time. Secondly, both 
benefits for children and the elderly are expressions of social solidarity, in that 
recognition is made of the social responsibility for child-rearing and the care of the 
elderly. No stigma is attached to receipt and benefits are financed via general taxation 
therefore they are perceived as being redistributive over the lifecycle and from those 
without children to those with. Implicit within such schemes is the acknowledgement of 
the higher costs associated with children and old age and the responsibility of society to 
meet part of those costs. Such benefits are associated with high take-up rates, 
administrative simplicity and are deemed to be effective in reaching the intended 
beneficiaries. However universal schemes are costly and as the primary redistributive 
effects are horizontal, rather than vertical, universal tax financed benefits do not directly 
address the problem of income inequalities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ZKDWµDWWUDFWHGVRPXFKLQWHUHVWDQGVXSSRUW¶ 
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Income maintenance programs can be justified with reference to the three 
claiming principles which will determine the actual structure of cash transfer 
mechanisms. The main differences in structure are the financing and delivery 
arrangements. Furthermore the purpose of these benefit structures is identified within a 
framework of public provision of financial assistance. As previously stated all three 
approaches can be adopted and are not mutually exclusive in implementation. However, 
financial assistance may be considered the primary function of income maintenance 
policy but, as stated above, social security policy performs a broader role in the workings 
of the economy.  
3.4 The Objectives of Social Security Policy 
7KHUH LV D VHQVH LQ ZKLFK DOWKRXJK WKH\ GR QRW UK\PH OLNH µORYH DQG
PDUULDJH¶ SRYHUW\ DQG VRFLDO VHFXULW\ JR WRJHWKHU OLNH D µKRUVH DQG
FDUULDJH¶1RWRQO\GRHVRQHGULYHWKHRWKHUEXWWKH\DUHIRUPHGRUGHVLJQHG
so as to fit one another. There is a peculiarly intimate relationship between 
the kind of poverty that is still experienced in advanced western societies 
and the social security systems through which we claim to relieve or prevent 
such poverty. 
(Dean, 1991:1) 
Social security measures can be identified with a broad range of objectives. The 
four broad categories, previously outlined, cover those objectives directly associated with 
direct cash transfer mechanisms. However, when considering social security in its wider 
context the objectives of policy are more extensive and less tangible in terms of definitive 
categories. In order to develop a richer understanding of the role social security plays in 
the overall functioning of the economy, the objectives and related functions of social 
security measures must be analysed within a broader conceptual framework. 
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In a study comparing the incidences and outcomes of social security transfers and 
income tax in operation in ten countries, Mitchell, at the outset, makes the following 
observation; 
In the first instance, all the countries in this study have income transfer 
policies which are aimed at ensuring that a minimum standard of income is 
enjoyed by all. In this context it is reasonable to assume, as a first 
approximation, that this indicates a desire to ensure that poverty is avoided 
or alleviated. 
(1991:11) 
However, for Spicker; 
6RFLDOVHFXULW\LVQRWµDERXW¶ the relief of poverty, and it is difficult even to 
claim that the relief of poverty is the primary objective; in some countries 
the relief of poverty has had a relatively minor role and in general the claims 
of social protection, compensation and provision for special needs seem at 
least as strong. If poverty remains a major concern for social security 
systems, it is not least that many kinds of objective associated with social 
security systems are obstructed by its persistence. 
(1993:116) 
In common with Dean, Spicker sees an intrinsic relationship between poverty and 
VRFLDOVHFXULW\SROLF\+HDSSHDUVWREHFODLPLQJWKDWSRYHUW\RUUDWKHUWKHµSHUVLVWHQFH¶
of poverty, serves to hinder the operation of social security measures in the goal of 
promoting social welfare. Although incidences of poverty can be directly attributable to 
insufficient money incomes, prolonged experiences of poverty can have as much to do 
with lack of access to resources other than income. Inadequate housing, health care and 
education facilities are all identifiable contributing factors to the spiralling effects of 
poverty. Policy aimed at addressing these issues may indirectly impact positively on 
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resolving the social problem of poverty. However, policies designed with the singular 
aiPRISURYLGLQJDµVDIHW\-QHW¶RILQFRPHWRDOOHYLDWHSRYHUW\ZLOOHIIHFWLYHO\DGGUHVVRQH
issue at the exclusion of all others. Minimum income guarantees operating in isolation 
will have a modest impact on improving the socio-economic conditions of those 
iQGLYLGXDOVOLYLQJLQSRYHUW\,QFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHPD\WKHUHIRUHEHµDERXW¶WKHUHOLHIRI
poverty, understood in the narrow sense of being without a money income, but social 
security policy has a wider remit. This important disitinction is exemplified in the 
differing rationales for the French and British systems of social security; 
7KH WHUP µ6RFLDO 6HFXULW\¶ LQ %ULWDLQ UHIHUV WR DOO JRYHUQPHQW WUDQVIHUV
provided by the Department of Social Security (DSS), no matter how they 
are funded or delivered. In France, only those schemes funded by 
hypothecated taxes - contributions paid by employers and employees are 
called securité social ...the more precise use of the term in France 
accompanies a stronger commitment to the contributory principle than in 
Britain. 
(Evans et al, 1995:3) 
This stronger commitment is representative of differing perceptions regarding the 
objectives of policy. In the British context, both in a historical and contemporary sense, 
the alleviation of poverty is generally considered the main focus of social security policy 
and thus the design of systems was based on providing a minimum subsistence level of 
income. However, in France, social security policy is considered within a wider 
framework: 
Indeed discussion of poverty in France is currently seen as a 
multidimensional phenomenon, a cumulative condition of social, 
environmental, employment and familial handicaps. Policy therefore must 
not only take into account the need for income for subsistence but also the 
  
 82 
social and economic and familial ties of all who are poor or who are 
threatened with poverty. In place of a direct policy concern for poverty there 
is an appreciation of social exclusion.  
(ibid:16) 
This demonstrable difference in policy objectives has important implications when 
considering the CBI model for reform. The focus on poverty results in a emphasis on 
economic issues, whereas the broader focus on exclusion allows for a simultaneous 
widening of the debate relating to policy outcomes.  
As stated in chapter one the objective of equity is a fundamental consideration in 
justifying state intervention in the transfer of incomes. Variations in the design of social 
security policy emerge partly as a result of differences in commitment to considerations 
of equity. Social security schemes financed from insurance contributions or tax revenue 
effectively redistribute resources form one sector of the population to another. 
Theoretically all four approaches to income maintenance, previously identified, can 
promote both vertical and horizontal equity. Vertical, in the sense that cash benefits may 
redistribute income from rich to poor thereby reducing income inequalities, and 
horizontal in that benefits paid should reflect relevant factors which contribute to 
additional costs of living such as age, family size, or disability, but not irrelevant factors 
such as gender or race (Barr, 1993:10). In practice the contribution made by social 
security measures in reducing income inequalities will be determined by the actual 
delivery and financing arrangements adopted. Inequality will only effectively be reduced 
in a vertical sense if benefits are financed through a progressive tax system or a 
progressive social insurance scheme. Claiming procedures and how the receipt of benefits 
affects entitlement to other forms of public or private support will influence take-up rates. 
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Policy directed at alleviating the worst aspects of poverty and targeted at those 
individuals or households identified as being most in need may not actually reach the 
predefined population group due to low take-up rates. Furthermore, the practice of 
discretion in the award of benefits may actually contribute positively to inequality in that 
certain categories of claimants may be treated more favourably than others.  
Attempts to relieve poverty and reduce income inequalities are not the sole 
functions of social security policy and these objectives can be tackled by measures other 
than those relating to direct income maintenance. State policy in the fields of housing, 
employment, health, education and transport all have a direct impact on resource 
redistribution and overall relative standards of living. For Alcock; 
Once the issue of inequality, rather than poverty, is addressed then the 
question of the economic structure of power and resources becomes central 
to analysis. 
(1987:10) 
The whole range of state activity in the economy which primarily relates to resource 
allocation can in fact create or even preserve income inequalities and, in turn, indirectly 
cause poverty. Measures intended to support the poor, designed with this principal 
function in mind, which do not take account of the causes of income inequality may fail 
in terms of the stated goal by not targeting the actual source of the problem. Although 
incidences of poverty can be used as an indicator measuring the success or otherwise of 
income maintenance policies, to singularly link social security policy with poverty is a 
limited approach. Identifying the various functions social security policy can perform will 
illustrate the role cash transfers play in the operation of modern welfare states and will 
provide a framework with which to analyse the motivating factors influencing design. 
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In his introductory observations on social security policy Hill states that; 
Social security measures are generally perceived as required because 
market-related economic processes generate inequalities, with consequences 
in terms of individual deprivation which are deemed to be politically 
unacceptable, either because of the threat they pose for social order or 
because of political movements and ideologies which demand remedial 
measures. 
(1990:3) 
)RUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVDQDO\VLVWKHXVHRIµSHUFHLYHG¶LQ+LOO¶VVWDWHPHQWLVRISDUWLFXODU
LQWHUHVW 7KH TXHVWLRQ LPPHGLDWHO\ SRVHG LV µSHUFHLYHG¶ E\ ZKRP" )RU +LOO it would 
DSSHDU WKDW WKH LVVXHRIµLQGLYLGXDOGHSULYDWLRQ¶RUSRYHUW\ LVRIFRQFHUQ WR WKRVHZKR
wish to preserve the existing political and economic structures of society and also to 
those who view poverty as an unacceptable feature of modern capitalist society because 
of their particular ideological beliefs. The conclusion drawn is that justification for cash 
transfer mechanisms can be sought within a twin pronged argument. That is, state 
supported poor relief is acceptable to those who adhere to the principles of market based 
economies as such policies are considered essential to the efficient workings of the 
market. However, government action to remedy poverty is also viewed as a crucial 
function of the modern state by those who not only recognise the inherent failings of 
market structures but also question the priority given to existing economic structures. 
6XSSRUWIURPWKLVYLHZSRLQWLVGHULYHGIURPDGHVLUHWRµUHPHG\¶WKHVLWXDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQ
PHUHO\ µVXSSRUWLQJ¶ WKH H[LVWLQJFDSLWDOLVW RUGHU7KH social problem of poverty, which 
stems from the process of distribution in capitalist economies, provides both functional 
and ideologically based justifications for state supported income maintenance schemes. 
Divergence in schemes will result from conflicting desires to either alleviate poverty or to 
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prevent it. The common motivating force for all income maintenance policy though is 
recognition of the need for state involvement in supporting the less well off members of 
society. 
Poverty, although widely experienced in its harshest form throughout history, 
RQO\EHFDPHDµSXEOLF¶FRQFHUQZLWKWKHDGYHQWRIFDSLWDOLVP 
3RYHUW\LQIHXGDOVRFLHW\ZDVQRWDµVRFLDOSUREOHP¶LQVRIDUWKDWLWZDVDQ
ascribed status to which the greater part of the population was born and 
from which it could neither in theory nor practice escape. With the collapse 
of feudalism and the development of capitalism in its various stages, 
poverty as a problem emerged, representing on the one hand the failure of 
the labouring classes to give full effect to their economic emancipation, or 
on the other hand the failure of the market economy to ensure the efficient 
(and/or humane) reproduction of labour power. 
(Dean, 1991:69) 
The transition from feudal society to industrial society brought with it a whole new range 
of social relations. The activities of subsistence economies were fundamentally altered by 
the introduction of money and market exchanges. With the development of industrial 
FDSLWDOLVP µFRPPRGLW\ SURGXFWLRQ DQG FRQVXPSWLRQ FDPH WR Jain precedence over 
SURGXFWLRQ IRU VHOI¶ *RU]  )RU (VSLQJ-Anderson this process of 
µFRPPRGLILFDWLRQ¶DSSOLHGHTXDOO\WRLQGLYLGXDOV 
In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the 
sense that their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labour power. 
It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of 
individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of 
the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labour 
contract meant that people were commodified. 
(Esping-Anderson, 1990:21) 
  
 86 
In modern capitalist societies, then, money income is a primary source of individual 
welfare and many individuals, for whole sets of reasons, may find themselves deprived of 
access to such incomes at various points in time. As a consequence those individuals will 
find themselves in poverty, unless of course they can rely upon financial support from 
sources other than private markets. The existence of poverty is thus an inherent feature of 
capitalist society; 
In subsistence economies everyone works; the labour force is synonymous 
with the population. But capitalism makes labour conditional on market 
demand, with the result that some amount of unemployment becomes a 
permanent feature of the economy. 
(Piven and Cloward, 1993:5) 
Commodified, then, individuals, or rather individual labour, becomes subject to the 
workings of competitive markets. Fluctuations in demand and supply will determine 
relative prices and resources will only be employed when demand and prices dictate. As 
Alcock states this leads to a situation where; 
...at any given time there may be many workers who are ill-suited to labour 
because of age or disability or who are not required for labour because the 
forces of production are already at full capacity or because the products 
produced cannot be sold in a competitive market. These workers in effect 
constitute a reserve army of labour, some more likely to be chosen than 
others, who can be employed by capital if circumstances encourage profits 
but who will otherwise remain outside the wage relationship. 
(1987:11) 
State provision of financial assistance to those individuals unable to secure a money 
income via market exchanges is effectively a response to the problem of poverty, caused 
by unemployment and the consequences of unequal distributions of power and wealth, 
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essential features of capitalist development. The distribution of cash benefits 
compensates individuals for a lack of financial resources and equips those individuals 
with an income, which they can dispose of as they choose. This facilitates further rounds 
of consumption and production and so the process of capital accumulation and 
development continues. As previously stated, whether the distribution of cash benefits to 
sustain incomes constitute measures to relieve poverty or to prevent it depends upon the 
actual design of systems, which depends largely upon ideological considerations. At this 
point in the analysis all that can be assumed is that state support for the poor, that is 
minimal subsistence level relief, is an essential ingredient for the survival of capitalist 
modes of production. Poor relief promotes the efficient workings of the market economy 
and therefore is an identifiable function of income maintenance policy. In fact in listing 
WKHDLPVRIFDVKEHQHILWV%DUULQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHUHOLHIRISRYHUW\LVDQDLPµDERXWZKLFK
WKHUHLVJHQHUDODJUHHPHQW¶ 
Poor relief in itself serves the economic arrangements of capitalist systems but it is 
arguable that financial aid targeted at the poor also performs an important role in serving 
the broader political economy of capitalism. Concerned about the motives behind the 
H[SDQVLRQRIVXSSRUWIRUWKHSRRULQWKH86$WKURXJKRXWWKH¶V3LYHQDQG&ORZard 
undertook a study of relief programs in order to substantiate their argument that relief 
ZDV D µVHFRQGDU\ DQG VXSSRUWLYH LQVWLWXWLRQ¶ ZLWKLQ FDSLWDOLVW VRFLHWLHV 3LYHQ DQG
Cloward, 1993:xv). Their groundbreaking work Regulating the Poor, first published in 
1971, argued that;  
«H[SDQVLYH UHOLHI SROLFLHV DUH GHVLJQHG WR PXWH FLYLO GLVRUGHU DQG
restrictive ones to reinforce work norms. In other words, relief policies are 
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cyclical - liberal or restrictive depending on the problems of regulation in 
the larger society with which government must contend. 
(1993:xv) 
For Piven and Cloward, poor relief programs have two main functions - µPDLQWDLQLQJ
FLYLORUGHUDQGHQIRUFLQJZRUN¶DQGWKHLUVWXG\GUDZVXSRQKLVWRULFDOHYLGHQFHUHODWLQJWR
the development of poor relief, focusing mainly on the contemporary American public 
welfare system to illustrate their theory (ibid:xvii). They conclude that expansive 
programs are designed to maintain civil order and restrictive programs serve to enforce 
work norms. Their insights as to the broader functions of public relief programs are 
crucial to this analysis. They serve to reinforce the arguments made earlier about the role 
social security policy plays as a fiscal tool applied in regulating the economy and how 
patterns of development conform to the perceived needs of the development of capitalist 
political and economic structures. Of significant interest, when discussing the overall 
objectives of income maintenance policy, is their assertion that the giving of relief is a 
means of controlling individual behaviour, particularly that related to formal labour 
PDUNHWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ3LYHQDQG&ORZDUGDFFHSW WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW µDOO VRFLHWLHV UHTXLUH
productive contributions from most of their members, and that all societies develop 
meFKDQLVPV WR HQVXUH WKDW WKRVH FRQWULEXWLRQVZLOO EH PDGH¶ LELG[L[ $OWKRXJK SRRU
relief is recognised as such a mechanism within market based economies, they go further 
to argue that; 
«PXFKPRUHVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGRI WKLVPHFKDQLVP WKDQPHUHO\ WKDW LW 
reinforces work norms. It also goes far toward defining and enforcing the 
terms on which different classes of people are made to do different kinds of 
work; relief arrangements, in other words, have a great deal to do with 
maintaining social and economic inequities. 
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(op cit) 
,WFDQEHFRQFOXGHGIURP3LYHQDQG&ORZDUG¶VREVHUYDWLRQVWKDWWKHDFWXDOGHVLJQRISRRU
relief programs are intended to support existing social relations and hence serve the 
political and economic base of capitalist society. Poor relief given in this sense is not 
associated with a reduction in inequality but rather should be viewed as attempts to 
alleviate poverty whilst at the same time promoting the economic relationships which 
generate such inequalities. Poverty prevention or elimination would necessitate; 
«D FKDQJH LQ WKH UHODWLYH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH SRRU DQG WKXV DQ DWWDFN RQ
inequality via a fundamental shift in power and resources...And if that 
inequality is to be reduced then intervention must be made into the 
economic structures which produce it - the pattern of wages and 
investment...  
(Alcock, 1987:11) 
This argument is of primary importance to the reform debate. Current income 
maintenance measures are both expressly and tacitly, linked to traditional patterns of 
work and pay operative within capitalist modes of production. Persistent poverty, 
inequality in terms of access to resources and gender discrimination are associated 
outcomes of this relationship and future social security reform measures, targeted at 
altering any one, or a combination of these outcomes, must first question the economic 
structures that existing policy, directly or indirectly, serves.  
,QDQDWWHPSW WRDSSO\3LYHQDQG&RZDUGV¶ WKHVLV WR WKH%ULWLVKVLWXDWLRQ+DUWOH\
Dean builds on their work, primarily focusing on the role social security plays in 
SURPRWLQJZKDWKHUHIHUVWRDVµH[WUDJRRG¶EHKDYLRXU-2). For Dean; 
The preoccupations of social security policy and the rules of the social 
security system are quite divorced from the causes of material inequality in 
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society, but they are highly effective in identifying and marginalising the 
SRRUVR WKDW WKH\DSSHDUDVD µFODLPLQJFODVV¶RU µXQGHUFODVV¶7KXVVRFLDO
security has a disciplinary effect. Not only does it place constraints on 
claimants, but it structures the way in which claimants and non-claimants 
are made to identify themselves, to act and to think about each other. 
(1991:9) 
Dean develops the argument that relief giving mutes civil disorder and enforces work 
norms to include a further dimensioQ WKDW RI LPSRVLQJ µLQGLYLGXDO VHOI GLVFLSOLQH DQG
H[WUD JRRGQHVV¶ LELG +H DUJXHV WKDW DOWKRXJK WKH REMHFWLYH RI SRRU UHOLHI KDV
remained a central focus of social security policy what has evolved since the fifteenth 
FHQWXU\ LV D V\VWHP RI µVRFLDO FRQWURO¶ LELGFK 'HDQ GHVFULEHV WKH VRFLDO VHFXULW\
V\VWHP LQ %ULWDLQ DV µD YHKLFOH IRU VRFLDO FRQWURO¶ DQG LGHQWLILHV µWKH PRWLYH IRUFH RU
µHQJLQH¶ZKLFKGULYHVWKDWYHKLFOHZLWKWKHIXQGDPHQWDODQWDJRQLVPEHWZHHQFDSLWDODQG
ODERXU¶LELG7DNLQJWhe view that the package of benefits and services provided by 
the modern welfare state (the so-FDOOHGµVRFLDOZDJH¶KDYHµDGLUHFWHIIHFWLQFRQWDLQLQJ
SRSXODUGLVFRQWHQWDQGDYHUWLQJWKUHDWVRIVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶'HDQFRQWHQGVWKDWWKHµVRFLDO
wage was one of several measures intended to improve capital accumulation by 
PLWLJDWLQJWKHKD]DUGVDQGH[FHVVHVRIDQXQSODQQHGIUHHPDUNHW¶LELG-12). He argues 
that; 
The social wage was to be paid, not as a ransom, nor even out of 
beneficence, but with a view to regulating the potential of the working and 
non-working population as both producers and consumers. 
(ibid:13) 
Dean goes on to assert that although the social wage serves the mutual interests of capital 
and labour, it also directly benefits the recipients E\PDNLQJDµGD\WRGD\FRQWULEXWLRQWR
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UHDO OLYLQJ VWDQGDUGV¶ LELG-14). However he argues that the payment of the social 
ZDJHLVDOVRDPHFKDQLVPWKHVWDWHFDQHPSOR\WRµEX\¶VRFLDORUGHULQWKDWLWWUDQVFHQGV
the individual antagonistic relations between labour and capital by influencing the price 
of labour, thereby serving to shift the focus from class struggle in the market place to 
political struggle between citizen and state (ibid:17-18). He concludes; 
The provision by the state of the social wage has the capacity to make the 
relationship between the individual citizen and the state appear as a matter 
of social policy, whereas the subjection of labour by capital cannot have that 
capacity. What is argued here is that it is only through the state that the 
domination of labour by capital may be translated into social control. 
(ibid:18) 
'HDQDSSOLHVDVLPLODUDUJXPHQWWRWKHLGHDRIWKHµVRFLDOVDQFWLRQ¶LELG7KURXJKD
system of punishments and rewards the state can deter or enforce particular forms of 
LQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRXUDQGVRSURPRWHVRFLDOGLVFLSOLQH'HDQXWLOLVHV)RXFDXOW¶VDFFRXQW
RI WKHUHIRUPDWRU\SULVRQDV WKH µHPERGLPHQWRIGLVFLSOLQDU\ WHFKQLTXHV¶ WRGHYHORSDQ
understanding of the significance of social sanctions to social control; 
«DFFRUGLQJWR)RXFDXOWWKHUHIRUPDWRU\SULVRQPD\QRWPHUHO\EHUHJDUGHG
as the site of discrete forms of social sanction, since it has refined, 
developed and continues to exemplify the techniques of power (such as 
µVXUYHLOODQFH¶ DQG µQRUPDOLVDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK )RXFDXOW FDOOV WKH µGLVFLSOLQHV¶
Such techniques are exercised throughout our social institutions - in 
factories, schools and hospitals - as mechanisms of a continuous discipline 
by which all individuals (whether they be delinquents, workers, pupils or 
patients) may be distinguished and meticulously ordered. 
(ibid:22-23) 
Dean argues that state administered sanctions are effective in the exercise of social 
FRQWUROEHFDXVHWKHµGLVFLSOLQDU\WHFKQLTXHV¶WKH\HPERG\DUHRISDUWLFXODUDSSOLFDWLRQLQ
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WKH µGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ DFFRPPRGDWLRQ DQG VXSHUYLVLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO EHKDYLRXU¶ LELG
When considering the role the capitalist state plays in supporting and reproducing the 
social and economic relations of capitalist modes of production these disciplinary 
techniques become a powerful tool in institutionalising the whole process of subjection 
and muting class struggle. This leads Dean to assert that in modern capitalist states; 
What therefore passes as social policy must embody social control; not 
because welfare reformers are necessarily cynical and manipulative; nor 
even because they are gullible and naive (although some doubtless have 
been); but because the fundamental terrain upon which reforms are fought 
for, the discourses of debate and the inherent limits to state action are all 
fashioned and constrained through the essential form of capitalist social 
relations; and because that essential form is one of exploitation, not co-
operation. 
(ibid:34) 
Arrangements for the provision of financial assistance to the poor are therefore ancillary 
to the preservation of the capitalist economic and political order. In this sense, a primary 
function of poor relief is to institutionalise and maintain a particular set of social 
relations. Evaluating the success or otherwise of policy may not therefore necessitate a 
headcount of the poor but rather an assessment of how effective policy is in supporting 
the structures of modern market based economies. Whilst the relief of poverty may be the 
most indisputable objective of social security policy, it is apparent from the above 
discussion that the motivation for relieving it may be driven by considerations other than 
those relating to benevolence or promoting social justice. The primary objective of social 
security policy is therefore less transparent than initially assumed. Further analysis is 
required to identify more clearly the actual functions of social security instruments.  
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Conceptualising social security arrangements solely in terms of cash transfers 
from the rich to the poor is a limited approach. Micro-analysis of this sort results in 
policy formation aimed at alleviating the worst aspects of poverty. The policy 
LQVWUXPHQWV DYDLODEOH WR SURPRWH µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ PXVW EH YLHZHG LQ D ZLGHU PDFUR
environment; 
Social security is an instrument for social transformation and progress, and 
must be preserved, supported and developed as such. Furthermore, far from 
being an obstacle to economic progress as is all too often said, social 
security organised on firm and sound bases will promote such progress, 
since once men and women benefit from increased security and are free 
from anxiety for the morrow, they will naturally become more productive.  
(Francis Blanchard in preface to ILO, 1984) 
Social security arrangements play a pivotal role in the pursuit of economic growth and as 
such constitute a primary element of any modern welfare state. Fiscal measures employed 
to enhance income security in times of need, not only affect those in direct receipt, but 
also contribute to the welfare of society in general. Social security must therefore be 
considered in light of the impact policy has on social welfare. Individual welfare is 
derived from many sources. The security of money income, either via the wage system, 
occupational pensions or public relief measures is of little use when other needs remain 
unmet. Access to adequate housing, health care, education, child-care facilities and the 
labour market are all crucial determinants of welfare. If social security is to mean public 
responsibility for the relief of need then the concept itself encompasses a whole range of 
issues which interrelate and respectively contribute to social welfare in a positive way.  
If this broader view is taken it follows that transferring cash from the rich to the 
poor is but one outcome of social security policy. Minimal poor relief may be legitimised 
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in terms of equity and economic efficiency arguments, however, in considering the 
financing of relief it becomes apparent that it is not only those with abundant resources 
who pay for security for the whole. Abel-Smith draws attention to the fact that the 
welfare state in modern societies has; 
...provided a minimum of security - a right of access to free or nearly free 
health and welfare services, to a minimum number of years of free 
education, to minimum income in defined contingencies, and in many 
countries to subsidised housing. To a considerable extent all this is paid for 
by the transfer of income within groups, using property taxes, indirect taxes 
and social security contributions. 
(1985:33) 
He goes on to conclude that; 
...to a large extent, the welfare state is a mechanism which redistributes 
income over life. But it also redistributes from those with no children to 
those with more than the average number, from those with secure 
employment to those with insecure employment, from those with short lives 
to those with long lives, from those with good health to those with poor 
health. While the lower income groups may have large families and less 
secure employment, it tends to be the higher income groups whose children 
continue longest in education and who retire earliest and draw their pensions 
for the greatest number of years. 
(ibid:33) 
Identifying social security with poor relief is too narrow an approach to adopt when 
analysing policy. Beneficiaries of cash benefits may not be poor and likewise not all of 
those who contribute to the funding of those benefits are rich. Social security is about 
social protection. Consequently issues about delivery, finance and outcomes have more 
wide ranging consequences than the mere relief of the plight of the poor. Spicker 
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identifies six main functions of social security which illustrates more precisely the nature 
of social security policy in terms of the state provision of welfare; 1) meeting needs, 2) 
remedying disadvantage, 3) maintaining circumstances, 4) the production of 
disadvantage, 5) changing behaviour, and 6) developing potential. (1993:105-109). 
Examining each in turn provides a useful framework with which to appraise the social 
welfare function of social security and to identify the problems social security policies 
are intended to address. 
7KH ILUVW WKUHH IXQFWLRQV FDQ EH JURXSHG XQGHU WKH KHDGLQJ µIRVWHULQJ OLYLQJ
VWDQGDUGV DQG UHGXFLQJ LQHTXDOLW\¶ (VWDEOLVKLQJ D PLQLPXP VWDQGDUG Rf living is a 
prerequisite for any strategy of poverty relief. Cash benefits providing minimum 
subsistence incomes can be viewed as a means of meeting the most basic needs of those 
who find themselves unable to secure money incomes from any other source. The system 
of IS in Britain provides such a safety net of provision which no-one should fall through. 
Poverty, however, should not be considered the sole indicator that needs are not being 
met. The need for economic security provides the rationale for benefits paid to 
individuals who are not necessarily identified as poor. Insurance based benefits such as 
unemployment, sickness and retirement pensions protect individuals from unexpected or 
even unmanageable drops in income. Meeting needs is combined with the objective of 
maintaining circumstances and in so doing the system operates to safeguard individuals 
from those circumstances most likely to lead to poverty. The avoidance of poverty is 
further advanced by those benefits which promote income smoothing. State provision of 
benefits to the elderly and those with young families acknowledge the fact that various 
stages in the lifecycle are financially more expensive than others. This example of 
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policies aimed at preventing poverty and promoting economic security DOVR UHIOHFW µWKH
ZD\ LQ ZKLFK VRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHPV HQIRUFH VROLGDULW\ EHWZHHQ JHQHUDWLRQV¶ 6SLFNHU
1993:106). CB, which is tax-funded, exemplifies this notion of solidarity in that people in 
work without children contribute to a scheme which provides guaranteed financial 
support, regardless of other means, to families. Contributors are not necessarily direct 
beneficiaries, and may never be throughout the course of their lifecycle providing they 
remain childless.  
With the exception of this intergenerational solidarity aspect of social security 
provision, the arguments raised thus far, regarding the functions of social security, have 
concentrated on issues of economic efficiency. Policies aimed at the relief of poverty; 
income smoothing and insuring against the risk of economic insecurity impact upon 
levels of economic activity. As such they act as important economic regulators which can 
be manipulated to bolster or dampen demand as required. Social security payments, 
however, are primarily redistributive and should be analysed with regard to equity. 
6SLFNHUYLHZVWKHIXQFWLRQRIµUHPHG\LQJGLVDGYDQWDJH¶DVIRFXVLQJRQFRPSHQVDWLRQDW
an individual level and at a social level it represents the promotion of equality (ibid:105). 
Disadvantaged groups, such as the disabled or the poor, are identified and compensated 
for their restricted access to resources. This compensation is met by those individuals 
with greater resources. This transfer of resources illustrates elements of both vertical and 
horizontal equity. Vertical in the sense that recipients of income-tested benefits do so at 
the expense of those in work with proportionately greater incomes, and horizontal in that 
benefits which take account of relevant factors, such as age, family size or disability, 
recognise differing needs.  
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The functions discussed above relate mainly to the clearly identified objectives of 
efficiency and equity. The final three functions identified by Spicker are not so easily 
compartmentalised. However, a common element is the function of promoting labour 
market participation and flexibility which in itself is an important component of 
economic efficiency. Historically systems of poor relief in Britain have been contingent 
upon individuals conforming to social norms. The punitive nature of the work house test 
of the Poor Laws; the assumption of the male breadwinner in the Beveridge model of 
VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH DQG WKH µDFWLYHO\ VHHNLQJ ZRUN¶ HOLJLELOLW\ FULWHULD IRU XQHPSOR\PHQW
EHQHILWV DUH DOO H[DPSOHV RI WKH µSURGXFWLRQ RI GLVDGYDQWDJH¶ 6\VWHPV DUH GHVLJQHG
within a framework of punishments and rewards. In fact Spicker maintains that of all the 
welfare services; 
Social security is probably most vulnerable to this criticism in its emphasis 
on work and participation in the labour market and in its reinforcement of 
familial norms.  
(ibid:106) 
Individual consumption behaviour can be altered by the provision of benefits 
which follows logically on from the function of maintaining circumstances. Benefits not 
only affect behaviour in the consumption of consumer goods and services but also 
directly influence the choice between work and leisure. The disincentive effects of social 
security payments have been discussed above and the topic will be revisited as it is a 
central focus in the CBI debate. At this point it is sufficient to comment on the ability to 
promote work incentives by manipulating benefit levels and or restricting receipt. On the 
positive side, social security arrangements can indeed foster opportunity. Benefits which 
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are linked to training schemes or education can develop individual potential and on a 
social level serve to enhance social integration. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to establish a working definition of income 
maintenance policy and to set it apDUW IURP WKH FRQFHSW RI µVRFLDO VHFXULW\¶ 7KLV LV
considered an essential first step in any undertaking to reform policy in light of modern 
demands. Firstly, it is argued that it represents a turn around in terms of economic 
analysis, and secondly it provides the basis for demonstrating the broad range of 
objectives that can be associated with income transfer schemes. That is, the subject of 
income maintenance policy is approached from a perspective which initially sets out to 
examine what policy can actually achieve. This is viewed as distinct from more 
traditional economic approaches where the analytical agenda is dominated by the practice 
of evaluating existing policy, and/or options for the future, with almost exclusive 
reference to considerations of economic efficiency.  
Distinguishing between policy and the ideological concept of social security serves 
to illustrate how the analytical process is shaped by assumed objectives regarding the role 
of the state as a provider of welfare. If social security is understood to refer to the range 
of measures adopted by the state to protect citizens against a set of specific economic and 
social risks, associated with the operation of capitalist based structures, this will dictate 
the terms of reference in evaluating policy. It follows that if economic efficiency is 
assumed to be the ultimate aim, state intervention will be justified only if it renders 
efficiency gains, or, at least, does not lead to any efficiency losses. However, if social 
security is understood in a wider context, that is, in terms of an ideological objective to 
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provide and/or promote an environment where each individual is afforded equal 
protection against economic insecurity, policy interventions are then assessed with 
reference to such a goal. The dominance of efficiency considerations in the evaluation 
process has thus been replaced by the value placed on the provision of social security. 
The point being made is that identifying, and defining the terms employed, is considered 
necessary for demonstrating the relevance of stated objectives in the subsequent analysis. 
It is argued that the transparency of objectives is an essential component in the policy 
process. The predominant focus on efficiency, inherent within traditional economic 
analysis, implies that policy will be primarily informed by such. However, this is not 
always expressly stated, but rather tacitly assumed, and thus can be said to hinder the 
UHIRUP SURFHVV ZLWK D µKLGGHQ¶ DJHQGD $ PRUH HQOLJKWHQHG DQG LQIRUPHG DSSURDFK
involves examining the nature of policy, assessing the overall implementation 
consequences of such, and then deciding on suitability with reference to stated aims. 
Such an approach conforms with the principles of feminist economics. 
Discussing the functions of social security has served to clarify the range of social 
problems that policy can be applied to, and the justifications for specific benefit 
payments. The particular aims and objectives of any social security strategy will depend 
largely upon the relative priorities given to the problems the system is designed to 
address. Outcomes will be influenced by the effects of government policy on the wider 
economic environment and therefore vigilance should be exercised in evaluating the 
success or otherwise of a particular policy. Strategies for reform should therefore be 
considered with these points in mind. However, much of the current debate on the future 
of social security has focused on issues of affordability. It is argued that the emphasis 
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placed on costs is indicative of a narrow and confining approach to the reform process. 
Furthermore, it is an approach largely informed by the continued strive for economic 
efficiency, defined in terms of its rather limited neo-classical sense. Talk of crisis has 
been dominated by finance and a raised awareness of the economic and social 
marginalisation experienced by ever increasing numbers of individuals and groups of 
individuals in modern capitalist economies. Policy makers are faced with a constraining 
economic environment, coupled with a need to reform in light of modern demands. The 
trend has been to engage in cost cutting, while simultaneously putting in place measures 
to restore faith in the labour market as the main source of economic and social welfare. 
However, the efficacy of this particular reform strategy is questionable given the 
continued concerns raised regarding increasing incidences of poverty and social 
exclusion. Current trends do not represent any great departure from historical 
developments, nor do they appear to be rendering policy more effective in meeting the 
needs of those individuals that systems were designed to address. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the reform of systems continues to be driven by the perceived needs of 
capitalist based structures of economic organisation, particularly those related to work 
and pay. This specific mind set is arguably the result of a lasting adherence to neo-
classical economic theorising and serves as a restrictive boundary in the reform process. 
In support of such claims, the following chapter will provide an overview of 
contemporary social security policy in Britain, alongside an analysis of the dominant 
influences informing policy in recent decades. It will be argued that social security policy 
is primarily viewed as a support structure in the operation of formal labour markets and 
as such systems are designed with this purpose in mind. Thus policy outcomes are 
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considered almost exclusively with reference to the world of paid work. From a feminist 
economics viewpoint this demonstrates a failure to fully appreciate the causes and 
consequences of material deprivation in modern society. 
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Chapter 4: Social Security in Britain ± A Micro Approach to Policy  
4.1 Introduction 
Social security arrangements in Britain encompass a wide range of measures with 
varying delivery and entitlement structures. The system as a whole is incredibly complex 
and can be criticised in terms of its effectiveness in meeting modern social problems. 
Recent developments in the operation and design of the British system have witnessed 
JUDGXDO HURVLRQ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µULJKWV¶ WR EHQHILWV DQG D VXEVHTXHQW IDYRXULQJ RI
VFKHPHVZKLFKVHUYH WRDEDWHDQ\ WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGVDFXOWXUHRIµZHOIDUHGHSHQGHQF\¶
This has meant a shift in emphasis from insurance based benefits to public assistance type 
means-tested forms of support, which are believed to be a more effective method of 
targeting those most in need. Such developments have occurred within a climate of 
caution and restraint regarding absolute levels of public expenditure. Fears about the 
proportion of public monies dedicated to social security spending have been the principal 
driving force behind recent reforms. However, expenditure on social security is largely 
demand led which makes overall control of spending levels difficult. Furthermore, the 
combined effects of increasing rates of long term unemployment; structural change in the 
labour market; the dynamics of modern family forms; and various demographic changes 
have contributed to growing levels of poverty and income inequalities. Thus, both the 
type and scale of problems the social security system is designed to address have been 
rapidly changing in recent decades.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of contemporary 
developments in British VRFLDO VHFXULW\ SROLF\ DQG WR LGHQWLI\ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH µQHZ¶
demands existing systems are struggling to meet. Particular attention will be drawn to the 
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discriminatory nature of current social security policy, which is attributed to the explicit 
relationship between income maintenance programs, both past and present, and the 
formal labour market. Although the focus is on the British social security system, it will 
be argued that the British experience is not entirely distinct from developments 
elsewhere. However, the extent to which international comparisons are made is limited 
for the purpose of illustrating convergence as opposed to difference. The chapter 
concludes that policy developments in recent decades have been predominately informed 
by the type of microeconomic analysis typical of that central to neo-classical economic 
theory. That is, in terms of social security policy, the focus has been on adapting systems 
in accordance with the needs of modern labour markets. Discriminatory changes in social 
security legislation have occurred alongside active employment measures in attempts to 
ensure that the world of paid work is commonly accepted as the main source of economic 
and social welfare in modern capitalist economies. It is argued that this particular strategy 
is founded on basic assumptions about consumption behaviour and individual choice. It is 
in this sense that the approach can be criticised for its limiting and partial nature.  
Understanding the nature of real world economic phenomena is a central feature of 
feminist economic analysis. It follows therefore, that inequality is considered a topic 
ZRUWK\ RI VWXG\ ,Q IDFW WKH µUHPDUNDEOH GHYHORSPHQW RI IHPLQLVW HFRQRPLFV LQ UHFHQW
\HDUV LV LQIRUPHG E\ WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI LQHTXLWLHV¶ 6HQ  )Rr feminists then, 
economists should demonstrate a willingness to engage in poverty debates and, more 
importantly, should view the analysis of the different distributional implications of 
particular policy options as part of their mainstream agenda. Developing a feminist 
economics perspective in the study of social security policy therefore necessitates an 
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undertaking to analyse the causes and consequences of poverty in contemporary society. 
In doing so it becomes apparent that there is a whole host of contributing factors in the 
determination of individual income levels. Furthermore, individual income, either in 
WHUPV RI DPRXQW RU VRXUFH LV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ DQ DFFXUDWH LQGLFDWLRQ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
welfare status or standard of living. It is clear then that an anti-poverty strategy, which is 
largely based on promoting labour market participation, may indeed only be addressing 
part of the problem. However, this is an unsurprising scenario, considering that such 
strategies have been framed within a narrowly conceived microeconomic analytical 
process. 
4.2 The British Social Security System: Evolution and Design 
The actual design of the present social security system in Britain draws upon the 
three justifying principles, outlined in the previous chapter, with the resulting differences 
in patterns of finance and methods of benefit delivery. Current British cash transfer 
mechanisms involve the use of contributory benefits, means-tested benefits and 
categorical universal benefits, albeit in varying degrees. In tracing the historical 
development of social security provision in Britain it has been possible to identify 
dominant strategies and clearly defined objectives, at least to the period following the 
implementation of the Beveridge proposals. However, limitations and deficiencies 
emerged within the Beveridge plan soon after implementation both in terms of adequacy 
of benefit levels and comprehensiveness of coverage. Numerous additions and 
modifications were made to the Beveridge design which ultimately rendered income 
maintenance policy in Britain piecemeal in terms of development and highly complex in 
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WHUPV RI VWUXFWXUH &RQVHTXHQWO\ LW µKDV EHFRPH KDUGHU WR GHVFULEH LW FOHDUO\ DQG WR
GLVFHUQDQ\FRKHUHQFHLQLWVSULQFLSOHV¶%URZQDQG3D\QH 
A Brief History 
Most studies of contemporary social security policy in Britain accept the immediate 
post war period as a starting point mainly because this period can be identified with the 
implementation of a major piece of legislation that transformed and rationalised existing 
social security measures. However, extensive state involvement in the provision of 
income maintenance to citizens was evident in Britain prior to the Second World War. 
The Poor Law, established in 1601, provided means-tested minimum subsistence local 
poor relief and the reforms enacted in the 1834 Act reasserted the principles of minimum 
relief, the means-test and local finance and administration. However, at the same time the 
new Act introduced harsher tests of eligibility due to the increasing demands imposed 
upon the system by the process of industrialisation and accompanying population 
movements. A national system of means-tested pensions was introduced at the beginning 
of this century with the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act. Anyone over the age of seventy was 
eligible for a state pension, tax financed, if they could demonstrate to the authorities that 
they were without sufficient income to meet their basic needs. This illustrates the first 
major departure from the Poor Law in that a national non-contributory means-test was 
introduced and furthermore the Act removed the statutory obligation on family members 
to contribute in meeting the needs of their less fortunate relatives (Atkinson, 1991:123). 
National Insurance was introduced in the early decades of this century with the enactment 
of the 1911 National Insurance Act which provided sickness and unemployment benefit 
for specific categories of workers. This piece of legislation built upon the activities of 
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voluntary forms of group insurance for some workers that had evolved from the turn of 
the century in the form of Friendly Societies. However, although benefits were time 
limited, and strict insurance principles were applied, with regard to contributions paid and 
benefits received, the system represented the first form of a state supported insurance 
scheme to be implemented in Britain. The onset of mass unemployment in the inter-war 
years resulted in high levels of public expenditure committed to meeting unemployment 
benefit claims and evidence was emerging regarding the inefficiencies of locally 
administered poor relief given the problems raised by wide scale geographical disparities 
in levels of deprivation. Faced with the problem of escalating costs and a lack of control 
in containing those costs the solution was to centralise the state system of poor relief. The 
Unemployment Act of 1934 established the Unemployment Assistance Board, which 
HIIHFWLYHO\UHSODFHGWKH3RRU/DZ7KHSURYLVLRQRIDVWDWHVXSSRUWHGµVDIHW\-QHW¶IRUWKH
unemployed and their families was now centrally administered and funded. Therefore, for 
the first time in Britain there was a national scheme of means-tested benefits which 
SURYLGHG D XQLIRUP V\VWHP RI SRRU UHOLHI %\ WKH HQG RI WKH ¶V D VWDWH V\VWHP RI
social security provision was well established in Britain. 
The post war years witnessed a shift in policy direction with the implementation of 
the proposals contained within the Beveridge Report, published in 1942. The basis of 
social security provision was now firmly established in the form of a compulsory social 
insurance scheme, which was believed to be the primary means by which to eliminate 
SRYHUW\RQFHDQGIRUDOO%HYHULGJHWKHUHIRUHLVµUHPHPEHUHGILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWDVWKH
proponent of social insurance as the appropriate means of providing a defence against 
:DQW¶ :LOVRQ DQG :LOVRQ  7KLV EHOLHI ZDV VKDUHG DFURVV WKH SROLWLFDO
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spectrum and thus the immediate post war period is characterised by political consensus 
with regard to the role of contributory based benefits within a model of state social 
security provision. 
Although the principle of social insurance was already evident in British social 
security policy, the Beveridge model extended membership of the national insurance 
scheme to the vast majority of the working population. A tripartite arrangement between 
employees, employers and the State would secure regular weekly contributions from each 
party, to be paid into a national insurance fund. Central to the scheme were the principles 
of uniformity and comprehensiveness; 
All would pay contributions, and all would be eligible for benefits that would 
cover them against loss of earnings due to sickness, old age, unemployment 
RU DQ\ RWKHU DQWLFLSDWHG FRQWLQJHQF\ ³IURP WKH FUDGOH WR WKH JUDYH´
Contributions would be flat rate, they would not vary with earnings. Benefits 
would also be flat rate, but they would be sufficient for subsistence: they 
would be enough to live on. More over, everyone who was receiving benefit 
would have established a right to that benefit through the payment of 
contributions, and so the amount they received would not depend upon their 
other resources or those of their families. 
(Deacon, 1995:74-75) 
In practice, however, a social security scheme that encompassed a direct link with formal 
labour market participation, necessitated by the contributory principle, could never be 
truly comprehensive and more importantly relied upon the continued commitment to the 
policy goal of full employment. Recognition of certain circumstances where access to 
employment was either denied or limited for certain individuals led to the justification for 
a policy of social assistance. Those individuals not covered by social insurance would be 
provided for via a package of means-tested benefits. Thus a system of social assistance 
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ZRXOGSURYLGHD µVDIHW\QHW¶RISURYLVLRQZKLFKZRXOGVXSSOHPHQW WKHVRFLDO LQVXUDQFH
model and therefore ensure the principle of comprehensive coverage. Although the 
%HYHULGJH VFKHPH ZDV QHYHU LPSOHPHQWHG LQ LW¶V HQWLUHW\1, (the main omissions and 
changes were due to financial considerations), the social security system established in 
post war Britain was firmly based on the insurance principle with the subsequent 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µULJKWV¶ WR EHQHILW WKDW VXFK D SULQFLple implies. 
Means-tested benefits were initially introduced to fill the gaps in coverage. However as 
those gaps became more widespread the reliance on social assistance accelerated. 
%\WKHHDUO\¶VWKHXVHRIPHDQV-testing within the social security system was 
growing, as opposed to diminishing, in importance due to the identified inadequacies in 
WHUPV RI HOLPLQDWLQJ µZDQW¶ LQKHUHQW ZLWKLQ WKH %HYHULGJH GHVLJQ IRU VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH
Furthermore the Beveridge model was failing to meet the needs of modern society. The 
µUHGLVFRYHU\RISRYHUW\¶ JURZLQJQXPEHUVRI HOGHUO\GHSHQGLQJRQEHQHILWV HPHUJLQJ
HYLGHQFH RI FKDQJLQJ IDPLO\ VWUXFWXUHV DZD\ IURP WKH µPDOH EUHDG-winner, dependent 
ZLIH¶PRGHODQGULVLQJXQHPSOR\PHQWZHUHDOOFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH¶Vthrough to the 
ODWH ¶V 6XFK GHYHORSPHQWV KDG SURIRXQG HIIHFWV RQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI VRFLDO
security policy;  
In this period, therefore, the increasing cost of social security tended to limit 
government willingness to concede the comprehensive reforms demanded by 
those who sought to build on the Beveridge model. Cost considerations 
FRQWLQXDOO\ WHPSWHG JRYHUQPHQWV WR XVH µVHOHFWLYH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µXQLYHUVDO¶
benefits to solve newly emergent problems-rent and rate rebates, the subsidy 
of lower wages through family income supplements, and extension of 
supplementary  benefit to single-parent families. 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed discussion of social security in this period see for example Hill,1990. 
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(Hill, 1990:51) 
Thus cost considerations have dominated the debate at least since the time of Beveridge 
and the resulting emphasis is on a set of social security PHDVXUHVZKLFKSURYLGHµYDOXH
IRUPRQH\¶7KHSULPDF\RIHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\RYHUVRFLDOSROLF\KDVVHUYHGWRIRFXV
the debate around the relative efficacy of means-tested versus non-means-tested benefits. 
In fact as Spicker indicates, since the implementation of the Beveridge proposals social 
VHFXULW\ SROLF\ LQ %ULWDLQ µKDV EHHQ EXLOW DURXQG WKH WHQVLRQ EHWZHHQ XQLYHUVDOLW\ DQG
VHOHFWLYLW\¶ 
However questions of affordability have not been the sole factor influencing British 
social security policy in recent decades. Benefits distributed on a universal basis, 
regardless of the existing resources available to the recipients of such benefits are 
criticised in terms of the stated objective of poor relief by those who support the selective 
targeting of benefits; 
If the major aim of the benefit system is to keep incomes above some 
minimum level, then it is rather ineffective in doing so. Not only does low 
take-XSPHDQWKDWVRPHSHRSOHµVOLS WKURXJKWKHQHW¶EXWDKLJKSURSRUWLRQ
of benefit expenditure provides income in excess of this minimum. If our 
principle objective is to boost low incomes to an acceptable level, this could 
be done much more cheaply, and/or we could afford to be considerably more 
generous to the poor, if payment to those who do not VWULFWO\ µQHHG¶ WKH
money were curtailed. 
(Dilnot et al, 1984:55) 
The logical argument which follows from such criticisms is that overall spending on 
social security could be reduced if all universal benefits were replaced by benefits 
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targeted specifically at those identified as poor, which out of necessity would be means-
tested. That is, if the aim of selective targeting is to relieve poverty then;  
«SRYHUW\ PXVW EH HVWDEOLVKHG XQGHU D PHDQV-test before benefit can be 
received, and benefit is paid only at a subsistence level to meet presumed 
absolute needs. To pay benefits beyond this level, or to those who are not 
SRRUZRXOGEHµZDVWLQJ¶VWDWHVXSSRUWRQWKRVHZKRGRQRWµQHHG¶LW 
(Alcock, 1987:141)  
The savings made from increased use of means-testing could be used to enhance the 
targeted benefits and go some way to improving the efficiency of the system in 
addressing the social problem of poverty at neutral cost. Those who advocate the 
increased use of targeting are therefore clearly driven by cost considerations and support 
structural reforms to the benefit system in the name of economic efficiency.  
The Thatcher administration, elected in 1979, formed a government committed to 
cutting public expenditure overall. On considering the relative size of the social security 
budget, representing 24.3% of General Government Expenditure in 1978/79 (DSS, 
1993:10), it followed that the newly elected Conservative Government would seek ways 
of reducing the costs to the public of the social security system. The Thatcher 
*RYHUQPHQWZDV LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKHDUJXPHQWVRI WKH µWDUJHWHUV¶DQG WKHUHIRUH VHW DERXW
replacing universalist principles with means-testing wherever possible. However the 
desire to reduce costs was not the only motivating factor that led the Conservative 
Government down the path of targeting. The Thatcher years have been identified as an 
era which marked a radical shift in both social and economic policies adopted in Britain 
(Deacon, 1995:87; McCarthy, 1989:4-6; Lister, 1989:104-106). Furthermore, social 
policy was now relegated to the back seat with economic policy being the driving force 
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behind any reform measures in the area of state welfare provision. In terms of social 
VHFXULW\SROLF\WKHUHOLHIRISRYHUW\RUSXWLQ%HYHULGJH¶VWHUPVµWKHDEROLWLRQ RIZDQW¶
was no longer identified as the prime objective. In fact; 
One of the hallmarks of the Thatcher era was the fierce debate over the 
nature of poverty. The more apparent poverty became the more strongly its 
level and indeed its very existence were VWURQJO\ GHQLHG«0DUJDUHW
7KDWFKHUDUJXHGWKDWWRFDOOSHRSOHOLYLQJRQLQFRPHVXSSRUWµSRRU¶ZDVWR
GHQLJUDWHWKHP,QVWHDGWKHSRRUZHUHRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµGHSHQGHQW¶6RPH
people argued that poverty was caused not by low wages or unemployment 
but by long-term dependency on state support. Welfare itself generated 
poverty.  
(Oppenheim, 1993:11) 
Thus the social problem of poverty, in so far as it existed, was believed to be a by-
product of the social security system itself. In terms of policy goals, then, income 
maintenance measures should be redesigned so as to reduce the role of central 
government as a provider of welfare; to promote an ethos of individualism and self-help; 
to reverse the trend whereby generous social security benefits were acting to threaten 
work incentives; and to simplify the system where possible with an emphasis on 
curtailing incidences of fraud and abuse (see for example Lister, 1989). Policy 
GHYHORSPHQWVWKURXJKRXWWKH¶VDQGHDUO\¶VZHUHSULPDULO\LQIRUPHGE\TXHVWLRQV
of cost containment and an accompanying emphasis on building a structure that 
encouraged the principle of self reliance. 
Historically, therefore, the benefit system in Britain evolved as a means of relieving 
poverty and policies were designed with this aim in mind (Spicker, 1993; Barr, 1993). 
However, consideration of the role social security plays in promoting a desired 
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behavioural response amongst both actual and potential recipients has proved equally 
important. Although the actual design of systems has witnessed various changes in 
emphasis since the seventeenth century, this overall objective of income maintenance has 
remained unaltered. At different stages in history benefit payments have been viewed 
HLWKHU DV D µJLIW¶ IURP WKH VWDWH DV D IRUP RI UHZDUG GHpendent upon the individual 
fulfilling a harsh work-test; as a return to the individual for investments made in a prior 
period of economic activity; or as a right of citizenship. Legislation regarding conditions 
of entitlement, rates of benefits and methods of payment has served to create a social 
VHFXULW\V\VWHPEXLOWDURXQGDQHWKRVRIµSXQLVKPHQWVDQGUHZDUGV¶:KDWHYHUWKHIRUP
cash assistance has taken the ultimate purpose has always been to relieve the harsh 
realities of poverty. In promoting this cause theoretical positions can be espoused as to 
whether the intention was to maintain population growth in line with agricultural 
production; to ensure a reserve army of labour to draw upon in boom periods; to prevent 
social disorder; or to meet a contractual obligation on the part of the modern state in 
terms of the rights of citizenship. The relative significance of such theoretical positions is 
crucial when examining the actual mechanisms employed in providing state supported 
income maintenance as well as the outcomes of social security policy. However, starting 
from the premise that the relief of poverty has been the historical constant, (albeit 
GHVFULEHG LQ D PRGHUQ FRQWH[W DV WKH µHIIHFWLYH WDUJHWLQJ RI WKRVH PRVW LQ QHHG¶ DQG
remains the primary motivating force informing social security policy in Britain, provides 
a foundation with which to critically evaluate the future of social security policy. 
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4.3 Contemporary Developments and Current Design 
The British social security programme currently comprises of over thirty separate 
cash benefits, covering a wide range of circumstances. Overall responsibility for the 
development and monitoring of the system rests with the Department of Social Security 
(DSS). Responsibility for the implementation, delivery and administration of benefits is 
GHYROYHG WR WKH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V ILYH H[HFXWLYH DJHQFLHV ODXQFKHG LQ WKH ODWH V DQG
HDUO\ V DV SDUW RI WKH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V RYHUDOO VWUDWHJ\ WR LPSURYH VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ E\
establishing clearly defined areas of responsibility and accountability. A number of other 
organisations are involved with the administration and payment of certain benefits, for 
example employers are responsible for the delivery of Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) and local 
authorities or district councils deal with Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit 
(CTB). Administration procedures can vary enormously, rules for assessing entitlement 
are complicated and, in the case of discretionary benefits, are open to misinterpretation. 
In addition to direct cash benefits, the structure of the tax system has a role to play 
in the operation of income maintenance policy in Britain. As explained in chapter two, 
tax expenditures are implicit transfers in that they do not involve an actual cash payment. 
However they do represent an important component of overall income maintenance 
policy in that they serve to subsidise, and therefore promote various forms of individual 
saving, which will effectively reduce future public expenditure on welfare provision. In 
addition, income tax allowances can be designed to indirectly enhance the incomes of the 
low paid. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed major changes to the structure of 
income taxes in Britain. Significant reductions in the basic rate for both low and high 
earners was accompanied by an overall shift in the tax burden from direct income taxes to 
other taxes, both direct and indirect. Subsequently there has been a gradual move towards 
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a more regressive tax structure. Considering such a development in relation to the 
adequacy and generosity of benefits involves examining how the tax and benefit system 
interact in such a way as to impact on individual decisions about entering the labour 
force. Incomes in and out of work are primarily determined by the structure of taxes and 
benefits. Individuals on the margins of social security and income tax will experience 
high MTRs. In 1994/95 over 700,000 individuals in Britain were faced with MTRs in 
excess of 70% (Cm 3613, 1997, Fig34:57). High rates of benefit withdrawal, combined 
with low wages and low tax thresholds serve to effectively trap people in situations of 
welfare dependency. The poverty and associated unemployment traps are inevitable 
consequences of a system heavily reliant on income tested benefits which interacts with a 
tax structure skewed in favour of higher earners. 
7XUQLQJWRH[SOLFLWFDVKWUDQVIHUVIURPWKHHDUO\¶VWKHZKROHV\VWHPKDVEHHQ
subject to series of wide ranging reforms. Repeated attempts at cutting costs, and a 
greater use of selective targeting, have culminated in an undermining of the contributory 
principle within the British system. The introduction of Incapacity Benefit (ICB) in 1995, 
which replaced state sickness and invalidity benefits, and JSA in 1996, which replaced 
UB (and IS for those required to look for work), exemplify this development. For both 
new benefits the eligibility criteria is more stringent than with the previous systems. For 
-6$ D FRQGLWLRQ RI HQWLWOHPHQW UHTXLUHV WKDW FODLPDQWV GUDZ XS D µ-REVHHNHU¶V
$JUHHPHQW¶ LQFR-operation with the benefit office which clearly defines the steps they 
are willing to take to secure employment and the contributory based element of JSA is 
only available for 6 months. Thereafter claimants are subject to a test of available 
income. The primary intention of the new benefit was to reinforce the pre-requisite for 
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entitlement, that is, active job search on behalf of the claimant, and to target available 
resources to those identified as being most in need by introducing a means-test after 6 
rather than 12 months. Furthermore, even if a claimant is otherwise entitled to JSA it may 
QRWEHSDLGGXHWRWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIDµVDQFWLRQ¶%HQHILWFDQEHVXVSHQGHGLIDFODLPDQW
IDLOV WR FDUU\ RXW WKH WDVNV GHWDLOHG LQ WKH MREVHHNHU¶V DJUHHPHQW RU LV GHHPHG WR EH
µYROXQWDULO\ XQHPSOR\HG¶ 7KH SUDFWLFH RI µVDQFWLRQLQJ¶ LV KDUVKHU WKDQ WKH SUHYLRXV
voluntary unemployment deduction rules in that no benefit at all is paid for periods of up 
to 26 weeks. The new ICB requires that claimants pass a medical test proving their 
incapacity for work. For claims of up to 28 weeks individuals are assessed with reference 
WRWKHLUµRZQRFFXSDWLRQ¶ZKHUHSRVVLEOH7KHUHDIWHUDVVHVVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHLUDELOLW\WR
perform any kind of work. The introduction of this new benefit for people with a long-
term illness or disability proved successful in reducing expenditure in this area of social 
security provision; 
In the three years to 1994/5, spending on Invalidity Benefit rose by £2 
billion. It was then replaced by Incapacity Benefit, several features of 
which led spending to be cut. In 1996/7, after it had been in place for two 
years, spending was £1.2 billion lower than in the last year of Invalidity 
Benefit. 
(DSS, 2000:40) 
Concern regarding costs can arguably be identified as the main driving force behind the 
benefit changes outlined above. However, by effectively restricting access to these 
principle contributory benefits, the reforms have wider implications for social security 
provision as a whole. That is, these particular reforms clearly indicate, that by the late 
1990s in Britain, a more punitive system of social security was being favoured over the 
µULJKWV¶EDVHGHOHPHQWRIFRQWULEXWRU\EHQHILWV 
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Other developments contributing to the weakening of the insurance principle 
included limiting coverage and reducing the level of benefits in a range of areas. From 
April 1988 benefits for 16 and 17 year olds and most full-time students were abolished. 
Only those demonstrating exceptional hardship are eligible for limited assistance. Their 
limited access to the labour market effectively renders young people ineligible for 
insurance based benefits, but the new legislation meant that many full-time students with 
sufficient contribution records witnessed the removal of their rights to benefits altogether. 
From 1980 benefits were uprated in line with inflation, rather than earnings, and in 1982 
the earnings related additions to short term contributory benefits were abolished. 
Moreover in the case of certain benefits the practice of uprating annually in line with 
LQIODWLRQZDVLQGHHGµIUR]HQDVZDVZLWK&%LQDQGGHOD\HGRURQO\SDUWLDOO\
LPSOHPHQWHG¶ /RZH  6XFK SROLFLHV LQWHQGHG DV FRVW FXWWLQJ PHDVXUHV LQ
effect eroded the value of income maintenance benefits in real terms. For example the 
YDOXHRIWKHVWDWHUHWLUHPHQWSHQVLRQKDVµIDOOHQIURPEHLQJPRUHWKDQSHUFHQWRIQHW
average male weekly earnings - not in itself a particularly generous figure - to some 20 
SHUFHQW¶$WNLQVRQDQGKDGLWEHHQOLQNHGWRSULFes since it was introduced in 
1948 its real worth in the early 1990s would be a mere £23 (CSJ, 1994:267). In a speech 
delivered in 1993 Peter Lilley, the then Secretary of State for Social Security, stressed the 
cost savings made from the uprating changes; 
The most important single spending decision in recent decades was the 
decision to link the basic retirement pension to prices rather than earnings. 
To have retained the earnings link would have boosted spending by £8 billion 
per annum already and set it heading remorselessly upwards. 
(Lilley, 1993)   
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In the case of long term incapacity benefits, earnings related supplements were abolished 
for all new claims, and frozen at 1994/95 rates for existing claims. 
Efforts to reduce spending did not just focus on reducing the real value of benefits 
but affected pension provision as a whole. Measures were taken in the late 1980s to 
encourage the growth of private pensions, which primarily involved giving rebates of 
national insurance contributions to those opting out of the State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS) and the granting of tax relief on approved private schemes. This has 
had the effect of gradually shifting the overall burden for pensions from the public to the 
private sector. As a result many pensioners have surrendered their rights to a guaranteed 
income and as a consequence their living standards are now determined by the 
performance of highly volatile private financial markets (Deacon,1 995:90).  
Changes in benefits designed to meet child support costs further demonstrated the 
emphasis on reducing costs to the public purse and the drive to replace public 
responsibility with private dependency. The Child Support Act (CSA), introduced in 
April 1993, was designed to ensure that both parents accepted and maintained financial 
responsibility for their children. This piece of legislation is primarily aimed at forcing 
absent fathers to pay child support and thereby reducing the public dependency of lone 
mothers. The CSA serves as an example of how income maintenance policy can be 
employed to encourage and promote a particular set of familial norms in that it has the 
SRZHU µWR UHJXODWH DQG HQIRUFH EUHDGZLQQHU REOLJDWLRQV LQ D ZD\ ZKLFK LV LPSRVVLEOH
ZLWKLQ KRXVHKROGV¶ +RRSHU  +RZHYHU WKH &6$ KDV EHen highly criticised 
since implementation for failing to meet its objectives. The closest approximation to a 
universal system of social security currently in operation in Britain is CB, introduced in 
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1976 to replace family allowance and income tax allowances for children. As a universal 
benefit, it enjoys widespread public support; high take up rates; ease of administration in 
that the target group is readily identifiable and remains stable over a period of time; and it 
raises no problems of disincentive effects. However universal cash benefits financed from 
general taxation are costly and as the primary redistributive effects are horizontal, rather 
than vertical, they do not directly address the problem of income inequalities. It was for 
these reasons that CB came under scrutiny in the 1980s. Attempts to introduce means-
WHVWLQJ ZHUH WKZDUWHG PDLQO\ GXH WR WKH µVWURQJ VXSSRUW IRU FKLOG EHQHILW IURP WKH
SRZHUIXO&RQVHUYDWLYH:RPHQ¶VOREE\DQGPDQ\03VRQERWKVLGHVRIWKH3DUW\¶/LVWHU
1989:207). Instead the real value of the benefit was eroded when it was frozen and the 
emphasis on child support was switched to the new means-tested benefit for working 
families, Family Credit (FC). This benefit has since been replaced by the Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC), introduced in 1999. The WFTC is similar in principle to its 
predecessor in that the prime purpose is to provide additional income to families with 
children who have low earnings. However under the new system, a social security benefit 
is effectively being replaced by a tax credit and therefore claimants will normally be paid 
via the wage system. The new credit is more generous than the previous benefit, 
withdrawal rates are set at higher levels of earnings and an additional amount is included 
to cover childcare costs. These changes are intended to address the situation whereby the 
operation of FC, alongside the other main means-tested in work benefits (HB and CTB) 
served to compound the problem of the poverty trap. That is, the new measure is 
primarily targeted at those individuals who would otherwise face very strong 
disincentives to engage in paid work. Alongside this change, the practice of uprating CB 
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has been restored. Although the benefit was uprated in the first post-Thatcher 
administration, it would appear that its role in promoting work incentives has been 
enhanced, demonstrated by the more generous uprating policy implemented by the 
present Labour administration.  
The current structure of the principle means-tested benefits was largely determined 
by the Social Security Act 1986, implemented in April 1988. This piece of legislation 
was an attempt to simplify the system and to introduce a uniform structure of entitlements 
common to the three main income related benefits (Dilnot and Webb, 1989:244-5, Hill, 
1990:60). A necessary step in this process was the abolition of discretionary awards. 
$GGLWLRQDO SD\PHQWV ZHUH UHSODFHG E\ ZHHNO\ µSUHPLXPV¶ DGGHG WR VWDQGDUG ,6
allowances, available only to certain groups, and the practice of making lump sum 
payments to individuals in exceptional circumstances was abolished altogether. In its 
place the Social Fund (SF) was introduced, a radical development in British social 
security policy; 
It was quite different from any previous type of British social security 
provision in that it was cash-limited not demand-led; it could make grants, 
but most payments were in the form of loans; claimants became applicants to 
the social fund, as they had no rights to a social fund payment and all 
decisions were discretionary; finally there was no independent right of 
appeal. 
(Walker, 1993:14) 
The operation of the SF has proved highly controversial and has been heavily criticised 
for contributing towards the poverty experienced by many claimants as opposed to 
alleviating their situation (Deacon, 1995:90). As the majority of financial aid provided by 
the fund is in the form of loans, (only 25% of the decisions made on Community Care 
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Grant claims resulted in awards in 1995/96 (DSS, 1996, table A5.04:87)), individuals 
DOUHDG\ OLYLQJ RQ µVDIHW\ QHW¶ OHYHOV RI LQFRPH H[SHULHQFH JUHDWHU KDUGVKLS LQ WKDW
repayments are deducted from their benefit at source. Furthermore, many individuals 
were no longer eligible for assistance, either because their personal circumstances did not 
fall within the QHZ VWULFWHU FULWHULD RU LQGHHG WKHLU µVSHFLDO QHHGV¶ ZHUH QR ORQJHU
identified. Therefore, those reliant on means-tested benefits as their main source of 
LQFRPH KDYH ZLWQHVVHG D VWHDG\ HURVLRQ RI WKHLU µULJKWV¶ WR EHQHILWV DQG D VXEVHTXHQW
reduction in their standard of living. 
7KH$FWUHSUHVHQWHGDµIXUWKHUVKLIWLQWKHFHQWUHRIJUDYLW\RIVRFLDOVHFXULW\
SROLF\¶/LVWHUE\ILUPO\SODFLQJµPHDQV-tested benefits at the heart of future 
EHQHILWSURYLVLRQ¶:DONHU7KHQXPEHUVRIindividuals claiming and receiving 
only contributory based unemployment benefits fell from 555,000 in May 1991 to 
314,000 in May 1995, a reduction of 43%. At the same time the numbers of individuals 
claiming unemployment benefits and receiving either a combination of contributory and 
income tested benefits, or IS only, has risen from 1,314,000 in May 1991 to 1,708,000 in 
May 1995, an increase of 30% (DSS, 1996, derived from table C1.01:122). This trend 
amongst unemployed claimants can only be assumed to continue with the introduction of 
the JSA 6 month rule. The proportion of the overall population receiving means-tested 
benefits rose from 17% in 1979 to 25% in 1992/93 (Oppenheim and Harker, 1996:25). 
Means-testing, therefore performs a fundamental and ever increasing function within the 
British social security system and this switch in emphasis forms the basis of much of the 
political and economic debate on the future direction of social security policy. 
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One reason for this shift is government policy direction. However, increased 
unemployment, particularly amongst young people, rising incidences of lone parenthood 
and an ageing population are all contributing factors to increases in dependency on social 
security benefits. The contributory principle does not serve these individuals well due to 
its explicit link with the formal labour market. Therefore the increased dependency on 
means-testing is also the result of changing socio-economic structures which 
demonstrates the point that efforts to cut costs must take account of the fact that spending 
on social security is demand driven. For Oppenheim, the focus on financial 
considerations in considering reform options is a narrow and limiting one; 
While the problem of public finances must be taken seriously, it is essential 
that any proposals for reforming the social security system be discussed 
against a background of profound changes in our society. 
(1994:3) 
Furthermore,  
«VRFLDO VHFXULW\ VSHQGLQJ WRWDOV UHIOHFW FKDQJHV DQG SROLFLHV ZKLFK OLH
largely outside the benefits system. The social security system is in many 
VHQVHVWKHµGXVWELQ¶IRUSROLF\FKDQJHVRUIDLOXUHLQRWKHUDUHDV 
(ibid:10).   
What is required is a fundamental reassessment of the whole system and how it interacts 
with other areas of social policy and economic policy. This would necessitate a clear 
statement of intent with regard to social security protection as well as an understanding of 
the current causes and consequences of individual poverty. 
4.4 Income Maintenance: The Reform Agenda 
...the DSS budget is huge, has grown rapidly and is set to continue 
outstripping national income in the future . This year we expect to spend over 
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£80 billion. That is - twice as much as the next biggest department, Health; 
more than 11 times as much as either Education or Transport; equivalent to 
the turnover of British Telecom, Unilever and BP combined. It means that to 
finance social security, every working person now effectively pays, on 
average, over £13 every working day. 
(Lilley, 1993:8) 
Cost considerations have informed social security policy throughout its history in 
Britain. However what characterises policy developments in recent decades is the explicit 
departure from a commitment to the Beveridge design to a system based predominately 
on the application of targeting benefits to those identified as being most in need. 
Consequently the arrangements for social security provision currently in operation within 
Britain are mainly dominated by a social insurance/social assistance dichotomy. The 
system has evolved in response to economic crisis and variations in design have been 
largely informed by the prevailing political ideology. However, the weaknesses inherent 
in both the insurance model and the safety-net type approach to income maintenance 
have been well documented. It is debatable, then, as to whether either of these approaches 
prove adequate in meeting the needs of modern society. In considering possible reform 
strategies, the case has to be made, initially, for a departure from the traditional focus on 
insurDQFH Y¶V DVVLVWDQFH 2QO\ WKHQ ZLOO URRP EH PDGH IRU VHULRXV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI
alternative and more radical approaches to social security policy. Thus the reform process 
necessitates a full-scale review of existing measures and experiences from the past should 
be drawn upon. Any future reform package must take into consideration all of the 
relevant variables; make clear the objectives of policy from the outset and take account of 
the interaction with related policy areas in order to ensure that past mistakes are not 
repeated. It follows then that the starting point for designing a reform package should be 
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an identification with the patterns of need emerging in Britain, both on a national level 
and in relation to our European partners. However, as indicated in the introductory 
section, any reference made to, either policy developments, or changing socio-economic 
circumstances, occurring in other developed economies is for illustrative purposes only. 
It should be noted that a theoretical focus is retained in favour of comparative analysis, as 
this is considered the more relevant route for demonstrating the constraining nature of 
current debates.  
The British experience of escalating costs is not unique. Funding pressures are 
common to all EU member states. The general attack on social security expenditure will 
be explored further in chapter six, highlighting the limiting nature of the reform agenda. 
The issue is being raised at this particular point in order to demonstrate the negative 
consequences arising from an increased reliance on means-testing in terms of addressing 
the social problem of poverty. The combined effects of competing demands on public 
expenditure, low rates of economic activity and the imposition of political and economic 
restraints on deficit financing have restricted the capacity of modern welfare states to 
PHHW WKHQHHGVRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\7KHSHUFHLYHG µFULVLVRI VRFLDO SURWHFWLRQ¶KDV
led to the emergence of a widespread political debate at an EU level on the future of state 
welfare provision with a core focus being to contain the explosive growth of public 
spending (see for example DSS, 1993b). With regard to social security policy, a number 
of factors have led to an increasing interest in comparative research. On a national level, 
countries wishing to embark upon a reform program may wish to look to alternative 
schemes operating elsewhere. Additionally, with a given climate of resource restraint, 
national governments may benefit from gathering information on their relative position in 
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terms of expenditure as a proportion of total output. Interest at an international level has 
EHHQJURZLQJGXHWRWKHµKDUPRQLVDWLRQRIVRFLDODUUDQJHPHQWV¶DJHQGDRIWKH(8DQG
due to macroeconomic considerations regarding the impact social expenditure has on 
overall economic performance (Bradshaw, 1993:50-51). However, analysing comparative 
statistics on social security expenditure is problematic. Definitions of what constitutes 
social security vary across countries; national estimates of social security expenditure are 
not always readily available nor accurate and absolute comparisons can be misleading 
given the relative values of different currencies (Eardley et al, 1996:3; DSS, 1993:33). At 
best comparative statistics perform a descriptive function and by their very nature are 
normally out of date by the time they reach the public domain. However, comparative 
research focusing on welfare provision in general, rather than social security expenditure 
in particular, has proved useful, at least in a British context, in providing evidence to 
counter the political attack waged on state welfare; 
These types of comparison have been influential in demonstrating that the 
UK does not have a particularly high proportion of GDP devoted to public 
expenditure, that social expenditure as a proportion of public expenditure is 
comparatively low, that expenditure on transfers as opposed to expenditure 
on goods and services is very low, that a larger proportion of transfers are 
means-tested rather than contributory, that a larger proportion of benefit 
expenditure is funded from direct and particularly indirect tax as opposed to 
contributions and that the UK faces a relatively more manageable 
demographic outlook over the next 40 or 50 years than many other countries. 
(Bradshaw, 1993:53) 
Given this evidence it would seem that the zealous campaign to cut costs in Britain has 
been informed more by political considerations than economic ones.  
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Research aimed at comparing patterns in policy direction in recent years has 
demonstrated common trends. A study commissioned in 1993 by DSS in Britain and the 
OECD compared the structure and operating features of state provided minimum income 
guarantees in the following OECD countries - Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK 
and USA. The authors concluded that the increased use of means-tested social assistance, 
as a form of social security, was evident in most of the countries studied and a common 
salient feature of reform debates was the issue of work incentives (Eardley at al, 1996). In 
an analysis of the 1994 Australian social security reforms, Saunders argues that the 
proposals were formulated broadly in response to the problem of growing unemployment 
and as such one of the main intentions was to design a system which would actively 
promote work incentives. He concludes that the move towards a tax-financed, targeted 
social security system was considered necessary in the process of designing a flexible 
DSSURDFKWRLQFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHZKLFKZRXOGµUHVSRQGWRDQGIDFLOLWDWHHFRQRPLFDQG
ODERXU PDUNHW FKDQJHV¶ 6DXQGHUV E 0RUULV DQG /OHZHOO\Q LQ WKHLU
descriptive account of social security provision for the unemployed in the US, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, West Germany and the UK, found that a built-in feature of all the 
systems was a concern for the maintenance of work incentives (1991:121). They further 
argued that a growth in dependence on means-testing was common to all systems, except 
for Sweden. Furthermore, in all of the countries studied, recent developments had been 
driven by a desire to restrict public expenditure, which had subsequently led to a general 
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limiting of coverage, either through absolute cuts in benefits or the imposition of tighter 
eligibility criteria, and an erosion in the real value of rates of payment (1991:121).  
Thus it can be argued that the salient feature of contemporary developments in 
social security policy throughout developed economies is evidence of a common concern 
with how policy interacts with the labour market. The focus on work incentives combined 
with the issue of escalating costs and its effect on future economic growth have become 
the primary factors influencing the reform debate. This has been accompanied by an 
overall general favouring of means-testing as an approach to income maintenance policy;  
5HVHDUFK KDV LGHQWLILHG VXEVWDQWLDO OHYHOV RI µQHZ SRYHUW\¶ LQ (8 PHPEHU
countries, partly related to limitations in insurance-based protection in the 
context of long term unemployment and social change. The view that high 
levels of social security expenditure damage economic effort has also 
become more influential internationally, and financial institutions working in 
the economies of Eastern Europe have been calling for the establishment of 
means-tested safety nets as a key element in anti-poverty strategies. 
(Eardley et al, 1996:2)  
Thus, the selective targeting of benefits to those identified as being most in need is 
generally believed to be an appropriate response to funding difficulties. The question 
remains as to whether or not it is an appropriate response to identified modern needs. 
4.5 Identifying Modern Demands 
The post war social security system has been immensely successful in 
helping people cope with periods when they cannot earn or they face extra 
costs. But the system has changed enormously since it was established and 
society has changed radically. 
(Lilley, in foreword to DSS, 1993)  
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&RPPHQWLQJRQWKHµVXFFHVV¶RIVRFLDOVHFXULW\SURYLVLRQLQYROYHVDQDZDUHQHVVRI
the stated aims of policy. As indicated in chapter two, social security has a multiplicity of 
goals and thus the process of policy evaluation must at the outset determine which goals 
have been given priority. If it is accepted that the primary purpose of social security 
provision in Britain has been to protect individuals from poverty, it follows that debates 
focusing on the future direction of policy should involve an assessment of its 
redistributive function. This involves commenting on, not only the extent to which 
poverty exists, but also the causes and consequences of poverty. Furthermore, as 
previously argued, the international reform agenda has been predominantly influenced by 
questions of work incentives, and concerns regarding the interplay between social 
security policy and the operation of traditional labour market structures. Assessing the 
effectiveness of such an approach entails exploring how social security measures impact 
on individual patterns of behaviour, with particular reference to the world of paid work. It 
is argued that part of the reason for emphasising the labour market stems from a desire to 
FRPEDWWKHSUREOHPVRIµVRFLDOH[FOXVLRQ¶2QHRIWKe consequences of living in poverty 
is that individuals find themselves excluded from participating in mainstream economic 
DQGVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQV,QWKH¶VSDUWLFXODUO\DFURVVFRQWLQHQWDO(XURSHUHFRJQLWLRQ
of this negative aspect of being poor has resulted in the development of measures for 
µDFWLYDWLQJ¶ RU µLQVHUWLQJ¶ WKRVH LQGLYLGXDOV H[FOXGHG IURP WKH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF
systems which represent the basis for social inclusion in modern welfare states; the 
labour market and the family (Jordan, 1996$FRPELQDWLRQRIWDUJHWLQJWKHµQDWXUDO¶
condition of poverty and tackling the problem of social exclusion through active 
employment policies has therefore emerged, in recent years, as the dominant approach in 
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the reform of social security. Examining the outcomes of policy in these two specific 
DUHDV DOORZV IRU FULWLFDO FRPPHQW RQ WKH DFWXDO µVXFFHVV¶ RI SROLF\ DQG VHUYHV WR
illuminate the nature of the changing environment in which social security measures 
currently operate.  
4.5.1 Understanding Poverty 
Social security provision in Britain has indeed, at least since the time of Beveridge, 
prevented some of the worst evils of poverty in that a minimum income has been secured 
LQ WLPHVRIQHHGIRU WKHPDMRULW\RIFLWL]HQV ,QIOXHQFHGE\5RZQWUHH¶VSRYHUW\ studies, 
Beveridge assumed that his social insurance scheme would address the social problem of 
poverty in that it protected against the main identified causes - the interruption, either 
WHPSRUDU\ RU SHUPDQHQW RI HDUQLQJV +RZHYHU LQ WHUPV RI µHOLPLQDWLQJ ZDQW¶ WKH
system has to date not proved successful. Vast numbers of individuals in Britain live in 
poverty. The absence of any official definition or universally accepted notion of what 
constitutes poverty renders the immediately preceding statement as no more than political 
sloganising. What is poverty? How many people live in poverty? What are the 
experiences of those living in poverty? What role does social security play in resolving 
the poverty issue? In attempting to provide answers to these questions some form of 
positive methodological analysis must be adopted in order to avoid the problems 
associated with the use of value judgements.  
The practice of defining and measuring poverty has long been debated and 
throughout this century various methods have evolved in the quest for reliable indicators 
as to the numbers of individuals living in either absolute or relative poverty (see for 
example Roll, 1992). No matter what method is employed the consensus appears to be 
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that numbers are on the increase and not just in Britain, but the experience is similar 
throughout the capitalist world. The economic growth witnessed in the 1980s was 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\WKHSURGXFWLRQRIGLVWLQFWVHWVRIµZLQQHUV¶DQGµORVHUV¶7KLVZDVODUJHO\
due to structural change in the labour market. At the same time as manufacturing jobs 
were giving way to the service industries, government policy actively favoured 
µGHUHJXODWLRQ¶ RYHU KLJKO\ UHJXODWHG ODERXU PDUNHWV DQG WKH SURPRWLRQ RI µIOH[LEOH¶
working practices and patterns. The winners were represented by those groups able to 
µPRQRSROLVH¶ ZHOO-paid non-manual jobs whilst the losers were either denied access to 
employment, or were forced to accept low-paid, often part-time, insecure jobs and were 
thus constrained in their individual ability to meet their respective needs. (Massey and 
Allen, 1995:124; Green, 1996:265; Cross, 1993). While unskilled workers have 
witnessed a deterioration in their labour market position, there has been a simultaneous 
rise in the relative earnings of highly educated workers. Thus, in recent decades a 
common trend of rising earnings dispersions has been in evidence throughout the 
industrialised world (Hills, 1995). The widening employment gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers has been accompanied by a general trend towards rising income 
inequalities (see for example Hills, 1996). Hills attributes this to a number of factors, 
including various demographic changes (the most crucial being ageing populations and 
the trend towards smaller households arising mainly from increasing incidences of lone 
parenthood); and general labour market trends (specifically the increased participation of 
women in the labour market, particularly in part-time work, occurring alongside growing 
UDWHV RI ORQJ WHUP XQHPSOR\PHQW µQon-VWDQGDUG¶ IRUPV RI ZRUN VXFK DV VHOI
employment, and early retirement) (1993:30-35; 1995:71-72). In terms of this analysis, 
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the most important contributing factor to increasing income inequalities can be associated 
with the operation of income maintenance policies. In identifying differences in rates of 
growth in inequality between countries, Hills distinguishes between the; 
...automatic reaction of tax and benefits systems to changes in the inequality 
of market incomes and the effect of discretionary policy changes which may 
reinforce or counteract these automatic effects. 
(1995:71) 
He concluded that in some countries the combination of automatic and discretionary 
changes served to slow down or even cancel out the effects of growing market income 
inequality, whereas in others, most notably, Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the 
USA, income transfer mechanisms actually contributed to the rise in inequality of 
disposable incomes (ibid:72). In his attempt at developing a comprehensive economic 
analysis of patterns of income distribution in Britain since 1979, Atkinson argues that for 
the period studied; 
...the major recorded redistribution in the UK budget is that associated with 
FDVKWUDQVIHUV«7KHIDFWWKDWWKHUHGLVWULEXWLYHLPSDFWRIWUDQVIHUVDQGGLUHFt 
taxes appears to have fallen since the mid-1980s is circumstantial evidence 
that discretionary policy changes have contributed to the rise in income 
inequality. 
(1996:42-3) 
Atkinson supports his conclusion by referring to specific policy examples. The most 
notable being those which served to erode the real value of social security payments, and 
WKHQXPHURXVUHIRUPVHQDFWHGZLWK UHJDUG WRXQHPSOR\PHQW LQVXUDQFHXS WR µWKH
PDMRULW\RIZKLFKUHGXFHGWKHOHYHORUFRYHUDJHRIEHQHILW¶ 
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Thus, a combination of general social and economic changes in recent decades have 
resulted in growing numbers of individuals living on low incomes and this trend has been 
accelerated in Britain by a variety of policy shifts in the area of income maintenance. 
Unexpected or even anticipated interruptions in earnings represent only one of the many 
factors contributing to the growing disparities in disposable incomes. This gives rise to 
questions regarding the quality of existing social security schemes. Is it that levels of 
benefit are inadequate; or that the system is too complex resulting in low rates of take-up; 
or that the reliance on labour market participation is outdated and therefore current 
systems fail to take account of social and economic change? The claim to be made is that 
these are all valid criticisms of current state supported income maintenance mechanisms 
and indeed the situation exists whereby receipt of state benefits can actually contribute to 
and reinforce individual poverty rather than eliminate it. Any attempt at reversing this 
situation necessitates an understanding of new forms of poverty.  
The overall tradition in terms of preventing poverty within advanced capitalist 
states has been a reliance on the goal of full employment coupled with state measures at 
ensuring a national minimum living standard (Mishra, 1990:27). Such measures have 
included the provision of universal services intended to meet basic needs in the areas of 
housing, education and health care. Further policies have been directed at maintaining the 
incomes of the low paid and the unemployed at minimum subsistence levels. However as 
5RFKHSRLQWVRXW WKHXVHRI WKH WHUPµSRYHUW\¶ LWVHOI LVDKLJKO\FRQWHQWLRXVPDWWHUDQG
leads to much debate surrounding the actual definition of poverty, the evolution of 
various explanations accounting for the existence of poverty and controversy surrounding 
the possible cures (1992:55). If the purpose is to examine the adequacy of state policies 
  
 132 
aimed at preventing poverty what is required is a workable definition of what constitutes 
being poor along with an inquiry into the various contributing factors.  
The issue of poverty has been a subject worthy of study within a variety of 
academic disciplines and not just in recent years. However it has not always been a 
subject worth similar attention on the political agenda. Within the EC the onset of 
recession and the persistence of high unemployment in recent years has resulted in more 
attention being directed at the development of anti-poverty policies (Brown, 1984). 
Social policy had previously taken a back seat to economic policy and the emphasis 
within social programs had tended to focus on labour market issues with the ultimate goal 
being to promote the freedom of movement of workers between member states (Brown, 
1984; Schulte, 1993). The recognition of the need for a constructive set of policy 
SUHVFULSWLRQV OHG WR WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI YDULRXV H[SHULPHQWDO SURJUDPV &RPPXQLW\¶V
Action Programme on Poverty) aimed at tackling poverty within the EC. The definition 
set out during the course of these programs was that poverty was experienced by those;  
...persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to 
exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State 
in which they live. 
(Schulte, 1993:40-41) 
This rather vague definition was subsequently translated into a tangible yardstick, used 
by the European Commission in measuring poverty, in that households are to be 
considered poor if their income falls below 50 percent of the average income prevailing 
within the member state in which they live (Atkinson, 1992:4). The use of this criterion 
directly led to the; 
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...widely quoted estimate that there were some 50 million people living in 
poverty in Europe in the 1980s, a statistic which played a powerful role in 
mobilising public and political opinion in favour of extending the social 
responsibilities of the European Community.  
(1992:4)  
It is worth noting that the utilisation of the European standard points to the actual severity 
of the poverty issue in Britain. Schulte draws from the statistics to show that; 
In the mid-1980s the proportion of persons with per capita disposable 
incomes below 50 per cent of the national average was; 
x particularly high (18-32 per cent) in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom; 
x about average (15 per cent) in France and Italy; and 
x relatively low (6-11 per cent) in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
(Schulte, 1993:41) 
Accepting the figures derived by the Commission provides policy makers with 
information on the numbers of households living on low incomes but does little in the 
way of accounting for the experiences of those households, nor does it furnish any 
explanation as to the possible causes. Measuring income levels, although providing an 
indicator as to the extent of the problem, is not a very socially useful tool in studying 
poverty. However this is the approach utilised in most advanced countries (Atkinson, 
1989:207).  
The situation in Britain is a prime example of a country adopting the income 
method, at least in official terms, as a mechanism by which to obtain statistics on the 
poverty issue. The government publication in 1974 of the Low Income Families Tables 
(LIF) was an official statistical series detailing the numbers of people living on, below or 
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just above the current supplementary benefit level (now IS) with benefit levels used as a 
means of measuring the poverty line. Measurements utilising benefit levels as the sole 
terms of reference merely indicate the numbers living either on or below a decidedly low 
level of income. The benefit standard was used until 1988 when the government replaced 
/,) ZLWK WKH µ+RXVHKROGV %HORZ $YHUDJH ,QFRPH¶ +%$, VWDWLVWLFV 7KLV VHULHV
represents the official figures on low income and the 50% of average income (after 
housing costs) figure is the yardstick most commonly used from these statistics to 
measure poverty, which is in line with EC practice. Although widely accepted and 
IUHTXHQWO\ FLWHG DV WKH µRIILFLDO ILJXUHV¶ RQ SRYHUWy, these figures are merely 
measurements of low income (Roll, 1992). Income levels within a household provide 
very little information on the actual living standards of that household and measurements 
of this sort assume a particular concept of poverty. Income may indeed not be equally 
shared within the household, perhaps going primarily to the wage earner and therefore 
poverty within such a household remains invisible. Conversely income levels may be no 
indication as to the resources available to a household and therefore the numbers living in 
poverty are overestimated. Perhaps a more reliable indicator would be combination of 
income and expenditure levels occurring within households. Atkinson distinguishes 
between the two arguing that the emphasis on income relates to a particular notion of 
SRYHUW\ WKDW LV WKH QRWLRQ RI µPLQLPXP ULJKWV WR UHVRXUFHV¶ DQG FRQFHQWUDWLRQ RQ
H[SHQGLWXUHSDWWHUQVSUHVHQWVDQLQGLFDWLRQRIµVWDQGDUGVRIOLYLQJ¶$WNLQVRQ 
The problem hence becomes one of defining poverty and distinguishing between 
absolute and relative concepts. Predetermining some absolute minimum level of income, 
either by using current benefit levels or average earnings figures, is a highly objective 
  
 135 
approach. Furthermore it provides nothing more than information on the number of 
households participating in the formal economy, either via the labour market or the 
official social security system, who are barely able to meet their most basic needs. The 
idea of relative poverty allows for more illustrative analysis as the concept encapsulates 
the idea that individuals in society should not only have a right to a minimum income but 
should also be economically able to participate in that society. Recognition of this fact 
has led to the development and use RIµFRQVHQVXDO¶PHDVXUHVRISRYHUW\ ,QVHHNLQJDQ
alternative to the focus on establishing absolute poverty lines, Mack and Lansley (1985) 
set out to investigate the views of the general population on what constitutes an 
unacceptably low standard of living in Britain, how many fell below this standard and 
how standards vary. The survey asked what necessities everyone in Britain should be able 
to afford and went on to enquire if the respondents themselves had the items and if not, 
whether it was because the\ GLGQ¶W ZDQW WKHP RU FRXOG QRW DIIRUG WKHP 3RYHUW\ LV
therefore conceptualised in terms of what is generally viewed by society to be minimum 
acceptable standards of living. The claim is made that utilising public opinion surveys as 
to what constitutes minimum acceptable living standards reflects the views of the general 
population and hence is not influenced by the opinions or value judgements of academics, 
policy makers or governments. A variation of this approach is the use of budget standard 
methodology. Drawing upon research precedents set in North America, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Scandinavia, the Family Budget Unit, established in Britain in 1987, has 
engaged in extensive research into the economic needs and living costs of various family 
compositions (Parker, 1998). The budget approach to measuring poverty brings together 
DUDQJHRIµH[SHUW¶QRUPDWLYHMXGJHPHQWVRQUHFRJQLVHGVWDQGDUGVIRUQXWULWLRQKRXVLQJ
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warmth and exercise, and empirical data relating to consumer spending patterns (Parker, 
1998:14). A budget standard is then set which serves as a benchmark representing the 
costs associated with maintaining a predefined living standard. Approaches such as those 
discussed above encompass the point made by Atkinson, referred to earlier, regarding the 
distinction between income and expenditure in that both resource constraints and 
consumption patterns are taken into account to provide a more demonstrative analysis of 
the extent and nature of poverty.  
Whatever the standards used, the evidence suggests that the numbers of people 
living in relative poverty is rising; 
«SRYHUW\KDVJURZQVLJQLILFDQWO\RYHUUHFHQW\HDUVDQGE\EHWZHHQ
13 and 14 million people in the United Kingdom - around a quarter of our 
society - were living in poverty. 
(Oppenheim and Harker, 1996:24) 
Within Europe it is estimated that 57 million people live on incomes deemed below the 
poverty level (European Commission, 1999). However, knowledge of the magnitude of 
poverty among societies is not sufficient information with which to formulate policy 
responses. If, for a large proportion of the populace, available resources are inadequate to 
achieve socially acceptable living standards the solution may be to increase incomes. 
However such a policy fails to address the reasons why sufficient resources are not being 
accessed by a significant number of individuals, nor does it explain why for some the 
actual incomes once secured are indeed inadequate. What is required is an understanding 
of the individual and social conditions that create poverty. For Cross this understanding 
KDVIDLOHGWRPDWHULDOLVHZLWKLQWKH(&EHFDXVHWKHWHUPµSRYHUW\¶LVFRQVLGHUHG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DQ RUJDQLF FRQFHSW VLPLODU WR µLOO KHDOWK¶ EHFDXVH LW LPSOLHV D µQDWXUDO¶
HTXLOLEULXPVWDWHIURPZKLFKWKLVµXQQDWXUDO¶condition departs. Therefore the 
focus tends to be on identifying the problem and a possible cure, rather than 
identifying the cause of the problem.  
(1993:6)   
Consequently this myopic view of a social problem results in policy proposals being 
targeted inefficiently. 
One of the most obvious causes of poverty occurs when individuals suffer a loss in 
earning power either through unemployment, sickness, old age or childbirth. Exclusion 
from the labour market, whether temporary or on a permanent basis, can often be 
accompanied by an associated increase in living expenses. For example, the costs of job 
search or retraining; medical expenses; additional household expenses incurred when the 
pattern of going to work is replaced with spending more time at home and the extra funds 
required to provide for a new baby. Such causes of poverty are well documented and 
were the main motivating factors leading to the design of modern welfare provision. The 
post war social security system in Britain has indeed been successful in alleviating the 
worst aspects of poverty arising out of temporary exclusion from the labour market. A 
combination of social insurance; a comprehensive National Health Service; a system of 
family allowances, and a scheme of social assistance proved to be an effective policy 
package for the purposes of alleviating poverty in the post war era. Social security acted 
as a tool for supplementing individual incomes whilst on the macro level the commitment 
to maintaining full employment instituted the right to work and witnessed the departure 
by post war administrations from laissez-faire type government to one of intervention. 
The development of social security provision in Britain throughout the 1950s and 60s 
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took place at a time of broad political consensus. Policies aimed at promoting a mixed 
economy and expanding the scope of state public welfare provision received little 
criticism. However, this was only to last as long as there was the guarantee of economic 
expansion (ILO, 1984:3). 
Although there was a marked development in social security provision in the 
immediate post war years, poverty remained an inherent feature of British society. 
1HDULQJ WKHHQGRI WKHV µHYLGHQFHEHJDQ WRHPHUJHDERXW WKH LQDGHTXDFLHVRI WKH
Welfare State, and specifically about the unsatisfactory character of parts of the social 
VHFXULW\V\VWHP¶+LOO7KHVPDUNHGWKHµUHGLVFRYHU\¶RISRYHUW\DWOHDVW
in the USA and Britain, with the publication of various academic studies indicating the 
current extent of the proEOHP DQG VSDUNHG UHQHZHG LQWHUHVW LQ WKH µSDUDGR[ RI SRYHUW\
DPLGVW SOHQW\¶ WKHPH -RUGDQ -94, Roll, 1992:26-27). Claims were made that 
existing provision was inadequate in terms of levels of benefit but more importantly 
studies pointed to the poverty experienced by those not covered by the system, either 
because they were ineligible for benefit or were in work and earnings were actually 
below the state benefit levels. This resulted in various enactments serving to provide 
assistance to the working poor and patching up the Beveridge design for social insurance 
to account for housing costs and vulnerable groups, such as those with children and the 
elderly. Such measures were piecemeal and failed to adequately address the causes of 
poverty.   
A further development in the study of poverty occurred with the realisation, largely 
D UHVXOW RI WKH (& UXQ H[SHULPHQWDO SRYHUW\ SURJUDPV RI WKH µQHZ SRYHUW\¶ HYLGHQW
WKURXJKRXW(XURSH)RU&URVVDFFHSWDQFHRIWKLVWHUPGRHVQRWLPSO\WKDWWKHµROG¶IRUP
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of poverty has been eliminated, that is poverty amongst the elderly the unemployed and 
the disabled, but rather permits analysis of the problem to go beyond these parameters 
DQG µIRFXV RQ WKH SRYHUW\ H[SHULHQFHG E\ WKH DEOH-bodied of working age who are 
themselves LQ WKH ODERXU PDUNHW¶  &URVV JRHV RQ WR PDNH D YHU\ XVHIXO
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµH[FOXVLRQ¶DQGµPDUJLQDOLW\¶ZKLFKDOORZV WKHFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
poverty to take account of changes in the structure of the labour market;  
Exclusion is a process of separation from employment which exists over 
sufficient time to force groups, communities and individuals into poverty and 
welfare dependence. Marginalisation is a process of low-level and insecure 
labour-market inclusion into employment, typically affecting identifiable 
groups, with few chances for advancement or wealth accumulation. 
(ibid:7) 
In making this distinction Cross implies that; 
...individuals or households may enter the ranks of the new poor either 
because they are excluded from employment or because they are employed at 
levels of income insufficient to sustain their families above the poverty line.  
(op cit)  
The decline of traditional manufacturing industries has rendered many individuals 
unemployable in that they do not possess the skills necessary to enter new industries and 
are therefore excluded from the labour market. Furthermore, the marginalisation that 
Cross talks of results directly from new forms of employment. A concentration of job 
availability in the service sector is characterised by a demand for casual, low skilled 
labour which is subsequently low paid (Standing, 1992). Subsequently, the type of job 
creation most evident in todays advanced economies often leaves individuals vulnerable 
to poverty in that they are unable to secure, for sufficient periods of time, an income 
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capable of meeting their own and the needs of their family. Such groups are therefore 
marginalised and forced to rely on state support to supplement their incomes. 
4.5.2 Women and Poverty 
The feminisation of poverty is a well documented phenomenon (see for example 
Millar & Glendinning, 1989; Glendinning & Millar 1990; Daly, 1992). However, official 
VWDWLVWLFV HVWLPDWLQJ LQFLGHQFHV RI SRYHUW\ WHQG WR EH µJHQGHU EOLQG¶ LQ WKDW WKH\ IDLO WR
DFFRXQW IRU HLWKHU ZRPHQ¶V JUHDWHU YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR SRYHUW\ RU WKH µLQYLVLEOH¶ SRYHUW\
experienced by women within the household (Lister, 1992:12). Although, as Pahl argues, 
the feminisation of poverty idea is not a new one, but rather simply the product of better 
documentation relaWLQJWRZRPHQ¶VSRYHUW\DQGµWKHLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUPDQDJLQJVFDUFH
UHVRXUFHV¶  ,W IROORZV WKDW WKH SURFHVV RI GHVLJQLQJ SROLFLHV VSHFLILFDOO\
targeted at relieving poverty should incorporate a gender dimension. In considering the 
gendered dimension of poverty it is evident that the different experiences of women from 
men arise mainly from their role as wives and mothers. These roles impact on their 
position in the labour market and the degree of control they are able to exercise over 
resources within the family unit. In terms of their increased vulnerability to poverty, 
recent trends in the labour market have served to exacerbate the relative disadvantaged 
position of women. Furthermore, whilst the hidden poverty of women is more difficult to 
quantify, recent developments in social security policy have done little in the way of 
securing the actual economic independence of women nor have they served to address 
the negative economic consequences for women arising from the sexual division of 
labour within the household. These issues will be returned to in when discussing the 
benefits of a CBI in terms of promoting gender equality. At this point, however, a 
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summary of the main factors contributing to women's poverty is provided for the purpose 
of illustrating their distinctive nature. 
Changes in the structure of modern labour markets has resulted in marked 
differences from the past in terms of the type of labour demanded. The model of full 
time, permanent employment, viewed as the sole and sustainable source of income, is 
being replaced by part-time, casual employment to be secured at different points 
throughout the lifecycle. Consequently such jobs offer little in the way of employment 
rights nor do they offer the opportunity to contribute on a long-term basis to some form 
of occupational pension scheme and the rates of pay reflect this process of 
deformalisation. The increased participation of women in the labour market throughout 
the post war years has been characterised by this growing labour market segmentation, 
both horizontally and vertically (Ginsburg, 1992:157; Harkness et al, 1996; Nixon and 
Williamson, 1993; Lonsdale, 1992:97). That is, concentration occurs in specific 
occupations which lend themselves to part-time or casual modes of employment and 
these jobs are traditionally offered at low rates of pay. At the same time the rising 
unemployment amongst men throughout the EC has resulted in the adoption of a range of 
strategies intended to encourage women back into the domestic realm (Kofman and 
Sales, 1996:37). This structural cause of the gendered nature of poverty is exacerbated by 
the operation the Keynes/Beveridge design for welfare provision.  
Women have long suffered in terms of economic disadvantage arising from their 
WUHDWPHQW DV µGHSHQGDQWV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH VRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHP 7KH FRPELQDWLRQ RI VRFLDO
LQVXUDQFHDQGDPDFURHFRQRPLFREMHFWLYHRI IXOO µPDOH¶HPSOR\PHQWSUHVHQWVDVRFLR-
economic structure which fails to promote the economic independence of women. Their 
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limited access to benefits, inherent within a social insurance model of welfare provision, 
places women in an economically disadvantaged position, when compared with men, 
throughout the course of their lifecycle (Lister, 1992; Walker, 1993:29-30). Women who 
find themselves unable to secure an independent income are forced to rely on the 
generosity of men, either directly through the wage packet or indirectly through their 
contribution records. Subsequently the range of income sources available to women are 
less secure than those available to men and in terms of the benefit structure they tend to 
be over-UHSUHVHQWHG DV UHFLSLHQWV RI WKH µLQIHULRU QRQ-FRQWULEXWRU\ EHQHILWV¶ RU WKH OHVV
generous means-tested forms of assistance (Lister, 1992:28). Furthermore, unpaid work 
caring for other people remains the primary responsibility of women in the private 
domestic economy. This serves to threaten their capacity to earn and limits their access to 
EHQHILWV IXUWKHUGXH WR WKHLUSHUFHLYHG µXQDYDLODELOLW\¶ IRUZRUN LQ WKHIRUPDOHFRQRP\
(-RVKL  *DUGLQHU  7KXV ZRPHQ¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ HLWKHU SXEOLF PHDQV RI
support or the financial contribution of their male partner; their limited access to the 
labour market, and societies failure to adequately recognise and provide for the 
traditional caring responsibilities normally assumed by women leaves them extremely 
vulnerable to poverty. 
In addition to these structural factors certain behavioural factors contribute to the 
gendered nature of poverty. The traditional values and beliefs about the role of women 
within the family unit and their corresponding responses to financial crisis limits even 
further the opportunity for women to break free of their public or private dependence. It 
is only when these factors are analysed can the feminisation of poverty hypothesis be 
fully understood and addressed. Although the unpaid domestic labour of women is 
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traditionally assigned no economic value, and subsequently their contribution is not 
viewed as part of the households available resources, they are normally assigned the role 
of domestic managers, specifically in low income households (Graham, 1992; Parker, 
1992; Payne; 1991, Morris, 1990:110-111, Pahl, 1989). In this sense women are often 
EODPHG IRU µFDXVLQJ¶ SRYHUW\ ZKHQ PDQDJLQJ D KRXVHKROG LQ ZKLFh another member, 
usually the male partner, appears to be providing the financial means to support the 
household due to their inability to adopt sound budgeting practices (Millar & 
Glendinning, 1989; Parker, 1992). Men on the other hand are traditionally expected to 
provide and when this is not possible they can fulfil their social responsibilities by 
UHJLVWHULQJ DW WKH XQHPSOR\PHQW H[FKDQJH DV µDFWLYHO\ VHHNLQJ ZRUN¶ %ODPH FDQ EH
DWWULEXWHGWRWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHODERXUPDUNHWZKHUHE\WKHIDLOXUHWRµPDNHHQGVPHHW¶
usually lands wholly at the feet of women with no obvious scapegoat. It is the pressure of 
such a social obligation that contributes to the situation whereby women often bear the 
burden of making the necessary individual sacrifices to ensure that the needs of the 
household are met (Pahl, 1989:178; Parker, 1992, Payne, 1991). The result is that when 
poverty is experienced within a household it tends to be felt more severely by the women 
acting as wives and mothers within that household. Thus, their structural location in work 
and family life mean that not only are the periods when women are at risk of poverty 
different from those for men, but also the ways in which men and women encounter 
poverty and respond to it show a marked contrast (Williams, Popay and Oakley, 1999). 
The above points have been made in order to illustrate the variety of issues arising 
out of any attempt to conceptualise and understand the nature of the social problem of 
poverty. On no account should it be viewed as an exhaustive analysis of the issue of 
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poverty, which is a subject worthy of further research, but rather an introduction to the 
questions raised regarding the efficiency of current anti-poverty policies. The aim is to 
draw attention to the fact that the continued existence of poverty, and the failure to come 
to any universally accepted conclusions as to the causes, is one of the main factors 
contributing to the criticisms of the modern welfare state and in particular the role played 
by social security.  
4.5.3. The Consequences of Poverty; Understanding Social Exclusion 
In debates about Social Europe, the terms poverty and social exclusion have 
on occasion been used interchangeably. Cynics have suggested that the term 
µVRFLDO H[FOXVLRQ¶ KDV EHHQ DGRSWHG E\ %UXVVHOV Wo appease previous 
Conservative governments of the United Kingdom, who believed neither that 
there was poverty in Britain nor that poverty was a concern of the European 
Commission. 
(Atkinson, 1998:1) 
The concept of social exclusion represents wider concerns than the direct economic 
effects of poverty. That is, the term means more than the lack of income but rather 
encompasses a range of problems experienced by individuals living in poverty, which 
effectively serve to exclude them from the social, economic and political institutions of 
mainstream society. Such problems are normally those associated with concepts of 
multiple deprivation or social disadvantage, including, inadequate housing, poor health, 
low educational and/or skills level, family breakdown and living in communities with 
high unemployment and crime rates which act to limit the range of services on offer. The 
most obvious include those services related directly to consumption, such as the location 
of large supermarkets, leisure and recreational facilities or the provision of public 
transport and public utilities. However, by way of their postal address, individuals 
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QRUPDOO\UHVLGLQJLQDUHDVGHILQHGDVGHPRQVWUDWLQJµPXOWLSOHGHSULYDWLRQ¶FDQRIWHQILQG
themselves excluded from a range of financial services which renders them more 
susceptible to poverty. Lack of insurance, or the denied access to mainstream banking 
facilities, contributes to the hardship experienced by low income households. In times of 
financial crisis they are forced to rely upon the more expensive forms of credit which 
more often than not transfers into unmanageable debt (see for example Ford, 1991; 
Berthoud and Kempson, 1990; Parker, 1992). 
Combating the problem of social exclusion has become a central feature of social 
policy in the 1990s at an EU level. However, to date, no legally binding rights and 
obligations have been set in place, rather the principle of subsidiarity continues to 
dominate, whereby it is up to individual member states to decide upon and implement 
policy within a supportive EU framework (Hantrais, 1995:ch8; Blake, 1996). For 
Hantrais;  
The growing recognition by the Union that poverty is a result of the 
inadequacy of cultural and social as well as material resources may help to 
explain why official documents emphasise the subsidiarity principle in 
formulating measures to combat social exclusion. 
(1995:160) 
Furthermore, what has emerged in the latter half of this decade has been a shift in 
direction from understanding and tackling social exclusion to a policy focus on 
promoting social inclusion (Blake, 1996:7). On the surface the distinction may seem an 
arbitrary one to make, but in terms of informing the kind of policies adopted it is crucial. 
In practical terms it demonstrates a narrow and limiting perspective on the problem of 
social exclusion, which fails to adequately account for its multi-dimensional nature. The 
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continued reference made to the direct relationship between social exclusion and 
unemployment within the European policy forum indicates a prioritising of job creation 
strategies, combined with active labour market measures designed to promote work 
incentives, as the main weapon against social exclusion (Hantrais, 1995:166, Atkinson, 
1998:8). It would appear then that the problems associated with social exclusion are 
perceived to be addressed through inclusion into the formal labour market. Although an 
emphasis on employment-related rights has been a consistent feature of the European 
social dimension, the current focus is increasingly directed at tackling the rights of the 
unemployed rather than the rights of the worker citizen.  
,Q%ULWDLQWKHUHKDVEHHQDQH[SOLFLWUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHQHHGWRILQGµQHZDQGPRUH
LQWHJUDWHG ZD\V RI WDFNOLQJ WKH ZRUVW SUREOHPV¶ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK SRYHUW\ DQG VRFLDO
exclusion (Scottish Office, 1998), represented by the establishment of the Social 
([FOXVLRQ8QLWZLWKLQWKH&DELQHW2IILFHLQ'HFHPEHU7KHFXUUHQW*RYHUQPHQW¶V
view on social exclusion appears to indicate a move towards a broad based approach to 
tackling the problem in that a range of both social and economic factors have been 
identified as contributing to exclusion;  
...in particular poor housing, low incomes, lack of work experience in the 
family, low educational attainment, ill health, family stress and the impact of 
drugs misuse and crime. The path put of exclusion, for individuals, or 
communities, is not therefore straightforward. Single interventions may be 
insufficient to break the cycle - although it will be important to identify 
where and when interventions can be most effective - and stand-alone polices 
may be insufficient in themselves to end exclusion. 
(Scottish Office, 1998:7) 
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However, although a number of key policy initiatives have been taken in the area of child 
care, housing, education and community safety, the emphasis mimics that adopted on a 
European level in that the focus of policy is to promote, or in some instances even 
HQIRUFH µLQFOXVLRQ¶ 7KLV LV EHVW GHPRQVWUDWHG E\ GHYHORSPHQWV LQ VRFLDO VHFXULW\ DQG
employment policy. These developments are representative of the current Labour 
*RYHUQPHQWV RYHUDOO µZHOIDUH WR ZRUN¶ SDFNDJH RI UHIRUP DQG FRPSULVH RI WKUHH PDLQ
policy initiatives - the National Child Care Strategy, the National Minimum Wage and 
the New Deal (Gardiner, 1997:55). In addition, the recently introduced WFTC is 
primarily a measure intended to strengthen the incentives to work amongst those 
LQGLYLGXDOV ZKR ILQG WKHPVHOYHV FDXJKW LQ D µZHOIDUH GHSHQGHQF\¶ WUDS GXH WR WKH
structure of current tax and benefit systems.  
The combined effect of this program of policy reform is to purposefully promote 
inclusion through active labour market participation, by making work financially 
attractive and by implementing measures which assist individuals, or groups of 
LQGLYLGXDOVLQEHFRPLQJµHPSOR\DEOH¶7KXVLWLVFODLPHGWKDWµZRUNDQGDFFHVVWRZRUN¶
is considered to be the main route out of poverty in contemporary British society (HM 
Treasury, 1999) and, as both current joblessness, and the dynamics of unemployment and 
poverty, are believed to be main contributing factors to the problem of social exclusion 
(Atkinson, 1998:8), it follows that advocating inclusion through the formal labour market 
is believed to be an appropriate policy response. However, it is argued that this response 
can be criticised both in terms of its limited perspective on the causes and consequences 
RIVRFLDOH[FOXVLRQDQGLQWHUPVRILWVµLQGLYLGXDOLVWLF¶IRFXV7KDWLVSROLF\LVIUDPHGLQ
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line with a traditional economic perspective which views individuals in isolation and 
assumes the supremacy of free rational choice in determining patterns of behaviour; 
In Britain the promotion of employment has now been restored as an 
objective of policy, but it is not included in the remit of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, which is required to pursue an inflation objective. The 
instruments adopted for the employment objective are not those of 
macroeconomic policy. Rather they are those which concentrate on the 
microeconomic circumstances facing individuals.  
(Meadows, 1998:75) 
This microeconomic approach to policy fails to account for the informing role played by 
social and economic institutions; collective identities, and gender differentials in creating 
social exclusion.  
Exclusion may be directly linked to the behaviour of others which the individual 
has no control over. For example, the conventional practice employed by financial 
institutions, referred to earlier, of blacklisting specific postal areas serves to exclude 
individuals who otherwise may meet all the necessary criteria for utilising the services on 
offer. Another form of consumption exclusion which is collectively determined can be 
identified as the effects of peer group pressure. This is particularly the case where 
children are concerned, in that not possessing the necessary items, as dictated by the 
latest fashion or recreational craze, effectively serves to set them apart from the social 
norm (Atkinson, 1998:13). Families, and in particular mothers, struggling to meet their 
FKLOGUHQ¶V UHODWLYHQHHGVPD\SULRULWLVH Hxpenditure in this area which can result in the 
neglect of necessary expenditures, thus rendering them more vulnerable to further 
exclusion (see for example McKay and Scott, 1999). With regard to intra-household 
resource distribution, certain members of a family unit may be more excluded than others 
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due to their lack of access or control over household income. Again the effects of such 
are more likely to be felt by women due to their dependent status which is either enforced 
by the operation of the benefit system or is a result of marked inequalities in earning 
power. Furthermore, the relationship between employment and exclusion is not as 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDVµLQFOXVLRQDU\¶W\SHSROLF\ZRXOGVXJJHVW(TXDOLVLQJRSSRUWXQLW\LVQRW
simply a matter of prioritising education and skills attainment. Discrimination in the 
labour market, based on factors such as age, gender, ethnicity and disability is well 
documented, therefore exclusion may be as much to do with belonging to a specific 
group as it has to do with unemployment. Although the New Deal programme makes 
explicit reference to the individual job search needs of lone parents, the young 
unemployed and the disabled, it remains to be seen whether such will impact on the 
attitudes and actions of employers, particularly in the long term. A related point when 
examining current labour market structures refers to the nature of the jobs on offer. 
Creating incentives to work via a restructuring of the benefit system, combined with a 
concentration on improving the quality of labour supply, is believed to feed through into 
the demand side of the equation by reducing replacement ratios thereby making labour 
more affordable. However; 
Critics of the American approach of labour market flexibility see it as 
generating jobs which are less privileged in their remuneration or in their 
VHFXULW\7KHQHZO\FUHDWHGMREVDUHVHHQDVµPDUJLQDO¶UDWKHUWKDQµUHJXODU¶
jobs, where the latter have the expectation of continuing employment, offer 
training and prospects of internal promotion, and are covered by employment 
SURWHFWLRQ µ0DUJLQDO¶ MREV ODFN RQH RU PRUH RI WKHVH DWWULEXWHV WKH\ PD\
also be low paid. In this respect, the relativity of the concept of exclusion 
becomes important. If the expansion of employment is obtained at the 
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expense of a widening of the gap between those at the bottom of the earnings 
scale and the overall average, then it may not end social exclusion. 
(Atkinson, 1998:9) 
Although the introduction of the National Minimum Wage may go some way in 
addressing the remunerDWLRQ DVSHFW RI WKH µMXQN MRE¶ VFHQDULR HPSOR\PHQW SROLF\
targeted almost exclusively at altering the behaviour of the unemployed fails to account 
for the totality of the social and economic environment in which those individuals 
operate. This criticism is further demonstrated by the emphasis on a microeconomic 
approach to employment policy. As well as considering the nature of the jobs available, 
with regard to both their current status and long term sustainability, the impact of policy 
aimed at getting people off the unemployment register and into work must be viewed in 
OLJKWRIRYHUDOOHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH,ILQGLYLGXDOZRUNHUVIHHOµSRZHUOHVVLQWKHIDFH
of macro-HFRQRPLF IRUFHV¶ WKLV PD\ UHVXOW LQ GLVLQFHQWLYHV WR PRYH IURP ZHOIDUH LQWR
work due to individual assessments of risk and uncertainty (Atkinson, 1998:9). This 
possibility is more likely when the structure of the benefit system makes the transition 
even more costly in that future job loss is accompanied by laborious and timeous 
claiming proceduUHVDQGDSRWHQWLDOORVVRIHQWLWOHPHQWVEDVHGRQµORQJ-WHUP¶UHFHLSW 
In conclusion, the concept of social exclusion is widely understood to be 
representative of a multi-dimensional problem. However, policy to date has increasingly 
focused on a uni-dimensional perspective on the relationship between the world of work 
and exclusion. Furthermore, within that perspective traces of an adherence to neo-
classical assumptions regarding human behaviour are to be found. Policy has been 
targeted at influencing the consumption patterns of individuals with reference to work 
and leisure. It is argued that such policy has been formed within a framework bound by 
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the constraining features of rational, individually determined, utility maximising choice. 
Thus the outcome of social integration, or inclusion, is believed to be a function of 
individual action, which is primarily informed by a realisation of the monetary benefits of 
formal employment. Implied within this strategy is the notion that poverty and social 
exclusion are inextricably linked and the solution to one provides an answer to the other. 
Income from work relieves poverty, assures inclusion and thus effectively combats social 
exclusion. However as indicated above, such a strategy only solves part of the problem 
and therefore is only part of the answer. A more appropriate response would be to 
identify the multiplicity of factors which impinge upon individual choice and to design 
policy with those in mind.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the main changes made to social security policy in recent 
years alongside an analysis of the principal social problems current measures have been 
targeted at addressing. Throughout the chapter the emphasis has been on demonstrating 
how policy developments have taken place within an environment where the perceived 
needs of money driven market based economies are prioritised. In particular social 
security policy has taken a back seat to the efforts devoted to supporting the operating 
structures of formal labour markets. It has been argued that this approach is a direct 
consequence of an almost exclusive application of neo-classical economic theory to the 
study of poverty and social exclusion. Furthermore, the reform agenda is effectively 
constrained by the dominance of this particular mind set. It follows that future reform 
proposals will only be taken seriously if they too are presented within a similar analytical 
framework. In order to move the reform debate beyond such limiting forces it is clear that 
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the first step should involve an explicit recognition of the objectives of social security 
policy, but also that such objectives should account for the actual nature of the whole 
range of economic and social exchanges evident in modern society. This is not to say that 
the formal work and pay relationship should be dismissed as a crucial foundation in the 
design and operation of social security measures, but rather that it should not exist as the 
sole factor, thus dominating the reform agenda.  
What is required is a policy that is independent of traditional labour market 
processes, but will operate in such a way that does not adversely affect the efficient 
functioning of the waged economy. Furthermore, the policy should be flexible in 
adapting to modern social problems and should serve to complement other forms of state 
welfare provision. In the search for a reform package that would achieve such a goal a 
CBI presents as a possible remedy to the related, but yet distinct, problems of poverty and 
social exclusion and one that positively responds to the dynamics of modern living 
conditions. The following chapter will provide an introduction to the CBI concept, 
outlining its defining features and evaluating the main arguments posed for and against 
its introduction. The claim will be made that a CBI can be viewed as a practical policy 
option emerging within a tradition of alternative positions on the relationship between 
work and pay. It is this feature of the proposal that makes it of interest in developing a 
feminist economics perspective to social security reform. That is, arguing for a CBI 
provides an opportunity for establishing a framework to critically examine commonly 
held beliefs about the nature of work and sources of income in modern society. Such a 
framework would allow for the deconstruction of institutionalised notions about the 
function of formal paid work in the operation of market based economies, thus rendering 
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the analytical process more transparent. By identifying the value judgements currently 
dominating debates on the future of social security policy, the research process can move 
beyond restrictive practices associated with narrow conceptions of economic efficiency 
and set in place a framework for recognising the full potential benefits of a CBI.  
The following chapter will therefore provide a working definition of a CBI, 
alongside a summary of the main arguments both for and against the proposal. Attention 
will be focused on how a CBI has been presented as a package for the reform of income 
maintenance policy. In this sense it has been viewed traditionally as a measure which 
would respond to modern demands without threatening the goal of economic efficiency. 
Thus, it is claimed that the CBI debate has been effectively defined by similar confining 
parameters to those associated with mainstream economic analysis.   
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Chapter 5: Why a Citizens Basic Income?: The Story So Far 
5.1 Introduction 
Arguments for a CBI have been framed within a diverse range of perspectives, 
ranging from the philosophical (see for example Van Parijs, 1995) to ecological 
considerations (see for example Fitzpatrick, 1999). However, for the purpose of this 
analysis the focus will be on the economic questions raised by the CBI proposal. Firstly, 
it will be argued that such questions have persistently dominated debates on social 
security reform and secondly, the intention is to demonstrate the limiting nature of the 
application of mainstream economic thinking in the analysis of income maintenance 
policy. By providing a critical evaluation of traditional economic arguments posed both 
in favour of, and against, a CBI, the stage is set for incorporating a wider and more 
inclusive economics perspective into current debates. Thus, in retaining the emphasis on 
economics, the tendency to attract criticism based on the neglect of a crucial aspect of the 
operating effects of income maintenance policy is abated, whilst at the same time the 
WUXO\µUDGLFDO¶QDWXUHRID&%,FDQEHDSSUHFLDWHG 
In arguing for reform along the lines of a CBI it is generally assumed that the issues 
being discussed relate exclusively to the reform of social security systems. This is mainly 
the result of two associated assumptions regarding the nature of a CBI. Firstly, a CBI 
involves a transfer of monies from the state to individuals and therefore by definition falls 
within the realms of state income transfer schemes. Secondly, a CBI represents an 
income source unrelated to earnings and as such is categorised as a social security 
benefit, that is cash received outwith the formal labour market. A CBI will therefore be 
introduced as a possible social security reform package. However, the wider remit of 
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securing individual autonomy and allowing for the development of social and economic 
relationships, negotiated outwith the confines of traditional market oriented transactions, 
has resulted in support for a CBI as a strategy for overall reform of state welfare 
provision (see for example Jordan, 1996; Purdy, 1994). This aspect of the debate will be 
explored further in the process of developing a feminist economics perspective on a CBI. 
For the purpose of this chapter a CBI will be examined with specific reference to the 
direct association made with the reform of income maintenance policy. In this sense a 
CBI is viewed as a feasible and desirable response to claims of crisis in modern social 
security systems. That is, a CBI is considered a possible solution to a whole set of social 
problems, identified in previous chapters.  
The principal arguments in favour of a CBI point to the potential for promoting 
fairness of treatment between men and women, the degree of freedom it offers to each 
individual by removing the economic necessity of employment and the related effect of 
supporting the requirements of a more flexible labour market. Initial observations 
indicate that a CBI can arguably be presented as an effective anti-poverty strategy which 
promotes both economic and social justice, whilst simultaneously responding positively 
to modern labour market processes. However, arguments against involve the claimed 
prohibitive costs and the adverse effects such a scheme may have on work incentives. 
The validity of these specific negative viewpoints is not to be disputed and indeed such 
are considered the principal influencing factors in determining whether or not a CBI is 
implemented. The fact that a CBI is not yet a reality implies that questions of finance and 
labour market behaviour continue to triumph over any perceived benefits the model may 
realise. 
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Outlining the main elements contained within the debate thus far will demonstrate 
that the world of paid work is central to current discussions. Although the workings of the 
formal labour market is accepted as an extremely relevant factor in the design of any state 
supported income maintenance programme, the prioritising of such above all else is 
indicative of a biased approach. Value judgements are being made with regard to the 
worth of paid work, the role of the labour market as a provider of economic and social 
welfare and the overall objectives of contemporary social security policy. As long as this 
particular approach dominates, the full potential benefits, particularly those relating to 
women, of a CBI will remain peripheral to the debate. It is argued that the continued 
emphasis on labour market participation rates and the advancement of flexible working 
patterns subordinates issues of gender justice to those concerning economic efficiency. 
This is considered a direct result of a governing bias in favour of traditional economic 
theorising.  
The first section in this chapter will outline the defining characteristics of a CBI, 
which is followed by an examination of the relationship between a CBI and the operation 
of modern labour market processes. A further section identifies the specific benefits of a 
CBI in furthering the citizenship rights of women. Arguments posed in favour of a CBI, 
which contain a gender focus, have to date been limited in that the emphasis remains 
centred on labour market effects. Evidence, therefore, of a bias in favour of a particular 
model of economic and social organisation exists within contemporary debates and this in 
turn serves to inform the reform process. This argument lays the foundation for the 
analysis contained within the following two chapters which trace the evolution of the CBI 
concept. It will be argued that, although the proposal appears within a tradition of 
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establishing an alternative notion of work, income and citizenship rights within capitalist 
economies, consistency in the analytical framework employed is evident. This 
consistency represents the dominance of a set of socially constructed ideals regarding the 
nature of social and economic exchange in market economies. Undertaking to identify, 
and subsequently deconstruct such ideals, provides a basis for thinking about a CBI in 
terms of gender justice, free from any preconceived notions about how the world should 
operate. 
'HILQLQJ$&LWL]HQV¶%DVLF,QFRPH 
The characteristics which distinguish a CBI from any existing mechanism of state 
supported cash transfer are the principles of universal
1
and unconditional entitlement. In 
brief, a CBI would involve the granting of a regular equal income to each adult member 
of society. Grants for children would be paid to parents or guardians
2
. Considering the 
level a CBI should be set at involves engaging in debates on the derivation of official 
poverty lines and subsequent discussion on what constitutes a minimum subsistence 
                                                 
1
  It is worth noting that no system of state supported cash transfer scheme can be literally defined as 
unconditional. With a CBI scheme eligibility would be based on the recipients citizenship status. This gives 
ULVH WR TXHVWLRQV RI µZKR LV D FLWL]HQ¶ DQG µZKDW DUH WKH HVWDEOLVKLQJ FULWHULD¶" 6XFK TXHVWLRQV LPSO\
conditionality and therefore merit further investigation when examining the actual implementation of a CBI. 
However, for the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that the unconditional and universal nature of a CBI 
implies that eligibility is dependent upon residency and requires no further action by the individual  
2
 There has been no detailed discussion on the treatment of children within the current literature. 
However it is generally assumed that the actual amount payable for children would be less than that paid to 
adults. Passing reference has been made to flat rate as opposed to age-related grants for children and the 
possibility of granting supplements to expectant mothers (see Parker, 1993:22). These issues, alongside 
related questions of additional supplements for the elderly, the disabled, and housing costs are all important 
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income. Clearly these are important issues worthy of further analysis. However the focus 
of this study is to show how a social security scheme, not intimately linked to the labour 
market, can serve to support the workings of market based structures, whilst at the same 
time act to promote alternative forms of economic and social organisation. A CBI, 
therefore, by recognising and allowing for a range of economic activity is in direct 
contrast to current social security schemes which serve to favour, and even enforce, a 
particular activity ± formal employment. The value placed on employment in modern 
capitalist societies is indicative of patriarchal structures and acts in constraining the 
choices of many individuals, women in particular. If freedom from such structures is to 
be realised, the right to an independent income must be wholly separated from the labour 
market. Thus a CBI must be paid at a level deemed sufficient to meet basic needs, so that 
any additional income earned is an indication of individual preferences as opposed to 
being borne out of economic necessity. The grant would be paid regardless of factors 
such as work status, previous employment records, current levels of income or social 
living arrangements. A CBI would replace all existing income maintenance benefits and 
the amount paid would not be subject to tax. The scheme would be financed via general 
taxation and would involve the abolition of all personal reliefs set against income tax, as 
they would be classified as benefits.  
A CBI would involve full scale integration of the tax and benefit systems, which is 
one of the principal arguments made in favour of the proposal. Current tax and benefit 
measures are criticised for their complex delivery structures and their failure to reach 
predefined targeted client groups. A CBI model benefits from simplicity in 
                                                                                                                                                 
considerations when discussing the actual form policy should take and further analysis in these areas is 
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administration. Information required to establish entitlement is clearly defined, simple to 
collect and monitor, and is not readily open to misinterpretation. The advantages with 
regard to take up rates are obvious because of the explicit and uncontroversial eligibility 
criteria. Likewise, assuming the scheme adopted is financed by a tax levied on personal 
earned income, contributors are easily identified as anyone in formal paid employment. 
Mechanisms for the collection of pay-as-you-earn taxes are well established in modern 
capitalist systems, with technological advances resulting in improved information flows 
and subsequent administrative cost reductions. Although the implementation of a CBI 
would involve major reorganisation of at least two large government departments (the 
Benefits Agency and the Inland Revenue in Britain), the costs of such should be 
considered alongside the future savings to be gained from reductions in the administrative 
burden. In considering the desirability of a CBI approach to income maintenance policy 
in Britain, Clinton et al identifies administrative ease as one of the main advantages; 
...one agency would be responsible for collecting taxes (basic income 
FRQWULEXWLRQV DQG FRXOG DOVR DGPLQLVWHU WKH µEHQHILW VLGH¶ - the claim, 
assessment and payment of basic incomes, although this might be provided 
via existing benefit agencies. The tax raising function could be operated on 
similar lines to the current system of the Inland Revenue for collecting 
income tax. Administration would be somewhat simplified since there would 
be a single basic income contribution to replace the current dual taxes - 
income tax and national insurance. Basic income paid to all individuals could 
operate in a similar manner to child benefit. A few fundamental details 
would be required to claim basic income i.e. age and residence/citizenship 
details. These may, in most circumstances, be able to be collected 
                                                                                                                                                 
therefore essential prior to the implementation of a CBI. 
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automatically from other systems and hence the administration would be 
simple and easily centralised. 
(Clinton et al, 1994:34) 
One of the main problems arising with regard to ease of administration refers to the 
period of claim. That is, current tax systems are usually based on annual assessments 
whereas the administration of benefits involves employing a whole range of time periods. 
This difference in assessment procedures reflects the fact that the delivery of benefits 
should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the system responds appropriately to 
frequent changes in circumstances. The use of differing time periods however should not 
be viewed as a disadvantage of integration but rather as a design flaw which could easily 
be addressed in the implementation process. 
Perhaps a more crucial positive feature of the integration of the tax and benefit 
systems is the potential such an approach has to remove the worst aspects of what has 
EHFRPHNQRZQDV WKHµSRYHUW\ WUDS¶7KLVVLWXDWLRQDULVHVZKHQKLJK075VUHQGHUDQ\
rise in gross income financially worthless. With a CBI model, administered by a single 
government department, such anomalies would not arise. The gains to be made from paid 
employment would always be positive. Whilst the operation of current tax and transfer 
mechanisms creates disincentives to work, the CBI model promotes labour market 
participation within a system that clearly delineates functions of receipt and provision. 
An added attraction of a simplified tax-transfer system is that it provides a favourable 
framework for promoting European wide implementation (Roche, 1992:189). 
Arguments against a CBI primarily focus on the claimed prohibitive costs and the 
adverse effects such a scheme may have on work incentives. The tax rates required to 
ILQDQFH WKH JUDQWLQJRI DQ µDGHTXDWH¶ OHYHO RI LQFRPH WR DOO FLWL]HQV DUH DVVXPHG WREH
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both politically unacceptable (Alcock, 1989:123) and damaging to economic effort 
(Parker, 1989:135). In fact, Parker, a supporter of unconditional income guarantees, 
DUJXHV WKDW WKH WD[ UDWHV UHTXLUHG WR ILQDQFHD IXOOEDVLF LQFRPHZRXOG µLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH¶
the unemployment and poverty traps rather than remove them (1991:13). Given that a 
CBI has not yet been tested these claims are based on theoretical assumptions which lack 
supporting empirical evidence. However, it is safe to assume that a policy which 
DGYRFDWHVSD\LQJSHRSOHLQH[FKDQJHIRUZKDWLVSHUFHLYHGWREHµGRLQJQRWKLQJ¶ZRXOG
not attract much electoral support given the value modern society attaches to work. For 
this reason due consideration has been given to analysing the positive effects a CBI 
would have on labour market participation rates. Consequently, much of the 
contemporary debate has focused on the CBI and its relationship with formal labour 
market processes. 
5.3 The Citizens Basic Income and Paid Work 
Much of the literature has been devoted to analysing the effects an unconditional 
income grant would have on existing patterns of work. (see, for example, Atkinson, 
1995(b); Standing, 1986, 1992; Van Parijs, 1992b). Van Parijs summarises the main 
issues by outlining three processes he identifies as leading to a more flexible labour 
market; 
...basic income can be viewed as an employment subsidy given to the 
potential worker rather than to the employer, with crucially distinctive 
implications as to the type of low-productivity job that is thereby made 
viable. Secondly because it is given irrespective of employment status, the 
introduction of a basic income abolishes or reduces the unemployment 
trap, not only making more room for a positive income differential between 
total idleness and some work, but even more by providing the 
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administrative security which will enable many people to take the risk of 
accepting a job or creating their own. Thirdly, basic income can be viewed 
as a soft strategy for job-sharing, by providing all with a small 
unconditional sabbatical pay, and thereby making it more affordable for 
many either to relinquish their job temporarily in order to get a break, go 
self-employed, or to work durably on a more part-time basis.  
(1996:65) 
A CBI, therefore, should not be viewed as a proposal that threatens the policy goal of 
encouraging active labour market participation but rather as one which meets the needs of 
DODERXUPDUNHWDGDSWLQJWRWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHWKHSKHQRPHQDRIµMREOHVVJURZWK¶DQG
intensifying international competition.  
In recent years modern labour markets have been characterised by an accelerated 
growth in precarious and more flexible forms of employment. Corresponding increases in 
income inequalities have been accentuated by the implementation of government policies 
informed by supply-side economics. Furthermore in the wake of international stagflation 
in the 1970s, the western world witnessed the onset of chronic mass unemployment. 
Individuals may find themselves excluded from employment for extended periods which 
forces them into situations of welfare dependency, or they may find that inclusion into 
the labour market depends upon taking jobs which are insecure and low paid. Micro-
IOH[LELOLW\LQODERXUPDUNHWVLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKODERXUIRUFHIUDJPHQWDWLRQEHWZHHQµFRUH¶
DQGµSHULSKHU\¶HPSOR\PHQWHIIHFWLYHO\PDUJLQDOLVLQJWKose individuals unable to secure 
full-time, regular jobs. Such marginalisation has become one of the main sources of the 
µQHZ¶ SRYHUW\ RXWOLQHG LQ WKH SUHYLRXV FKDSWHU HYLGHQW DFURVV (XURSH &URVV 
Standing, 1992:52). Furthermore, Cross identifies PDUJLQDOLVDWLRQDVµW\SLFDOO\DIIHFWLQJ
LGHQWLILDEOHJURXSVZLWKIHZFKDQFHVIRUDGYDQFHPHQWRUZHDOWKDFFXPXODWLRQ¶
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Successful anti-poverty policies must therefore take account of both marginalisation and 
exclusion and identify those typically affected. Social security systems institutionalised at 
a time of high and stable levels of employment, with full-time male jobs as the norm, are 
no longer effective in meeting the needs of the ever expanding numbers of individuals 
joining the ranks of the µQHZSRRU¶RUWKHµVRFLDOO\H[FOXGHG¶ 
7KH SURYLVLRQ RI LQFRPH VHFXULW\ ZRXOG HQKDQFH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V RSSRUWXQLW\ WR
make real choices with reference to economic and non-economic activities throughout the 
course of their lifecycle. Targeted income maintenance programs pre-define specific life 
situations which render individuals, or groups of individuals vulnerable to poverty. An 
alternative anti-poverty strategy such as a CBI, which does not involve the categorising 
and continual re-categorising of eligible beneficiaries appears promising given the 
volatile nature of modern labour markets and uncertainty regarding the future. A CBI 
scheme would serve to meet the twin objectives of preventing poverty and enhancing 
labour flexibility. Economic and social policy would once again be integrated into a 
single simple coherent strategy. However, although attempts have been made to illustrate 
both the social and economic gains to be made by severing the link between work and 
income, the arguments thus far can be criticised for being too narrow in focus. For 
instance, the focus within the literature on demonstrating how a CBI could serve to 
enhance labour market flexibility assumes that formal labour market participation is the 
desired end result. Furthermore, it is indicative of a perspective that is blinkered to the 
SRVVLEOHDGYDQWDJHVWREHGHULYHGIURPDOWHUQDWLYHµHQGUHVXOWV¶ 
In considering a CBI, which she refers to as a basic income guarantee (BIG) 
proposal, Orloff agrees with those who advocate the scheme on the grounds that it 
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HIIHFWLYHO\GHFUHDVHVH[LWFRVWVWKHUHE\DOORZLQJERWKPHQDQGZRPHQHQJDJHGLQµQDVW\
wage-ZRUN¶WROHDYHWKRVHMREV7KHVXEVHTXHQWUHGXFWLRQLQWKHµSRRORIFKHDS
ODERXU¶ PD\ LQGHHG OHDG WR DQ LPSURYHPHQW LQ HPSOR\PHQW FRQGLWions with respect to 
unpleasant and menial jobs. However, she is sceptical about the effects the scheme would 
KDYHRQWKHFKDUDFWHURIZRPHQ¶VSDLGZRUN)RU2UORIIWKHµIUHHGRPIURPWRLO¶DIIRUGHG
by the introduction of a universal cash grant, have very different implications for men 
DQGZRPHQ$OWKRXJKWKHVFKHPHKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRLQFUHDVHWKHUHODWLYHYDOXHRIµEDG
MREV¶ LW GRHV QRW RIIHU WKH VDPH SRWHQWLDO LQ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH UHODWLYH YDOXH RI ZRPHQ¶V
unpaid domestic work; 
Are there technological innovations which will change the character of the 
work of caring for people, including infants in diapers, sick toddlers, the 
incontinent elderly, and those ailing in hospitals? And if not just who is 
going to do this dirty work? It is possible that the BIG would function to 
raise the pay for service sector jobs, but then who pays? The families who 
UHO\RQWKLVFDUH"2UZLOOZRPHQEHµHQFRXUDJHG¶WRµVSHFLDOLVH¶ LQGRLQJ
this work - XQSDLG EXW ZLWK D%,* WR FRYHU WKHLU µEDVLF¶QHHG" >2UORII¶V
own emphasis] 
(ibid:3-4) 
Although she argues that the BIG may ease the financial situation of those individuals 
who opt to specialise in nurturing activities, she dismisses it as a stand alone welfare 
reform proposal because it fails to directly address traditional gender-based divisions of 
labour within the domestic economy. Her preference is for a package of reforms which 
serve to challenge the; 
«YDULRXV ZD\V LQ ZKLFK WKH ZRUNIRUFH LV LQWUDQVLJHQWO\ KRVWLOH WR WKRVH
who want to combine wage work and nurturing (of children, parents, 
whomever) 
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(op cit) 
Orloff considers the encouraging of paid-work to be an essential component of any future 
welfare reform proposal; 
...I would argue that jobs offer far more benefits than does unpaid labor in 
the home (even with a BIG): in addition to material resources, they provide 
networks of co-workers, self esteem, an arena for demonstrating 
competence...The coming labor shortages in the United States offer an 
unprecedented opportunity for the feminist movement to challenge the 
character of workplace practices, since women are needed as workers; it 
strikes me as myopic to ignore this potential in favor of arguing for a 
(better-paid) return to the home. Workplace innovations already suggested 
by various feminists and family policy reformers include sharing work 
through a shorter work day and longer vacations. This would not only 
spread the available work to more of those who desire it (thus parallelling 
the goal of BIG to share the resources of work); it would make it far more 
possible for people - men as well as women - to combine parenting and 
wage work, without giving up the benefits of either - and without suffering 
from the second-class work citizenship of part-time workers in a world run 
by full-time workers. 
(ibid:4-5) 
For Orloff then the benefits afforded by a BIG in terms of promoting gender equality are 
negative in that it merely serves to alter the balance between staying at home to undertake 
XQSDLGFDULQJDFWLYLWLHVDQGHQJDJLQJLQSRRUO\SDLGZRUN7KHQDWXUHRIZRPHQ¶VXQSDLG
work within the household is not explicitly recognised and it is unlikely that a BIG alone 
would increase the value society places on such work. Whilst rates of remuneration and 
conditions of service may improve in other sectors of the economy, due to the 
introduction of a minimum income guarantee, the same would not be true of caring work. 
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This leaves Orloff concerned about who will remain responsible for this type of work. If 
WKHVWDWHLVQRWZLOOLQJWRµDEVRUEWKHFRVWVRISRVLWLYHDOWHUQDWLYHVWRSULYDWHFDUegiving on 
WRS RI WKH FRVW RI %,*¶ 2UORII FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH %,* PD\ VHUYH WR LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH
ZRPHQV¶ SRVLWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH KRPH UDWKHU WKDQ HPDQFLSDWH WKHP RS FLW ,W LV IRU WKLV
reason that Orloff prefers a reform agenda that focuses on the world of paid work, rather 
than a BIG. She believes that the goal of gender justice is best served through the 
LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µIDPLO\ IULHQGO\¶ SROLFLHV ZKLFK PDNH LW HDVLHU IRU WKRVH ZKR ZLVK WR
combine paid work with their respective domestic responsibilities.  
Although Orloff raises valid concerns regarding the nature and value of caring 
work and how a minimum income guarantee would impact on such, her tendency to view 
the BIG as compensation for non-access to the formal labour market is limiting. By 
basing her concerns on the economic and social benefits to be derived from paid work, 
Orloff appears to be considering a BIG solely in terms of how it will replace current 
systems of social security provision. The introduction of a guaranteed subsistence income 
is to be applauded in the sense that it addresses the basic financial needs of the 
impoverished. However, on its own it has no, or very little impact, on those individuals 
marginalised or excluded from the labour market and as such find themselves segregated 
from WKHPDLQVWUHDP,QIDFWUDWKHUWKDQHDVLQJVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFGHSULYDWLRQµDJUDQW
may be but a more generous pay-off to get the residents of the ghettos to stay where they 
DUH¶2UORII7KLVOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJFDQEHFULWLFLVHGIRUIDLOLQJWRUHcognise the 
potential a CBI may have in shifting the sands of the world of work. It follows from an 
undisbutable faith placed in the labour market as the primary source of both economic 
and social well-being. The question remaining, given the contemporary character of 
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poverty and social exclusion, identified in the preceding chapter, is whether or not the 
labour market can perform such a fundamental role, but more importantly whether it is 
desirable to expect it to do so? 
Responding to this question allows for discussion around the wider benefits to be 
derived from a CBI. In contrast to existing social security measures, a CBI does not 
explicitly link income provision with work. In this sense it can be regarded as an 
emancipatory measure in that it serves to free individuals from the necessity of toil. 
Individual preferences are better served by a policy that allows for freedom of choice as 
opposed to one which limits choice in favour of labour market participation. A family 
policy agenda may indeed resolve the difficulties experienced by some in entering, or 
sustaining, employment but does little for those individuals not constrained by family 
responsibilities. What a CBI offers is real freedom for all individuals to choose between 
work and non-work. Rather than being representative of a policy that responds to some 
pre-determined individual situations, the CBI should be viewed as a measure which 
adapts to a whole range of individually defined life choices. Some individuals may 
indeed derive great pleasure from work, but any policy which has at its core an assumed 
QRWLRQ WKDW ZRUN LV D µJRRG¶ WKLQJ GRHV QRW DOORZ IRU IUHHGRP RI H[SUHVVLRQ IRU DOO LQ
terms of individual preferences. However, it is worth noting that adopting such a line of 
reasoning does not imply an opposition to work intrinsically but rather takes into account 
the fact that, for many individuals, the experience of work is not necessarily liberating. 
For instance, some people may view the work that they are required to perform as 
unpleasant, or; 
...they see it as something which restricts opportunities for developing 
themselves in ways they would most like to grow. People have different 
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needs and desires vis-a-vis trade offs between income, work and leisure. 
Presently, economic reality and public policies do not allow people who 
define personal happiness and freedom more in terms of greater free time 
than in terms of work and a high income sufficient avenues to fulfil their 
desires. 
(Needham, 1994:11) 
Justifying a CBI along these lines is a challenging task given the relative worth 
attributed to work in modern society, and when considering the institutionalised nature of 
both the economic and social structures associated with the world of employment. 
However, it is argued that any further attempt at moving the debate forward must 
progress from a focus on the work/non-work dichotomy and instead focus on how a CBI 
presents as a policy with potential benefits that go beyond the realms of the labour 
market. It is with regard to this claim that the following analysis is premised on. In order 
to strengthen the case made for a CBI, it is considered essential that an investigation is 
initiated into how the proposal would promote the form of freedom Needham refers to. 
That is, how would the CBI allow for a greater degree of autonomy in the pursuit of 
individual preferences and indeed is this a desirable public policy goal. Given that the 
promotion of gender equality is often cited as one of the main benefits of a CBI, and that 
the issue of caring work remains a controversial topic within the debate, the following 
section will outline the advantages of the proposal for women. However, it should be kept 
in mind that the focus is to demonstrate the actual impact a CBI would have on individual 
life experiences, and that the emphasis on women should not be viewed as limiting. On 
the contrary, analysing the specific impact a guaranteed minimum income would have on 
the nature of womens lives and work, serves to illustrate how a CBI can act in the 
removal of constraints imposed on individual choices. A similar analysis could be applied 
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to any identified disadvantaged group in society. However, if the underlying purpose is to 
show how a CBI allows for greater freedom for all, the focus on women is indicative of 
the nature of current institutionalised structures of constraint with regard to the world of 
work and income. 
5.4 Women and a Citizens Basic Income 
The existing literature focusing on a CBI as a possible welfare reform strategy is 
lacking in rigorous feminist analysis, which is disappointing considering the potential 
such a proposal has for promoting gender justice. Attempts have been made to 
incorporate the situation of women into the various competing arguments. However, with 
objectives relating to the operation of formal labour market processes alone it is unclear 
KRZ WKH UHVXOWLQJ DQDO\VLV FDQ GR DQ\WKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ µDGG ZRPHQ DQG VWLU¶ :KDW LV
meant by this criticism is that the current debate is characteristic of an approach which 
VLPSO\ DGGV µZRPHQ DV VXEMHFWV ZLWKRXW FKDQJLQJ WKH WRROV RI DQDO\VLV¶ )HUEHU 	
Nelson, 1993:6). 
Formal social security arrangements have traditionally served men more favourably 
than women. This is in part due to the direct relationship between insurance based 
benefits and the labour market, but is also an indirect consequence of policies which fail 
to recognize the diverse roles of women as wives, mothers, workers and carers. Women's 
historically limited access to the labour market and their lower earnings relative to their 
male counterparts are well documented. Consequently, women are disadvantaged in 
terms of rights to benefits within a system based on contributions made whilst in paid 
employment. Legislation promoting the removal of discriminatory policies has served to 
enhance womeQ¶V IRUPDOSRVLWLRQDV FODLPDQWV DQG WR HVWDEOLVK WKHLU ULJKWV WREHQHILWV
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However various social and demographic factors, such as the increase in single parent 
KRXVHKROGV SUHGRPLQDWHO\ IHPDOH KHDGHG ZRPHQ¶V ORQJHU OLIH H[SHFWDQF\ DQG WKH
unpaid work undertaken primarily by women in providing welfare within the household, 
further contribute to gender bias in the operation of social security systems. Ignoring such 
factors when designing systems inevitably results in unequal outcomes. Social security 
programs which continue to emphasise the role of the worker, alongside the traditional 
male-breadwinner family model, implicitly promote male citizenship whilst 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\GHQ\LQJZRPHQV¶IXOOLQFOXVLRQDVFLWL]HQVE\DVVXPLQJWKHLUGHSHQGHQF\
on men. 
References made to women within the CBI literature have primarily focused on the 
advantages an unconditional income guarantee offers through promoting equal treatment 
between the sexes; recognizing the value of unpaid work; providing income security 
outwith the traditional labour market thereby strengthening family life; improving work 
incentives and incentives to invest in human capital; securing financial independence 
within families and providing the basis for a more equal sharing of domestic 
responsibilities between men and women (see for example Jordan, 1988:118-119, 
1992:171-172; Parker, 1993; Walter, 1989:116-127). All of these perceived outcomes can 
be applied equally in an analysis of the benefits a CBI would have for men. Establishing 
a right to a basic income independent of work would have major consequences for 
women in determining their life choices and would provide the foundations for a 
rethinking of the relationships between men and women in families. However the formal 
establishment of equal rights does not necessarily lead to equal outcomes. Although 
LQFRPHVHFXULW\LVDSRZHUIXOWRROE\ZKLFKWRLQIOXHQFHDQ\LQGLYLGXDO¶VFKRLFHVLWLVQRW
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a unique factor in determining those choices. Therefore, although the advantages a CBI 
would have for women, listed above, may indeed be realized, they follow from 
JHQHUDOL]HGDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWSDWWHUQVRIPHQV¶EHKDYLRXU 
It would seem then, that there is a major gap in the conventional case made for a 
CBI which results from an androcentric preoccupation with paid work and the labour 
market at the expense of provisioning/caregiving work performed outside the labour 
market. More convincing arguments could be made for a CBI on the grounds of gender 
justice by providing insights into the range of structures constUDLQLQJZRPHQ¶VFKRLFHV
This claim will be examined in a later chapter. However, it is considered a necessary first 
step, in the process of developing a feminist case for a CBI, that the assertion made 
regarding evidence of a bias within the current debate is further investigated. 
5.5 Providing Evidence of an Androcentric Bias 
The preceding sections indicated that contemporary debates focusing on the CBI 
proposal have been strongly influenced by an adherence to a traditional economics 
framework. This is particularly apparent when considering the persistent explicit links 
made between social security policy and the operation of the formal labour market. Thus 
the arguments made so far, both for and against, a CBI remain constrained by narrow and 
limiting assumptions about the purpose of state supported income guarantees. Tracing the 
origins of the idea that the state should act to provide some form of universal, and 
unconditional, income guarantee provides evidence of the historical nature of the 
prevalence of such assumptions. However, the process of doing so also serves to verify 
the existence of alternative and more radical approaches to social security policy. It is 
argued that such approaches present the opportunity to visualise a wider range of policy 
  
 172 
options when considering the future of social security arrangements in modern capitalist 
societies.  
The bias, indicated in the literature, towards conceptualising social security policy 
as a tool for remedying particular market failures, and thus promoting economic 
efficiency, inevitably results in reform debates being constrained by a set of intractable 
obstacles. These obstacles effectively serve to limit the consideration given to policy 
options which focus on objectives other than those specifically related to supporting a 
traditional work and pay relationship. Policy proposals not primarily directed at 
promoting the efficient operation of the formal labour market remain at the margins of 
the reform debate. It is for this reason that such proposals are vieZHGDVµUDGLFDO¶7KDWLV
WKH\ UHSUHVHQW D GHSDUWXUH IURP WKH µQRUP¶ E\ UHTXLULQJ D UHWKLQNLQJ RI WKH WHUPV RI
reference which have come to dominate the reform agenda.  
As previously argued, a multiplicity of objectives can be associated with social 
security policy and ranking the relative importance of such has obvious implications for 
the resulting policy design. Evidence of the prioritising of objectives can be found in the 
CBI literature and thus the design of the proposal has been presented in differing guises. 
It will be argued that the principal modifications made to the concept of an unconditional, 
and universal, minimum income guarantee follow from a desire to promote a CBI as a 
reform package that conforms with the demands of modern capitalist structures. Given 
the nature of present social and economic arrangements, it is necessary that this link be 
made. However, what emerges from the literature, both historical and contemporary, is a 
common thematic emphasis on assigning superiority to a particular model of capitalism. 
That is, it is generally assumed that social security policy should be designed in 
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accordance with the needs of a competitive, growth orientated, monetised market 
economy.  
The following two chapters will explore the development of the CBI proposal, 
specifically in terms of its relationship to traditional debates on economic efficiency. The 
argument will be made that the main body of literature provides evidence of a continuing 
emphasis on preserving a traditional productivist work and pay relationship within the 
debate. This focus is criticised, in general terms, for locating the CBI proposal within a 
predefined reform program, and in particular, for illustrating a gender bias in that the life 
experiences of women are largely ignored. Furthermore, providing an outline of the 
evolution of the CBI concept will aid in clarifying what is actually understood by the 
proposal and illustrate that concentration on social security reform as the main agenda is 
misleading. However, for the purpose of identifying a bias this outline must be developed 
within an appropriate analytical framework.  
5.6 Developing an Analytical Framework 
5.6.1 Identifying Bias in the Method of Approach 
It is in the method of attack on its problems, that modern inductive science 
offers such a striking lesson to politics and legislation; in recognising the 
existence of certain forces in the universe which have real validity, and that 
in consequence its triumphs must be achieved by ascertaining the nature of 
these forces and, taking them as they are, employing and combining them 
to achieve the desired result. But the whole of our modern civilisation is 
hedged in, distorted, and confused by a number of limitations which have 
no validity other than that which we choose to give them. 
(Douglas, 1924:45) 
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The concept of a basic income for all has attracted attention, on an academic level, 
from a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences. Support for the proposal has 
also been heralded by practitioners in the political arena, from both left and right wing 
perspectives, and from those actively involved in campaigning for state action to improve 
the living conditions of impoverished members of society. The wide and varied base of 
support indicates that arguments in favour of a CBI originate from a diverse range of 
viewpoints regarding the nature and purpose of state activity in the field of income 
maintenance. However, it is possible to categorise these viewpoints in terms of two 
general concerns regarding the outcomes associated with the free operation of market 
economies. The process of economic exchange in an unregulated market generates 
income inequalities, and in many cases, renders inefficient results due to the inherent 
nature of identified market failures. Promoting the objectives of economic efficiency 
and/or social justice are normally cited as the justifying principles for state intervention 
within a predominately capitalist framework. It is not contentious to assert, then, that the 
accepted starting point in arguing for social security policy involves a consideration of 
the dual objectives of efficiency and equity.  
With regard to economic efficiency, the theoretical framework, and policy 
prescriptions, are made quite explicit within the neo-classical model of economic 
analysis. By accepting the validity of certain behavioural assumptions the consequences 
of a particular action, or even inaction, can be predicted. Commenting, and acting upon, 
the objective of equity is not as straightforward, at least in a technical sense. The concept 
of equity is essentially normative in nature in that it involves making judgements as to the 
UHODWLYHµIDLUQHVV¶RIGLIIHULQJSDWWHUQVRILQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQ7KXVDUJXLQJIRUSROLF\RQ
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the grounds of promoting equity implies that some notion of social justice has been 
decreed, and subsequently employed, in the analysis. Policy recommendations, in this 
instance, will be informed primarily by moral value judgements as to what constitutes a 
socially just allocation and distribution of resources. Questions of social justice attract 
attention from a wide and diverse range of interested parties. For example; politicians 
seeking votes; environmentalists concerned about the continued depletion of the worlds 
natural resources; womens movements motivated by their desire to promote gender 
equality; and individuals, or groups of individuals, who act to protect and further their 
own respective business interests, are indicative of the very different perspectives held on 
issues of social justice. Given the myriad of interests represented in any discussion on 
social justice it follows that a wide variety of policy recommendations will emerge from 
the debate. Any useful analysis of social security policy must therefore account for 
LQIOXHQFHVWKDWDUHµSROLWLFDO¶LQQDWXUH 
Social Security measures are generally perceived as required because 
market related economic processes generate inequalities, with 
consequences in terms of individual deprivation which are deemed to be 
politically unacceptable, either because of the threat they pose for social 
order or because of political movements and ideologies which demand 
remedial measures. 
(Hill, 1990:3)  
It would appear, then, that debates on social security reform could be broken down 
into two distinct processes. Questions of economic efficiency are considered within a 
IUDPHZRUN RI GHGXFWLYH UHDVRQLQJ EDVHG RQ µIDFWXDO¶ SURSRVLWLRQV DERXW KXPDQ
behaviour. The practice of doing so gives rise to claims of positive scientific analysis in 
that theories can be tested by appealing to the relevant empirical evidence. The focus on 
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equity, however, follows a more normative route in that discussions are largely informed 
by the opinions of policy analysts. Particular values, and subsequent policy prescriptions, 
will be ranked in accordance with perceived notions as to what constitutes a just society. 
Ascribed values are therefore given as the justifying principles for state intervention, 
which inevitably leads to a great deal of controversy regarding policy direction.  
Making the distinction between positive and normative constructs in the analysis of 
social security policy mimics the process adopted within traditional economic theory. By 
emphasising the preserve of scientific methods, the traditional economics approach is 
dominated by techniques believed to be wholly objective. The inherent preference for 
µSRVLWLYH HFRQRPLFV¶ GLVSOD\HG LQ QHR-classical paradigms, is transferred to the social 
security reform agenda. The process of categorising analytical frameworks is arguably a 
mechanism for establishing a hierarchical structure in considering the objectives of 
policy. Those which can be analysed within a model which employs logical methods of 
scientific reasoning will be favoured in the research process over those which are subject 
to scrutiny in terms of identifying and prioritising a particular set of subjective values. 
Thus, in the ranking of objectives, superiority is assigned to achieving economic 
efficiency. This is mainly because, as a concept, it is technically easier to quantify. 
Furthermore, by appealing to theories, based on assumptions derived from observed 
patterns of individual behaviour, the process of justifying policy prescriptions can claim 
to be value free. This effectively reduces the potential for controversy by presenting 
policy as an essential remedy to previously identified, and agreed upon, real world 
phenomena. 
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However, claims of objectivity are to be treated with caution. The basis of any 
positive statement, that is one which can be validated or falsified by appealing to 
empirical evidence, is in itself normative. To illustrate this point Culyer considers the 
essentially positive statement, widely used in the economic analysis of social policy, that 
the introduction of a subsidy on the price of a service will result in increased levels of 
consumption of that service (1983:3). Although the statement itself can be categorised as 
positive, in that it can be tested by examining the consumption patterns of individuals 
before and after the subsidy is introduced, the fact that it is considered a proposition 
worthy of study at all stems from a value judgement relating to desired consumption 
levels. That is, explicit interest in the analysis of behavioural responses to subsidies 
suggests an implicit interest in the outcomes of such a policy. Concern regarding 
outcomes is inextricably linked with subjective notions of what is considered to be an 
acceptable level of consumption, both at an individual and at a social level. This 
acceptable level may be determined by appealing to a range of arguments such as those 
relating to economic efficiency, equity or political expediency. Whatever the justifying 
principles employed, the process of prioritising objectives and expressing an interest in a 
desired outcome provides evidence of the existence of value judgements in any positive 
analytical process. 
However, as Culyer argues, this does not mean that the practice of distinguishing 
between the positive and the normative in the analytical framework is meaningless; 
the fact that a positive analysis may have a normative motive does not of 
itself make that analysis normative. Nor does the fact that normative 
analysis includes positive analysis make positive analysis normative. 
(ibid:4) 
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He goes on to argue that what is crucial is that the practice of making judgements is 
identified and understood in the use of the normative and positive dichotomy; 
Note that both involve judgement: one can never be perfectly sure either 
that a behavioural prediction will actually be borne out (our theories are too 
imperfect for that) or that others will interpret the evidence in the same way 
as oneself (the evidence is rarely unambiguous enough for that), nor can 
one be perfectly sure  HLWKHUWKDWRQH¶VYDOXHVDUHVKDUHGE\RWKHUVRUWKDW
RQH¶V RZQ YDOXes are perfectly consistent with one another. There is 
however, an important difference of principle between the two kinds of 
MXGJHPHQW IRU LQ WKH FDVH RI SRVLWLYH MXGJHPHQWV FRQFHUQLQJ µZKDW ZLOO
KDSSHQLI¶LWLVSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFHDUJXPHQWVZKHUHSHople differ in their 
judgements, to questions concerning the relevant and valid use of logic and 
the relevant and valid interpretation of the facts. In the case of value 
judgements, argument ultimately boils down also to questions of logic and 
fact but also - and herein lies a major difference - to differences in views 
about equity, social justice, political values, and so on: in short to 
differences in what may turn out to be fundamental views on what 
constitute the good society. 
(op cit) 
Culyer, although a subscriber to the traditional economics framework of favouring 
positive scientific analysis in the study of social policy, recognises that value judgements 
are an inherent feature of such an approach. For Culyer, this recognition does not serve to 
diminiVK WKHXVHIXOQHVVRISRVLWLYH HFRQRPLFDQDO\VLV5DWKHU WKHSULQFLSOHVRI µORJLFDO
YDOLGLW\DQGHPSLULFDOYDOLGLW\¶SURYHWREHYDOXDEOHWRROVSURYLGHGWKH\DUHQRWHPSOR\HG
in a limiting sense, that is with regard to a single set of values, but are drawn upon to 
µH[SORUHDYDULHW\RIdifferent YDOXHV¶LELG 
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Therefore, although most economists would accept that claims of objectivity in the 
application of economic analysis to social policy are flawed, the practice of adhering to 
the positive approach serves to counter this criticism. That is, by emphasising their 
technical expertise in explaining the implications of policy, both existing and proposed, 
economists assume the role of specialists in informing value judgements as to what 
µFRQVWLWXWHVWKHJRRG VRFLHW\¶+RZHYHULWFDQEHDUJXHGWKDWWKHIRFXVRQDFKLHYLQJWKH
goal of social efficiency, both in the allocation and distribution of resources, 
demonstrates a particular bias and thus policy will be directed in this area. Although the 
methods practiced in the traditional economics approach approximate a scientific 
impartial methodological framework, it is implicitly assumed that the principal goal of 
policy is to maximise the fulfilment of individual preferences, which in turn will promote 
the ultimate aim of achieving efficiency. Thus the normative content of the neo-classical 
IUDPHZRUNLQYROYHVPRUHWKDQµTXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHUHOHYDQWDQGYDOLGXVHRIORJLF
DQG WKH UHOHYDQW DQG YDOLG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH IDFWV¶ 7KH JHQHUDOLVHG WKHVLV RI WKH
economics model is that scarcity implies choices. The maximisation of social welfare, 
and so efficiency, will be the end result if resources are allocated in accordance with 
individual preferences, which are in turn indicated by their individual choices. Thus; 
The efficiency criterion can rank alternative situations by reference to their 
ability to satisfy the preferences of consumers, given their money incomes, 
but produces no agreed method for deciding what relative incomes should 
be. 
(Wiseman, 1991:60) 
Intrinsic to this thesis is the assumption that individuals will always act to maximise their 
own personal satisfaction and in doing so their choices are both freely made and 
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expressed. Constraints on choice, other than those associated with money incomes, are 
effectively ignored. Issues concerning the distribution of resources, therefore, remain 
outwith the scope of the model. Commenting on equity is thus considered a matter 
determined by the personal value judgements of the commentator, rather than a practice 
which can be supported by appealing to a process of logical deductive reasoning. For 
Wiseman, this illustrates the limitations of the welfare economics component of the neo-
classical framework; 
The explanation of this situation lies in the fact that, although it purports to 
be a genralised logic of choice, this welfare thesis is essentially concerned 
with choice-through-markets. 
(ibid:62) 
Herein lies the most crucial value judgement contained within the traditional economics 
approach to policy analysis, which tends to go unrecognised (at least in a formal sense) - 
the accepted dominance of markets in determining social arrangements. As Wiseman 
goes on to argue; 
...the market operates in the context of a set of institutions and constraints 
which are themselves in one way or another also the outcome of the 
choices of citizens. The relationships between such institutions 
(constitutions, governments, legal systems) and markets is intimate and 
complex, and there is no obvious reason to evaluate the efficiency of social 
arrangements by reference to the operation of only one of them. 
(op cit) 
The overarching emphasis on efficiency over equity; the unremitting attachment to 
µVFLHQWLILF¶ PHWKRGV RI DQDO\VLV DQG WKH H[FOXVLYH IRFXV RQ WKH PDUNHW FRQVWLWXWH WKH
basic elements of the neo-classical construct. It is argued that these elements themselves 
originate from statements of subjective value and thus the analytical framework is 
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essentially normative in nature. The traditional economics approach to policy analysis 
can in itself be described as comprising a set of generalised beliefs as to what constitutes 
D µJRRG VRFLHW\¶ +RZHYHU WKLV LV QRW DOZD\V LPPHGLDWHO\ DSSDUHQW DQG DV :LVHPDQ
DUJXHV µWKH QHRFODVVLFDO FRQVWUXFW IDFLOLWDWHV WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI SHUVRQDO YDOXH
MXGJHPHQWVZKLFKWKHQDVVXPHDQXQPHULWHGµVFLHQWLILF¶VWDWXV¶LELG,WIROORZVWKHQ
that the practice of making scientific conclusions based on empirical evidence, which 
forms the basis of the neo-classical framework, is fundamentally premised on a set of 
SHUVRQDOYDOXHVWDWHPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ WKH µULJKW¶ZD\RIGRLQJ WKLQJV7RFODLPWKHUHIRUH
that this approach to policy analysis represents an unbiased methodological framework 
for the purposes of explaining policy outcomes, and thus informing policy direction, is 
erroneous. Furthermore a continued exclusive adherence to this approach represents a 
particular bias, albeit disguised, with regard to the nature of social and economic 
arrangements. 
Any useful analysis of social security policy must account for this bias and attempts 
should be made where possible to distinguish vested interests from fact. In examining the 
CBI literature evidence emerges of a continual emphasis on preserving a traditional work 
and pay relationship. It is argued that this emphasis represents a similar bias to that found 
in the welfare thesis of neo-classical economic theory. That is, policy is considered in 
terms of its intrinsic relationship to the workings of a market economy. Certain 
assumptions are held regarding the behaviour of individuals, particularly with reference 
to motivational issues; the role of government and the functioning of market determined 
transactions. Following on from these assumptions, a process of logical deductive 
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reasoning produces policy prescriptions that conform to the ideals associated with an 
efficient market economy. 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, the purpose of social security policy can 
be directly associated with both economic efficiency and equity goals. That is, systems 
are designed with specific reference to the goal of supporting the workings of the market 
economy, but state administered income maintenance measures can also be considered in 
terms of the role they play in promoting social citizenship rights. This dual, and often 
conflicting, function of social security policy informs the analytical process in that 
systems are assessed according to their impact on both efficiency and equity. More 
specifically, the tendency in the practice of analysing state supported income 
maintenance schemes has been to concentrate on three distinct but interrelated principles; 
1) the advancement of the right to a minimum income; 2) the body of work devoted to 
analysis of the traditional wage mechanism in an attempt to separate work from pay; and 
3) the concern for the furtherance of the principles of individual freedom and personal 
autonomy. Reference to these principles, with varying degrees of emphasis, is to be found 
in the literature pertaining to the CBI concept. However, it is argued that common to the 
various arguments is an underlying focus on the question of economic efficiency. 
Although reference is made to the objective of equity and the promotion of citizenship 
rights, such issues have been considered within the confines of market based economies. 
In accounting for the evolution of the CBI concept it can be demonstrated that the 
continued application of neo-FODVVLFDO PHWKRGV DQG WKHRULHV KDYH UHVXOWHG LQ µLQWHUHVWV¶
being subsumed in what has been presented as fact. Thus the constraining features of a 
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sociallly constructed academic discipline spill over into applied areas with equally 
limiting consequences. 
In order for the debate to progress beyond such a confining framework it is crucial 
WKDWWKHVHµLQWHUHVWV¶DUHLGHQWLILHG,WLVLQWKLVsense that the analytical approach adopted 
is similar in content to the methods employed in a feminist economics analysis. That is, 
the intention is not to disregard or even exclude questions of economic efficiency from 
the debate. The purpose is rather to engage in discussion which formally recognises the 
inherent bias displayed in both historical and contemporary debates regarding the CBI 
proposal, thus enabling the development of a broader discussion, incorporating a wider 
UDQJHRIµLQWHUHVWV¶ 
The purpose of inquiring into the origins and development of the CBI concept is 
therefore to demonstrate the limiting effects of adhering to a particular set of assumptions 
regarding the nature of social and economic arrangements. However, in doing so it is 
equally important to note the relevance of external influencing factors. An intellectual 
KLVWRU\RIWKH&%,LGHDZKLFKUHDGVOLNHDµOLVWRIZKRVDLGZKDW¶ZRXOGPHUHO\SURYLGHD
chronology of ideas. The evolution of theories concerning minimum income guarantees 
must be examined with regard to the prevailing political structure and socio-economic 
organisation of the period. The task then becomes one of identifying the various social, 
economic and/or political pressures and assessing their relative importance in the forming 
of policy. The primary focus remains that of tracing a common, and dominant, practice of 
prioritising the goal of economic efficiency, defined in accordance with a traditional neo-
classical model of the market economy. However, the analysis will also serve to identify 
and dissect various attempts to wed philosophical ideals concerning social justice with 
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the practical solutions advocated, giving due consideration to the influence of the existing 
political and economic climate as well as to that of opposing doctrines. In this sense the 
DSSURDFK DGRSWHG FDQ EH GHVFULEHG DV D µSROLWLFDO HFRQRP\¶ DSSURDFK 7KDW LV WKH
analysis combines questions of economic efficiency with the goal of promoting moral 
and social justice and situates such within a framework that accounts for the numerous 
factors which influence the policy process. 
5.6.2 Identifying Bias in the Subject Matter: Incomes in a Market Economy  
Individual incomes in modern market economies are primarily determined by the 
degree of control or ownership an individual commands over the factors of production - 
land, labour and capital. Subsequently, alterations in patterns of income distribution will 
result from market transactions which effectively serve to alter patterns of resource 
allocation. Within the neo-classical framework it is assumed that individuals, motivated 
by a desire to maximise their own personal utility, will act independently and 
autonomously when engaging in their respective market transactions. Thus, sources of 
income are derived directly from individual action in the market place and the level of 
such can be attributed to an individuals ability to accumulate resources. For Heilbroner, it 
ZDVWKLVµLGHDRIJDLQDVDQRUPDOJXLGHIRUGDLO\ OLIH¶WKDWPDUNHGWKHHQGRIVRFLHWLHV
organised around the principles of tradition and custom and the birth of the modern 
capitalist economy (1980:24). Accepting the market as the guiding principle of economic 
organisation gives rise to new forms of social and economic relationships which, as 
HeLEURQHUDUJXHVDUHSULPDULO\LQIRUPHGE\WKHDFWLRQVRIµHFRQRPLFPDQ¶ 
The problem of survival was henceforth to be solved neither by custom nor 
by command, but by the free action of profit-seeking men bound together 
only by the market itself.  The system was to be called capitalism. And the 
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idea of gain which underlay it was to become so firmly rooted that men 
would soon vigorously affirm that it was an eternal and omnipresent part of 
human nature. 
(ibid:35-36) 
Setting aside inherited property and capital ownership, paid work is the main source of 
income, or rather the main means of accumulating resources, for the majority of 
individuals in market based economies. Paid work, therefore, is an essential feature of the 
market economy; 
«SUHVHQW-day market-oriented economics was conceived by Adam Smith 
at the same time that markets for hiring labor were becoming more 
widespread, suggesting an intrinsic link between the wage system and the 
market economy. Not surprisingly, anyone who would dare to question the 
wage system is automatically seen as either anti-capitalist or utopian, and 
certainly as a most questionable economist. 
(Lutz and Lux, 1988:154) 
Furthermore, as Lutz and Lux argue, viewing paid work, or rather the operation of the 
traditional wage system, as a necessary ingredient in the functioning of the modern 
economy is an uncontroversial hypothesis across the political spectrum. They point out 
that contemporary orthodox Marxists have a problem with paid work only when it results 
in the generation of private profit; 
(OLPLQDWHWKHVHµIUXLWVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ¶DQGWKHUHLVQRWPXFKWKDWLVZURQJ
with the paying of wages. There is, then, a strange common ground shared 
by the two rival ideologies of today: they both are committed to the 
institution of wage labor. 
(ibid:155) 
It can be argued then that, although the promotion of and adherence to the capitalist mode 
RISURGXFWLRQ DQGGLVWULEXWLRQ UHVXOWHG LQ D JURZLQJ DZDUHQHVVRI WKH µHYLOV¶RI VXFKD
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system in terms of wealth distribution, the traditional wage system has been accepted as 
an unquestionable and immutable element of capitalist economies. 
It follows that attempts to resolve questions of equity, economic efficiency and 
citizenship rights within a capitalist market based framework have tended to focus on the 
workings of the wage mechanism. The subject of work and pay has attracted the attention 
of those with an interest in preserving existing capitalist institutions in their bids to ensure 
greater efficiency. Similarly, attempts at promoting greater equity or advancing the rights 
of citizenship, within the confines of a market economy, have generally targeted issues 
such as low pay, employment rights, the role of the state as compensator for loss of 
employment and actively securing adequate levels of work. Finally any proposal which 
posits alternative forms of political and economic organisation must contain some 
reference to issues pertaining to work and pay given the current prominent role such 
plays in the functioning of modern socio-economic relationships. Thus the desire to re-
evaluate, or even restructure, the traditional relationship between work and pay, emerges 
as a common doctrine amongst economists, social reformers and political analysts alike.  
The CBI debate has not escaped this primary focus. Evident throughout the 
literature is an overarching theme of questioning the existing wage system. As previously 
argued, the emphasis may differ in terms of the motivating force in arguing for a CBI. 
Concern regarding the income security of individuals operating in a market economy has 
attracted many to the CBI concept with a view to instituting and preserving a notion of 
citizenship rights within an economic system governed by market principles. 
Furthermore, questions of wealth distribution and its impact on the efficient workings of 
the market economy have resulted in attention being drawn to the threat widespread 
  
 187 
poverty poses for the functioning of capitalist structures. A CBI becomes relevant to such 
questions in that it presents the opportunity to promote efficiency in the labour market. 
Finally, a CBI has been viewed in terms of its potential for promoting individual 
freedom. The free market holds no guarantees in terms of gender or racial equality, 
personal autonomy and independence, as well as income security. A CBI can be 
conceived of as a mechanism for promoting such goals without radically altering the 
relationship between the state and the market, thus preserving the fundamental principles 
of capitalist societies.  
All of the above arguments have been employed in the literature supporting a CBI. 
Differences in emphasis have resulted in a range of variations on the CBI model being 
proposed. However, it is argued that common to all such proposals is an underlying 
assumption that engaging in paid work in a market economy is continually viewed as the 
main source of economic and social survival. This issue will be returned to in chapter 
eight. For the moment the purpose is to demonstrate the bias inherent in the literature, 
which is akin to that found in traditional economic theory. That is, the practice of 
assuming the dominance of a particular framework in determining modern socio-
economic relations serves to limit the reform agenda with regard to state supported 
income maintenance policy. Accepting, and indeed actively promoting, the principal role 
of formal market oriented work in determining individual incomes, leads to the 
subsequent assumption that any alternative source of income is either secondary, 
temporary or compensatory. The implication for the CBI proposal is that it is placed 
within a dualistic hierarchical structure with obvious negative consequences in terms of 
implementation prospects. Policies aimed at promoting and preserving the traditional 
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work and pay relationship will be favoured over those that can be construed as radically 
opposed, or even independent to that relationship. Thus, the task for those who support a 
CBI has been to make the glove fit. Arguing for a CBI on the grounds that it is a policy 
proposal that conforms with the model of modern capitalist development proves to be the 
favoured approach. In doing so the demands imposed by accepting the supremacy of the 
market economy, along with the implicit assumptions relating to the behaviour of 
µHFRQRPLFPDQ¶DUHPHW 
5.7 Conclusion 
At first sight a CBI presents as a promising proposal for the reform of income 
maintenance policy. On a macro level it has the potential to promote both overall 
economic efficiency and social justice. While, on a micro level a CBI can arguably be 
viewed as a measure that corresponds with, and indeed assists, in the functioning of 
flexible labour markets. Conversely a CBI can be construed as damaging to economic 
performance in that it threatens the incentive to engage in paid work. Assessing the 
validity of such claims, both for and against a CBI, although considered a necessary 
feature of the reform debate, was not the prime intention of this chapter. The purpose was 
rather to show how thinking about a CBI in these terms, that is, with explicit reference to 
the relationship between social security policy and the operation of the formal labour 
market in capitalist economies, is indicative of a narrow and limiting approach. It follows 
from a failure to fully appreciate the purpose and nature of social security policy in 
modern economies and a subsequent limited understanding of the CBI proposal, which in 
turn, results from a continued and exclusive adherence to neo-classical economic theory 
in the analytical process.  
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A CBI has the potential to promote real freedom for all but this aspect of the 
proposal will never be fully recognised as long as it continues to be regarded within a 
framework defined by the governing principles of mainstream economic thought. The 
implicit faith bestowed upon a particular model of economic and social organisation, 
inherent within neo-classical theory, occupies the policy agenda. Thus reform proposals 
are considered with this agenda in mind. With reference to income maintenance policy in 
particular this results in a privileging of the traditional work and pay relationship. That is, 
policy is considered, first and foremost, with respect to the impact such will have on 
formal labour market processes and any other possible outcomes are subsequently 
neglected in the analytical process. Arguing for a CBI within this perspective indicates 
that the whole range of potential benefits to be derived from the implementation of such a 
proposal, particularly those relating to gender justice are overlooked. Rather, paid work is 
emphasised as the main source of economic and social welfare therefore the efficient 
functioning of modern labour market structures is assigned priority.  
However, the idea of an unconditional minimum income guarantee is not unique to 
contemporary debates on state welfare reform. Tracing the origins of the CBI concept 
provides evidence that it appears in various guises as a fundamental component of 
attempts to establish alternative notions of work, income and citizenship rights within 
capitalist economies. Such attempts have produced convincing theoretical positions in 
support of a CBI, and in the process of doing so have produced valuable insights in the 
search for an alternative economics. However, a critical assessment of this literature 
indicates that while the limitations of conventional economic theory may be recognised, 
the focus remains firmly grounded within a view of the world that implicitly assumes the 
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dominance of capitalist based principles of social and economic organisation. Arguing for 
a CBI, therefore displays a long established tradition of adherence to a socially 
constructed analytical framework which favours a particular vision of how the economy 
should operate. This continued practice serves to negate our understanding of the range of 
possible outcomes associated with the CBI proposal.  
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Chapter 6: Arguing for a Universal Income Guarantee -The Reformist 
Case 
6.1 Introduction 
The development of money based market economies brought with it a set of social 
and economic problems to which the state was forced to respond. This was largely due to 
the generally perceived notion that such problems posed a threat to future capitalist 
development. However, increased state responsibility was also called for on moral 
grounds. The poverty caused by economic and social dislocations associated with the 
transition to capitalism was considered unjust during a period witnessing rapid and 
substantial increases in national wealth. Arguments for state intervention in the field of 
welfare provision were, therefore, premised on both national efficiency grounds and with 
regard to social justice.  
As previously argued, the problem of poverty amidst plenty has been the prime 
motivating force behind the development of state supported income maintenance 
schemes. Although differences in design can largely be attributed to the influence of 
disparate ideological beliefs, the rationale for state involvement in the relief of poverty 
can be presented in positive economic terms. A fundamental feature of traditional 
economic theory is the formal recognition of particular market failures, not least of which 
refers to the inability of the free market in securing sufficient incomes for all. However, 
this does not imply that an alternative system of economic organisation is preferred. 
Rather, the case is made that the operation of the free market remains the single, most 
effective method of ensuring individual freedom, and that the process of both resource 
allocation, and distribution, should take place within a market determined framework 
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wherever possible. State intervention is deemed necessary only in those instances when 
the market fails on either of these counts.  
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution of the minimum income 
guarantee concept and to identify the arguments employed in justifying such a scheme. 
The rationale for providing such an historical account is to demonstrate the relevance of 
mainstream economic theory in arguing for a universal minimum income proposal. This 
is not to say that all justifications have been framed within the market failure approach. 
The idea of a minimum income guarantee appears within alternative views regarding the 
actual structures of economic organisation. However, the claim is made that common to 
all arguments is an accepted belief that the economy is governed exclusively by the 
principles of free market capitalism. In this sense the universal minimum income 
proposal is presented as a practical policy response to a particular set of problems 
associated with capitalist development. State action is required to ensure a minimum 
income for all citizens, however the nature of such action should be designed in 
accordance with the needs of a market economy. 
A number of schemes supporting an unconditional and universal minimum income 
guarantee have been proposed under different names, such as, social dividend; social 
credit; social wage and demogrant. Such schemes, although varying in detail, share a 
common aim - the formalisation of the right to an income predicated by citizenship. 
Furthermore, all such proposals have at their core an implicit assumption regarding the 
responsibility of the state as a provider of welfare. That is, the state in capitalist society 
has a duty to promote the freedom of all citizens and to act in ensuring that the process of 
wealth accumulation benefits all members of society. With this in mind, proposals for a 
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minimum income guarantee can be grouped within two main categories - those which 
emphasise the rights of citizenship and those which appear within attempts at developing 
an alternative view of the relationship between work, income and property in capitalist 
economies. It is worth noting that these two categories are not mutually exclusive and 
that justification for a minimum income guarantee is often sought by appealing to both 
considerations. However, making the distinction serves to illustrate the relevance of 
differing influences on the actual form policy should take.  
This chapter will therefore begin by outlining the various proposals for a universal 
minimum income which originate within a predominantly rights based theoretical 
framework. A further section will introduce similar proposals which have emerged as a 
fundamental feature of debates focused on rethinking the formal relationship between 
work and pay, as it exists within capitalist society. A final section will examine proposals 
for a universal minimum income guarantee that were presented as an alternative to the 
social insurance model of provision, representative of an era which witnessed the 
development of the modern welfare state. Such proposals are treated distinctly, not 
because of any detraction from the past in terms of justifying principles, but rather 
because they appear at a time of consensus regarding the role of the state in the economy. 
That is, the nRWLRQ RI WKH µPL[HG HFRQRP\¶ EHVWRZHG XSRQ WKH VWDWH D EURDGHU VHW RI
responsibilities, particularly in the area of welfare provision. Thus, less attention is 
devoted to justifying state intervention per se, but rather the focus is on the actual 
mechanisms to be employed. The conclusion will be drawn that the evidence indicates a 
well established and heterogeneous tradition of attempts at justifying some form of CBI. 
Although such attempts provide useful insights into the potential economic and social 
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benefits to be gained from a CBI, it is argued that they remain constrained by an implied 
acceptance of an entrenched set of governing principles that dominate all spheres of 
economic and social life. In this sense, proposals for a minimum income guarantee 
present as practical policy solutions, responding to the needs of a dynamic capitalist 
HFRQRP\,WLVQRWXQWLOWKHRQVHWRIWKHSHUFHLYHGµFULVLVLQZHOIDUH¶WKHRU\WKDWWKH&%,
proposal emerges as a radical alternative to existing provision. The extent to which it is 
presented and understood as such will be explored in the following chapter. 
6.2. Tracing the Origins: The Rights Based Justification for a Citizens Basic Income. 
The idea of the right of every individual in society to a minimum of existence dates 
back to the end of the eighteenth century when Thomas Paine in his attempt to explain 
the widespread poverty evident in advanced civilised nations became one of the earliest 
advocates of a social security system sponsored and regulated by the state. Van Parijs 
UHIHUVWR3DLQHDVRQHRIWKHµPRVWRXWVSRNHQIRUHUXQQHUVRIEDVLFLQFRPH¶DQGWKHDXWKRU
RI µZKDW FDQ SODXVLEO\ EH YLHZHG DV WKH ILUVW HODERUDWH SURSRVDO RI D JHQXLQH EDVLF
LQFRPH¶   3DLQH ZDV ERUQ LQ (QJODQG LQ  DQG UDLVHG ZLWKLQ D Quaker 
community. The Quaker tradition of egalitarianism, hostility to authority, and the 
HPSKDVLVRQVLPSOLVWLFOLIHVW\OHVDUHYDOXHVIRXQGWKURXJKRXW3DLQH¶VOLIHDQGZRUN 
Paine began his career as a writer espousing political causes with the publication in 
1792 of The Case of the Officers of the Excise, which drew attention to the low wages 
and mundane duties of the excisemen. Paine pointed out that such conditions resulted in 
the existence of strong temptations for dishonesty on the part of excisemen that had 
obvious negative consequences for government revenue. Although motivated by a 
concern for the poor conditions suffered by his fellow workers, Paine took care to attempt 
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to appeal to the authorities. Rather than justify his claims for improvement on 
humanitarian grounds, he raised the issue of efficiency by pointing out the consequential 
indirect effects on government revenue by implementing policies which would serve to 
weaken the financial motives for participating in the underground economy. Higher 
wages would not only ensure a better standard of living for the excisemen but would also 
alleviate the temptation to engage in smuggling. This would further improve overall 
efficiency as providing sufficient reward, in terms of adequate wages, may result in 
workers being more diligent in their duties. It would appear then that Paine shows great 
insight in his attempts to promote the cause of the low paid. Rather than relying solely on 
an appeal for improving social justice he relates his demands to the objectives of both 
macro and micro efficiency in the sense that his claims of higher productivity and the 
curtailment of illegal activities will result in increased national wealth.
1
   
3DLQH¶V OLIHKLVWRU\ LOOXVWUDWHV WKDWKHZDV D FRPPLWWHG FKDPSLRQRISROLtical and 
economic reform which served to promote the rights of the citizen and the preservation of 
individual liberty (see for example Oser and Blanchfield, 1975:340 and Claeys, 1989:chs 
2,3). He travelled to America and France in support of the revolutionary cause and wrote 
extensively on the subject of republican government in the name of freedom and justice 
IRUDOOFLWL]HQV$QH[DPLQDWLRQRI3DLQH¶VWKHVLVRQLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQWREHIRXQGLQD
text primarily concerned with the reform of agricultural society in the latter half of the 
18th century, demonstrates that the rationale for his concept of the right to a guaranteed 
                                                 
1
It is interesting to note that Paine himself was dismissed in 1765 from one of his earlier jobs in the 
excise office for passing some goods without a full inspection.   
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income was primarily motivated by a concern for the rights of citizenship and democratic 
government. 
In Agrarian Justice (1796) Paine started from the premise that; 
It is a position not to be controverted that the earth, in its natural, 
uncultivated state was, and ever would have continued to be, the common 
property of the human race. 
(Paine, 1796:611) 
Paine is concerned with the fact that as society moves from a natural state to a civilised 
state by means of essential and beneficial agricultural improvements, advances in 
manufacturing technology and progress within the arts and science domain, poverty, 
ZKLFK GRHV QRW H[LVW LQ WKH µQDWXUDO DQG SULPLWLYH VWDWH RI PDQ¶ EHFRPHV DSSDUHQW
LELG +H FRQFOXGHV WKDW ZKLOH WKH SURFHVV RI µFLYLOLVDWLRQ¶ OHDGV WR DIIOXHQFH IRU
some, it also exacerbates the deprivation suffered by others. Paine witnesses this poverty 
WR EH µWKH FRQGLWLRQ RI PLOOLRQV LQ HYHU\ FRXQWU\ LQ (XURSH¶ DQG WKDW VXFK LQGLYLGXDOV
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHWWHURIILQWKHVWDWHRIQDWXUHRSFLW7KHUHPDLQGHURI3DLQH¶VHVVD\
attempts to show how poverty occurs as a consequence of civilisation and indeed how 
governments should intervene to ensure that each member of society is not robbed of 
WKHLUQDWXUDOULJKWVWKDWLVWKHULJKWWRµQDWXUDOSURSHUW\RUWKDWZKLFKFRPHVWRXVIURP
the Creator of the universe - VXFKDVWKHHDUWKDLUZDWHU¶LELG 
In doing so Paine distinguishes between natural property and what he refers to as 
µDUWLILFLDORUDFTXLUHGSURSHUW\¶LELG+HH[SODLQVWKDWDVODQGLVFXOWLYDWHGRQO\WKH
value of the cultivation should become private property; 
...as it is impossible to separate the improvement made by cultivation from 
the earth itself, upon which that improvement is made, the idea of landed 
property arose from that inseparable connection; but it is nevertheless true, 
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that it is the value of the improvement, only, and not the earth itself, that is 
individual property. Every proprietor, therefore, of cultivated lands, owes 
to the community a ground-rent (for I know of no better term to express the 
idea) for the land which he holds; and it is from this ground rent that the 
fund proposed in this plan is to issue. 
(ibid:611) 
Paine recognised the fault in the system of accumulating personal property and present 
possessors could rectify this fault by the means of redistribution. This then was how 
Paine envisaged the financing of his system of social security and in the name of justice, 
not charity, the funds so raised should be distributed as such; 
...there shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty one 
years, the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as a compensation in part for the 
loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of 
landed property. And also, the sum of ten pounds per anum, during life, to 
every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all others as they 
should arrive at that age. 
(ibid:612-3) 
Paine goes on to emphasise the role of society in his plan for social security and thus 
justifies taxation as a means of finance in the name of moral justice; 
I have made the calculations stated in this plan, upon what is called 
personal as well as upon landed property. The reason for making it upon 
land is already explained; the reason for taking personal property into the 
calculation is equally well founded though on a different 
SULQFLSOH«3HUVRQDO SURSHUW\ LV WKH HIIHFW RI VRFLHW\ DQG LW is impossible 
for an individual to acquire personal property without the aid of society as 
LW LV IRU KLP WR PDNH ODQG RULJLQDOO\«$OO DFFXPXODWLRQ WKHUHIRUH RI
SHUVRQDOSURSHUW\EH\RQGZKDWDPDQ¶VRZQKDQGVSURGXFHLVGHULYHGWR
him by living in society; and he owes on every principle of justice, of 
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gratitude, and of civilisation, a part of that accumulation back again to 
society from whence the whole came. 
(ibid:614) 
Although simplistic it would appear that Paine writing in the eighteenth century 
provides us with a proposal for a genuine CBI, financed from a form of progressive 
taxation, and further provides a powerful rights based justification for such a proposal in 
that;  
Every living human being is unambiguously entitled to an equal share of 
the total value of natural resources. 
(Van Parijs, 1992b:12) 
Paine does not distinguish between rich and poor when calculating his payment plan but 
places emphasis on the right to compensation for loss of natural inheritances. A system 
which does not involve the direct transfer of funds from those in work to those out of 
work but rather depends upon taxation justified in terms of an individuals debt to society 
avoids the social evil of stigmatising the poor. For these reasons, that is the development 
of the notions of compensation due and debt owed which were not explicitly linked to the 
formal labour market, the Paine doctrine for social security is to be viewed as radical. It 
can be argued that such radicalism would not be welcomed in 18th century Britain as it 
involved a substantial transfer of funds from the prospering property owning classes, who 
were emerging as an increasingly dominant force both politically and economically. 
However transfer by taxation and the state provision of a minimum subsistence 
level of income did in fact emerge in practical policy terms. The Speenhamland system of 
poor relief administered in Britain in the late 18th century reflects these aspects of the 
Paine philosophy. The system developed as a direct result of the following event; 
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The justices of Berkshire, meeting at the Pelikan Inn, in Speenhamland, 
near Newbury, on May 6, 1795, in a time of great distress, decided that 
subsidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale 
dependent on the price of bread, so that a minimum income should be 
assured to the poor irrespective of their earnings. 
(Polanyi, 1968:78) 
This system of relief, originally intended as an emergency measure was copied widely 
WKURXJKRXW(QJODQG LQ VXEVHTXHQW \HDUV DQGDOWKRXJKQHYHUEHFDPH ODZ µUeceived the 
VWDPSRIFRPPRQDFFHSWDQFH¶*UHJJ+RZHYHUDV3RODQ\LSRLQWVRXW 
«LW LQWURGXFHG QR OHVV D VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF LQQRYDWLRQ DV WKH µULJKW WR
OLYH¶DQGXQWLODEROLVKHGLQLWHIIHFWLYHO\SUHYHQWHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of a competitive labour market. 
(1968:78)  
The problem of the free-rider emerged in that relief was now provided regardless of 
whether an individual was in work or not. Relief payments were criticised specifically for 
promoting idleness; encouraging the breeding of illegitimate children for the purposes of 
maximising allowances; and for preventing individuals from assuming responsibility for 
their own economic misfortunes (Gregg, 1965:180-81). Furthermore, the system created 
disincentives in terms of labour productivity;  
Hence, no labourer had any material interest in satisfying his employer, his 
LQFRPHEHLQJWKHVDPHZKDWHYHUZDJHVKHHDUQHG«KRZHYHUOLWWOHKHWKH
HPSOR\HUSDLGWKHVXEVLG\IURPWKHUDWHVEURXJKWWKHZRUNHUV¶LQFRPHXS
to scale. 
(Polanyi, 1968 :79) 
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As a direct consequence labour productivity began to decline and this in turn provided 
employers with an added justification for reducing wages even further. However the 
system proved to be universally popular, at least in the short term, in that; 
«HPSOR\HUV could reduce wages at will and labourers were safe from 
hunger whether they were busy or slack; humanitarians applauded the 
measure as an act of mercy even though not of justice and the selfish gladly 
consoled themselves with the thought that though it was merciful at least it 
was not liberal; and even ratepayers were slow to realize what would 
KDSSHQ WR WKH UDWHV XQGHU D V\VWHP ZKLFK SURFODLPHG WKH µULJKW WR OLYH¶
whether a man earned a living or not. 
(ibid:79-80) 
It was clear, that in the longer term, the Speenhamland system of poor relief was 
GRRPHGWRIDLOXUH&RVWVHVFDODWHGEH\RQGFRQWURODVWKHSULFHRIODERXUHUV¶VXEVLVWHQFH
was increasingly met by local taxpayers due to unscrupulous employers taking up the 
incentive to reduce wages below subsistence levels;  
Although it took some time till the self-respect of the common man sank to 
the low point where he preferred poor relief to wages, his wages which 
were subsidised from public funds were bound eventually to be bottomless, 
and to force him upon the rates. 
(ibid:80) 
The Speenhamland system, in attempting to protect labour from the dangers of 
competitive market mechanisms, actually resulted in the irony that individuals were 
compelled to offer their labour in order to earn a living whilst at the same time that labour 
was being deprived of its market value. Abolishing Speenhamland to make way for the 
more stringent system implied by the Poor Law of 1834, can arguably be viewed as a 
measure conducive to the needs of a competitive labour market. The principles of the 
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µ:RUNKRXVH7HVW¶DQGµ/HVV(OLJLELOLW\¶HQVXUHGWKDWSRRUUHOLHIZDVWDUJHWHGDWWKHWUXO\
needy and receipt of such was conditional upon individuals subjecting themselves to 
harsh conditions of deprivation. The underlying philosophy of the 1834 Act followed a 
Malthusian line in that it was believed that the condition of poverty itself would serve as 
a natural check on population growth, thus curbing any further increase in overall poverty 
levels. The assumption was that individuals experiencing destitution, in the absence of 
poor relief, would alter their behaviour with regard to having children, thus ensuring a 
sustainable, stable and natural level of poverty. Although primarily based on religious 
doctrine and political philosophy regarding the natural order of society, such beliefs were 
in accordance with the economic theories espoused by Adam Smith. The new system of 
poor relief conformed to the ideas of individualism and the assumed inherent efficiency 
of the operation of the free market. Poverty was believed to be a condition which an 
individual could control by their own independent action and state support should only be 
provided in the most extreme circumstances in order to avoid any damaging effects on 
the structure and functioning of the market; 
Far better was private charity, which of its goodness relieved necessitous 
cases and had the discrimination to pass over the idle and dissolute. The 
labouring population would thus be kept down to the level at which there 
was work for all, and a sequence of work, wages and contentment would be 
set in train, with the unavoidably needy relieved by the charitable rich. 
...Each man had to work, not in the position to which God and birth had 
called him, but in the place into which his own exertions had brought him. 
Supervising his efforts and ensuring that the sum total of all such activity 
in the community would result in the greatest possible good was an 
µ,QYLVLEOH+DQG¶6RLQSODFHRI*RGDQGELUWKWKHHFRQRPLVWVVXEVWLWXWHG
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the invisible hand and competition, which, in the long run, came to the 
same thing. 
(Gregg,1965:184-85) 
The Poor Law Act of 1834 therefore effectively removed any notion of rights to 
income maintenance that had developed under the auspices of Speenhamland and served 
to stigmatise the poor. The selective granting of relief was strongly favoured over the 
previous universal system as experience had proved that such was detrimental to the 
efficient workings of the market economy. This leads Green to conclude;  
The failure of this first experiment with a guaranteed minimum income left 
as a legacy to the future grave doubts about the workability of any plan that 
provides a minimum income to all citizens. 
(1967:51)  
By driving wages down to levels below their natural market clearing rates the 
Speenhamland experiment created disincentives to work, which took effect on a large-
scale basis, thus rendering the scheme prohibitively costly (Brittan, 1988:203). National 
productivity suffered and the widespread dependency on public assistance led to an 
increase in rates of poverty. Although supportive of a CBI, Brittan argues that in order to 
DYRLGWKHSLWIDOOVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH6SHHQKDPODQGH[SHULPHQWWKHUHVKRXOGEHDµIDLUO\
ODUJHJDSEHWZHHQQDWLRQDOLQFRPHSHUKHDGDQGWKHEDVLFLQFRPH¶Lbid:299). Thus basic 
LQFRPH JXDUDQWHHV VKRXOGEH VHW DW D OHYHO µZHOO EHORZ WKH DYHUDJHRU PHGLDQZDJH LI
WKH\ ZHUH QRW WR EH UXOHG RXW RQ µLQFHQWLYH¶ JURXQGV¶ EXW WKH OHYHO VKRXOG DOVR EH
sufficient to ensure at least a standard of living which is above subsistence levels 
LELG )RU %ULWWDQ WKLV VFHQDULR LV SRVVLEOH LQ µDIIOXHQW¶ PRGHUQ PDUNHW HFRQRPLHV
and represents a practical solution to the problems associated with work-induced poverty; 
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Classical economists who rightly argue for market rewards to factors of 
production usually fail to face the problems of those whose work has a low 
market value. The challenge for economic and social policy is to find a 
way of obtaining as much as we can of the benefits of an American-style 
labour market, without incurring the cost of American-style poverty.  
(ibid:301) 
$OWKRXJKDGYRFDWLQJDULJKWVEDVHGPLQLPXPLQFRPHJXDUDQWHH%ULWWDQ¶VDUJXPHQWVDUH
primarily founded on economic efficiency grounds and the scheme he envisages is to be 
designed in accordance with the requirements of modern capital and labour markets. That 
is, the system should operate in such a way as to ensure sufficient profits are to be 
realised from individual effort, thereby promoting continued economic growth, which in 
turn would safeguard the QDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRSD\7KHGHPLVHRIWKH6SHHQKDPODQGV\VWHP
can arguably be attributed to its failure in meeting such conditions. 
Thus, while Paine provides us with the theoretical justification for a state supported 
minimum income guarantee the economics of such a scheme had not yet been well 
thought out. Practical experience in the U.K. in the late eighteenth century demonstrated 
that any proposal for the implementation of a system of state provided income 
maintenance, which does not entail a work test, financed via general taxation would not 
be politically expedient given the historical context in which it was proposed. During this 
period the advancement of a capitalist system based on laissez-faire principles of socio-
economic organisation took precedence and the relief of poverty was mainly viewed as a 
private concern. It is perhaps for these reasons that the concept of a CBI does not appear 
again in the literature until the beginning of this century.  
+RZHYHUXWLOLVLQJ3DLQH¶VWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFHSURvides a powerful basis with which 
to build upon in that a CBI can be supported within a theory of natural human rights. In 
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seeking further justification the purpose is not to dismiss such a theory but to elaborate on 
it, as will be demonstrated by an examiQDWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRIµ&XOWXUDO+HULWDJH¶ZKLFK
emerges in various forms in the subsequent literature. As capitalism develops in the 
industrialised world the growing numbers of individuals experiencing the poverty that 
Paine witnessed occurs simultaneously with a general increase in national wealth due to 
economic growth. This pattern of events leads to concern among academics, politicians 
and social reformers alike within the area of income distribution. Any attempt to resolve 
widespread poverty involves investigation into the respective roles of the state and the 
market in determining wealth distribution.  
Accepting that great disparities in patterns of wealth distribution pose a threat to the 
functioning of the liberal market economy gives rise to questions concerning the 
appropriate mechanisms to be employed in addressing distributional imbalances. Whether 
the emphasis is placed on achieving social justice or promoting a more efficient, in 
strictly economic terms, allocation and distribution of resources, the poverty issue 
provides justification for state intervention. Given the political and economic structures 
associated with capitalist forms of organisation, the policy instrument most suited to 
achieving such goals is the use of transfer payments. However the question remains as to 
which method of transfer is indeed the most effective in securing continued economic 
growth and addressing deficient demand; how are such transfers to be implemented 
within the prevailing socio-economic structure and, how do transfer payments relate to 
the dominant political philosophy? That is, the overall desire to preserve freedom whilst 
maintaining limited state intervention in the workings of the economy. The concept of a 
CBI has featured prominently in debates focused on resolving such issues. However it 
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has also been presented, although at times somewhat modified, as part of a range of 
measures intended to alter existing structures of resource allocation implied by adhering 
to a strictly capitalist model of economic organisation. In this sense a CBI is viewed as an 
alternative to the more traditional approach to income redistribution involving 
straightforward transfer by taxation. The differences in emphasis result in differences in 
design but the ultimate goal remains the same. That is, promoting a socially efficient 
allocation and distribution of resources, whilst at the same time preserving individual 
freedom in an economy which is largely governed by the operational principles of the 
market place. If it is assumed that paid work, as previously argued, remains a primary 
source of income, then it follows that debates focused on the relevance of a CBI to issues 
of income distribution originate from concerns relating to perceived inadequacies of the 
functioning of the labour market. Attempts to resolve such issues, taking into account the 
lessons learned from past experiences with transfer payments, have resulted in a great 
deal of attention being paid to the formal relationship between work and income in a 
modern market economy. 
6.3 Work and Pay 
Transfer payments represent a shift in income from higher income groups 
to lower, from taxpayers to non taxpayers, from younger to older workers, 
from active, productive members of the economy to those no longer 
contributing to output.  Whatever the arguments about justice, and aside 
from the effects on the direction and level of output, transfer payments 
LQGLFDWH D YLWDO JURZLQJ DUHD ZKHUH µZRUN¶ DQG µSD\¶ DUH QRW FORVHO\
related. 
(Lovenstein, 1966:113) 
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:ULWLQJ LQ WKH ¶V /RYHQVtein, an economist, draws attention to the fact that 
transfer payments are a logical solution to the problem of an unequal distribution of 
income. Furthermore, as a policy measure, it conforms to the capitalist structure of 
reliance on the market recognising the responsibility of the state to promote stability and 
HFRQRPLFJURZWK)RU/RYHQVWHLQWKHJUDQWLQJRIDµJXDUDQWHHGLQFRPH¶LVVXFKDWUDQVIHU
payment and serves not only to fulfil the governments objective of ensuring sufficient 
purchasing power within the economy to sustain growth, but also contributes to the 
process of separating work and pay.  
The separation of income and work has been the subject of many a political tract 
and economic theory. However it is not the purpose of this chapter to examine such 
literature but merely to demonstrate the strong link with the CBI proposal and the belief 
WKDWWKHHPSOR\PHQWRIRQH¶VODERXULVQRWWKHVROHVRXUFHWRWKHPHDQVRIVXEVLVWHQFH$
dual concern for the level of national output and the rights of the individual attracted 
many contributors to the CBI debate, but it is argued that within such contributions there 
is no concrete policy proposal for an unconditional minimum income to be paid as of a 
right and on an individual basis. It is not until the emergence of the contemporary 
literature, responding to the flaws and inadequacies of existing transfer payment systems, 
that a CBI is more explicitly defined. However many of the proposals advocated during 
this precursor phase contain some of the more radical elements of the CBI philosophy 
and hence require attention in that they promote an understanding of the underlying 
theoretical concepts. 
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6.3.1 Guild Socialism and the Social Dividend 
Guild Socialism, primarily a British movement, reached its height around the time 
of World War One. The Guild Socialists were a moderate group advocating a type of 
socialism that relied on gradualism and reform. Its leading exponents were a group of 
middle class intellectuals dissatisfied with the performance of the Labour Party. The 
*XLOG6RFLDOLVWVFODLPHGWRUHSUHVHQWHYHU\ERG\¶VLQWHUHVWVZLWKDQHPSKDVLVRQWKHQHHGV
and interests of workers. The underlying philosophy was common amongst other 
moderate socialist movements, moderate in the sense that they did not promote 
revolutionary change nor did they advocate an all powerful state, such as the Utopians 
(Robert Owen) and the Christian socialists (Charles Kingsley). The emergence of guild 
socialism occurred at a time when the syndicalist approach to reform was gaining ground 
over the collectivist philosophy. Competing demands regarding the role of trade unions in 
the management and control of labour as opposed to the autonomy of a centralised 
bureaucracy, which would be the consequence of an adherence to State Socialism, led to 
a compromise being sought in the form of National Guilds which would involve a joint 
partnership with workers, industry and government.  
The economic basis of the Guild Socialist movement centred around an attack on 
the traditional wage system. That isXWLOLVLQJWKH0DU[LDQDQDO\VLVRIµVXUSOXVYDOXH¶WKH
new movement criticised the appropriation of value from the efforts of workers in the 
IRUPRIWKHFDSLWDOLVW¶VSURILWV7KHWUDGLWLRQDOV\VWHPRIZDJHVZRXOGKHQFHEHUHSODFHG
by a system that would more adequately reflect the value of labour and the contribution 
made by that labour to the end product. The political question to be resolved was the lack 
of control afforded the individual in a system relying upon the electoral process as the 
only means of voicing discontent. Economic freedom and political freedom would be 
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advanced in a new form of organisation. Each industry or craft guild would be 
responsible not only for the management and control of production and distribution 
within their own particular sphere of economic activity, but would also be responsible for 
the care of those outwith the traditional labour market, such as the old, the disabled and 
the unemployed within the relevant guild. The establishment of the Joint Council would 
serve to promote the collective wishes of all guilds and hence a more democratic form of 
government would ensue. The movement attracted widespread support due to its twin 
pronged attack on the wage system and undemocratic government, in the sense that it 
attracted those committed to the Marxist ideology regarding the role of labour and those 
committed to devolved power. However events in Russia led to a focus of attention on 
the Bolshevik revolution. The Guild Socialists found it increasingly difficult to retain 
supporWHUV LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH FRPPXQLVWV¶ VXFFHVV DQG LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR SUHYHQW PDVV
exodus of the more extreme socialists, the move towards the idea of revolutionary change 
did in fact alienate the more moderate supporters whilst the extremists left to join the 
newly formed Communist Party in Britain (Finlay, 1972:83). Despite the political demise 
of the Guild Socialists the analysis contained within the philosophy regarding the 
relationships between income and work provides a concrete link to the CBI proposal. 
The Guild Socialists sought to;  
...combine Syndicalism with the Ruskin-Morris belief that work should be 
a creative, life enhancing experience, fearing that both Fabians and 
Marxists gave too much power to the state. 
(Burkitt, 1984:121) 
Bertrand Russell, essentially a Fabian but attracted to the anarchist philosophy, wrote in 
1918 that; 
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Marxian Socialism would give too much power to the State, while 
Syndicalism, which aims at abolishing the State, would, I believe, find 
itself forced to reconstruct a central authority in order to put an end to the 
rivalries of different groups of producers. The best practible system, to my 
mind, is that of Guild Socialism. 
(1918:13) 
Russell, therefore is attracted by the movement and in common with the Guild Socialists 
he devHORSVDWKHRU\ZKLFKFRQWDLQVHOHPHQWVRID&%,+RZHYHU5XVVHOO¶VDUJXPHQWIRU
a form of minimum guaranteed income finds justification in the earlier work of Paine as 
well as going further to examine the relationship between work and pay. In a chapter 
enWLWOHG µ:RUNDQG3D\¶5XVVHOO EHJLQVE\ VWDWLQJ WKDW LW LV HFRQRPLF IDFW WKDW µ1DWXUH
RQO\\LHOGVFRPPRGLWLHVDVWKHUHVXOWRIODERXU¶LELG)RU5XVVHOOWKHQODERXULVDQ
essential ingredient for economic survival. However, he remains concerned about the 
WUDGLWLRQDO PHDQV RI UHZDUGLQJ SURGXFWLYH DFWLYLWLHV ZKLFK µ\LHOG FRPPRGLWLHV¶ WKDW LV
the wage mechanism. He hence looks to alternative systems of political and economic 
organisation for inspiration. He begins by drawing similarities with the Socialists and 
Anarchists who propose the abolition of the wage system in the name of a more equitable 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VUHVRXUFHV 
Defenders of the existing system maintain that efficient work would be 
impossible without the economic stimulus, and that if the wage system 
were abolished men would cease to do enough work to keep the 
community in tolerable comfort. Through the alleged necessity of the 
economic motive, the problems of production and distribution become 
intertwined. The desire for a more MXVWGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHZRUOG¶VJRRGVLV
the main inspiration of most Socialism and Anarchism. 
(ibid:105) 
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The primary concern of the Socialists is to retain the willingness to work, according to 
Russell, as a condition of receipt of the minimum right to subsistence. Whilst the 
Anarchists wish to provide everyone with as much as they can consume of necessities 
ZLWK QR FRUUHVSRQGLQJ FRQGLWLRQV RI HQWLWOHPHQW 7KH µUDUHU FRPPRGLWLHV¶ ZRXOG EH
rationed and subsequently divided equally amongst the population. For Russell, then, 
both systems of redistribution are compatible with the common ownership of land and 
capital but the difference is that socialists would impose an obligation to work whilst 
anarchists would not. Two very distinct forms of economic organisation would hence 
evolve. The problem for Russell is how to deal with the problem posed by work no 
longer requiring the economic stimulus of income. If this is the case then how would 
production be affected. If equal incomes are to be granted to all those workers willing to 
ZRUN XQGHU WKH PRUH µWKRURXJKJRLQJ 6RFLDOLVW¶ V\VWHP DQG DQ HTXDO VKDUH RI DOO
commodities is to be the result under Anarchism then how would society ensure that 
enough of the necessary unattractive work would be done in a society wherH WKH µLGOHU
UHFHLYHGMXVWDVPXFKRIWKHSURGXFHRIZRUN¶LELG7KLVLVWKHSUREOHPWKDW5XVVHOO
sets out to resolve; 
Wages or Free Sharing? - µ$EROLWLRQ RI WKH ZDJHV V\VWHP¶ LV RQH RI WKH
watchwords common to Anarchists and advanced Socialists. 
(op cit) 
However only the Anarchists plan can lay claims to this watchword. In a system of free-
sharing, with no work requirement, would work which brought no other utility than pay 
be done? Russell points out that the main criticism of the Anarchist system is that as long 
as work remained unpleasant no individual would engage in such employment for the 
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mere fact that they were no longer forced to for reasons of economic survival. Russell 
counters this criticism by pointing out that;  
A certain amount of effort, and something in the nature of a continuous 
career, are necessary to vigorous men if they are to preserve their mental 
health and their zest for life.   
(ibid:112) 
Income is therefore not the only stimulus. There are other rewards and for Russell 
these factors will outweigh the pay factor for the vast majority of citizens. There will 
DOZD\VEHZRUNZKLFKLVGLVDJUHHDEOHKRZHYHUDQGWKHUHIRUHµVSHFLDOSULYLOHJHVPXVWEH
accorded to those who undertake it if the anarchist system is ever to be made workable¶
(op cit). Such privileges are not within the Anarchists terms of reference and hence 
Russell concludes that inflexibility on the part of the Anarchists leads to their plan being 
unfeasible. However, Russell remains attracted to Anarchism and finds great merits in a 
system that grants all individuals the right to as much as is desired of free commodities 
and an equal right to a share of rationed commodities. As long as flexibility was 
incorporated, as to which commodities remained on the free list or were removed as 
circumstances dictate, then the system contributes greatly to the enhancing of individual 
freedom.   
Russell remains concerned about the removal of the obligation to work. With this in 
PLQG KH WXUQV WR WKH 6RFLDOLVWV DQG VWDWHV µ$QDUFKLVP KDV Whe advantages as regards 
OLEHUW\6RFLDOLVPDVUHJDUGVWKHLQGXFHPHQWVWRZRUN¶LELG,QDWWHPSWLQJWRRXWOLQH
WKH SUREOHP LQKHUHQW ZLWKLQ WKH $QDUFKLVWV¶ SODQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH ZRUN UHTXLUHPHQW
5XVVHOO¶VDWWUDFWLRQWR*XLOG6RFLDOLVPFDQEHWUDFHG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Anarchists always assume that if their schemes were put into operation 
practically everyone would work; but although there is very much more to 
be said for this view than most people would concede at first sight, yet it is 
questionable whether there is enough to be said to make it true for practical 
purposes. Perhaps, in a community where industry had become habitual 
through economic pressure, public opinion might be sufficiently powerful 
to compel most men to work; but it is always doubtful how far such a state 
of things would be permanent. If public opinion is to be really effective, it 
will be necessary to have some method of dividing the community into 
small groups, and to allow each group to consume only the equivalent of 
what it produces. This will make the economic motive of each operative 
upon the group, which, since we are supposing it small, will feel that its 
collective share is appreciably diminished by each idle individual. 
(ibid:116)  
Such a scheme is again not consistent with the Anarchist system. However it appears that 
the organisation proposed by Russell is indeed compatible with the plan advocated by the 
Guild Socialists. 
In trying to combine the advantages of both the Socialist and the Anarchist systems 
RIGLVWULEXWLRQRIVRFLHW\¶VUHVRXUFHV5Xssell advocates the following plan; 
...that a certain small income, sufficient for necessaries, should be secured 
to all, whether they work or not, and that a larger income - as much larger 
as might be warranted by the total amount of commodities produced - 
should be given to those who are willing to engage in some work which the 
community regards as useful. 
(ibid:119) 
Continuing concern for the problem of choice in occupation, and the resulting effects on 
levels of production if income is to be granted as of a right and with no obligation to enter 
the labour market, leads Russell to further propose some sort of system which would 
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enhance the incomes of those who engaged in disagreeable trades over those who are 
employed in more pleasant or skilled jobs. It would seem then that Russell is advocating 
a CBI scheme which for him; 
...combines freedom with justice, and avoids those dangers to the 
community which we have found to lurk both in the proposals of the 
Anarchists and in those of orthodox Socialists.  
(ibid:120)  
5XVVHOO¶V SODQ ILWV WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI D &%, DQG DOWKRXJK SULPDULO\ PRWLYDWHG E\ WKH
separation of income from work debate, he does find justification in the equal right to 
freedom, therefore developing the rights based approach;  
When education is finished, no one should be compelled to work and those 
who choose not to work should receive a bare livelihood, and be left 
completely free; but probably it would be desirable that there should be a 
strong public opinion in favour of work, so that only comparatively few 
should choose idleness.  
(ibid:193)  
In Roads to Freedom Russell also presents a powerful argument to counter those 
who criticise universal minimum income guarantees on the grounds that the free-rider 
problem would render such schemes economically inefficient; 
There would, of course, be a certain proportion of the population who 
would prefer idleness. Provided the proportion were small, this need not 
matter. And among those who would be classed as idlers might be included 
artists, writers of books, men devoted to abstract intellectual pursuits - in 
short, all of those whom society despises while they are alive and honours 
when they are dead. To such men, the possibility of pursuing their own 
work regardless of any public recognition of its utility would be 
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invaluable...Freedom for such men, few as they are, must be set against the 
waste of the mere idlers. 
(ibid:115) 
Although Russell uses this argument to defend the criticisms of the Anarchist system, 
which requires no work obligation, his observations prove relevant in arguing for a CBI. 
5XVVHOO UDLVHV WKH LVVXHRI µSURGXFWLYH OHLVXUHDFWLYLWLHV¶ZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHVDQ LPSRUWDQW
element in contemporary debates. Such arguments will be elaborated on in chapter eight, 
particularly with reference to how the process of categorising activities, traditionally 
ODEHOOHG µQRQ-ZRUN¶ LQ D GXDOLVWLF SURGXFWLYHQRQ-productive framework can be 
construed as illustrating a gender bias. The negative consequences of employing such an 
approach becomes apparent when attempts are made to justify a CBI on the grounds of its 
potential in promoting gender neutral citizenship rights. However, at this stage the points 
Russell makes are worthy of comment, due in part to their relevance in negating claims of 
the economic inefficiency arising from the granting of a universal minimum income. 
It would appear that by making the distinction between those engaged in 
µLQWHOOHFWXDO SXUVXLWV¶ DQG µPHUH LGOHUV¶ 5XVVHOO HQYLVDJHV D SULYLOHJHG &%, 7KDW LV D
minimum income would be secured to those individuals who spend all of their time 
furthering the arts and sciences for no immediate financial gain, however the same 
minimum income should not be paid to those who merely refuse to work. Such a system 
is not in accordance with the CBI proposal in that it distinguishes between classes of 
individuals in much the same way as means-test would. However it is not entirely clear 
that this is what Russell is proposing as he does draw attention to the fact that the gains to 
be made from granting a PLQLPXPLQFRPHWR WKHµLQWHOOHFWXDOV¶ LV WREHVHWDJDLQVW WKH
waste incurred by the loss in productivity from allowing some individuals the opportunity 
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to become free-ULGHUV %\ UHIHUULQJ WR WKLV µZDVWH¶ KH VHHPV WR EH DGYRFDWLQJ WKDW WKH
minimum income is due to all and that in doing so the gains in terms of personal freedom 
will offset any efficiency loss. The Russell doctrine therefore presents a case whereby the 
question of economic efficiency is combined with the political concern of promoting 
individual liberty.  
Although it has been illustrated that Russell was attracted to the Guild Socialist 
plan for reform, his basic income philosophy was distinct, though similar in aspects, to 
the policy proposed by the movement itself. One of the major academic contributors to 
the Guild Socialist doctrine was G.D.H. Cole, a professor of economics at Oxford 
University. Cole although an adherent of the socialist cause, remained committed to the 
idea of active as opposed to passive democracy and the avoidance of central control by 
impersonal state bureaucracies, which become unresponsive to the needs of the citizens it 
is elected to represent
2
. This is primarily what attracted him to the movement. His 
thoughts on Guild Socialism appeared on a regular basis during thH¶V LQ WKHNew 
Age, DSXEOLFDWLRQHGLWHGE\5$2UDJHDIHOORZ*XLOG6RFLDOLVW&ROH¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWK
WKLVSXEOLFDWLRQLVLOOXVWUDWLYHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVDQDO\VLVGXHWRWKHMRXUQDO¶VVWURQJ
link with the Douglas Social Credit movement, to be discussed below. Given the 
                                                 
2
 Activism on his own part was demonstrated by his ability to organise fellow socialists, such as 
Bertrand Russell, Sidney and Beartrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw, by encouraging them to engage 
in regular debating sessions of which he was of course a central figure. One such debating session became 
NQRZQZLWKLQWKHDFDGHPLFFRPPXQLW\DVWKHIDPRXVµ&ROHJURXS¶ZKHUHSDUWLFLSDQWVHQJDJHGLQDIRUP
of role playing where they took on the responsibilities of members of a future Labour government (Van 
Trier, 1989). Cole, himself, was therefore an inspirational figure in that he engendered active debate and a 
conducive atmosphere for the formation of new policy amongst a prominent community of middle class 
intellectuals committed to social reform. 
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academic environment in which Cole was operating and his contact with fellow 
distinguished theorists advocating social reform, his role in the evolution of the political 
economy of income redistribution is an influential one. 
Cole draws an analogy with the political and economic system of capitalism and a 
religious doctrine. He identifies those in control as the money makers and the economists, 
ZKRP KH UHIHUV WR DV WKH µKLJK SULHVWV¶ DQG µOHVVHU SULHVWV¶ UHVSHFWLYHO\ ZLWK WKH
economists being the servants of the high priests. In doing so Cole draws attention to the 
supremacy of the role of money in the economy and to the dominant nature of those in 
control of managing the money supply. His reference to religion also reveals the fact that 
a great deal of mystification surrounds the present system but any criticism may be 
viewed as heresy. This scenario results in a strong solidarity amongst those in control but 
WKHSUREOHPUHPDLQVDVWRKRZWRDGGUHVVWKHJURZLQJXQUHVWIURPWKHµIORFN¶)RU&ROH
capitalism is µWKH UHOLJLRQ RI HFRQRPLF LQHTXDOLW\¶ and in order to survive must find a 
means of solving the issue of growing inequality (Cole, 1935:13). 
Writing in 1935, Cole attempts to develop a practical analysis of the principles and 
methods of economic planning within a society exercising a parliamentary system of 
control and which would be institutionalised without revolutionary change but rather 
through a process of constitutional reform of the existing economic and political 
structure. Principles of Economic Planning is therefore an account of how planning could 
be introduced taking into consideration that capitalism, despite suffering recent setbacks 
in the form of being unable to adequately address the social problems of increasing levels 
of unemployment and poverty, remains a omnipotent and positive force throughout the 
Western world. Cole takes care to point out that he is not adverse to revolutionary change 
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nor does he rule it out as a future option. However, given the existing dominant economic 
and political order he is merely recognising that change is necessary, and operating 
within this structure, he presents; 
«DQRXWOLQHRIWKHSUREOHPDVLWPHHWVXVKHUHDQGQRZ- compelled as we 
are under the existing conditions to make a choice between working for the 
revival of private enterprise on the old lines and attempting to substitute a 
different economic system designed to unloose the chained up forces of 
production and to give to the entire people a wider and more abundant life. 
(Cole,1935:ix) 
7KHVWLPXOXVIRU&ROHDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHDVRQZHQHHGWRµXQORRVHWKHFKDLQHG
XSIRUFHVRISURGXFWLRQ¶LVKLVFRQFHUQIRUXQGHUFRQVXPSWLRQDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJHIIHFWRI
widespread unemployment. He is scathing of the situation in the U.K. during the interwar 
years whereby individuals are either left to starve or kept alive by means of government 
KDQGRXWV LQ WKH µPLGVW RI SRWHQWLDO RU HYHQ RI DFWXDO DEXQGDQFH¶ LELG +H IXUWKHU
distinguishes between unemployment and leisure and maintains that the present system 
ensures that unemployment is degrading and shameful to those suffering it directly when 
in fact the recent advances in productive capacity should allow us to experience more 
leisure time without being financially worse off. He criticises the classical doctrine of 
laissez-faire, with its emphasis on the supremacy of free markets in allocating resources 
efficiently and lambasts the economists who attribute unemployment to high wages. 
However, he recognises that there are a growing number of economists in favour of a 
new order involving increased management in terms of preventing downturns in the 
trade-cycle by encouraging investment as opposed to savings. Furthermore there is a 
growing awareness amongst those controlling business that unemployment affects them 
directly as the resulting lack of purchasing power within the economy leaves their 
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machines idle and their warehouses full. However those exercising control over the 
means of production are a powerful group and therefore the instinct is to opt for 
µSODQQLQJ¶ DQG QRW VRFLDOLVP DV WKLV ZRXOG PHDQ UHOLQTXLVKLQJ SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF
SRZHU&ROH¶VSXUSRVHWKHQLVWRGHYHORSDSODQQLQJPHFKDQLVPµZLWKRXWDJRRGGHDORI
VRFLDOLVP¶LELG 
If, as illustrated above, Cole was motivated by a concern for underconsumption and 
the realisation of the economic importance of leisure time, his analysis of economic 
planning would obviously have something to say about the distribution of incomes. It is 
in this area that he introduces the social dividend. Cole begins, in a chapter entitled 
Planned Distribution of Incomes and Production, by acknowledging that the price 
standard is insufficient as a measure of value. Prices reflect a willingness to pay and 
therefore indicate the relative scarcity of a particular good or service. Such prices can 
only be attached to purely economic goods and if the question at issue is how best to use 
the productive resources available then some measure must be devised which takes into 
DFFRXQWµFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIMXVWLFHDQGZHOOEHLQJ¶DVZHOODVWKHHFRQRPLVWV¶FULWHULRQRI
µSUHSDUHGQHVV WRSD\¶ LELG&ROHWKHQJRHVRQWRGHWHUPLQHZKDWFULWHULDRIVRFLDO
justice and social well being should be applied in a planned economy. 
In his analysis Cole categorically states that need should take precedence over 
demand; 
...the need for a generally diffused supply of all things which can be 
regarded as necessaries of civilised living will constitute the first 
overriding claim upon the available resources of production. A satisfactory 
minimum of food, fuel, clothing, housing, education and other common 
services will come before anything else, as a social claim that a planned 
economy must meet. 
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(ibid:224) 
In the resource allocation process the provision of necessaries for all citizens therefore 
assumes the highest priority. Cole then outlines his notion of what constitutes a necessity 
by taking into consideration individual tastes and developing a definition of relative as 
opposed to absolute standards of living. Goods that are not believed to be absolute 
necessaries in any civilised society, such as leisure goods or more than is essential for 
survival of basic goods
3
, may be considered a necessity by some in order to achieve an 
acceptable and tolerable standard of living. The individual must be afforded the 
opportunity to consume such goods and hence the provision of a minimum income, with 
ZKLFKWKHLQGLYLGXDOLVIUHHWRGHYRWHWRWKHSXUFKDVHRIWKHVHµVHFRQGFODVV¶JRRGVDQG
services, becomes the subsequent claim on available resources. This leads Cole to his 
logical assumption that the planned economy must intervene in the area of income 
distribution; 
In the field of primary necessaries there will be no doubt about what the 
planned economy is to set out to produce, though there will be doubt about 
the level at which the necessary universal minimum is to be set, and 
therefore about the total size of the primary claim. But in the secondary 
ILHOGRIZKDWZHPD\FDOO³VXEVWLWXWDEOHQHFHVVDULHV´WKHUHZLOOEHGRXEW,W
will be desirable for the most part to leave the individual citizen the widest 
range of choice in deciding which of these secondary goods and services he 
prefers, and is therefore prepared to pay for out of his limited income. But 
as soon as this freedom of choice is assumed, it is at once apparent that the 
                                                 
3
  Cole specifically mentions, beer, tobacco , cinemas and theatre as goods which are viewed by some as 
necessary to secure an acceptable standard of living and further maintains that as society benefits from 
economic groZWK WKH UDQJH RI VXFK µVHFRQG FODVV¶ QHFHVVDULHV JURZV LELG -5). Cole therefore shows 
foresight in considering the dynamics of poverty.  
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structure of demand for substitutable necessaries to which the planned 
economy will have to respond will depend on the distribution of incomes, 
and that no plan for their production can be made except with a definite 
distribution of incomes in view. 
(ibid:225) 
&ROH PDLQWDLQV WKDW WKH SODQQLQJ RI SURGXFWLRQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI µVRFLDO MXVWLFH RU
H[SHGLHQF\¶ZLOOEHH[WUHPHO\LQHIILFLHQWDWOHDVWDWWKHPLFUROHYHOXQOHVVLWLVSUHFHGHG
by planned income redistribution. Utilising the economists tools of merit goods and 
externalities he outlines how reliance on the operation of the price mechanism as a way 
of influencing demand will fail in its ultimate purpose of correlating consumption 
patterns with planned output. The planned economy, like the free market economy, must 
match up what various producers are willing and able to sell with what consumers are 
willing and able to purchase. In other words the aim is to ensure that supply in each 
individual market is equal to the level of demand. It is assumed in the free market 
economy that this equilibrium will occur through the automatic and unfettered operation 
of the price mechanism. The planned economy has to find an alternative method of 
responding to signals and allocating scarce resources. 
*LYHQWKHFULWHULDRIµVRFLDO MXVWLFH¶DQGµH[SHGLHQF\¶WKHSODQQLQJDXWKRULWLHVFDQ
readily determine the level of output required to provide everyone with the predefined 
primary necessaries and select an efficient method of distribution, such as free provision, 
without requiring any prior knowledge of income distribution, or indeed assuming 
responsibility of any future control of income distribution. However, this is not the case 
ZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHSURGXFWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRIµVXEVWLWXWDEOH¶QHFHVVDULHVJLYHQWKH
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objectives of social justice and well-EHLQJ $IWHU KDYLQJ SURYLGHG µWKH PLQLPXP
UHTXLUHPHQWVRIGHFHQWDQGKHDOWK\OLYLQJ¶IRUDOOFLWL]HQVLW LVDVVXPHGWKDW LQGLYLGXDOV
are free to choose how to spend their incomes and society has no interest in determining 
or indeed influencing these choices. However such an assumption fails to take account of 
situations where there may be sound social and or economic reasons for wishing to 
influence consumption patterns. The planning authorities can attempt to affect 
consumption by the direct use of pricing policies. Goods that are considered meritorious 
can be priced low to encourage consumption and likewise goods and services which are 
considered harmful to society can be attributed high prices to discourage consumption. 
However, as Cole points out, the actual effect of pricing policies will depend largely on 
the distribution of incomes at any given time, and hence without prior knowledge of such 
distribution the results may be inefficient. 
Cole then goes on to explain how the planned economy may run into problems 
when trying to account for changes in demand without first considering the distribution 
of income. By anticipating how much of a particular good or service will be demanded at 
the proposed price the planners will set output levels correspondingly. Mistakes in the 
HVWLPDWHGDPRXQWVZLOOEHHYLGHQW LQ WKHIRUPRIHLWKHUVXUSOXV¶RUJOXWVRQWKHPDUNHW
The planned economy in attempting to rectify for such errors can attempt to mimic the 
free market by fixing prices in the short run and altering production levels in the long run. 
Fixing prices will serve to deplete existing stock-piles or to curtail demand until such 
times as supply can be increased and the altering of output levels will reflect the change 
in market conditions in the next time period. However, as the overall level of demand in 
any economy is subject to regular fluctuations, any authority assuming the responsibility 
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of planning the level of production in all productive sectors must remain extremely 
flexible in order to emulate the market process. Such a degree of flexibility at the micro 
level is administratively difficult and very costly to achieve. Planners, therefore can resort 
to influencing demand in such a way that their decisions regarding output appear to be in 
line with consumers tastes. In other words manipulating individual choice to suit the 
planned output. Cole maintains that this monopoly power, accruing in the hands of a 
large state bureaucracy, is indeed the principal danger of a planned economy in that it 
serves, just as a large monopolistic industry in a free market, to severely curtail individual 
choice (ibid:230-1). This leads Cole to his conclusion that the success of the planned 
economy in responding to the frequent changes in demand conditions requires the 
adoption of policies directed at income distribution; 
,I KRZHYHU FRQVXPHUV¶ LQFRPHV FDQ EH VR UDLVHG DV WR JLYH HYHU\RQH D
surplus to be spent on substitutable necessaries and cheap luxuries, the 
consequent enlargement of freedom of choice is likely very much to 
outbalance any tendency of the planning authority to persuade consumers 
into buying what they do not want. 
(ibid:231) 
Cole does not rely on this justification alone, that is in terms of efficiency and 
preserving individual freedom, but goes on to examine macro issues which affect the 
level of demand. The planning authority requires information regarding the total level of 
purchasing power in the economy and a general concept of the division of the national 
income between geographical areas as well as between groups of individuals. Equipped 
with this information the planned economy will be more successful in estimating the 
level of demand for particular goods and services and the pattern of allocation of that 
demand. Providing the analytical reasons why knowledge and control of the distribution 
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of income is important, Cole then goes on to say how the planned economy should 
operate in this area.  
Cole starts by stating that incomes perform two roles in the economy. They provide 
the means of financing the purchase of consumer goods by all individuals and they 
contribute towards the accumulation of capital goods through the process of savings and 
investment. The savings and investment function is not only represented by the actions of 
µEXVLQHVVHVDQGRWKHUFRUSRUDWHERGLHV¶EXWDOVRE\LQGLYLGXDOVZKRFKRRVHQRWVSHQGDOO
of their incomes in the immediate time period or by individuals who are forced, out of 
QHFHVVLW\ WR µSXWDZD\ UHVRXUFHV WRSURYLGH IRU D³UDLQ\GD\´ IRU WKHLUROGDJHRU IRU
JLYLQJWKHLUFKLOGUHQDVWDUWLQOLIH¶LELG+HDUJXHVWKDW 
The sum accruing as incomes to the members of the community is 
therefore meant to be large enough to buy not only the current supply of 
consumers¶JRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVEXWDSURSRUWLRQRIWKHLQYHVWPHQWJRRGVDV
well. 
(ibid: 232-33) 
In a planned economy this scenario will be replaced by a system that distributes incomes 
sufficient for the consumption of all consumable goods and holds back an amount 
deemed necessary for the supply and accumulation of capital goods. It will therefore no 
longer be the responsibility of specific individuals to provide for the purchase of 
investment goods. This is not to say that individuals should not save a part of their 
LQFRPHV LI WKH\ ZLVK WRGR VREXW DV WKLV DFWLYLW\ µZLOO EHRIQR HFRQRPLF VHUYLFH¶ WKH
savings will not accrue any interest. The balance between consumption and the 
accumulation of capital will be determined by the state in accordance with the national 
plan in that preference for saving on the part of individuals will be met by a reduction in 
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the amount held back by the authorites and an equivalent increase in the amount available 
for distributing as incomes. Likewise, any shortfall in the savings level as determined by 
the state will be rectified by decreasing the sum available for distribution and translating 
this amount into collective savings. The planned economy will therefore operate in such a 
way as to ensure that in any given time period the total level of income circulating within 
the economy will be sufficient to purchase the total amount goods and services supplied. 
What remains to be explained is how the national income will be distributed. 
Reliance on a system that provides incomes either in the form of earnings or 
SD\PHQWVIURPWKHSXEOLFSXUVHZKLFK&ROHUHIHUVWRDVµGROHV¶DQGLQFOXGHVSD\PHQWVRI
interest on public debts, pensions, insurance and means-tested benefits) leads invariably 
to long term deficiencies in disposable income. Any down turn in the economy will be 
HTXDOOHG E\ D UHGXFWLRQ LQ DYDLODEOH LQFRPHV DV µGROHV¶ DUH FXUUHQWO\ ILQDQFHG E\
WD[DWLRQ $Q LQFUHDVHG GHPDQG IRU µGROH¶ SD\PHQWV UHVXOWV LQ IXUWKHU UHGXFWLRQV LQ
purchasing power and therefore unemployment becomes; 
...self-perpetuating, because incomes cannot be increased until production 
has been increased, but production will not be increased until incomes are 
available to purchase the extra products.  
(ibid:234) 
For Cole, then, the under utilisation of productive resources could become a long term 
phenomena in the planless economy and the market will not automatically return to 
equilibrium. The issue becomes one of discovering some alternative means of distributing 
incomes from that which depends upon payment for services to production and state 
handouts financed via general taxation. Cole attempts to build a model which will ensure 
continued full employment in that; 
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A planned economy will seek to begin at the other end, by distributing 
enough income to buy at the planned SULFHVDOOWKHFRQVXPHUV¶JRRGVDQG
services which can be produced with the available productive resources, so 
as to leave adequate provision for the making of the requisite supply of 
capital goods.  There will be a planned total of incomes as well as of 
products, and the aim of the plan will be to balance these two at the highest 
practicable level. 
(ibid:234) 
,W LV DW WKLV SRLQW WKDW &ROH SUHVHQWV WKH µVRFLDO GLYLGHQG¶ +H ZLVKHV WR UHSODFH
µGROHV¶ ZLWK D VRFLDO GLYLGHQG ZKHUHE\ LQFRPH ZLOO QR ORQJHU EH Gerived from tax 
financed state handouts or from payments of interest. Direct services to production will 
be rewarded in the form of wages and further income will be due to each citizen directly 
IURP WKH VWDWH DV D µUHFRJQLWLRQ RI HDFK FLWL]HQ¶V FODLP DV D consumer to share in the 
FRPPRQKHULWDJHRISURGXFWLYHSRZHU¶LELG&ROHWKHUHIRUHSURYLGHVDPHFKDQLVP
by which work is no longer deemed the sole source of income in that each citizen is due 
from the state an income paid as a dividend representing their collective right to benefit 
IURP WKH QDWLRQV SURGXFWLYH ZHDOWK 7KH GLYLGHQG ZLOO EH GXH DV D µFLYLF ULJKW¶ SDLG
universally on an equal basis for each adult with appropriate allowances for children, and 
IURP WKH YHU\ RQVHW VKRXOG EH µDW OHDVW ODrge enough to cover the bare necessities of 
HYHU\IDPLO\LQWKHFRPPXQLW\¶LELG(DUQLQJVIURPZRUNZRXOGQRORQJHUEHWKH
means of economic survival but rather a means of securing an income over and above the 
minimum. Cole answers the criticism that work incentives would thus be destroyed 
within such a system by stating that the desire to obtain a degree of luxuries and a greater 
VXSSO\ RI ZKDW KH SUHYLRXVO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV µVXEVWLWXWDEOH QHFHVVDULHV¶ LV LQ IDFW µWKH
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NHHQHVWRIDOOKXPDQGHPDQGV¶ LELG&ROH¶V VRFLDOLVWSULQFLSOHV DUHHYLGHQW LQKLV
statement that; 
The need for very high monetary incentives is a product of class inequality, 
and not of human nature. It will be ended when men can no longer 
accumulate property as a means to power, or hope to live at a standard far 
beyond that of the great majority. 
(ibid:236) 
Cole is aware of the possible threat to work incentives within a scheme abolishing 
the traditional wage system altogether and replacing it with equal incomes for all and 
therefore is keen to ensure that an element of reward remains for participating in the 
labour market. However, the price mechanism will no longer be the main method of 
income distribution but will be complementary to a scheme of primarily distributing 
incomes on the basis of need. Hence the main slice of national income will now be 
accounted for by the priorities of the amount set aside to provide for the accumulation of 
capital and the distribution of the social dividend. Any amount remaining will be 
available for payment to individuals engaging in work. Cole actually emphasises the 
growing importance of the social dividend when he refers to the primacy the payment of 
the dividend will have over the wage mechanism; 
I believe the tendency will be for a planned economy steadily to reduce the 
proportion of total income distributed in the first of these ways, (rewards 
for work) and steadily to enlarge the amount of the social dividend. 
(ibid:235) 
In adopting these policy measures in the field of income distribution, the planned 
economy will be better equipped in forecasting the level of demand and in accounting for 
fluctuations, the problem Cole set out to resolve. All that is now required is an estimate of 
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the overall level of basic needs. This will now be an easier task as the demand for basic 
QHFHVVLWLHV UHPDLQV PRUH VWDEOH WKDQ WKH GHPDQG IRU µVXEVWLWXWDEOH QHFHVVDULHV¶ DQG
luxury goods. Individual demands will indeed vary over time quite considerably, but a 
knowledge of the average level of demand for the bare essentials of life can be much 
more readily gained than the information required to establish the market conditions in 
each industry. Uncertainty of demand will not be completely abolished but the move 
towards equality will diminish the extent of this uncertainty at least in the short run. The 
expenditure of incomes derived from sources other than the social dividend will be much 
more difficult to anticipate. However in drawing up a plan of national consumption the 
authorities will be aware of the supplies and output required to fulfil basic needs and, by 
UHWDLQLQJIOH[LELOLW\LQWKHµILQLVKLQJWUDGHV¶LQWHUPVRIFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHLWZLOOEHHDVLHU
to switch resources from one area to another in response to fluctuating demand. Within 
WKLVFKDSWHURI&ROH¶VWKHVLs on economic planning, the recurring theme of citizens rights 
is coupled with an analytical illustration of the inadequacies of the current means of 
distributing wealth (with its accent on the price mechanism leading to rewards and 
ownership) to develop a justification for a guaranteed minimum income scheme. Cole is 
WKHUHIRUHHVVHQWLDOO\XWLOLVLQJWKHHFRQRPLVW¶VWRROVRIDQDO\VLVWRGHYHORSDPRUHHIILFLHQW
means of wealth distribution. He develops practical proposals for the planning of income 
distribution within the realms of traditional economic theory. However his contribution to 
the CBI debate contains a theoretical aspect which complements his practical analysis. 
In an appendix to this chapter Cole goes on to provide a more theoretical 
justification for his social dividend; 
The power to produce wealth is a social power which arises out of the 
entire development of the society in which it exists. This power can be 
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increased by individual skill or effort; but the skill and effort of individuals 
are exercised upon a situation which embodies the entire social heritage of 
WKHFRPPXQLW\WRZKLFKWKH\EHORQJ:KHQHFRQRPLVWVVSHDNRIDPDQ¶V
µSURGXFWLYLW\¶ WKH\ UHDOO\ PHDQ WKDW SDUW RI WKH SURGXFWLYLW\ RI VRFLHW\
which is realised more or less effectively with his aid. It follows that no 
PDQUHDOO\µSURGXFHV¶WKHIXOOYDOXHZKLFKLVDWWULEXWHGWRKLPLQHFRQRPLF
theory, and that no other factor of production really possesses a 
µSURGXFWLYLW\¶ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKDW ZKLFK LW LV FUHGLWHG 0RVW RI WKH
product achieved by the employment of the factors of production is 
attributable to society: the individual is responsible only for relatively 
small variations in its value, according as he uses well or ill the available 
resources of production. 
(ibid: 251) 
In 1936 Cole published a pamphlet titled Fifty Propositions about Money and 
Production
4
 in which he states; 
14. The productive power of the community is a social power: it depends 
on the accumulated capital resources and knowledge at the disposal of the 
community as well as upon the current efforts of individuals. Wealth 
creation is a social, as well as an individual, process. 
15. Accordingly, the entire body of citizens has a social right to share in the 
current product of industry, not only as a reward for current service 
rendered, but as a right of citizenship. 
(1947:360) 
Witness the recurring theme of citizenship coupled with the separation of work and 
income. Cole goes on to say: 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix B in Cole (1947) 0RQH\,W¶V3UHVHQWDQG)XWXUH 
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20. It is implied in the above proposition that the social dividend should be 
equal for all citizens. Every citizen has an equal right to share in the social 
heritage. 
Note - This does not exclude decisions by the community to make 
additional grants to certain citizens on grounds of special need, e.g. to the 
sick or infirm, or decisions to vary the dividend in the case of children who 
are receiving free services such as education, or of other persons receiving 
special free services at the public expense. 
(ibid:360) 
&OHDUO\ WKHQ WKH VRFLDO GLYLGHQGHQYLVDJHGE\&ROH LQ WKH¶VZDVRQHZKLch 
should be paid unconditionally to all citizens. There was to be no work test and the 
amount paid would have no link to individual effort and therefore not viewed as a reward 
for work. However, Cole does appear to develop a concept of debt to society in that he 
assumes a preparedness to work on behalf of all citizens making a claim on the nations 
cultural heritage. He is unclear how the system is to be policed in light of individuals 
IDLOLQJ WR µSXOO WKHLU ZHLJKW¶ EXW KH LV UHVROXWH WKDW VRPH IRUP RI SURvision should be 
PDGHIRUDWOHDVWPHHWLQJWKHEDVLFQHHGVRIWKRVHZKRµIRUIHLWWKHLUFODLPV¶
In making this claim Cole reinforces the important issues his thesis raises with regard to 
the responsibility of modern civil society in providing for the needs of its citizens as 
opposed to their individual wants. This point will be returned to in chapter eight in 
examining the relevance of a CBI in the process of formally recognising the undertaking 
RIµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHVZKLFKVHUYHWRPHHWWKHµQon-HFRQRPLF¶QHHGVRIRWKHUV7KLVLV
a crucial element in developing an argument for a CBI founded on its potential for 
promoting gender equality. Cole further recognises the relationship between social 
security and other forms of state welfare provision when discussing the criteria for 
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determining the amount of dividend payable. The Cole doctrine, then, represents a 
significant contribution to the CBI debate.  
However, the arguments presented by Cole display limiting characteristics due to 
his acceptance of the dominant and monopolising force of capitalism in determining the 
socio-economic base of society. Although primarily motivated by his desire to 
demonstrate the efficiency benefits of organising an economic system around the 
principles of planning, in doing so he presents a logical and persuasive argument for a 
CBI. He takes care to point out that his model does not imply the demise of capitalist 
based structures, which would entail radical economic and political change. Rather, he 
presents it as means RIVHFXULQJDPRUHHIILFLHQWXVHRIDQDWLRQ¶VUHVRXUFHVE\H[HUFLVLQJ
a degree of carefully managed and democratically based control over the process of 
market allocation. Inherent within his plan is a mechanism which ensures that the basic 
needs of economic survival are met from a source alternative to the processes associated 
ZLWK WKH WUDGLWLRQDOEX\LQJDQGVHOOLQJRI ODERXU%\GHILQLQJKLV µVRFLDOGLYLGHQG¶DVD
claim on the nations common heritage, he further separates his plan for income 
redistribution from the formal labour market. Furthermore, this aspect of his model 
emphasises the notion of collective responsibility, which is distinctively opposed to a 
IRFXVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDODIXQGDPHQWDOIHDWXUHRIFDSLWDOLVWRUJDQLVDWLRQ+RZHYHU&ROH¶V
thesis is first and foremost an analysis of the economic planning of income distribution in 
D FDSLWDOLVW HFRQRP\ $V VXFK KLV µVRFLDO GLYLGHQG¶ LV WR EH UHJDUGHG DV DQ LQFRPH
maintenance measure that complements the traditional work and pay relationship. The 
focus on an equitable distribution of wealth being a necessary condition for achieving 
efficiency in the utilisation of productive resources implies that the direction of social 
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policy is being driven by economic considerations. Although explicit links to the labour 
PDUNHWDUHHIIHFWLYHO\UHPRYHGWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµVRFLDOGLYLGHQG¶UHPDLQVLPSOLFLWO\D
function of production and consumption in a market-RULHQWHGHFRQRP\+RZHYHU&ROH¶V
plan does represent a crucial turning point in the CBI debate in that for the first time the 
relationship between the economic planning of income distribution and the formation of 
social policy is defined and analysed.  
&ROH DSSDUHQWO\ KLVWRULFDOO\ FRLQHG WKH WHUP µVRFLDO GLYLGHQG¶ LQ KLV WKHVLV RQ
economic planning in a capitalist economy (Van Trier, 1989). However the concept of a 
guaranteed minimum income appears throughout the literature on how a socialist 
economy could reach the equilibrium afforded by the market. An examination of this 
literature provides further justification for a CBI in that it illustrates yet another area of 
political economy, that is the idea of market socialism, attracted by the idea. 
6.3.2 The Neo-Classical View 
In 1938 Oscar Lange, an economist, attempted to deal with the objection from the 
capitalist economists Von Mises and Hayek that a socialist economy was impracticable in 
that it would fail to solve the problem of rational allocation of scarce resources. Lange, 
utilising neo-classical analysis spoke of the social dividend; 
...there must be some connection between the income of a consumer and 
the services of labour performed by him. It seems therefore convenient to 
regard the income of consumers as composed of two parts: one being the 
receipts for the labour services performed and the other being part of a 
VRFLDO GLYLGHQG FRQVWLWXWLQJ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VKDUH LQ WKH LQFRPH GHULYHG
from the capital and the natural resources owned by society. 
(Lange, 1964:74) 
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Lange therefore envisages a system in which dividends are due to citizens from the state 
in a planned economy in the same way that privately owned industries distribute 
dividends to shareholders in a capitalist state. That is, by virtue of their ownership of the 
means of production as a natural right. Again the rights based justification for state 
supported schemes of income support is raised. However, Lange is not primarily 
concerned with justifying a CBI on the basis of citizenship rights but is rather working 
out a theory of distribution within state socialism that will resolve questions of allocative 
efficiency. Work is no longer the sole source of income but the relationship between 
labour provided and financial reward, in the form of pay, remains unaltered. Pay rates act 
as signals to providers and purchasers indicating degrees of relative scarcity and ration 
resources accordingly. Therefore, when discussing the distribution of this social dividend 
Lange points out that it must be entirely independent of the choice of occupation so as not 
to distort the price mechanism operating in the distribution of labour, hence ensuring that 
µDVXEVWLWXWLRQRISODQQLQJIRUWKHIXQFWLRQVRIWKHPDUNHWLVTXLWHSRVVLEOHDQGZRUNDEOH¶
(ibid:83). Lange addresses the distribution of the social dividend in practical terms using 
neo-classical tools of marginalism; 
Freedom of choice of occupation assumed, the distribution of the social 
dividend may affect the amount of services of labour offered to different 
industries. If certain occupations received a larger social dividend than 
others, labour would be diverted into the occupations receiving a larger 
dividend. Therefore, the distribution of the social dividend must be such as 
not to interfere with the optimum distribution of labour services between 
the different industries and occupations. The optimum distribution is that 
which makes the differences of the value of the marginal product of the 
services of labour in different industries and occupations equal to the 
differences in the marginal disutility of working in those industries or 
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occupations. Therefore, the social dividend must be distributed so as to 
have no influence whatever on the choice of occupation. >/DQJH¶V
emphasis] The social dividend paid to an individual must be entirely 
independent of his choice of occupation. For instance, it can be divided 
equally per head of population, or distributed according to age or size of 
family or any other principle which does not affect the choice of 
occupation. 
(ibid:83-84) 
Lange therefore is not proposing an unconditional guaranteed income payable to all, in 
the CBI sense, as he points out that his scheme does not necessarily entail equal 
distribution of the social dividend per head of population. His contribution to the debate 
though can be viewed in the separation of income from work analysis in that he views 
two sources of income in a planned economy, that is wages for work done and the social 
GLYLGHQG/DQJH¶VVRFLDOGLYLGHQGLVKHQFHPHUHO\DSROLF\LQVWUXPHQWWREHDGRSWHGE\
the planners of a socialist economy to ensure a more efficient distribution of income. The 
price mechanism would remain as the primary economic force within labour markets. 
Lerner, writing in 1944, utilises the same tools of analysis (later to become known 
as the Lange-Lerner model of the price mechanism of a socialist society) to illustrate how 
in a socialist economy governments can avoid the evils of inflation whilst attempting to 
maintain full employment; 
In the collectivist economy this can be done in two ways.  The first is 
through adjustments in the rate of interest. This affects both the rate of 
investment and the rate of consumption. Second, and more important, is the 
direct effect of government action on income and through income on 
consumption. 
The consumers receive part of their income from their work in payment for 
their labour by the managers of production, who hire labour in accordance 
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with the Rule. The rest of the income of consumers comes to them from the 
government. This can be considered as the citizens share of the earnings of 
the factors of production other than labour, but however it is considered, 
the government must distribute just enough to induce consumers to spend 
the right amount which, together with the investment demand for factors, 
will provide full employment. 
(Lerner, 1970:267) 
Governments therefore have to be aware of the right amount of dividend due in 
accordance with production plans and it would appear that flexibility is a part of the 
Lerner model in that the dividend should be adjusted accordingly as production plans are 
altered. Although using marginal analysis Lerner was essentially a Keynesian and to 
GHVFULEH KLP DV D µQHR-FODVVLFDO¶ HFRQRPLVW LV µD ELW PLVOHDGLQJ¶ 9DQ 7ULHU 
Van Trier draws attention to the fact that; 
$OWKRXJKVWXG\LQJDQGWHDFKLQJDW WKH/6(EHLQJWKHµSURWHJH¶RI/LRQHO
Robbins, very much influenced by Hayek and von Mises, and intellectually 
FRPPLWWHGWRWKHHOHJDQWORJLFRIPDUJLQDOLVP/HUQHU¶VVRFLDOLVWYDOXHVOHG
KLPWRDFFHSW.H\QHV¶VVFKHPH)RU/HUQHUWKHDOOHJHGO\VPDOOORVVHVLQ
efficiency from a Keynesian type of intervention did certainly not outweigh 
the social costs of mass unemployment.  
(ibid: 43) 
For Lerner then the social dividend plays a very different role in guiding the allocation of 
resources than it does for Lange. Justified in the same way, that is, as a means of 
reimbursing citizens with their share of the social product, Lerner views the social 
dividend as more than a policy instrument to redistribute income. It is also viewed as a 
mechanism governments could and indeed should utilise to guarantee an effective level 
of demand to ensure full employment; 
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The only proviso that must be made in the interest of the optimum use of 
resources is that the amount paid out to any individual should not in any 
way be affected by the amount of work he does. This is because of the 
desirability of having the wage equal to the vmp (value of marginal 
product) of labour (which is what the manager will be paying the worker 
TXLWHDSDUWIURPDQ\³VRFLDOGLYLGHQG´VRDVWRLQGXFHQHLWKHUWRRPXFKRU
too little labour. In the name of the optimum division of income it can be 
argued that the distribution of the social dividend should not be very 
unequal. My personal inclination is for an equal share to be given to each 
member of society as his right as a citizen, with no questions asked and no 
exceptions. There could be no better safeguard of the freedom and 
independence of the individual. 
(Lerner, 1970:267) 
Van Trier summarises the differences between the Lange and Lerner social 
dividend schemes; 
...for Lerner the social dividend is clearly a steering device, keeping the 
economy on the right but narrow track between inflation and depression. 
/DQJH¶V YLHZ RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ SXW WKH VRFLDO GLYLGHQG LQ D PRUH VWULFWO\
distributional framework. Secondly, whereas for Lange social dividends 
should not correlate with the choice of occupation, Lerner stresses the 
necessity of its being independent from the amount of work done. Thirdly, 
for Lange the rate of equality of the distribution was optional; Lerner, on 
the other hand, states his preference for an equal distribution, based on a 
dual argument: citizenship rights on the one hand and a more utilitarian 
argument in terms of the optimal income distribution on the other hand. 
(1989:48) 
The Lange-Lerner model therefore contributes to the CBI debate in an influential way. 
Both develop a state scheme of income maintenance based on citizenship rights and fiscal 
policy measures to ensure full employment. The right to work is linked with the right to 
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an adequate income whilst at the same time developing a model which successfully 
separates work from income. The use of neo-classical marginal analysis, combined with 
Keynesian demand management type measures, illustrates the flexibility of the concept of 
a minimum guaranteed income for all individuals across the political and economic 
divide.   
6.3.3 Poverty as a natural consequence of progress 
Continuing with the theme of financial reward for work, strands of the CBI proposal 
can be found in theories of poverty as a natural consequence of progress; 
Where the conditions to which material progress every where tends are 
most fully realised - that is to say, where population is densest, wealth 
greatest, and the machinery of production and exchange most highly 
developed - we find the deepest poverty, the sharpest struggle for 
existence, and the most of enforced idleness. 
(George, 1913:9)   
Concern for the effect on the labour market of increased mechanisation has attracted 
many individuals to a CBI. The need to uncouple income from work in view of 
decreasing job supply, with simultaneous increases in demand for employment, is 
necessary if the Malthusian argument is to be denied. Parker (1989) points out that two 
former soldiers, Major C.H. Douglas and Jaques Duboin, at the time of World War One 
were motivated by such concerns;  
In France, Verdun veteran Jacques Duboin, who watched the newly 
manufactured tanks succeed where echelon after echelon of men had died, 
argued passionately for institutional change that would completely 
uncouple income from work. In order to prevent mass unemployment and 
to take advantage of the material abundance made possible by new 
WHFKQRORJLHV KH SURSRVHG WKDW HDFK FRXQWU\¶V QDWLRQDO LQFRPH VKRXOG EH
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VKDUHGRXWHTXDOO\EHWZHHQ LW¶VFLWL]HQVZLWKD WD[RISHUFHQWRQDOO
their other income. 
5
 
(Parker, 1989:126) 
When developing a historical sketch for his book Basic Income Freedom from Poverty, 
Freedom to Work (1989) Tony Walter takes a similar starting point, that is the proposals 
associated with the aforementioned Major Clifford Douglas. Douglas, an engineer by 
profession was spurred by a concern for the effect of expanding industry during the war 
and how was this to be consumed. The possible failure of society to fully appreciate and 
benefit from ongoing advances in modern technology led Douglas to turn his attention to 
the study of economics. He began to work out and subsequently advocate a plan that 
would address the decline of traditional liberal orthodoxy within the economics discipline 
(Finlay, 1972:1). Although the Douglas proposal can be criticised with regard to 
providing a workable solution to deficient demand; 
«WKH ERG\ RI ZRUN SXEOLVKHG EHWZHHQ  DQG  LQ FROODERUDWLRQ
with Orage forms a coherent critique of the capitalist financial mechanisms 
which regulate production and distribution in a technologically advanced 
society. 
 (Burkitt, 1994:19) 
The central issue for Douglas was how to address the scenario of overproduction 
and unemployment and his remedy was the Social Credit. Douglas based his theory on 
the idea that; 
                                                 
5
 Parker explains in a footnote on p420 that JaquHV 'XERLQ¶V ZULWLQJ ZKLFK LQFOXGHG La grande 
revolution qui vient (1934); (QURXWHYHUVO¶DERQGDQFH (1935) and Liberation (1936) are now out of print. 
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What backs the value of currency is not the banks but the productive 
capacity of the people and therefore credit ultimately derives from and is 
due to the people. 
(Walter, 1989:23) 
Douglas therefore became associated with the founding of the theory of Social Credit and 
his work was expounded in The New Age WKURXJKRXWWKH¶V7KHOLQNZLWKThe New 
Age is worthwhile noting for two reasons. Douglas was not an economist by profession 
and as such was not afforded the academic credibility essential for ensuring his doctrine 
was brought into the public domain. He was further handicapped by what Finlay refers to 
DVµKLVDZNZDUGVW\OHDPL[WXUHRIWHFKQLFDOEUHYLW\DQGSHGDQWLFTXDOLILFDWLRQVXFKWKDW
even his friends and admirers were forced to admit heavy gRLQJ¶  6 Douglas 
hence required a public stage that would be sympathetic to his cause. The New Age 
turned out to be that stage;  
$W OHQJWK DW WKH HQGRI  D1HZ$JH HGLWRULDO GUHZ DWWHQWLRQ WR µDQ
LQJHQLRXV DQG FRQYLQFLQJ DUWLFOH¶ E\ 0DMRU 'ouglas appearing in the 
µ(QJOLVK5HYLHZ¶RI'HFHPEHUWKDW\HDU7KHDUWLFOHLWVHOIZDVUHSULQWHGLQ
WKH1HZ$JH¶VILUVW LVVXHRI WKHQHZ\HDUDQG2UDJHDQGKLVSDSHUZHUH
launched upon a championing of Social Credit to which both were to 
remain loyal to the death - that of Orage dramatically on the night after his 
BBC talk on Social Credit, that of the New Age in 1938, when it faded out 
unable to pay its way. 
(Finlay, 1972:62) 
                                                 
6
  5HIHUHQFHLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLVDJDLQPDGHWR'RXJODV¶µFRQYROXWHGZULWLQJVW\OH¶ZKHQ+XWFKLVRQDUJXes 
WKDWLWGLUHFWO\OHGWRFRQIXVLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPVµ6RFLDO&UHGLW¶DQGµ1DWLRQDO'LYLGHQG¶ - the 
former being used to denote the name of the movement and the latter represented their main demand 
(1995:43). 
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The journal itself served to promote both the political and economic aspects of 
socialist beliefs and under the editorship of Alfred Richard Orage it commanded a certain 
degree of literary and academic prestige. Although the paper never actually built up a 
ZLGHUHDGHUVKLSQRUDVHFXUHILQDQFLDOEDVHIRUµWKRVHZKRZHUHDFWLYHLQMRXrnalism and 
politics at this time, the New Age EHFDPH VRPHWKLQJ RI D OHJHQG¶ LELG $Q
association of this kind allowed the opportunity for the Douglas doctrine, essentially a 
treatise on monetary reform, to become connected with and to incorporate, with the aid of 
2UDJH¶VHGLWRULDOVNLOOVWKHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOYDOXHVRIDSURJUHVVLYHOLEHUDOPRYHPHQW
The second, related point to note regarding the link with the New Age regards the 
DXGLHQFH'RXJODV¶6RFLDO&UHGLWWKHRU\UHFHLYHG$VPHQWLRQHGHDUOLer G.D.H. Cole was 
a regular contributor and therefore it can safely be assumed that Cole was more than 
familiar with the Douglas proposal. As an economist, it follows that he would be 
interested in the function of money in the economy and therefore may have been 
influenced by Douglas. 
The main thrust of the Douglas proposal was that, in order to rectify any deficiency 
in purchasing power within the economy, governments should distribute additional 
money to consumers and grant subsidies to employers in order to divorce the production 
process from the price mechanism. It remains to be explained how this was to be done 
and if the Social Credit envisaged by Douglas bears any relation a CBI, which would 
serve to separate work from income. Charles Sanderson, in a booklet published in 1936, 
attempted to outline the pros and cons of the Douglas plan, pointing out that Douglas was 
initially concerned with the problem of under-consumption. Consequently his proposal 
set out to ensure sufficient purchasing power existed within the economy to buy what was 
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being produced, that is, the central tenet of the scheme was demand management. 
According to Sanderson; 
...Social Credit offers a scheme which it believes will cure under-
consumption without interfering in any way whatsoever with the present 
economic organisation.  It leaves ownership untouched, it leaves 
management untouched, it leaves profits untouched, it leaves interest 
untouched; it leaves the present economic organisation just as it is.  It 
applies itself directly and entirely to the financial side.  
(1936:5) 
The scheme therefore offers a mechanism by which governments can control the amount 
of financial credit available within the economy to ensure that total national consumption 
would be equal to total national production. This mechanism was two pronged, involving 
the National Discount affecting product prices and the National Dividend affecting 
incomes. It would appear at first glance, then, that Douglas is an early Keynesian. 
However further interpretation of the Douglas proposal is necessary to illustrate that this 
is not the case and that Social Credit did entail much more than, as Sanderson advocates, 
UHIRUPRIWKHILQDQFLDOVHFWRU'RXJODV¶VFULWLTXHRIWKHZRUNLQJVRIFDSLWDOLVWHFRQRPLHV
does provide useful insights into the relationship between social and economic policy, 
previously viewed as separate. Furthermore, the Douglas doctrine contains strong 
elements of the notion of rights of citizenship and the abolition of the work requirement, 
albeit for a temporary five year period, as a condition of state supported income 
maintenance schemes. 
Douglas wrote in the preface to the revised edition of his original text, published in 
1924, that his book Social Credit was issued; 
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...in order to correlate the financial theories, which have since become 
widely known under the same title, with the social, industrial, and 
philosophic ideals to which they are appropriate.  
(1935:v).  
Douglas himself, hence recognises that his ideas on financial reform are to be viewed as a 
new social order if his scheme is to be at all successful. Douglas is not prepared to accept 
that the adoption of his Social Credit scheme should involve revolutionary change, nor 
should it be a natural evolutionary process, but rather a combination of the two. The 
scheme proposed is to address the growing awareness that present financial and social 
arrangements throughout the industrialised world are unstable and that change is 
inevitable. In fact he writes; 
1RWKLQJZLOOVWRSLWµ%DFNWR¶LVVKHHUGUeaming; the continuation of 
taxation on the present scale, together with an unsolved employment 
problem, is fantastic; the only point at issue in this respect is the length of 
time which the break-up will take, and the tribulations we have to undergo 
while the break-up is in progress.  But while recognising this, it is also 
necessary not to fall into the error which has its rise in Darwinism; that 
change is evolution, and evolution is ascent.  It may be; but equally it may 
not be.  That is where the necessity for the revolutionary element arises; 
using of course, the word revolutionary in a constructive sense. 
(ibid:197) 
7KLVSURYLGHVVRPHLQGLFDWLRQDV WR'RXJODV¶SROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQV+HJRHVRQ WRVWDWH
that; 
There is, at the moment, no party, group, or individual possessing at once 
the power, the knowledge and the will, which would transform the growing 
social unrest and resentment (now chiefly marshalled under the crudities of 
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Socialism and Communism) into a constructive effort for the regeneration 
of Society. 
(ibid:197) 
The simple solution to the negative balance between potential supply and effective 
demand, that is demand backed by a willingness and ability to pay was, for Douglas, 
money (Douglas, 1924:27). In developing his scheme for financial reform Douglas 
adopts the attitude that the individuals comprising a community rightfully own the 
productive capacity of that community. His justification for this is based on his belief that 
accrediting all wealth formation to the collective values of the three traditional factors of 
production; land, labour and capital, is an erroneous assumption as it fails to recognise 
the contribution made by individual enterprise; 
Quite clearly no one person can be said to have a monopoly share in this; it 
is the legacy of countless numbers of men and women, many of whose 
names are forgotten and the majority of whom are dead.  And since it is a 
cultural legacy, it seems difficult to deny that the general community, as a 
whole, and not by any qualification of land, labour, or capital, are the 
proper legatees.  
(ibid:56-57) 
This process of deduction provides Douglas with a theoretical justification for 
income redistribution based on the premise that individuals are naturally entitled to a 
share of the nations wealth by way of their inherited ownership as citizens. The rights 
based approach to an income guarantee is very much a part of the Douglas doctrine. 
+RZHYHU'RXJODVGRHVQRWUHO\VROHO\RQWKLVMXVWLILFDWLRQDQGWKHFRQFHSWRIDµ&XOWXUDO
+HULWDJH¶WKDWKHUHIHUVWRLVstrengthened by his analysis of the role of credit. Douglas 
tackles his analysis of deficient purchasing power by attempting to distinguish between 
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financial credit and real credit. He begins by stating his concerns regarding the role of 
money in the economy, which subsequently leads him to his plan for financial reform. 
The emphasis on money as a measure of the value of a particular service or commodity is 
fiercely criticised by Douglas and he himself views this criticism as fundamental to his 
theory; 
The proper function of a money system is to control and direct the 
production and distribution of goods and services. >'RXJODV¶V RZQ
HPSKDVLV@,WLVRUVKRXOGEHDQµRUGHU¶V\VWHPQRWDµUHZDUG¶V\VWHP,WLV
essentially a mechanism of administration, subservient to policy, and it is 
because it is superior to all other mechanisms of administration, that the 
money control of the world is so immensely important. 
(ibid:72) 
The financial organisation of an economy leads to the scenario of deficient 
effective demand in light of increasing supply. Individuals within such an economy are 
unable to purchase the goods they require or those goods and services which producers 
DUHZLOOLQJDQGLQGHHGµDQ[LRXV¶WRVXSSO\GXHWRWKHODFNRIPRQH\QHFHVVDU\WRPDNH
such purchases. The Socialist retort to this theory would be that the problem stems from 
an unequal distribution of wealth but for Douglas this is a misconception; 
The point we have to make is not merely that financial purchasing power is 
unsatisfactorily distributed, it is that, in its visible forms, >'RXJODV¶VRZQ
emphasis], it is collectively insufficient. 
(ibid:95) 
Douglas therefore builds his analysis around the theme of the role of money in the 
economy. The fact that money is viewed as a tool for measuring value results in a 
possible disequilibrium between supply and demand. If, as Douglas argues, the reason for 
underconsumption is due to individuals not having enough money in their pockets to buy 
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goods produced, and as money represents the value of these goods, then he must turn to 
an examination of the price system. Prices represent money values and if money is 
deficient in the hands of the consumer then this leads Douglas to the assumption that 
prices are prohibitively high. If prices are determined by the need to cover costs of 
production then what does this say of the behaviour of producers. The problem arises 
when some of the costs being covered do not represent costs of final goods or services 
offered for sale but rather contribute towards the financing of capital goods. Not all 
money in the economy is spent on consumable goods but is saved in order to pay for 
capital goods, which become the property of those doing the saving, that is the capitalists. 
If the ultimate motivation is profit maximisation then the accumulation of capital goods is 
viewed as a future investment which will ensure the production of new goods, which in 
WXUQ ZLOO EH VROG DW D SULFH VXIILFLHQW WR FRYHU WRWDO FRVWV WKDW LV ERWK µROG¶ DQG µQHZ¶
costs. If this process continues then it iVµVHOI-HYLGHQW¶WR'RXJODVWKDWHYHQLIWKHUHZHUH
sufficient money to purchase all goods produced at any one point in time, the filtering of 
PRQH\LQWRWKHSURGXFWLRQRIµQHZ¶JRRGVUHVXOWV LQDGLVSDULW\EHWZHHQ WRWDOFRVWVDQG
current prices in the successive period; 
The condition then is, that there are more goods in the world at each 
successive interval of time, because of the financial saving, and its 
application to fresh production, while the interest, depreciation, and 
absolesence, on this financial saving has to be carried forward into the 
prices of production during a succeeding period. Each pound saved would 
be a pound withdrawn from consumption and put into production. Since 
costs must be less than prices, it only requires a very simple examination of 
this condition to see that the cycle becomes unworkable in a very short 
period of time, since no one would be able to buy anything. 
(ibid:98-99) 
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The process of depreciation, then, is diminishing the purchasing power available in the 
economy and requires intervention from the financial sector to prevent economic 
collapse. Assuming that money, in the form of legal tender, is the only form of 
SXUFKDVLQJ SRZHU WKHQ IROORZLQJ 'RXJODV¶V DUJXPHQW WKHUH ZLOO QHYHU EH HQRXJK
circulating to meet increases in production. This deficiency of purchasing power can be 
PHWE\WKHFUHDWLRQRIµEDQNPRQH\¶LELG7KHJUDQWLQJRIILQDQFLDOFUHGLWHQVXUHV
the survival of the production process, which as a consequence becomes debt driven. For 
Douglas then, it is the banking system that controls and determines production and the 
distribution of incomes. The creation of credit in the form of loans creates bank deposits 
which individuals can draw upon in the form of money used to purchase goods and 
services. However the repayment of these loans serves to reduce bank deposits and 
thereby reducing effective demand. Due to what Douglas refers to as the existence of a 
system of punishment and reward, the cost of providing producers with financial credit 
must be recouped in monetary form. It is therefore passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices and thus the cycle continues as these higher prices stifle the additional 
demand the original creation of credit was intended to address. The financial system not 
only controls the production process but also determines the distribution of incomes by 
affecting prices; 
...a policy of increasing issues of money or credit, in such a manner that it 
can only reach the general public through the medium of costs, and must, 
therefore be reflected in prices, has one thing and one thing only to be said 
for it at this time; that it is absolutely and mathematically certain to reduce 
any financial and economic system to ruins. 
(ibid:118) 
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Douglas is scathing of the financial system in that it has developed into a powerful 
monopolistic organisation operating in such a way as to continually cream off purchasing 
power from the individual. This is represented by higher prices, justified due to increased 
costs of production arising from the repayment of debt, to reap the financial rewards of 
providing the service of issuing money in the first place. Thus,  
The capitalist financial system facilitates production and distribution of 
goods only incidentally, as an adjunct to its primary UDLVRQG¶rWUHto secure 
D WLWOH RI WKH VKDUH RI WKRVH JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV WKH µUHDO FUHGLW¶ RI WKH
FRPPXQLW\ WKURXJK WKH DJHQF\ RI LQWHUHVW SD\PHQWV«7KH UHFXUULQJ
cycles of debt creation and repayment with interest require a constant 
growth in the overall economy if it is to function effectively.  
(Hutchinson, 1995:44) 
Any attempt, given the current financial system, to reduce prices would subsequently lead 
to a reduction in profit margins and if this was to fall below the amount needed to cover 
costs, production would come to a halt and unemployment would occur. The current 
system of financial organisation means that policies of deflation will be at the expense of 
the producer. Bankruptcies will increase which will directly effect the consumer in terms 
of unemployment and policies of inflation will negatively effect purchasing power, 
therefore affecting the producer in the long run. This leads Douglas to his conclusion; 
«WKHFRQVXPHUFDQQRWSRVVLEO\REWDLQWKHDGYDQWDJHRILPSURYHGSURFHVV
in the form of correspondingly lower prices, nor can he expect stable prices 
under stationary processes of production, nor can he obtain any control 
over the programme of production, unless he is provided with a supply of 
purchasing-power which is not included in the price of the goods produced. 
If the producer or distributor sells at a loss, this loss forms such a supply of 
purchasing-power to the consumer; but if the producer and distributor are 
not to sell at a loss, this supply of purchasing-power must be derived from 
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some other source. There is only one source from which it can be derived, 
and that is the same source which enables a bank to lend more money than 
it originally received. That is to say, the general credit. 
(ibid:114) 
Douglas therefore seeks a new method of income distribXWLRQ7KH µVDYLQJV¶ WKDW
Douglas referred to earlier allowed the owners of factors of production to re-invest in 
capital goods and to accumulate profits. These profits were realised in the form of 
dividends payable on shares. However these savings were not the result of forgone 
consumption but were created by the banks in the form of paper transactions therefore 
such individuals were claiming a share of the national wealth to which they had not 
directly contributed in the form of a personal sacrifice. That is, rewards were accruing to 
those who had no claim in terms of individual effort other than their ability to secure the 
financial credit from the banks. It would appear from this argument that Douglas is 
accepting the Marxist principle of surplus value (Finlay, 1972:112). For Douglas, then, 
there would never be enough purchasing power in the economy to buy back the total 
products of industry. Under-consumption would persist, posing a threat to the process of 
economic growth; 
Economic growth requires a constant expansion not only of production but 
PRUH SDUWLFXODUO\ RI FRQVXPSWLRQ ZKHUH ³FRQVXPSWLRQ´ LV GHILQHG DV
³SXUFKDVHRQWKHPDUNHWZLWKWKHXVHRIPRQH\´ 
(Hutchinson, 1995:44) 
What was required was some regulatory mechanism which served to increase the level of 
purchasing power within the economy so ensuring that total national consumption was 
equal to total national production. The Douglas social credit scheme proposed that 
government should increase demand by paying everyone a National Dividend and that 
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this dividend should be financed from increasing the money supply. Douglas justified this 
GLYLGHQG E\ UHIHUULQJ WR KLV FRQFHSW RI WKH µ&XOWXUDO +HULWDJH¶ DQG LQ DQ HDUOLHU ERRN
Credit Power and Democracy KHUHIHUUHGWRWKHGLYLGHQGDVµWKHQDWXUDOVXFFessor to the 
ZDJH¶,WLVLQWKLVVHQVHWKDWWKH'RXJODVSURSRVDOLVUHOHYDQWWRWKHVHSDUDWLRQ
of income from work debate. 
The National Dividend was to be granted as of right to every citizen and thus 
µHVWDEOLVKHGWKHSULQFLSOHRISD\PHQWRIDQunearned income from the state, unrelated to 
ZRUN UHFRUGRU WRDQ\RWKHU WDQJLEOHFRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH IRUPDOHFRQRP\¶ +XWFKLQVRQ
1995:45). In his attempt to illustrate the specific benefits of his income distribution 
scheme with regard to the labour market, Douglas contrasts his proposed National 
'LYLGHQGZLWKH[LVWLQJXQHPSOR\PHQWDOORZDQFHVZKLFKKHUHIHUV WRDV WKHµ'ROH¶+H
UHJDUGV WKH GROH DV WKH µ&LQGHUHOOD RI 'LYLGHQGV¶ DQG FULWLFLVHV LW IRU VWLJPDWLVLQJ
recipients; creating unnecessary and damaging divisions within society between 
contributors and beneficiaries; imposing harsh regulations which stifle work incentives, 
and for being set at levels determined by concepts of absolute as opposed to relative 
poverty (Douglas, 1924:126-128). Furthermore, he suggests that existing mechanisms of 
income maintenance are designed, not only in accordance with the needs of a policy goal 
of full employment, but that there is also a hidden agenda; 
...it must be evident that the soundness of this stress on the prime necessity 
for continuous and general employment, using that term in the narrow 
sense of commercial employment for wages, rests on quite other grounds 
than the use of employment as a means for distributing wages,- can, in fact 
only rest on the premises of the Modernist, or Classical idea. 
(Douglas, 1924:130) 
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+HJRHVRQWRDUJXHWKDWDFWLYHO\SURPRWLQJIXOOHPSOR\PHQWGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIµHYHU\
individual capable of employment were employed and paid according to the existing 
canons of the financial system¶ZRXOGSURYHGLVDVWURXVRQERWKDSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
OHYHOIRUDQ\JRYHUQPHQW7KHUHVXOWZRXOGEHµIDQWDVWLF¶ LQIODWLRQDU\SUHVVXUHVRUµWKH
PLOLWDU\ FRQVHTXHQFHV RI DQ HQKDQFHG VWUXJJOH IRU H[SRUW PDUNHWV¶ LELG-32). He 
claims, therefore that the focus of attention directed at the formal labour market primarily 
derives from; 
...a widespread feeling on the part of executives of all descriptions that the 
only method by which large masses of human beings can be kept in 
agreement with dogmatic moral and social ideals, is by arranging that they 
shall be kept so hard at work that they have not the leisure or even the 
desire to think for themselves. The matter is rarely stated in so many 
words. It is more generally suggested that leisure, meaning by that, 
freedom from employment forced by economic necessity, is in itself 
detrimental; a statement which is flagrantly contradicted by all the 
evidence available on the subject. 
(ibid:132-33) 
In arguing that current welfare strategies reinforce the traditional work and pay 
relationship, Douglas views such as barriers to individual enterprise and hence they serve 
to stifle economic progress. Douglas regards this scenario as an inevitable consequence 
RIDVRFLHW\JRYHUQHGE\WKHSULQFLSOHVRI µUHZDUGVDQGSXQLVKPHQWV¶ZKLFKHIIHFWLYHO\
acts to subordinate the rights and interests of the individual to that of the community as a 
collective. Determining the social and economic order of a society around such ideals 
may have been expedient in the past, but for Douglas the whole process of industrial 
SURJUHVV KDV UHQGHUHG WKH V\VWHP µXQGHVLUDEOH DQG DFWLYHO\ DQG SUDFWLFDOO\ YLFLRXV¶
(1924:80). In developing his line of reasoning, Douglas appears to be making similar 
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observations to those made by the physchologist, Abraham Maslow concerning the 
hierarchy of human needs. That is, once the basic physiological needs of any individual 
are satisfied, that individual is then free to devote attention and energy to the securing of 
a further category of needs, which are more social or moral in nature; 
In other words, human needs manifest themselves in a series of stages and, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR 0DVORZ¶V FODVVLF RULJLQDO FRQFHSWLRQ \RX KDYH JRW WR JHW
through one stage before you can go on to the next. These stages can be 
seen as priorities, so that a more crucial priority must be heeded before 
another priority can claim attention. This can be seen to define the process 
of growth. It has been summarized by Maslow in the following phrase: 
³0DQGRHVQRWOLYHE\EUHDGDORQH- if he has enough EUHDG´ 
(Lutz and Lux, 1988:11) 
In his efforts to demonstrate the outmoded nature of relying upon the sanctions imposed 
by a system of punishments and rewards, Douglas refers to his own conception of a 
hierarchy of human needs; 
So far from the mere sustenance of life through the production of food, 
clothing and shelter from the elements being, with reason, the prime 
objective of human endeavour, it should now be possible to relegate it to 
the position of a semi-automatic process. Biologists tell us that the earliest 
known forms of life devoted practically the whole of their attention to the 
business of breathing. Breathing is not less necessary now than it was then, 
but only persons suffering from some lamentable disease pay very much 
attention to the process. 
(Douglas, 1924:83) 
For Douglas the new direction of human energy, implied by reaping the benefits of 
industrial progress, is being hindered by adherence to a system that was designed with the 
old direction in mind.  
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The National Dividend scheme proposed by Douglas therefore represents a 
mechanism capable of re-orientating society, in that an obsolete system of restraint is 
replaced with one of co-operation and assistance. As a proposal for welfare reform, it 
effectively severs the traditional link between work and pay by providing an income 
guarantee for all citizens, explicitly detached from the processes associated with modern 
labour markets. His form of a CBI would free individuals from the economic necessity of 
employment and enable them to pursue a range of non-material needs. As a consequence 
individuals are afforded the opportunity to ascend to a higher level of personal 
development which in turn will benefit further economic progress. This particular aspect 
of the Douglas doctrine represents an important contribution to contemporary debates 
focusing on the efficacy of current income maintenance measures given the dynamics of 
modern socio-economic conditions. Furthermore, his critical analysis of the role of 
money in the economy, and his assessment of the motivations behind all human 
endeavour prove relevant in developing a feminist economics perspective in support of a 
CBI. The preceding discussion of the Social Credit movement, and in particular the 
proposals advocated by Douglas, has therefore indicated the strength of the arguments, 
FHQWUDOWRERWKLQSURPRWLQJDµQHZHFRQRPLFV¶ 
The method of income distribution proposed by the Social Credit movement was 
essentially premised on a critical appraisal of mainstream economic theory regarding the 
relationship between ownership and control of the factors of production. Theories 
DGYRFDWLQJDµVRFLDOGLYLGHQG¶VFKHPHDVDIXQGDPHQWDOHOHPHQWRIDSODQQHGHFRQRP\
either capitalist or socialist determined, accept as a starting point that prices are not a true 
reflection of value. This phenomena occurs when ownership is separated from control 
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and the prices accruing to factors of production are not representative of actual economic 
values, but rather are determined by the degree of power which can be exercised in the 
market place. Deficient levels of aggregate demand may therefore be a natural, and 
indeed permanent feature, of the capitalist system due to artificial distortions of market 
HTXLOLEULXP SULFHV DQG RXWSXW OHYHOV 7KH µVRFLDO GLYLGHQG¶ UHSUHVHQWV a scheme for 
income distribution that effectively serves to redress the unequal balance between 
ownership and control arising from the economic processes associated with a free market 
economy.  
The Douglas analysis formally recognises the economic consequences of ownership 
of the factors of production being divorced from the control of those factors. However, 
rather than placing faith in the ability of a centralised planning authority to direct both 
production and consumption patterns, Douglas focuses on the structure of the financial 
system. For Douglas, control over production and distribution lay in the hands of 
financiers, and thus the level of aggregate demand in the economy was nothing to do with 
ownership of factors of production but a function of power with regard to access to 
financial credit. Furthermore, the financial system was a human construct and therefore 
any claims to legitimacy were political in nature (Burkitt and Hutchinson, 1994). To 
illustrate this point Douglas draws upon the British experience in financing World War 
2QH7KHJRYHUQPHQWHIIHFWLYHO\ µFUHDWHG¶ WKHPRQH\ WRSD\ IRU WKHZDUE\HPSOR\LQJ
the mechanisms associated with the workings of the existing financial system. By 
DEDQGRQLQJWKHJROGVWDQGDUGWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDVDEOHµWKUough a complicated series of 
SDSHU WUDQVDFWLRQV¶ WR WUDQVIHU WKH 1DWLRQDO 'HEW LQWR D 1DWLRQDO $VVHW +XWFKLQVRQ
1995:45; Burkitt and Hutchinson, 1994:24). The interest accruing to individual owners of 
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Government War Securities did not represent direct payment for a current material 
contribution to the formal economy but rather was a claim to be drawn against future 
production. Thus, the government; 
...established a precedent for the payment of dividends, a share of national 
wealth, to individuals whose contribution to the creation of that wealth was 
HSKHPHUDO7KH1DWLRQDO'HEWLVµFOHDUO\DGLVWULEXWLQJDJHQW¶ 
(Burkitt and Hutchinson, 1994:24) 
)RU'RXJODVWKHQµILQDQFLDOFUHGLW¶ZDVPHUHO\DFRQYHQLHQWZD\RIrepresenting WKHµUHDO
ZHDOWK¶RIDFRPPXQLWy; and wealth should be a communal possession rather than reside 
in the hands of the bankers (Finlay, 1972:112). His package of proposals was, he 
believed, a way of reforming existing capitalist structures in order to restore power to the 
individual, without at the same time incurring the need for large scale bureaucratic 
planning authorities, which in essence posed a further threat to individual liberty.  
The Douglas proposal is distinct from a CBI previously defined as it involves direct 
transfer of funds from the state to the individual to be financed by increasing the money 
supply, rather than via the tax mechanism. In addressing critics who pointed to the 
inflationary pressures implied by such a system, Douglas again emphasised the 
importance of the production and sound management of social credit. The price system 
would be self-regulating in that consumption would match production, and vice versa, 
SURYLGHGWKHUHVWUDLQWVLPSRVHGE\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIµILQDQFLDOFUHGLW¶ZHUHHOLPLQDWHG
Furthermore by removing the economic necessity to work, Douglas believed his model 
for the future development of capitalism was better suited in meeting the demands of 
technological development. Douglas foresaw that continuing advances in technology 
meant that future work would give way to more leisure time but that current financial 
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structures would not allow the individual this option. Industrial progress, combined with 
the present system of income distribution, based primarily on the principle of financial 
punishments and rewards, would serve to further subject the individual to wage slavery. 
His belief in the intrinsic value of work, and the potential the capitalist model had for 
stifling individual creativity and innovation, implied that he was radically opposed to 
conFHSWLRQV RI µUDWLRQDO VHOI LQWHUHVWHG HFRQRPLF PDQ¶ $V %XUNLWW DQG +XWFKLQVRQ
argue; 
This rejection of the inherent disutitlity of labour, with its denial of 
necessary centrality of financial reward, was among the factors that 
UHQGHUHG 'RXJODV¶ ZULWLQJ Xncongenial to mainstream economists of the 
inter-war period. 
(1994:25) 
Douglas therefore presented a case for questioning the efficacy of traditional economic 
theory in explaining economic practice. The laws of supply and demand did not provide a 
framework for determining the value of commodities, in particular labour. Rather the 
concept of scarcity was an artificially generated phenomenon emanating from the 
practices of capitalist financial structures. Individuals, as consumers, are not free to 
choose but remain servile to those with power over the whole production process - the 
financiers. Given his heretical views on such fundamental concepts of orthodox 
HFRQRPLFVLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWPDLQVWUHDPHFRQRPLVWVZRXOGWUHDW'RXJODV¶SURSRVDOV
with caution.  
However, it was not only the economics profession that questioned the validity of 
the Social Credit movement. The blatant attack on financiers, not only disturbed the 
bankers themselves, but was also viewed as being potentially anti-Semitic (Walter, 
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1989:23; Finlay, 1972:176- )XUWKHUPRUH 'RXJODV¶ RXWVSRNHQ GLVDSSURYDO RI D
system dominated by the process of centralised economic planning and state ownership 
gave rise to criticism from those espousing the socialist cause (Finlay, 1972:12-113). In 
fact; 
Throughout the inter-war years Social Credit aroused powerful negative 
reactions in practically all established centers of male socio-economic 
power - among mainstream economists, socialists, communists, trade 
unionists, bankers and politicians of all parties. 
(Hutchinson, 1995:39) 
The movement witnessed some success when the Social Credit Party was founded in 
Alberta, Canada in 1935 and dominated politics within the province until 1971. However 
WKH 3DUW\ PRUH RU OHVV DEDQGRQHG 'RXJODV¶ WKHRULHV HDUO\ RQ Dnd went on to advocate 
policies such as employee participation in profits and shareholding, more a workers co-
operative theory. The social credit theory was ultimately a political failure. 
Despite this, the economics of Major Douglas and his contemporaries provides 
some useful insights into the relationship between economic policy and social policy. As 
a model for welfare reform, social credit established a principle whereby the economic 
necessity of formal employment would no longer dictate the forming of both policy and 
institutions aimed at promoting social justice. In this sense the social credit doctrine 
proves relevant to contemporary debates on the future direction of income maintenance 
policy. Given the dynamics of modern socio-economic conditions, social credit may 
provide the mechanisms for minimising the negative consequences of the continual strive 
for sustainable economic growth. That is, the maximising of economic conflict and the 
associated problems of social exclusion and marginalistion. Specifically, the collective 
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regulation of financial instruments, along with the payment of a national dividend, could 
effectively act to promote the socio-economic status of those individuals who devote the 
PDMRULW\ RI WKHLU WLPH HQJDJLQJ LQ µQRQ-HFRQRPLF¶ DFWivities. Reform along this route, 
would have obvious advantages for women, but could also prove conducive to an 
economic system based on alternative ways of organising and doing work. This particular 
point is of interest in developing a feminist case for a CBI and thus will be explored 
further in chapter eight. 
In analysing the Douglas plan, the purpose has been to illustrate the distinctiveness 
of social credit as a proposal for a state supported minimum income guarantee. It is 
argued that the innovative nature of the Douglas scheme rests in its explicit rejection of 
the principles governing the traditional work and pay relationship. In doing so, Douglas 
effectively presents a logical case for dismantling and restructuring the principal 
organising features of an economy dominated by a strict adherence to the canons of 
competitive free market economics. Although this would prove, in practice, to be 
politically unacceptable, the insights to be gained relate to the contribution of the social 
credit approach to HFRQRPLFUHIRUPLQWKHSURFHVVRIGHYHORSLQJDµQHZHFRQRPLFV¶ 
However, both in practice and in theory the Douglas scheme was overtaken by 
Keynesianism. The publication of The General Theory of Employment Interest and 
Money by J.M. Keynes in 1936 brought about the dawning of a new age in economic and 
political organisation. When criticising the classical economists assumption that supply 
FUHDWHVLWVRZQGHPDQG.H\QHVUHIHUVWRKLVDQDO\VLVDVVXSSO\LQJµXVZLWKDH[SODQDWLRQ
of the paradox of poverty in thH PLGVW RI SOHQW\¶ (Keynes, 1951:30). For Keynes the 
problem lies with effective demand and he draws attention to the fact that this area has 
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EHHQ VDGO\ QHJOHFWHG ZLWKLQ WKH HFRQRPLVW¶V GLVFLSOLQH IRU µPRUH WKDQ D FHQWXU\¶
(ibid:32). Although the existence of deficient or excessive demand was observed and 
recognised by some, the lack of positive economic analysis explaining why aggregate 
demand could indeed be deficient, led to the widespread appeal of the classical model 
with an emphasis on the supply side, free markets and flexible prices. In fact Keynes 
points out that the inability to scientifically analyse the theory of aggregate demand and 
its effects on the level of employment and national income meant that; 
The great puzzle of Effective Demand with which Malthus had wrestled 
vanished from economic literature. You will not find it mentioned even 
once in the whole works of Marshall, Edgeworth and Professor Pigou, from 
whose hands the classical theory has received its most mature embodiment. 
It could only live on furtively, below the surface, in the underworlds of 
Karl Marx, Silvio Gesell or Major Douglas. 
(ibid:32) 
Keynes, therefore was aware of the Douglas proposal but viewed the Major as somewhat 
of a crank; 
Since the war there has been a spate of heretical theories of under-
consumption, of those which Major Douglas are the most famous. The 
VWUHQJWKRI0DMRU'RXJODV¶VDGYRFDF\KDVRIFRXUVHODUJHO\GHSHQGHGRQ
orthodoxy having no valid reply to much of his destructive criticism. On 
the other hand, the detail of his diagnosis, in particular the so-called A+B 
theorem, includes much mere mystification. If Major Douglas had limited 
his B-items to the financial provisions made by entrepreneurs to which no 
current expenditure on replacements and renewals corresponds, he would 
be nearer the truth. Major Douglas is entitled to claim, as against some of 
his orthodox adversaries, that he at least has not been wholly oblivious of 
the outstanding problem of our economic system. 
(ibid:370-371) 
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Keynes sets out to proYLGH D µYDOLG UHSO\¶ WR 'RXJODV¶V µGHVWUXFWLYH FULWLFLVP¶ DQG
through a process of positive macro-economic analysis, develops a model justifying state 
intervention in the economy for the purposes of effective demand management. 
The National Dividend proposed by Douglas, although unique in terms of its 
criticism of traditional economic theory, should not be set apart from the arguments in 
support of a universal minimum income guarantee discussed above. Common to all 
proposals is a concern for the rights of the individual citizen within the confines of 
capitalist based market economies. Questioning the traditional relationship between work 
and pay is evident throughout the literature. Furthermore, taking into account the 
historical perspective, the proposals discussed thus far were argued for at a time when 
there was no established principle for state intervention in the field of income 
maintenance. Mechanisms for the relief of absolute poverty, argued for on the basis of 
religious, philosophical or moral grounds, had not managed to secure a concrete foothold 
in the political or economic base of industrial society. Arguments for state intervention 
based on economic considerations were equally marginalised in that they remained 
subordinate to the demands imposed by the operation of competitive free markets. 
Attempts, therefore, at justifying a form of CBI, prior to the development of the modern 
welfare state, can be categorised as practical policy solutions responding to the perceived 
social evils of capitalist development. In other words they were not presented as an 
alternative to existing provision but rather as proposals for social and/or economic reform 
which assumed a common starting point - the dominance of laissez-faire market 
economics in forming the structural base of society.  
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The development of the modern welfare state can arguably be pinpointed as 
representing the break down of this dominance. The explicit political acceptance of 
Keynesian economics in post war Britain demonstrated a departure from a sustained and 
prolonged attachment to orthodox neo-classical economic theory in the design of social 
policy. Future proposals for a universal minimum income guarantee would therefore have 
to be framed as an alternative to the new orthodoxy. The following section therefore 
traces evidence of proposals for a form of CBI, presented as practical policy options 
conforming to the principles of demand management and a general consensus regarding 
state responsibility for securing the welfare of those individuals and their families 
excluded from the labour market.  
6.4 A Practical Policy Alternative  
The Beveridge Report of 1942 provided the British wartime Government with a 
range of policy options designed to ensure the effective implementation and operation of 
a state supported income maintenance program. The Beveridge plan, intended initially as 
a mere tidying up of existing provision, was to replace the current system of social 
VHFXULW\ZLWK D FRPSUHKHQVLYHXQLYHUVDO VFKHPHSURYLGLQJ IUHHGRP IURP µ:DQW¶ IURP
the cradle to the grave. Previous legislation was inadequate in coverage in that only 
privileged client groups were entitled as of a right and the continued reliance on means-
testing did not address the stigmatisation and harsh conditions forced upon the poor. The 
Report not only contained a list of policy proposals but also contained detailed analysis 
on administrative procedures and the method of finance. Public support for the document 
itself (Abel-Smith, 1992:13; Jacobs, 1992:6; Thane, 1996:237) coupled with the fact that 
Beveridge had been thorough both in his consultation with the Treasury regarding 
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affordability (Abel-Smith, 1992:12; Thane, 1996:228), and in laying out the specific 
details of his plan, resulted in the Government being more or less forced to take it on 
board.  
The central tenet of the Beveridge scheme was social insurance. This in itself was 
not a new idea as schemes similar were developing elsewhere in the world.
7
 What was 
new was the fact that the plan for social insurance entailed universal coverage, flat rate 
contributions; flat rate benefits; centralised administration and a residual safety net 
designed to meet the needs of those who were denied access to the labour market and 
therefore unable to contribute. Furthermore, Beveridge outlined three related policy areas 
necessary for the effective operation of his scheme. Firstly, to complement social 
insurance a scheme of family allowances was proposed to cover low income families in 
work. Secondly, a comprehensive health service should be established to provide access 
to adequate health care free at the point of use based on the rationale that industry 
requires a healthy work force. Thirdly, Beveridge assumed that in order for social 
insurance to operate and continue effectively governments should be committed to 
ensuring full employment within the economy, employment being the central concept in 
a contributory based plan for social security. Thus Beveridge can be credited with 
institutionalising the concept of the right to work. Furthermore, the emphasis on a 
commitment to full employment, contained within the Beveridge doctrine, incorporated 
Keynesian demand management techniques and hence provided a basis for a new 
economic, political and social order. Government acceptance of the Keynes/Beveridge 
model was made explicit with the publication of the Social Insurance White Paper and 
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the Employment Policy White Paper in 1944. For the first time in U.K. history social 
policy was inextricably linked to macro economic policy. 
In the post war period social insurance, with its emphasis on employment, became 
the prevailing doctrine with regard to income maintenance policy, not only in the U.K. 
EXW DOVR WKURXJKRXW (XURSH $V 3DUNHU VR FRJHQWO\ SXWV LW µVRFLDO LQVXUDQFH TXLFNO\
established itself as one of the institutions no self-respecting social democracy could be 
ZLWKRXW¶ (1989:12). It would appear then that the uncoupling of income from work 
concept within the realms of social security policy had drawn its last breath with the 
overwhelming acceptance of variants of a system based on contributions from employer, 
employee, and the state. However an alternative to the Beveridge plan was proposed 
which did in fact contain elements of the CBI concept.  
The idea of a CBI, or social dividend, has been proposed as an alternative to the 
Beveridge plan for social security reform in recognition of the limitations of social 
LQVXUDQFH $WNLQVRQ  7KH µ6RFLDO &RQWUDFW¶ DGYRFDWHG E\ /DG\ -XOLHW 5K\V
Williams, an independent economist, was presented as such an alternative; 
The basic idea of the Social Contract was originally put forward in August 
1942, in a privately circulated
8
 pamphlet under the title of Something to 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 For example, Bismarks pioneering scheme of social insurance implemented in Germany between 
1883 and 1889 and in New Zealand non-contributory pensions were introduced in 1898 (Barr, 1993:19,22) 
8
  Citizens income bulletin no 17, January 1994, p32, draws attention to the fact that an earlier version 
of Something to Look Forward To was published and circulated privately three months prior to the 
Beveridge Report of December 1942, but that this publication is not widely available. As Rhys Williams 
states in the foreword to her 1943 publicatiRQVKHKDVµHODERUDWHG¶RQWKHSURSRVDOVFRQWDLQHGZLWKLQ WKH
earlier publication in light of the Beveridge Report.  However, when considering the Rhys Williams 
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Look Forward To. A shorter booklet, bringing the proposals up to date in 
light of the Beveridge Report, was published in January, 1943, under the 
title of Some Suggestions for a New Social Contract. An Alternative to 
the Beveridge Report Proposals. The present book is an elaboration of 
the suggestions contained in these two publications. 
(Rhys Williams,1943:vii) 
Lady Rhys Williams was concerned, like Beveridge, with the problem of ensuring 
µIUHHGRPIURPZDQW¶IRUWKHFLWL]HQVRIWKH8.LQWKHSRVWZDU\HDUV3DLQIXOO\DZDUHRI
the existence of poverty in light of progress she saw the greatest problem facing U.K. 
society as the distribution of wealth question; 
We have got to discover a means of distributing the wealth of which there 
is, in peace time, such comparative abundance, to those who need it, and 
we have got to do this without destroying the will to work of those 
engaged in its whole production. >5K\V:LOOLDPV¶RZQHPSKDVLV@ 
(ibid:10) 
The work incentive is important for Rhys Williams. She explains that the existence of 
poverty is not a direct product of the system of social and economic organisation. 
Therefore in the U.K. the inability of a great number of individuals to purchase the 
necessaries of life cannot be blamed on the capitalist system but rather is a function of the 
µSHFXOLDULW\ RI KXPDQ QDWXUH¶ LELG +HU FRQFHSWLRQ RI KXman nature leads Rhys 
Williams to the assumption that individuals illustrate an unwillingness to engage in work 
unless forced to do so, or are adequately rewarded. It would appear then that, unlike 
Douglas, Rhys Williams favours the framework of punishment and reward, brought about 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine in terms of an alternative to the Beveridge plan the existence of this earlier publication is an 
important factor.  
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by the operation of existing financial systems. There would be no problem distributing 
the abundance of goods in the economy to all citizens on an equal basis and thereby 
eliminating want if it were not for the fact that such a method of allocation would result 
LQ D GUDVWLF GHFOLQH LQ WKH QDWLRQ¶V ZHDOWK 5K\V :LOOLDPV FRPHV WR WKLV FRQFOXVLRQ E\
adopting assumptions associated with mainstream economic theory. She asserts the view 
that if goods are received with no work requirement then the incentive to free-ride would 
EH VR VWURQJ WKDW µWKHSURGXFWLRQRIQHZZHDOWK ZRXOG FRPH WR DQ HQG DQG WKHZKROH
FRPPXQLW\ ZLOO VWDUYH WRJHWKHU¶ LELG 1R V\VWHP RI VRFLDO SROLWLFDO RU HFRQRPLF
organisation would be successful unless the current motives of reward and punishment 
for working are replaced with an alternative motive. Rhys Williams goes on to develop a 
plan which will solve the problem of distribution whilst addressing the effects of the 
removal of work incentives in the form of fear of poverty and hope of gain; 
The cause of the whole difficulty of distributing wealth and abolishing 
poverty does not lie in the material sphere of economic and political 
systems, of Governments and their policy, or of the laws of supply and 
demand; it lies in the psychological sphere, and depends upon the 
discovery of some motive for labour, other than the fear of want, which 
does not involve resort to even more unsatisfactory and primitive motive 
from which we have so recently escaped, and to which a Nazi victory 
would have condemned us to return, namely the fear of punishment at the 
hands of a Gestapo. 
(ibid:11)  
Aware of the apparent failure of the classical model to provide answers to the 
problems of increasing unemployment and the humility suffered by those forced to claim 
benefits from the state via Public Assistance, Rhys Williams recognised that the time was 
ripe for political and economic reform. However, the preservation of individual freedom 
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is paramount and any attempt to abolish poverty by LQVWLWXWLQJDµQHZRUGHU¶VKRXOGQRW
be at the expense of such freedom. The dangers of Fascism are to be remembered and 
lessons learned;  
In our determination to abolish want and the fear of want, we must beware 
of those panceas which promise these reliefs only at the cost of 
surrendering the greater part of our hard-won political liberties, including 
the right to withhold our labour and to select our employment. 
(ibid:19)  
Rhys Williams therefore seeks a system which will serve to uphold the supremacy of 
individual liberty whilst at the same time institutionalising a program of social planning 
which is fully democratic and does not necessitate coercion by the state in the name of 
the National Plan. With the ultimate goal of ensuring freedom from want, that is the 
complete abolition of poverty, any future reform must address the problem of distribution 
in such a way; 
...that no human being can ever be in such a condition, regardless of his 
own actions or of external circumstances, since while poverty remains at 
all, the fear of it can never be removed from the hearts of men. 
(ibid:22) 
The question remains as to how this is to be achieved without destroying the will to work, 
which, for Rhys Williams, is the means of wealth creation. Given this assumption it 
follows that her plan for state supported income maintenance would remain inextricably 
linked to the labour market. It would appear from her initial statements that she wishes 
only to propose a more socially just proposal for social security whilst operating within 
the parameters of traditional economic liberal orthodoxy. That is, she is ultimately 
concerned with economic efficiency and the creation of wealth although wishes to 
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remedy the fact that a growing number of individuals are not afforded the opportunity to 
participate in the labour market and are therefore unable to meet their most basic needs. 
This scenario is unacceptable in a society committed to the principles of liberty for all 
and state action is required and justified in these terms. Further examination of her 
proposals will illustrate that her motivations were grounded in making a capitalist system 
more economically efficient and therefore her particular proposal can be categorised as 
displaying the limiting characteristics implied by adopting such an approach. However 
her contribution is important given its historical context and her criticisms of the 
Beveridge plan, which became the accepted policy option. This becomes more crucial 
when discussing the crisis in welfare literature in that if the Rhys Williams plan had been 
adopted instead of social insurance the idea of a CBI may appear less radical as a 
contemporary reform package. 
Rhys Williams illustrated great insight in her warning of the pitfalls of the dilemma 
which has come to be known as the poverty and unemployment traps. She recognised that 
if the Beveridge plan was to become law the social security scheme in Britain will serve 
WR VHULRXVO\XQGHUPLQH WKHZRUN LQFHQWLYHE\ µVXEVLGLVLQJ WKH LGOHDQGQRW WKHZRUNHU¶
(ibid:144). The solution according to Rhys Williams is the adoption of a new social 
contract where the State assumes responsibility for the welfare of all citizens and 
therefore benefits should be paid on an equal basis to all regardless of employment or 
health status. She categorically states that; 
The prevention of want must be regarded as being the duty of the State 
to all its citizens, and not merely to a favoured few. >5K\V :LOOLDPV¶
own emphasis] The notion that only the unemployed, the sick, the 
improvident and the unfortunate should obtain the largesse of the State, 
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and never the hard-working, the energetic, the thrifty and the successful 
should be replaced by a fresh and insistent interpretation of the conception 
that all men are equal in the eyes of the law. 
(ibid:145) 
This provides Rhys Williams with a theoretical framework in the acceptance of an 
REOLJDWLRQRQ WKHSDUWRI WKH6WDWH WRSURYLGH IRU DOO FLWL]HQV LQ WKH IRUPRI WKH µ6RFLDO
&RQWUDFW¶ ,Q SUDFWLFDO WHUPV WKLV FRQWUDFW ZRXOG LQYROYH WKH SD\PHQW RI DQ µDYHUDJH
EHQHILW¶ IURP WKH SXEOLF SXUVH SDLG RQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO EDVLV WR HYHU\ PDQ ZRPDQ DQG
FKLOGZLWK DFWXDOEHQHILWV GXH WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW UHQW OHYHOV µSUHYDLOLQJ LQ WKHGLVWULFW
FRQFHUQHGDQGWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VDOORZDQFHVFRXOGEHJUDGHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHDJe of 
WKHFKLOG¶LELGS7KLVEHQHILWZRXOGUHSODFHDOOH[LVWLQJIRUPVRISXEOLFDVVLVWDQFH
and render the means-test redundant. Evident in the Rhys Williams proposal is the 
emergence of the concept of an unconditional income due to all citizens by the State. 
However further analysis of the doctrine points in the direction of conditionality as the 
use of the term contract implies some form of responsibility to be undertaken by both 
parties. Rhys Williams views this responsibility as availability for work; 
The payments would be made available immediately upon the signature of 
the contract, and every week thereafter, provided that proof was supplied, 
say, once a month, to the local Labour Exchange, that the signatory was 
gainfully occupied, or if unable to find employment, then that he was 
ZLOOLQJ WR DFFHSW VXLWDEOH HPSOR\PHQW RIIHUHG E\ WKH ([FKDQJH«DW
standard rates of pay.  In the event of refusal to accept such employment, 
or to remain in it or in alternative employment, the benefits would cease, as 
in the case of unemployment assistance today. 
(ibid:145-6)   
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Rhys Williams incorporated this conditional aspect into her plan as she was ultimately 
concerned with the effects on the labour market of the receipt of state income 
maintenance. Further evidence of this concern can be traced to her treatment of women 
within the social contract. She makes a positive contribution to the feminist cause for a 
CBI in that she appears to recognise the economic value of domestic work; 
Married women and those acting as unpaid housekeepers, where no other 
domestic assistance was provided to a worker, would receive the benefits 
of the contract without being required to register for employment. 
(ibid:146) 
However, she does not fully accept the idea of complete economic independence for 
women as she wishes to institutionalise the concept of male dominance in the labour 
market when she states; 
Single women and widows under sixty without dependent children, 
although free to take up full-time work, would not be required to do so, but 
only to do part-time work, if available, for eighteen hours a week, since the 
labour market would otherwise be overcrowded. 
(ibid:147) 
Her opinions with regard to the productive capacity of labour operating within 
traditional commercial labour markets is evident throughout her proposal. She believes 
that the Social Contract will provide individuals with sufficient incentive to engage in 
paid work as such activity will render financial gain and result in higher standards of 
living. The Social Contract does not destroy this motivation nor does it require any form 
of coercion to be exercised by the State. The work requirement test exists to prevent 
DEXVHRIWKHVFKHPHIURPWKHµZRUNVK\¶DQGKHQFHWKH6RFLDO&RQWUDFWSURSRVDOOHDYHV
individuals free to choose both with regard to where they want to work and whether they 
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want to work part-time or full-time. Although this argument may not have proved critical 
LQ WKHHDUO\¶V JLYHQ WKDW WKH ODERXUPDUNHWZDVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\D IXOO-time male 
employment norm, it is frequently employed in the contemporary literature with 
UHIHUHQFHWRPHHWLQJWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIPRGHUQµIOH[LEOH¶ODERXUPDUNHWV 
An interesting point to note when examining the relevance of the Rhys Williams 
scheme to the evolution of the CBI concept is that she advocates voluntary exclusion 
from benefits by way of not signing the contract; 
There would be no compulsion to enter into the contract. Those unwilling 
to hold themselves out for employment on account of private means could 
simply refrain from signing.  They would thereby forfeit the benefits, but 
would not be exempt from the Social Security tax which would be 
necessary to finance the Scheme, and which would represent their 
contribution to the resources of the country in lieu of personal service. 
(ibid:146) 
A scheme based on the weekly distribution of benefits, to be paid through the issuance of 
order books redeemable at the post office, with receipt being conditional upon periodical 
visits to the local labour exchange to illustrate willingness to work, is not to be viewed as 
stigma free. The option of voluntary exclusion within such a scheme would be attractive 
to those unwilling to accept the necessary State intrusion into their work patterns, or 
those unhappy about weekly trips to the local post office to collect state benefits. Given 
sufficient private means were available such individuals may see the costs of claiming 
and collecting the social dividend as outweighing the financial benefits of receipt. Such a 
proviso would ultimately lead to the stigmatisation of those individuals currently in 
receipt which defeats the purpose of a guaranteed minimum income paid as a right. 
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When discussing the method of financing her scheme Rhys Williams draws upon 
the Douglas Social Credit plan. She, like Douglas, recognises the problem of deficient 
demand and agrees that the state should assume responsibility for ensuring sufficient 
purchasing power is maintained within the economy. However she remains concerned 
about the effects a direct injection of new money of a predetermined amount would have 
on the general price level. Rhys Williams draws attention to the fact that conditions of 
production are regularly in flux and therefore a set weekly dividend which assumes a 
corresponding set increase in national output is too rigid. Such a mechanism must be 
counter balanced with taxation measures designed in such a way as to take account of the 
amount of money currently in circulation. This would avoid the situation whereby too 
much money would be chasing too few goods and resulting inflation (ibid:116). She 
therefore goes on to describe a mechanism that does just this; 
What is required, then, is some machinery for issuing money directly to the 
individual consumer, which will be closely linked to the other machinery 
for taking it away again, either up to the precisely similar amount, if no 
increase in the amount of money in the hands of the public is required; or 
up to a less amount, if some increase is permissible, owing to the expansion 
in the quantity of goods available; or in the event of some catastrophe such 
as war involving the sudden decline in the amount of purchasable goods, 
then up to a greater amount, in order to produce a deflationary effect. It is 
clear that if such machinery could be devised it would be of immense 
assistance to those in whose hands the task of balancing our monetary 
system with our productive power would lie after the war, since in this way 
a stable price level could be maintained. 
(ibid:150) 
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The Social Contract scheme is such a machine and whilst serving ultimately to abolish 
want it provides the government with a mechanism by which to ensure and maintain a 
stable price level. The proposed tax structure is to take the form of a single social security 
tax. It is in this area that the Rhys Williams doctrine is to be viewed as important for the 
purposes of examining the evolution of the CBI concept.  
Complexity and costly administrative processes would be avoided with the 
abolition of all personal tax reliefs to be replaced with a single social security tax, 
payable by each individual. Justification for the abolition of personal allowances for 
dependants is to be found in the fact that dividends would be paid directly to the 
individuals concerned and therefore each individual would be secured a subsistence 
income (ibid:151-2). The scheme would be entirely self-financing in that revenues raised 
from taxation would fund the dividends due under the contract. This system, according to 
Rhys Williams, would not only be simpler to understand and ensure the maintenance of a 
VWDEOH SULFH OHYHO EXW ZRXOG DOVR UHVROYH WKH µROG DQWDJRQLVP¶ EHWZHHQ WD[SD\HUV DQG
WKRVHLQUHFHLSWRIVWDWHEHQHILWVµLQDVPXFKDVHYHU\LQGLYLGXDOZRXOGEHDEHQHILFLDU\DV
ZHOO DV D WD[SD\HU¶ (ibid:155). Obviously those with larger incomes would contribute 
PRUHWRWKHVFKHPHEXWIRU5K\V:LOOLDPVWKHµMXVWLFHRIWKLVLVQRWLQGRXEW¶LELG 
The Rhys Williams plan is hence essentially a transfer by taxation scheme which 
carries a work test and could ultimately lead to stigmatisation of the poor due to the 
voluntary exclusion clause. However, the establishment of the right to a minimum 
subsistence income in return for an obligation on the part of the individual to the state to 
contribute to the creation of wealth within society by striving to engage in the traditional 
labour market, is important in that it deletes the need for resort to a means-test. The only 
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LQWUXVLRQ LQWR LQGLYLGXDO¶V OLYHV LV WKH PRQLWRULQJ E\ SXEOLF RIILFLDOV UHJDUGLQJ ZRUN
patterns. For these reasons it is not a CBI scheme. Nevertheless, given the resulting 
system of social security, descending directly from the adoption of the Beveridge plan, in 
Britain today, the Rhys Williams plan is viewed as constructive in that she does provide 
useful insights into the benefits of integrating the tax and benefit systems. Considered in 
an historical context she builds on previous doctrines, namely the Douglas Social Credit 
plan, and provides a radical alternative to the Beveridge Report. However, she does not 
develop any powerful justification other than the system would result in a more efficient 
allocation of resources given the existing political and economic structure. The fact that 
her plan was not politically successful, although widely referred to in the literature, can 
perhaps be attributed to this neglect on her part. The Beveridge scheme was viewed a 
more appropriate mechanism for achieving such a goal. 
Some trace of the move to separate income from work is to be found in the Social 
Contract, in that the dividend constitutes income paid whether in work or not and is not 
removed as income increases. However, as explained, inherent within the Rhys Williams 
plan is the explicit assumption that paid work remains the most important contributor to, 
not only, individual welfare but the welfare of the community as a whole. Thus, the Rhys 
Williams model for reform of tax and income maintenance measures conforms with a 
traditional approach to social security policy. That is, the function of social security is, 
first and foremost, to support the efficient operation of traditional labour market 
structures. This subordination of social security policy in the overall workings of the 
capitalist economy has, as previously argued, negative consequences for the reform 
process. By acquiescing to a given set of assumptions regarding the nature of work and 
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pay, debates on the future direction of social security will remain bound by the doctrine 
of punishments and rewards. Reform of the tax and benefit systems along these lines can 
arguably be viewed as a process of manipulating existing measures to meet newly 
emerging demands, as and when they arise. A more comprehensive approach would 
involve examining the justifying principle and basis of income transfers in light of the 
dynamics of modern socio-economic conditions. In other words, an approach which is 
PRUHµUDGLFDO¶UDWKHUWKDQµUHIRUPLVW¶LQQDWXUH 
The Rhys Williams plan for social security reform can arguably be viewed as a 
radical alternative to the Beveridge scheme. However, as indicated the underlying 
foundations of the Social Contract were dictated by the principles of Keynesian 
economics. Subsequently, in terms of social policy reform it represented a continuance 
with existing norms regarding the relationship between social security measures and 
economic policy. Taken in this context any attempt at restructuring the relationship 
between work and pay is to be considered in a strictly reformist sense. That is, it is 
implicitly assumed that any restructuring will be either temporary or peripheral. The 
ultimate result will be the permanence, and indeed predominance, of traditional market 
oriented work and pay structures. In tracing the development of minimum income 
guarantee proposals, post the institutionalisation of social insurance, it becomes apparent 
that this assumption is a common feature. Although contemporary debates focus intensely 
on the nature of modern labour markets, it is argued that the total separation of income 
from work has not yet been envisaged. However, this is not to say that the reform agenda 
has been lacking in originality. The process of justifying a minimum income guarantee 
has produced a wide range of theoretical positions regarding the nature of citizenship 
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rights in a predominately capitalist market economy. One such position is encountered in 
the analysis of the role of social security policy within the writings of the New Right. 
6.5 Tax and Benefit Integration - A New Right Agenda? 
The classic statement of New Right economic philosophy is to be found in Milton 
)ULHGPDQ¶VCapitalism and Freedom, originally published in 1962. The basic premise of 
the Friedman doctrine was that laissez-faire capitalism was the only mechanism by which 
individual political and economic freedom could be guaranteed. He therefore attacks the 
growth of government throughout society and advocates a limited role in similar terms as 
those expounded by Adam Smith in the 18th Century. He further argues that since limited 
government intervention is justified in the name of preserving freedom, in order to 
prevent the possible abuse of state control government power should be decentralised and 
reduced to the local level wherever possible. Subsidiarity would allow for a more 
democratic and responsive government in that individuals are more able to use their exit 
option as a means of voicing protest at the local level than at the national level. The 
central theme therefore of the Friedman school is to promote the; 
...role of competitive capitalism - the organisation of the bulk of economic 
activity through private enterprise operating in a free market - as a system 
of economic freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom. 
(Friedman, 1982:4) 
Whilst doing this Friedman also finds it necessary to devote time to considering the role 
of government in a society committed to the preservation of individual freedom, and the 
dominance of free markets, as a means of organising economic activity. His proposals for 
the role of government in the provision of social welfare are therefore determined by this 
LGHRORJ\:KDWUHPDLQVWREHH[DPLQHGLVZKHWKHURUQRW)ULHGPDQ¶VSURSRVDOVIRUVRFLDO
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security and tax reform represent a radical departure from an income transfer system 
premised on employment based rewards and punishments, and if so how does his plan 
UHODWHWRWKH&%,GHEDWH7KHFRQFOXVLRQZLOOEHGUDZQWKDW)ULHGPDQ¶V1HJDWLYH,QFRPH
Tax (NIT) proposal attempts to depart from the model of work status benefits but does so 
with the ultimate goal of developing a mechanism in which work and pay would 
eventually not be uncoupled. 
)ULHGPDQ¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOWKHVLVZDVZULWWHQDWWKHKHLJKWRIWKH.H\QHVLDQ:HOIDUH
State consensus and hence was outwith the existing mainstream body of thought. 
Friedman himself is aware of his marginal position when he notes in the preface to the 
1982 edition of Capitalism and Freedom; 
Those of us who were deeply concerned about the danger to freedom and 
prosperity from the growth of government, from the triumph of welfare-
state and Keynesian ideas, were a small beleaguered minority regarded as 
eccentrics by the great majority of our fellow intellectuals. 
(1982:vi)  
However he draws the readers attention to the relevance of new radical ideas in times of 
consensus for the purpose of aiding future policy reform. He is not perturbed by the fact 
WKDWXSRQILUVWSXEOLFDWLRQKLVSKLORVRSK\ZDVJLYHQWKHµVLOHQWWUHDWPHQW¶E\WKHQDWLRQDO
press as his book exists to; 
...keep options open until circumstances make change necessary. There is 
enormous inertia - a tyranny of the status quo - in private and especially 
governmental arrangements. Only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces 
real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on 
the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to 
develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available 
until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable. 
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(ibid,1982:ix) 
He is in no way a radical nor does he represent a philosophical departure from traditional 
views. He is merely restating classical traditional economic thought in modern terms and 
he believes his time will come. His ideas on social security reform should therefore 
SHUKDSVEHYLHZHGDVVWHPPLQJIURPFRQFHUQRYHUµFULVLV¶LQFXUUHQWZHOIDUHSURYLVLRQ
Although writing at a time when the concept of the welfare state was enjoying much 
public acclaim, he pre-empts its failure to address the problems of banishing want, whilst 
at the same time holding the freedom of the individual as sacred, by providing policy 
makers with a viable alternative which will preserve the capitalist system. He is not 
worried that his proposal is not taken seriously at the time but is confident that the 
µ)ULHGPDQ¶SKLORVRSK\ZLOOUHPDLQRQWKHIULQJHVXQWLO LWEHFRPHVREYLRXVWKDW LW is the 
only way.  
He develops his NIT proposal in a chapter entitled The Alleviation of Poverty. The 
title in itself suggests that Friedman does not want to put an end to the existence of 
poverty but merely wishes to alleviate its worst aspects. He does however recognise the 
relative nature of poverty and admits that while the majority of individuals throughout the 
Western world have escaped from poverty in an absolute sense, (which he attributes to 
the benefits derived from the capitalist model of free enterprise), there are many who are 
experiencing deprivation defined according to the acceptable standards set by the society 
in which they live. These individuals are hence labelled as living in poverty. The most 
consistent remedy to this condition, given the Friedman philosophy, is reliance on acts of 
private charity. However, the increase in government intervention in the arena of social 
ZHOIDUH SROLF\ KDV UHVXOWHG GLUHFWO\ LQ D µFRUUHVSRQGLQJ GHFOLQH LQ SULYDWH FKDULWDEOH
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DFWLYLWLHV¶LELG(YHn if this turn of events had not taken place the assumption 
of rational self-interest as the dominating motive for all human behaviour would 
ultimately render private charity inefficient in alleviating poverty as communities grow in 
size. This is due to the strong incentive to free-ride. That is, although the existence of 
poverty causes distress on the part of those experiencing it, it also causes disutility for 
those witnessing the hardship experienced by others. Such disutility can be overcome by 
contributing to the relief of poverty either by donating to a charity dedicated to such a 
worthwhile cause or by personally giving money to the beggar in the street. This type of 
charitable activity may be sufficient in small, localised communities where individuals 
are known to one another and public pressure limits the opportunity to rely on the 
donations of others to solve the problem. No such pressure exists in larger communities, 
hence the rational self interested actor will realise that benefits can be derived from the 
charitable activities of others. There is, therefore, no reason to incur personal costs when 
one can free-ride on the actions of others. If sufficiently numerous individuals adopted 
this line of reasoning very few donations would be made to the social goal of alleviating 
poverty and it is this line of reasoning which allows Friedman to justify government 
action in the sphere of poor relief. 
The primary objective of governments should be to establish and maintain a set 
standard of living which no one individual in the community should fall below. This is to 
be achieved through the direct targeting of resources to the poor and any policy aimed at 
doing so should not interfere with the operation of the free market. That is, no attempt 
should be made to distort the flexibility of the price mechanism through policies such as 
minimum wage legislation or price subsidies. The answer for Friedman is the 
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LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDµQHJDWLYHLQFRPHWD[¶LELG,QVXPPDU\WKH1,7SURSRVDOLVD
combined system of tax and benefits which would involve setting a minimum level of 
income to which every individual would be entitled. Any earnings above the fixed level 
would be subject to tax, the amount paid depending on the tax rates charged on various 
levels of income. If income received were below the set minimum, a subsidy would be 
GXH IURP WKH JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKZRXOG UHSUHVHQWSD\PHQWRI µXQXVHG WD[ DOORZDQFHV¶
)RU )ULHGPDQ WKH 1,7 KDV µHQRUPRXV DGYDQWDJHV¶ EXW RQO\ LI LW UHSODFHV DOO FXUUHQW
income maintenance measures within existing welfare systems and does not simply 
EHFRPH µDQRWKHU UDJ LQ WKH UDJEDJ RI ZHOIDUH SURJUDPV¶ )ULHGPDQ DQG )ULHGPDQ
1980:122). Such a comprehensive reform would not only cut down on direct 
administration costs but would also lead to reductions in the overall welfare burden. By 
emphasising that the role of the NIT is to alleviate poverty caused by low incomes, the 
claim is made that although some individuals or families may need further assistance due 
WR VSHFLILF FLUFXPVWDQFHV µWKDW DVsistance could and would be provided by private 
FKDULWDEOH DFWLYLWLHV¶ LELG%\RSHUDWLQJ LQZD\V WKDW VWLIOHV VXFKDFWLYLW\ H[LVWLQJ
welfare systems are imposing unacceptable costs upon both current and future taxpayers. 
Thus for the Freedman's the NIT is ultimately a reform proposal which effectively serves 
to redefine the role of the state, as provider of welfare, by promoting the notion of self-
help. 
9DULDWLRQV RI )ULHGPDQ¶V 1,7 VFKHPH KDYH HPHUJHG LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ WD[ DQG
benefit integration (see for example Brittan and Webb, 1990; Clinton et al, 1994; Parker, 
1989). Exploring the relatively minor technical differences of such schemes is not 
considered crucial in this analysis. What is important is the relevance of the results of the 
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Friedman scheme and the role played by the NIT model in the CBI debate. The NIT does 
allow for integration of the tax and benefit system, which is synonymous with a CBI, but 
this is where the similarity ends. The continued emphasis on income testing is argued to 
be more economically efficient in that it does not weaken the incentive to work in the 
same way that universal non means-tested programs, such as a basic income grant, would 
(Garfinkel and Kesselman, 1978; Clark, 1977). In the U.S. the NIT scheme received a 
much more positive reception than in Britain
9
 following Freedman's publication in 1962, 
DQGLQIDFWµKDYHEHHQWKHVXEMHFWRIYROXPLQRXVWKHRUHWLFDODQDO\VHVFRVWHVWLPDWHVILHOG
H[SHULPHQWVDQGOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOV¶10 (Garfinkel and Kesselman, 1978:180). 
A possible reason for this difference across the Atlantic in terms of attraction to the 
idea could be the fact that the concept of universal payments based on social insurance 
and not income tested were already very much a part of the British welfare system by 
1962. These institutionalised benefits would be almost politically impossible to remove 
and replace with an income tested scheme. Furthermore, any reform package that implies 
the integration of the tax and benefit system would involve a radical overhaul of the 
administrative structures already in place in Britain. For Dilnot et al this serves as the 
main stumbling block to implementing reform along the lines of an NIT (1984:2-4). In 
arguing their case for replacing existing social security and tax structures with a single 
payment mechanism they stress the point that their scheme does not necessarily entail 
any distributional changes. Previous proposals for integration have failed in getting this 
LPSRUWDQWPHVVDJHDFURVVDQGKDYH µVXEVHTXHQWO\EHHQ tagged as right-ZLQJSURSRVDOV¶
                                                 
9
 Although a universal NIT has not been adopted in the UK the Family Income Supplement (FIS), 
introduced in 1971, displayed characteristics similar to an NIT scheme (Creedy & Disney,1985:155) 
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(ibid:70). Arguing that there is no necessary connection between tax credit schemes and 
any particular income distribution allows Dilnot et al to go on and develop an approach to 
UHIRUPZKLFK WKH\EHOLHYH WREHD µVLPSOHUDQGPRUH WUDQVSDUHQWPHFKDQLVP¶LELG
The outcome of such is that the resulting system of income transfers is more flexible in 
adapting to any subsequent stated policy goals regarding patterns of income distribution. 
However; 
There are too many historical instances, especially in the field of social 
security, of desirable administrative changes being successfully blocked by 
those who opposed the associated distributional consequences or distrusted 
the political motives of those who put them forward. This is exactly what 
happened to the 1972 tax credit scheme
11
. 
(ibid:4)  
Full scale integration of the tax and benefit system, at least in Britain, would therefore 
prove costly and, on a practical level, difficult to achieve given the established nature and 
the differing operating structures of the two large scale government departments 
involved. This is a crucial consideration in the CBI debate. However, as discussed in 
chapter five, the administrative difficulties could be overcome, and it can be argued that 
the benefits in the long term outweigh the short term costs. For this to happen though it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 The authors refer to the New Jersey Income Guarantee Experiments conducted in 1972. 
11
  This reference is to the Conservative Governments proposals for a partial integration of the tax and 
benefit system made explicit in the 1972 Green Paper Proposals for a Tax-Credit System, Cmnd 5116, 
+062$OWKRXJKWKHVFKHPHµUHSUHVHQWHGDGRSWLRQRIVRPHRIWKHLGHDVHPHUJLQJIURPWKHDGYRFDWHVERWK
RI µQHJDWLYH LQFRPH WD[¶ DQG µVRFLDO FUHGLW¶ LQYROYLQJ WKH LGHD RI JXDUDQWHHG PLQLPXP LQFRPH IRU WKH
earning poor and a state benefit which would taper oIIDVHDUQLQJVURVH¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQZRXOGXOWLPDWHO\
prove to be too costly, at least in the short term, mainly due to the large scale administrative changes 
required (Hill, 1990:42). 
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essential that the association which has evolved, regarding integration proposals and a 
right wing agenda of increased emphasis on means-testing, and a subsequent reduction in 
the role of the state as a provider of welfare, is understood as an erroneous one. Such a 
negative view is based on a particular proposal, rather than being applicable to the 
principle of tax and benefit integration in general.  
In conclusion, then, Friedman does provide policy makers with a scheme that 
grants all individuals with a minimum income and hence represents a safety net. 
However, the emphasis remains strongly on the centrality of the labour market in 
providing individual welfare. The prime purpose of a Friedman style NIT scheme would 
be to enforce labour market participation by redressing the balance between incomes in 
work and incomes out of work. Targeting income transfers at those demonstrating actual 
need as opposed to potential need is argued to be more efficient and such theorising 
forms the basis of the main tensions surrounding contemporary social security reform 
debates. In this respect the NIT model is often directly compared with a CBI (see for 
example Brittan and Webb, 1990:9-11; Creedy and Disney, 1985:ch9; Commission on 
Social Justice, 1994: 258-265: Parker, 1989). Brittan goes as far as to argue that when 
considering the redistributional impact of the NIT model, compared with a CBI scheme, 
the differences relate to the level of the basic payment and/or the rate of withdrawal. He 
UHIHUV WR VXFK DV µGLIIHUHQFHV RI GHJUHH ZLWKLQ WKH VDPH IUDPHZRUN¶ DQG WKXV WKH
µGLIIHUHQFHV DUH DORQJ D FRQWLQXXP UDWKHU WKDQ EHWZHHQ LQFRPSDWLEOH SURSRVDOV¶
(1990:11). However, arguing along these lines fails to account for a fundamental 
distinction between the NIT model for reform and a CBI, that is the primary motivational 
aspect of promoting paid work. In this respect, any scheme which proffered the granting 
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of a minimum income guarantee to all citizens would obviously raise suspicions 
regarding the possible negative impact on work incentives. In fact it was this issue that 
was used to undermine the whole idea of the NIT in America. Critics questioned the 
results of the NIT experiments, claiming WKDW VXFK KDG µJUHDWO\ XQGHUHVWLPDWHG WKH
potential reduction in work effort amongst low-LQFRPH ZRUNHUV¶ 3DUNHU 
However, as Parker indicates, such criticisms were biased in that the focus was on 
emphasising the negative impact on incentives as opposed to any possible positive 
incentive effects. She thus concludes that opposition to the scheme was primarily driven 
by political considerations and it was the unconditional nature of the Friedman NIT 
scheme which ultimately led to its political demise (ibid:97). The practical experience of 
the NIT model therefore serves to demonstrate the limiting nature of the welfare reform 
agenda. By adopting an uncomprising position with regard to the relationship between 
income transfers and the labour market, policy makers are loathed to consider any 
scheme that may be construed as threatening to that relationship. This position proves 
hostile to the conditions necessary for any serious consideration of reform along the lines 
of a CBI. 
Friedman himself recognised that, given the political and economic climate of the 
ODWH¶VWKHSROLWLFDOZLOOQHFHVVDU\WRLPSOHPHQWKLVSODQIRUZHOIDUHUHIRUPZDVQRW
evident; 
Too many vested interests - ideological, political, and financial - stand in 
WKHZD\«7KHSROLWLFDORbstacles to an acceptable negative income tax are 
of two related kinds. The more obvious is the vested interests in present 
programs: the recipients of benefits, state and local officials who regard 
themselves as benefiting from the programs, and above all, the welfare 
bureaucracy that administers them. The less obvious obstacle is the conflict 
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among the objectives that advocates of welfare reform, including existing 
vested interests, seek to achieve. 
(1980: 120, 124-25) 
Friedman thus draws attention to the institutionalised nature of modern welfare state 
policies and the subsequent difficulties associated with attempts made at replacing them. 
He further indicates that for reform of any kind to take place there must be a broad base 
of political consensus. Given the radical nature of his plan and the right-wing label 
DWWDFKHG WR WKH 1,7 PRGHO µHQDFWPHQW RI VXFK D SURJUDP VHHPV D XWRSLDQ GUHDP DW
SUHVHQW¶LELG)ULHGPDQKRZHYHULVSUHSDUHGWREHSDWLHQWDQGFRQVLGHUVKLVSODQDV
a guide for a future timHSHULRGZKHQLWLVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHµWLGHRIRSLQLRQ¶KDVWXUQHGLQ
favour of limited government and greater economic freedom. The election of 
governments committed to such a philosophy, on both sides of the Atlantic in 1979 and 
1980, is perhaps indicativHRIWKHµWXQLQJWLGH¶)ULHGPDQKRSHGIRU6XFKGHYHORSPHQWV
FRXSOHGZLWKWKHDVVRFLDWHGSHUFHLYHGµFULVLVLQZHOIDUH¶GHEDWHVJDYHULVHWRDZKROHQHZ
way of thinking about social security reform, and in effect meant that arguing for a CBI 
could take place on a different stage. The extent to which this shifting environment has 
been embraced by advocates of a CBI proposal, and how it has informed the justifying 
principles employed in arguing for such a reform package, will be examined in the 
following chapter.  
6.6 Conclusion 
Support for variations of a CBI can be traced to, at least, the beginnings of modern 
welfare state development. Advocates have either presented the idea of an unconditional 
minimum income as a necessary component in the process of capitalist development, or 
have argued that the proposal presents as a more effective and indeed efficient alternative 
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to existing schemes of social security provision. Either way, during this period, the CBI 
has been framed as a reform proposal that conforms with, and supports, the needs of 
ongoing capitalist development. Presenting the proposal as such is arguably a necessary 
precondition in the reform debate given that the policy process is determined by the 
acceptance, and strict adherence to, a set of unifying political and economic structures 
associated with capitalism. Thus the reform agenda is hindered from the outset in that it is 
bound by the continued dominance of a particular mind set. The truly radical nature of 
the CBI proposal is not fully appreciated until the validity and sustainability of those 
structures and processes are questioned. The following chapter will outline contemporary 
developments in the CBI debate, with the purpose of demonstrating the extent to which 
WKHKXUGOHRIµUHIRUPLVW¶WRµUDGLFDO¶KDVEHHQRYHUFRPH 
 
  
 284 
Chapter 7: Arguing for a CBI - A Radical Policy Response? 
7.1 Introduction 
Despite substantial reform in recent decades, income maintenance measures in 
Britain are perceived to be economically inefficient and inadequate in terms of achieving 
the primary objective of poor relief. As discussed in chapter four, the attack on social 
security policy has been consistent and policy developments have contributed to a 
withering of employment related insurance based benefits in favour of income targeted 
benefits. Furthermore the emphasis on supporting the labour market has remained a firm 
IRFXVZLWKSROLF\SULPDULO\ DLPHGDW SURPRWLQJ µZHOIDUH WKURXJKZRUN¶ UDWKHU WKDQYLD
the mechanisms of state income transfers. However, although economic pressures have 
remained a constant feature in reform debates, the perceived crisis has been fuelled by 
concerns regarding policy outcomes. Persistent and high levels of poverty, evident 
throughout the advanced capitalist economies, has served as a stimulus for evaluating the 
overall structure of income maintenance programs. The evolution of the reform process 
has therefore involved taking account of the nature of modern social problems in addition 
to the crucial question of finance. 
With this agenda in mind the ideal opportunity exists for widespread discussion of 
DOWHUQDWLYHPHFKDQLVPVIRUGHOLYHU\DQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KDWLVJLYHQWKHFXUUHQWµFULVLV¶
environment, it can be argued that the reform debate provides a more welcoming stage 
for radical ideas. Social security reform is a policy arena commanding much political 
attention, not only in Britain, but throughout Europe, which has subsequently led to a 
resurgence of interest in the principles elementary to the CBI concept. The issues of 
social justice; gender equality; the separation of work from income; the future of 
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capitalist economic and political structures and the sustainability of the environment in 
view of limited resources have all been raised within the contemporary CBI literature, 
albeit in varying degrees. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and provide an 
overview of the main contributions to the current debate, setting both the theories and 
their respective proposers in an economic, political and social context. It will be 
concluded, however that although it may be presented as a radical policy option, 
contemporary debates display a characteristic bias towards emphasising how a CBI 
conforms to the demands imposed by modern labour market structures. Thus the radical 
element is superseded by what is argued to be a productivist reform approach. 
This chapter will begin by expanding on the claim made in earlier chapters 
UHJDUGLQJWKHSHUFHLYHGµFULVLV¶LQPRGHUQDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\SURYLVLRQ7KH
intention is not to revisit tKHDOUHDG\ZHOOUHKHDUVHGµFULVLVLQZHOIDUHK\SRWKHVLV¶5DWKHU
the purpose is to emphasise that renewed interest in the CBI proposal results from an 
increased awareness regarding the inadequacies of current social security provision in 
addressing modern needs. Thus, it is argued that contemporary debates have tended to 
focus on the potential benefits of a CBI in sustaining the capitalist system, in view of the 
dynamics of modern socio-economic conditions. The remainder of the chapter will 
examine the various attempts made at justifying reform along the lines of a CBI, which 
have been presented in response to concerns regarding the future of modern welfare 
SURYLVLRQ6XFKDWWHPSWVZLOOEHFDWHJRULVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHLUµSHUFHLYHG¶UDGLFDOQDWXUH
The conclusion will be drawn that contemporary debates demonstrate limited evidence of 
µUDGLFDOLVP¶ ,W ZLOO EH DUJXHG WKDW WKLV HQG UHVXOW LV XOWLPDWHO\ GXH WR D FRQWLQXHG DQG
unyielding attachment to the principles of mainstream economic theory, in particular 
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those related to the world of work and income. It is claimed that such a process 
subordinates issues of gender justice to a predefined, implicitly assumed, and 
unquestioned conception of economic efficiency. The CBI debate thus remains exclusive 
in that, similar to the economics discipline itself, it has been determined by its approach 
rather than its subject matter. That is, recognition of the totality of benefits to be derived 
from a CBI will only come about once the constraining features which continue to 
dominate the approach to study have been identified and removed. 
7.2 The Turning Tide: Collapse of the Keynesian Welfare State Consensus and the end 
of Full Employment. 
In Britain, as in many other parts of Western Europe, the post-1945 era was 
marked by a brRDGVRFLDOFRQVHQVXVEDVHGRQWKHJHQHUDOFRPPLWPHQWWRµIXOO
HPSOR\PHQW LQ D IUHH VRFLHW\¶ DQG WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D FRPSUHKHQVLYH ZHOIDUH
state. Since the late 1970s that social consensus has been shattered, and 
nothing has yet been put in its place. Unless a new basis for consensus does 
emerge, there are reasons enough to fear a steady drift towards 
authoritarianism, superimposed on widening inequalities and mass 
unemployment. 
(Standing, 1992: 47) 
The erosion of the post war Keynesian welfare state consensus coupled with the 
onset of supply side economics, and the electoral success of a government committed to 
new right ideology resulted in increasing attention being paid to the operation of state 
welfare policy in Britain. The new right ideologues, convinced by the philosophies of 
+D\HNDQG)ULHGPDQ H[SRXQGHG WKHQRWLRQVRI µUROOLQJEDFN WKH IURQWLHUVRI WKH VWDWH¶
and wherever possible replacing state intervention with the more economically efficient 
free market mechanism. The role of the individual is supreme and states should merely 
act in situations where there is a threat to individual freedom. Consequently income 
  
 287 
security is to be achieved by promoting the role of the labour market and ensuring that 
individuals are afforded the opportunity to provide for themselves and not to depend on 
the state as a source of income. State provision is justified to prevent the most extreme 
cases of hardship but benefits should be kept to a minimum to encourage individual 
saving and earning. 
As outlined in chapter three, recent developments in British social security policy 
have encapsulated this ideology. Universal benefits have been eroded in favour of 
selectivity; private pensions have been encouraged in place of state pensions; the real 
value of benefits have diminished over the years by abolishing earning related 
supplements and replacing the uprating of benefits indexed to wages with an index to 
prices, and more stringent rules have been implemented as qualifying conditions. The 
inadequacies of the British social security system are patently obvious whenever 
evidence is presented regarding incidences of poverty and social exclusion. In 
considering contemporary arguments for a CBI, the most pressing question to be 
answered is would such a policy fare any better in addressing those problems? In other 
words, why a CBI now?  
An examination of the various cases made for a CBI indicates that, just as earlier 
proposals were viewed as alternatives to existing measures, topical debates have tended 
to focus on the proposal as a possible reform option in response to the continued attack 
on the system of income maintenance; 
With the apparent ineffectiveness of traditional macroeconomic policies, and 
with the general assault on the welfare state and big government (particularly 
in the United States and the United Kingdom), it may be time to consider 
alternative policies to address the problems of unemployment and income 
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LQHTXDOLW\$%DVLF,QFRPHSROLF\DOVRNQRZQDV&LWL]HQ¶V,QFRPHRU6RFLDO
Dividend) is a policy response to the economic maladies the developed world 
currently faces. 
(Clark and Kavanagh, 1996:400) 
As illustrated in the preceding chapter, the notion of an unconditional income due to all 
from the public purse is not by any means a new idea nor should it be viewed as merely a 
response to the war waged on social security by the New Right. However the result of the 
said war has indeed allowed the CBI debate to reach the public arena far quicker than 
perhaps would have been possible if the consensus, referred to by Standing above, had 
not come under threat. Current proposals should thus be examined with due regard to the 
political, social and economic environment in which they were framed. For this purpose, 
before going on to critically assess the various proposals for some form of CBI that have 
EHHQSURPRWHGDVDPHDQVRIUHVROYLQJWKHµFULVLV¶LWLVFRQVLGHUHGHVVHQWLDOWKDWFODLPV
of crisis are understood in context. 
7.2.1 The Welfare State in Crisis: Rethinking Social Security Policy 
Contemporary social security policy has attracted a vast amount of attention 
since the current depression shook the complacency with which most people 
viewed the future during the steady growth period of the 1960s. It would 
seem however that the sudden concentration of attention on social security, 
and in particular on the legitimacy of state protection, is above all a reaction 
to current economic difficulties (increasing unemployment, declining 
industries, monetary chaos and so forth); and, on these grounds, many people 
have not hesitated to accuse social security of aggravating the world-wide 
economic crisis. 
(Francis Blanchard in preface to ILO, 1984) 
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Blanchard, the then Director General of the International Labour Office, 
commissioned a study in 1983, involving a group of ten independent experts on social 
security policy, to analyse and report on the future development of social security in 
advanced industrialised countries (ILO, 1984). The call for such a study is clear from 
%ODQFKDUG¶V RSHQLQJ VWDWHPHQW TXRWHG DERYH WR WKH ILQDO UHSRUW. Social security 
provision was generally believed to be a main contributor to the fiscal crisis evident 
throughout modern welfare states and thus came under attack. The agenda became one of 
reforming systems in light of new demands, but more importantly, with specific reference 
to resource constraints. This resulted in a concentrated effort to reduce costs and to 
encourage, wherever possible, dependence on private means of support as opposed to 
reliance on the state. Although periodic attention was given to questions regarding the 
EDVLV RI ILQDQFH DQG GHOLYHU\ WKH µVR-called crisis of welfare which ensued from the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFSUREOHPVRIWKHV¶UHVXOWHGLQDQDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQ
DQ µRSSRVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ µXQLYHUVDO¶ DQG µWDUJHWHG¶ EHQHILWV¶ (DUGOH\ HW DO  ,Q
general terms, the decades following the 1970s have witnessed a universal trend amongst 
welfare state governments towards absolute reductions in social policy, or at least the 
enactment of measures which serve to restrain the future growth of state supported 
welfare provision (Hill, 1996:293). Within this environment of restraint income transfer 
systems have undergone considerable changes and in particular social security policy has 
been characterised by a shift away from universal benefits to a greater reliance on means-
testing or income targeted benefits. 
The increased emphasis on selectivity has undoubtedly been driven by concerns 
regarding a shrinking resource base. However, it has been the question of work incentives 
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that has tended to dominate international debates on the reform of tax and social security 
systems (Eardley et al, 1996:21). In fact; 
While the European Commission and many of the EU governments have 
resisted any wholesale reduction of insurance-based social protection, and 
indeed have recently emphasised the importance of the social dimension, the 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, nevertheless 
recommends a range of measures aimed at increasing employment, which 
include reductions or restruFWXULQJ RI HPSOR\HUV¶ QRQ-wage costs and 
boosting of work incentives through income-related supplements to earnings. 
(Eardley et al, 1996:21) 
Thus the principal objective behind many of the tax and social security changes occurring 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s has been to encourage work effort; reduce levels of 
welfare dependency and to cut the social costs of labour experienced by employers. This 
focus indicates that, on an international level, developments in social policy are being 
driven primarily by the perceived needs of the economy, with particular reference to 
changing labour markets. Although specific reforms have been directed at altering the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH PDUNHW WKH VWDWH DQG WKH IDPLO\ WKXV SURPRWLQJ WKH µPL[HG
HFRQRP\ RI ZHOIDUH¶ or have been premised on redistributional goals, the underlying 
emphasis has remained strongly fixed on curbing any future growth in public 
expenditure. Set against this background, income maintenance measures have been 
subject to reforms characterised by revenue neutrality and a shift in emphasis from 
µVHFXULW\¶WKURXJKHPSOR\PHQW-UHODWHGLQVXUDQFHEDVHGEHQHILWVWRµVXEVLVWHQFH¶WKURXJK
targeted income-related benefits. The trend has therefore been to view social security 
reform as an economic policy response to the dynamics of modern capitalist 
development.  
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Throughout the 1980s the degree to which modern welfare states followed this 
trend illustrated marked differences. Some countries were slower than others in 
responding to economic pressures, however by the 1990s the tensions between economic 
and social policy became universally apparent, resulting in a levelling out of the division 
EHWZHHQ µZHOIDUH OHDGHUV¶ DQG µZHOIDUH ODJJDUGV¶ +LOO  7KH GLIIHUHQFHV LQ
response can be attributed to a combination of factors. The varying cultural, political and 
economic influences which have informed the evolution of welfare systems have resulted 
in differences in design. Thus the direct relationship between social security policy and 
the labour market has assumed greater importance in some countries than in others. 
Furthermore, historical experiences of unemployment levels have not been universal and 
thus the prioritising of questions of work incentives has not been a consistent common 
feature. Notwithstanding the effects of these factors, perhaps the most influential has 
been the existence of a firm political will in favour of rolling back the frontiers of the 
state and promoting the mixed economy of welfare. Such a political will was made 
explicit in Britain with the election of the Thatcher government 1979. Subsequently there 
was a definite and sustained attack on public expenditure in Britain throughout the period 
in question. Furthermore, the trends towards casualisation in the labour market have been 
particularly strong in Britain (Hill, 1996:312), which has had negative consequences for 
the effective operation of a Beveridge type social insurance model. Thus the attack on 
social security policy, originating from the economic crisis of the 1970s, has been 
particularly marked in Britain. 
Although the British experience of concern regarding the future sustainability of 
income maintenance programs is not unique, the emphasis on reducing public 
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expenditure and adapting income transfer schemes to conform with the perceived needs 
of modern labour markets, can arguably be viewed as a typical British response. 
Primarily driven by the underlying philosophy of New Right politics, the prolonged 
period of Conservative government in Britain witnessed dramatic changes in social 
security policy. Hill writes of the influential nature of the work of Friedman with regard 
to the purpose of social security in that benefits should be maintained at a minimum level, 
µVRWKDW WKH\VHUYHRQO\ WRSUHYHQW WKHPRUHH[WUHPHFDVHVRIGestitution and operate in 
VXFKDZD\WKDW WKH\HQIRUFHODERXUPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶+HQFH WKHDFWLRQV
of individuals operating freely in the labour market should be left unhindered by the 
effects of state income maintenance measures. Implicit in this ideological stance is the 
notion that the labour market remains the primary source of individual welfare. This is a 
crucial point when discussing the criticisms of a CBI proposal waged by the New Right 
and explains the predisposition of right wing thinkers towards a form of NIT. A further 
related concept is the overarching aim of the New Right to reduce the role of the state in 
all spheres of economic, social and political life. What is advocated is the return to a 
µODLVVH]-IDLUH¶ VW\OH RI JRYHUQPHQW with a corresponding confidence in the role of the 
market place to efficiently allocate resources. Individuals should be encouraged to 
provide for their own income security in times of need and state supported provision 
VKRXOGEHYLHZHGDV D µODVW UHVRUW¶ when circumstances prevented access to the private 
sector. The principle of self-reliance emerged victorious over the notion of welfare 
dependency. Social security systems based principally on the concept of universality and 
the idea of institutionalised µULJKWV¶ WREHQHILWVZHUHIRUWKH1HZ5LJKWRYHUJHQHURXV
inefficient; administratively costly and led ultimately to a dependency culture which 
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would be difficult, if not impossible, to ideologically reverse. This is not to mention the 
negative consequences such systems create in terms of resources available to the private 
sector.  
The Thatcher administration proved, therefore, to be quite a significant period for 
social security in Britain. (Lister, 1991; Hill, 1990; Hill, 1993; Lowe, 1993). Prior to 
1979 there had been moves to contain costs, spurred mainly by the economic crisis of 
ZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQDUJXPHQWVUHODWLQJWRWKHJRDORIµWDUJHWLQJ¶WKRVHPRVWLQQHHG
(Lowe, 1993:314; Lister, 1991). There seemed to be a clear economic agenda for 
reassessing methods of income redistribution in an attempt to improve overall efficiency, 
defined in terms of resource allocation. The shift in emphasis from social insurance to 
means-testing was to be justified by appealing to the fact that available resources were 
not in abundant supply and hence benefit payments to rich and poor alike were 
unaffordable luxuries. Social policy once again was destined to take a back seat to the 
goals of economic policy. This is a primary indication of the end of the post war 
consensus where the adoption of the Keynes/Beveridge model of the mixed economy of 
welfare had ensured that social and economic policy were inextricably linked. 
However, the Conservatives added momentum to the process by incorporating the 
aforementioned political considerations. The policy of favouring selective benefits over 
the principal of universality as a means of promoting a more efficient allocation of scarce 
resources was to be complemented by reductions in the real level of benefits; the 
implementation of harsher qualifying conditions; the replacing of grants with loans 
wherever possible and a rigorous campaign to encourage individuals to appreciate the 
benefits of provision available within the private sector. Not only would this combination 
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of policy proposals reduce the financial burden for the state but would also foster the 
QRWLRQRIVHOIUHOLDQFHDVRSSRVHGWRZHOIDUHGHSHQGHQF\7KHVORJDQRIµWDUJHWLQJWKRVH
LQPRVWQHHG¶ WKHQ LVPRVW UHDGLO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKH\HDUSHULRGRI&RQVHUYDWLYH 
rule in Britain. A fundamental shift occurred in policy objectives for social security and 
incremental reforms were designed primarily to improve the efficiency of the system by 
specifically addressing the problem of work incentives as opposed to the goal of reducing 
inequality (Barr and Coulter, 1990). The use of the term poverty disappeared altogether 
IURPJRYHUQPHQWUKHWRULF3UHIHUHQFHZDVJLYHQWRWKHXVHRIµWKHVDQLWLVHGODQJXDJHRI
µWKHPRVWYXOQHUDEOH¶µORZLQFRPH¶µWKRVHLQJUHDWHVWQHHG¶DQGLmplicit assumptions are 
PDGHDERXWWKHUHODWLYHGHVHUYLQJQHVVRIGLIIHUHQWJURXSV¶/LVWHU,QIDFWWKH
over-riding purpose of social security provision was considered to be that of relieving the 
worst poverty and the targeting of benefits became the central theme of state income 
maintenance policies. This was a marked departure from the original and more ambitious 
JRDORIHOLPLQDWLQJµZDQW¶DQGDVVXFKVHUYHGWRVWLJPDWLVHWKRVHHOLJLEOHIRUUHFHLSWE\
labelling them the worst off in society. Furthermore the continued emphasis on 
promoting the supremacy of the role of the family and community as providers of 
welfare, with the stated aim of promoting self reliance, merely serves to shift the realm of 
dependency from the public to the private sector for many individuals.  
However, as indicated in chapter four, contemporary debates on the future of 
income transfers in Britain have not demonstrated any radical departure from the past. 
The early 1990s witnessed the onset of widespread political debate on future reform 
options. The Government embarked upon its Long Term Review and in a speech, 
delivered in 1993, Lilley appeared to be indicating that the reform agenda should not only 
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FRQVLGHUWKHµHFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHV¶RIVRFLDOVHFXULW\SROLF\EXWVKRXld also refer to its 
µVRFLDOSXUSRVH¶/LOOH\+HDQQRXQFHGWKDW 
Reforms of our welfare state are essential. They are essential above all in the 
interests of those who most depend upon the welfare state. Beveridge largely 
GHVWUR\HGWKHµHYLOJLDQWRIZDQW¶7KHRQO\WKLQJZKLFKZRXOGEULQJLWEDFN
WROLIHZRXOGEHDV\VWHPZKLFKERWKRXWVWULSSHGDQGXQGHUPLQHGWKHQDWLRQ¶V
ability to pay. 
(Lilley, 1993:22) 
Although the emphasis on cost remained, he also indicated that there was scope for 
political consensus regarding the objectives of policy and in recognising the need to 
PRGHUQLVH WKH V\VWHP KH ZHOFRPHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI GHEDWH FHQWUHG RQ µUDGLFDO¶
solutions; 
We all want to make the system better. We all want to safeguard, in 
particular, the position of the most vulnerable. We all want to ensure the 
V\VWHPGRHVQRWRXWVWULSWKHQDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRSD\$QGZHDOODJUHHDV\VWHP
designed for yesterday requires updating to reflect contemporary human 
QHHGV«6RLWRXJKWWREHSRVVLEOHWRJREH\RQGSDUWy political point scoring. 
And we must certainly not allow scaremongering to choke off any radical 
thinking. Radical ideas will often prove impractical or unattractive in 
themselves. But they are worth voicing since they often highlight strengths or 
weaknesses of the system and so help generate more modest but practical 
proposals. 
(ibid:15) 
The potential for political agreement on objectives may exist but the question of policy 
outcomes is another issue. For the political right, generous social security benefits 
promote welfare dependency and the high levels of resources devoted to programs 
negatively impact on overall economic performance. Those on the political left tend to 
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DUJXH IURP D XVHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ FODLPLQJ WKDW PHDQV-testing traps people in poverty 
and exacerbates the problem of social exclusion. The Commission on Social Justice 
(CSJ), set up by the Labour Party in 1992, examined current social security measures 
employed in Britain in an attempt to develop a reform package which would modernise 
the system. The Commission reported the following objectives for any system of benefits, 
tax allowances and private provision; 
1. To prevent poverty where possible and relieve it where necessary. 
2. To protect people against risks, especially those that arise in the labour 
market and from family change. 
3. To redistribute resources from richer to poorer members of society. 
7RUHGLVWULEXWHUHVRXUFHVRIWLPHDQGPRQH\RYHUSHRSOH¶VOLIHF\FOHV 
5. To encourage personal independence. 
6. To promote social cohesion. 
(CSJ, 1994:224) 
Thus it would seem that in Britain, by the early 1990s, the terms of reference for the 
reform debate had moved beyond the limiting parameters of cost containment to 
encompass a broader range of social issues relating to the dynamics of modern socio-
economic conditions. Furthermore there appeared to be political commitment to at least 
FRQVLGHUSROLF\RSWLRQVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWHGDGHSDUWXUHIURPWKHWUDGLWLRQDOXQLYHUVDOY¶V
targeting dichotomy.  
As indicated in chapter four, recent policy developments in the area of income 
maintenance have served to stigmatise the poor further, curtail the coverage and level of 
benefits, and rather than promote independence, has substituted public with various forms 
of private dependence. The focus of social security policy in Britain has altered from a 
rights based insurance scheme to a residual system of safety-net provision that has had a 
  
 297 
negative impact on individual welfare. Given the evidence it is obvious that the system of 
social security, in operation in Britain in the early 1990s, was failing to relieve the 
poverty of many individuals. JSA, paid at a weekly rate of £52.20 in 2000 represents 
11.7% of full time average earnings (the average full time wage rate, April 1999, is 
£442.50; source: New Earnings Survey). These figures indicate that the objective of 
maintaining living standards is clearly not being met and, when considering the issue of 
insuring against risks, or even promoting economic security, levels of benefit dictate that 
this is at the most basic level.  
In addition to the specific comments regarding the contradictory outcomes of recent 
changes in social security policy further criticisms point to the fact that the system is 
historically structured in such a way that it suffers from gender bias. Gender inequalities 
are exacerbated within the current British social security framework. The direct 
relationship between insurance based benefits and paid work directly disadvantages 
women due to their historically limited access to the labour market and their lower 
earnings relative to their male counterparts. Means-tested benefits in Britain are 
calculated on family income therefore women married to employed men are denied 
access to IS regardless of their own levels of income. Also evidence suggests that those 
most affected by the poverty trap are women married to unemployed men who find that 
the loss in benefits does not financially compensate them for going out to work (see for 
example Dilnot and Kell, 1989). Furthermore, recent reforms, particularly in the area of 
child care provision and support for child care costs, indicate that the focus is clearly on 
improving work incentives. Social security programs, which are linked to the formal 
labour market and continue to assume the traditional male-breadwinner family model, 
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implicitly promote the citizenship rights of workers whilst denying the full inclusion of 
many individuals, primarily women and children, by assuming their dependency on men. 
Future reform of the British tax and social security system must take all of the 
above quoted factors into account. In considering a CBI, the question now becomes one 
about whether or not such a reform proposal presents as a possible policy option which 
addresses all of the identified failings of current measures. However, equally important is 
an emphasis on establishing political acceptance for a proposal which entails a radical 
overhaul of existing claiming principles, methods of finance and delivery mechanisms. 
With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter will review the contemporary literature 
arguing for some form of CBI. The conclusion will be drawn that implementation 
remains blocked largely by questions of political expediency, as opposed to critiques 
regarding what a CBI can actually achieve. It is argued that not only has this served to 
temper the debate, but also that the focus on political will is a product of a limiting and 
constraining vision regarding the welfare function of modern labour markets.  
7.3 First Principles - Integration as a Radical Agenda 
The starting premise of any model for reform based on the CBI proposal involves 
full scale integration of the present systems of tax and benefits. In the early 1990s in 
Britain there did not appear to be the political will to support a process of integration. 
Opposition on the part of the Government appeared to be based on financial 
considerations; 
The fact is the benefit and tax systems each do essentially different things, in 
different ways, over different timescales. The benefit system is designed to 
alleviate need. Of necessity it works on a weekly or even daily basis, it 
assesses needs and it takes into account other household income and savings. 
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The tax system looks at income on an annual basis, assesses individuals, 
usually ignores savings and relies on the co-operation of employers. Few 
benefit claimants have employers. So there is far less scope for administrative 
synergy than many suppose. To the extent that benefits are replaced by tax 
credits they would need to ignore savings and short term variations in need. 
So they would be less well targeted and therefore more expensive than the 
benefits they replace. Tax credits may be a good or bad thing - but they are 
not a potential source of savings. 
(Lilley, 1993:17) 
For the Conservatives then the focus in terms of social security reform remained firmly 
grounded in measures that would generate cost savings and increased targeting. In their 
VHDUFK IRU DQ µLQWHOOLJHQW ZHOIDUH VWDWH WKDW ZRUNV ZLWK UDWKHU WKDQ DJDLQVW WKH JUDLQ RI
FKDQJH¶ WKH /DERXU Party considered integration of the tax and benefit systems as a 
possible reform strategy (CSJ, 1994:ch6). Again the perceived cost implications of such 
an approach proved to be the main stumbling block. The CSJ employed a team of 
independent consultants to investigate the feasibility of full scale integration who 
concluded that such a structural change would not solve the current problems. Rather, 
what was required was a more strategic approach to ensure that that the tax and benefit 
systems worked in unison and reforms should centre around addressing the problems of 
the poverty and unemployment traps arising from the interaction of current schemes 
(Clinton et al, 1994). The Commission subsequently reported that employing tax-benefit 
LQWHJUDWLRQ µWR WU\ WR solve the problems of the minority would be like using a 
VOHGJHKDPPHUWRFUDFNDQXW¶1 (CSJ, 1994:260). 
                                                 
1
 5HIHUHQFHWRWKHµPLQRULW\¶LVZRUWK\RIQRWHZKHQFRQVLGHULQJJHQGHU issues in arguing for a CBI. 
The practice of examining the impact a particular policy has on women is often identified within an 
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Arguing in a similar vein to Lilley, quoted above, the Commission drew attention 
to the differences in timescales used by the two systems, differences in units of 
assessment and the enormous administrative costs implied by such a large scale process 
of government reorganisation (ibid:260). However in considering a CBI package, as 
opposed to a NIT scheme, the Commission added weight to their objections by 
HPSKDVLVLQJWKHSROLWLFDOXQDFFHSWDELOLW\RIWKHµIUHH-ULGHU¶LPSOLFDWLRQVRIVXFKDSROLF\ 
A change of this magnitude would have to be backed by a broad-based 
consensus, of which there is, as yet, no sign. In a society with a strong work 
ethic many peopOHZRXOGRSSRVHDVJLYLQJµVRPHWKLQJIRUQRWKLQJ¶DVFKHPH
GHOLEHUDWHO\GHVLJQHGWRRIIHUXQFRQGLWLRQDOEHQHILWV WRDOO&LWL]HQ¶V ,QFRPH
does not require any act of citizenship; it would be paid regardless of whether 
someone was in a job or looking for one, caring for children or other 
dependants, engaged in voluntary work or not. 
(ibid:262) 
In dismissing the proposal for these reasons the Commission was keen to point out that 
their position is not a static one; 
It would be unwise to, however, to rule ouW D PRYH WRZDUGV D &LWL]HQ¶V
Income in future: if it turns out to be the case that earnings simply cannot 
provide a stable income for a growing proportion of people, then the notion of 
some guaranteed income, outside the labour market, could become 
increasingly attractive. Work incentives might matter less and those who 
                                                                                                                                                 
µHTXDOLW\¶ DJHQGD DQG DV VXFK LV SUHVHQWHG DV D SRVLWLYH VWHS LQ DGGUHVVLQJ WKH QHHGV RI µPLQRULWLHV¶
Considering the policy evaluation process in these terms is misleading as women are clearly not a 
minority group. More importantly, engaging in a gender impact assessment should not be viewed as 
µGRLQJ ZRPHQ¶ EXW UDWKHU PRUH DFFXUDWHO\ DV DQ DSSURDFK ZKLFK WDNHV DFFRXQW RI DQ\ possible 
GLIIHUHQWLDO HIIHFWV D SROLF\ KDV IRU PHQ DQG ZRPHQ 7KH SRLQW EHLQJ PDGH LV WKDW LI WKH µPLQRULW\¶
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happened to be in employment, knowing that they probably would not remain 
VR WKURXJKRXW WKHLU µZRUNLQJ¶ OLYHV PLJKW EH PRUH ZLOOLQJ WR ILQDQFH DQ
unconditional payment.  
(ibid:263-64) 
In seeking a resolution to the problems associated with unconditionality, the Commission 
considered integration in the form of a Participation Income, but rejected such on the 
EDVLVRILWVGLVWULEXWLRQDOLPSDFWDUJXLQJWKDWµLWZRXOGPHDQVRPHZKDWKLJKHUWD[Eills 
IRU WKRVH DOUHDG\ SD\LQJ LQFRPH WD[¶ LELG )XUWKHUPRUH DVVXPLQJ LW ZDV VHW DW D
level equivalent to current personal tax allowances the Participation Income would 
involve extra expenditure. Thus cost considerations proved again to be a decisive factor. 
However, the Commission did indicate that if it were not for the presence of necessary 
resource restraints, there was much to commend in the idea of a Participation Income; 
If it could be afforded, particularly at a higher level than that available 
through abolishing tax allowances, it could go a long way towards eliminating 
means-WHVWLQJUHFRJQLVLQJWKHYDOXHRISDUHQWV¶DQGFDUHUV¶XQSDLGZRUNDQG
encouraging people to take up employment, education and training. 
(ibid:265) 
Thus the CBI proposal, for the Labour Party, proved to be unacceptable, at least in 
the short term, due to questions of affordability and the perceived negative impact such a 
reform package would have on work incentives. Although the benefits in terms of 
promoting social justice were implicitly recognised, the case against was premised 
primarily on economic considerations. The third main political party in Britain, the 
Liberal Democrats, raised their concerns regarding a CBI in a consultation paper 
                                                                                                                                                 
position is dominant in the literature arguing for a CBI, it serves to hinder the development of debates 
focusing on the potential the proposal has for promoting gender equality. 
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published in January 1994, which recommended that their previous commitment to the 
proposal be scrapped. (CI Bulletin, 1994: 9). The paper made clear that a full CBI had 
never been supported due to the excessive increase in income tax levies required to 
finance such a scheme. The favoured Partial Basic Income was now considered 
unworkable for reasons of poor targeting and expense. Furthermore, as the Partial Basic 
Income implied retaining some income-tested benefits to meet special needs, the benefits 
of integration, in terms of administrative simplicity, would not be fully realised. 
Thus, in Britain in the early 1990s there appeared to be a broad based political 
consensus with regard to tax-benefit integration. Common across the political spectrum 
was a rejection of the proposal on the grounds of costs in the short run and a clear 
indication that approaches involving greater targeting were to be given priority. The 
landslide victory of New Labour in the May 1997 General Election indicated the 
possibility of a fresh approach to social security policy. However, their election promises 
contained very little about social security policy specifically, but it was clear that there 
was a firm pledge to enact measures which would improve access to the formal labour 
market, thereby tackling poverty and reducing the future fiscal demands made by the 
social security budget. Gordon Brown, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, reaffirmed this 
commitment in an election address; 
7KH XQHPSOR\HG PHQ DQG ZRPHQ , PHHW LQ P\ FRQVWLWXHQF\ GRQ¶W ZDQW WR
settle for an H[WUDSRXQGDQGDOLIHRQEHQHILW7KH\GRQ¶WGHPDQGWKHULJKW
to benefit they demand the right to work...Therefore our first priority - the 
purpose of our windfall tax - will be to cut unemployment, modernise the 
Welfare State, reduce social security bills and get our people back to work...A 
tax system for work, and the reform of the Welfare State to encourage work, 
that will be our first priority. 
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(The Scottish Labour Party 1997 Annual Conference, 8th March) 
The current Labour Government came into office stressing their commitment to reducing 
social security bills and addressing the social problems of poverty and exclusion through 
active employment measures, thereby reversing the trend in welfare dependency. The 
promotion of employment is now understood to be a fundamental goal of both social and 
economic policy and thus future social security reform in Britain will undoubtedly be 
informed, first and foremost, by the impact measures will have on the efficient 
functioning of the labour market. Given the negative view expressed by the Labour Party, 
whilst in opposition, to integration proposals with respect to work incentives it seems 
highly unlikely that serious consideration will be given to a CBI in the near future.  
In the first few years of office, policy developments undertaken by the Blair 
administration in the area of welfare reform have demonstrated a clear preference for 
favouring work over welfare. Measures taken have mainly focused on implementing an 
active welfare to work strategy through the New Deal program. In the field of income 
maintenance specifically, the introduction of the WFTC, could be construed as a move 
towards partial integration. The WFTC is assessed and paid by the Inland Revenue and is 
normally paid via employers through the wage packet. As indicated in chapter four the 
switch from benefit to tax credit is part of a package intended to strengthen the incentive 
to take up paid employment. Thus the prime motivation behind reform is to restructure 
the relationship between the tax and benefit systems and the world of work in such a way 
as to ensure that labour force participation rates are maximised.  
In considering the integrational aspect of the proposal, the main difference between 
Family Credit and the WFTC is their treatment under standard public accounting rules. 
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The former is treated as a social security benefit and as such appears as a component of 
public expenditure. Tax credits however appear as negative revenues and therefore 
expenditure on the WFTC will be represented as income tax foregone; 
In fact it appears that its treatment will fall outside the rules as they have 
normally been interpreted in the past. Instead of being treated partly as public 
expenditure and partly as income tax forgone, as the US Earned Income Tax 
Credit is, it will be treated wholly as income tax foregone. 
(Meadows, 1998:74)     
This is a crucial point of distinction when considering the political feasibility of a CBI. In 
Britain the accounting practice of showing tax expenditure as negative revenue, means 
that the introduction of a new cash benefit, to replace all tax relief and allowances would 
distort the government's accounts by showing an exorbitant increase in spending. This 
OHDGV0RQNWRQWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµXQOHVVWKH7UHDVXU\LIIRUFHGWRPHnd its ways, it 
will always block the consideration of any universal benefit scheme, erroneously 
EHOLHYLQJLWWREHLQDOOFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQDIIRUGDEOH¶:LWKDIRFXVRQUHGXFLQJ
public expenditure and improving work incentives it seems a model of tax-benefit 
integration such as that implied by a CBI will be embraced during the lifetime of the 
current political administration in Britain.  
7.4 Welfare to Work or a Welfare System that Works?  
7KH REOLJDWLRQ WR GR SDLG ZRUN LV FHQWUDO WR /DERXU¶V DSSURDch to social 
security reform. In the words of the Secretary of State for Social Security, 
Harriet Harman, we are reforming the welfare state around the work 
HWKLF«%HQHILWV IRU WKH XQHPSOR\HG KDYH DOZD\V EHHQ XQGHU-pinned by the 
obligation to be available for paid work, but we are now witnessing a clear 
shift towards the prioritising of paid work obligations over social citizenship 
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rights. Such a shift is in the opposite direction to the principles that underpin 
%DVLF,QFRPHRU&LWL]HQ¶V,QFRPHPRUHJHQHUDOOy. 
(Lister, 1998:3) 
In Britain, as is the case elsewhere in Europe, social security reform has principally 
been driven by the need to reduce expenditure and the general belief that accessing the 
labour market is the main route out of poverty. Thus the general direction of income 
maintenance policy has been towards an ever increasing reliance on income related 
benefits. This has been combined with an overall shift in approach from one that assumes 
the primary responsibility of the state in securing welfare, to one which now focuses on 
the role of the individual and the market. The dominant view emerging, therefore, is one 
that places social security policy within a framework of obligations and achievements 
relating to the labour market (Plant, 1997:3). That is, the main driving force behind 
income maintenance reform can be identified as the need to conform with the policy 
goals of promoting employability and supporting the operation of flexible labour markets. 
Social security policy thus assumes a subsidiary role in relation to employment policy 
and serves as a tool for furthering the principles of self-help and the work ethic.  
It can be argued this particular approach to social security policy is informed by a 
general acceptance of the assumptions regarding human behaviour inherent within 
mainstream economic theory. The impact of such on the formation of social security 
policy was discussed at length in earlier chapters. However, it is worth reinforcing at this 
point the arguments as they relate to work incentives. Arguments favouring income 
related benefits over universal benefits are normally presented in terms of resource 
savings. It is true that with a given budget constraint the targeting of benefits to those 
LGHQWLILHG DV µQHHG\¶ LV LQ SULQFLSOH FKHDSHU than paying benefits to all regardless of 
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need. However, in practice this may not be the case due to the very different operating 
structures required to administer both types of benefit. Problems arise with regard to 
identifying, and continually monitoring, the conditions of receipt, which in turn can prove 
costly. Furthermore the impact on economic activity arising from a switch to targeting 
may have exactly the opposite effect from that intended, thereby effectively reducing the 
available resource base. Aside from the financial considerations, targeted benefits tend to 
be promoted by those who adhere to a rather cynical view of human nature. Operating 
within an environment of unconditional universal benefits the self interested utility 
maximising individual will behave in such a way as to secure receipt of those benefits. 
Thus the concept of moral hazard is employed to demonstrate the inevitability of 
overconcunsumption and how the benefit system creates perverse incentives for 
individuals to engage in activities, which they would otherwise avoid, in order to meet 
eligibility conditions. A related argument draws upon the notion of the free-rider. Tax 
funded unconditional universal benefits will result in situations where the working poor 
are effectively subsidising those who freely choose not to work. Thus the benefit system 
creates disincentives to work and has negative distributional consequences. This scenario 
is not only considered unfair, and economically inefficient, but in the long term 
politically unfeasible. Tax payers will eventually object to funding benefits at a level 
deemed sufficient to meet the needs of the unemployed, placing further pressures on an 
ever shrinking resource base. Accepting these arguments leads to a convincing case for 
preferring targeted benefits to universal schemes.  
However, what is implied is a particular form of targeting. As previously discussed, 
FRQWHPSRUDU\GHEDWHVRQVRFLDOVHFXULW\UHIRUPKDYHEHHQGRPLQDWHGE\DWDUJHWLQJY¶V
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universal framework, but caution should be exercised in the use of terminology. The 
choice is not essentially an either/or scenario but rather involves a range of policy options 
(Atkinson, 1995:224). As indicated in chapter three, the concept of universalism, in its 
true sense, is not evident in any existing benefit structure; 
In practice virtually all existing benefits involve some degree of 
conditionality or are targeted in some way, either towards certain categories 
of people, such as those with children in the case of child benefit, by 
contingency in the case of disability benefits, or on the basis of contribution 
records for social insurance benefits. 
(Eardley et al, 1996:21) 
What is referred to when discussing current trends towards the increased use of targeting 
is the practice of means-testing. The operational nature of means-tested benefits was 
previously outlined and it has been argued that social security systems are evolving, on 
an ever increasing level, in line with a means-tested approach. Social security provision 
of this kind is that which is most commonly associated with the current use of the terms 
targeting or selectivity. 
The question remaining, is does means-testing work? Accepting that the objectives 
of policy have somewhat altered in recent decades in favour of prioritising labour market 
policy, evaluating the practice of means-testing involves examining the impact such has 
individual work patterns. One of the negative consequences of the increased use of 
means-tested benefits is indeed the effect on work incentives arising from the rapid 
reductions in benefits as income rises. This is compounded by increases in tax liability. 
The anomaly arises when individuals find themselves both in receipt of income tested 
benefits and liable for income tax and national insurance deductions. A system which 
pays out from one government department only to recover the same via an other 
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department does not make economic sense, given the emphasis on reducing 
administrative costs. Furthermore creating a situation whereby individuals find 
themselves no better off in financial terms by entering the labour market, or moving to a 
higher paid job, is at worst immoral and at best inefficient with regard to promoting 
future economic growth. 
It is now generally accepted that the numbers of individuals affected are indeed low 
and that recent reforms to the social security system have eliminated the worst aspects of 
the poverty trap. That is, no individual now faces MTRs in excess of 100% and the 
system has been redesigned to ensure sufficient penalties exist for those unwilling to take 
XSµVXLWDEOH¶RIIHUVRIHPSOR\PHQW+RZHYHUWKHUDPLILFDWLRQVIRUZRPHQLQSRYHUW\DUH
widely felt. The behaviour of women with regard to the labour market is notably sensitive 
to disincentive effects (Oppenheim, 1994:28). Particularly affected are wives of 
unemployed men in that the new rules regarding full time work means that a woman 
employed for 16 hours per week or more disqualifies her family from receipt of IS and all 
of the associated passported benefits such as access to the SF. Furthermore the actively 
seeking work test serves to discourage those women, who are eligible by way of paid 
contributions and who wish to return to some form of employment after childbirth, from 
claiming JSA and instead depending on the incomes of their partners or IS.   
Whilst these criticisms are worth detailed analysis in their own right, for the 
purposes of this discussion they merely add to the list of identified problems previously 
mentioned. Any model for reform that fails to recognise the totality of the situation and 
simply targets a specific issue illustrates a very narrow perception of the role public 
policies aimed at income redistribution play in the macro economy. It further 
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demonstrates a desire to continue with existing models, adapting as the need may arise. 
Within this context a CBI emerges as a radical policy response. Although the 
contemporary literature is extensive and diverse, arguing from a range of philosophical, 
economic, social and environmental perspectives, the following sections will outline the 
main contributions as they relate to the concerns raised thus far regarding social security 
V\VWHPVLQµFULVLV¶7KDWLVWKHIRFXVLVGLUHFWHGDWWKRVHDUJXPHQWVZKHUHLVVXHVRIFRVW
reduction, addressing poverty and social exclusion, and the functioning of modern labour 
markets are highlighted. The intention is to demonstrate that a CBI can be argued for 
FRQYLQFLQJO\ RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW LW LV D V\VWHP WKDW KDV WKH SRWHQWLDO WR µZRUN¶ JLYHQ WKH
existing dominant framework, as opposed to systems that deny welfare and promote 
work.  
7.5 The Second Marriage of Justice and Efficiency - The Proactive Approach 
Perhaps the most prominent of theorists within the contemporary CBI literature is 
Phillippe Van Parijs, academic economist and co-founder of the Basic Income European 
Network. For Van Parijs the; 
...introduction of a basic income is not just a feasible structural improvement 
in the functioning of the welfare state, it is a profound reform that belongs in 
the same league as the abolition of slavery or the introduction of universal 
suffrage.  
(Van Parijs, 1992:7)  
Whilst he has made various influential contributions to the debate in a primarily 
philosophical sense, the analysis he develops in chapter thirteen of his edited volume 
Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform is most useful for 
the purposes of this particular study. 
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Van Parijs draws upon the historical development of the CBI concept to illustrate 
that the concern for economic growth and the simultaneous preservation of individual 
rights has led many theorists in the past to make demands for an unconditional minimum 
income (1992c:215). However, he begins his attempt at justifying a CBI by referring to 
the difficulties experienced within capitalist states in determining the criteria with which 
to evaluate and design redistributive social reform. Judging the political acceptability of 
any change in current resource allocation by estimating the amount of gainers compared 
to losers and implementing only those policies that are positive is flawed. This is due to 
ignorance on the part of voters as to whether they are, or will be, better off or not, and 
because of the persuasive influence of political beliefs and ideology. Likewise attempts to 
formulate social policy with reference to the legitimate functions of the capitalist state are 
highly subject to fluctuations in overall economic performance. Hence there is no direct 
relationship between political acceptability and the functional requirements of the 
capitalist state but rather social policy takes a back seat to the priority of capital 
accumulation. Van Parijs argues; 
...the presence of a plausible case on the grounds of both justice and 
efficiency constitutes a necessary condition for any major reform in the field 
of social policy. 
(ibid:216) 
The introduction of a CBI, for Van Parijs, can indeed meet the challenge of presenting 
such a plausible case in that it is a policy for reform that can be argued for convincingly 
in terms of promoting both social justice and economic efficiency. The caveat being, 
however, that the understanding of what constitutes justice and efficiency must first be 
re-examined, taking into account the changing socio-economic structure of modern 
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capitalist societies. Van Parijs rather poignantly refers to the mixed economy of welfare 
DVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHµILUVWPDUULDJHRIMXVWLFHDQGHIILFLHQF\¶DQGJRHVRQWRVWUHVVWKDWWKH
marriage is under immense strain due to the increasing concerns regarding the damaging 
effects of state activity in the area of income redistribution during periods of slow or even 
negative economic growth (ibid:215-233). Utilising tools of economic analysis, and 
ethical theorising, Van Parijs develops an abstract framework from which he traces the 
relevance of the WUDGLWLRQDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI µHFRQRPLFYDOXH¶ HIILFLHQF\DQG µHWKLFDO
YDOXH¶MXVWLFHWRWKHVRFLDOFRQVHQVXVDIIRUGHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPRGHUQZHOIDUH
state. Social policy was generally considered an essential ingredient in the pursuit of 
economic growth. However, by relating the arguments about trade off between efficiency 
DQGHTXDOLW\WRDYDULDQWRI WKH/DIIHUFXUYH9DQ3DULMV LOOXVWUDWHVWKHHFRQRPLVW¶VFDVH
for arguing that too much social policy actually prohibits further economic growth. This 
is in main due to the disincentive effects high levels of taxation, required to finance social 
policy, and over generous levels of transfer payments have on the supply of capital and 
the supply of labour respectively; 
If a rise in t (defined as the average tax rate
2
) makes people both less willing 
to get a job and work hard, and less willing to save and invest, how could it 
possibly generate a rise in average income, especially in the long run? 
(ibid:222) 
This is precisely the case made by supply side economists for reducing the average tax 
rates for those with a higher marginal propensity to save and reducing the real level of 
                                                 
2
 9DQ 3DULMV DFWXDOO\ GHILQHV W DV µDQ DYHUDJH UDWH DV WKH UDWLR RI ZKDW LV FROOHFWHG IRU WKH VDNH RI
WUDQVIHUV WR GLVSRVDEOH LQFRPH¶ F +H IXUWKHU GLVWLQJXLVKHV EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI
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transfer payments for those who are highly responsive to the price of labour. Thus 
effectively reducing the replacement ratios of income in work and income received when 
out of work. Such analysis was extremely influential in determining recent reforms to the 
social security system in Britain, particularly with regard to the unemployment trap, as 
well as the changes made to the tax base and reforms in the area of pension provision.   
However, as Van Parijs points out the situation in the 1930s was very different 
from that of today. Hence the same analysis could be utilised to argue for expansionary 
fiscal policy in that increasing the overall level of transfers would;  
...prevent minor fluctuations degenerating into full-scale slumps by stabilizing 
effective demand, both directly through the income guarantee and indirectly 
by setting a floor to wages.  
(ibid:222).   
Keynes made such arguments in his General Theory and therefore the stage was set for 
the positive interaction of social and economic policy within advanced capitalist systems. 
Income redistribution would prove to be an effective policy instrument in enhancing total 
output and therefore social policy was attributed an economic value. Crucial to this 
change in policy thinking was the fact that the analysis assumes a relatively low level of t 
to begin with, which indeed was the case in the period of modern welfare state formation. 
A continued commitment to demand management techniques and expansions in social 
policy throughout the immediate post war decades has led to quite considerable increases 
in the average rate of taxation. As national output continues to grow though the belief is 
that everyone is benefiting, or at least there exists the potential for all citizens to become 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsiveness of Y (national income) depending on how the tax is levied. The effects will be determined 
by the degrees of elasticity illustrated by the supply of labour and the supply of capital. 
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EHWWHU RII DV WKH VL]H RI WKH µFDNH¶ KDV LQFUHDVHG +RZHYHU WKLV EHOLHI FDQ HDVLO\ EH
GLVSXWHG$V WKH JURZWKRI WKH µFDNH¶ LV GLUHFWO\ DWWULEXWDEOH WR the increase in average 
transfers, some individuals will indeed be worse off as they experience more and more of 
their disposable income being creamed off by the state in order to finance the expansion 
in social policy. This means that a further condition is necessary in proving the economic 
value of social policy. That is, not only must the national output grow but it must grow at 
DIDVWHUUDWHWKDQWKDWRIW2QO\WKHQZLOOWKHµHQOLJKWHQHGVHOILQWHUHVW¶RIWKRVHEHDULQJ
most of the financial burden be served, at least in the long run. This leads Van Parijs to 
the conclusion that decisions regarding the economic value of social policy will be taken 
when due consideration has been given to the long run effects on average income, where 
this is positive the policy is said to have economic value and where this is negative the 
policy creates economic damage and hence will be abandoned (ibid:224). 
Social policy formation is, therefore, traditionally determined by appealing to 
classical welfare economic analysis. The political will and electoral support for any 
reform will only ensue if long run potential Pareto improvements can be made. That is, 
any redistribution of current resources can only be justified if it eventually improves the 
welfare of all citizens. Such criteria merely provide the analytical process by which social 
policy is judged. The impetus for reform, however, comes from arguments concerning 
distributive injustice and hence the concepts of efficiency and justice become intertwined. 
Questions regaUGLQJWKHµHWKLFDOYDOXH¶RIVRFLDOSROLF\DUHGLIILFXOWWRUHVROYHJLYHQ
the normative nature of the issue. The use of value judgements is extremely evident 
within theories of social justice. Those beholding to the libertarian view condemn any 
violation of the individual right to accumulate economic resources and retain ownership 
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of such. Excessive levels of taxation threaten individual freedom therefore social policy 
should not cross the boundary between what is required to ensure that at least basic needs 
are met and what is believed to be necessary to reduce inequality. Tax rates should hence 
be kept to a minimum. Conversely, egalitarian arguments promote social justice in terms 
of the maximum level of transfers required to ensure a more equitable distribution of 
resources. The average rate of taxation should be set at the maximum level determined by 
the financial requirements of social policy aimed at ensuring every citizen receives an 
income adequate to cover basic needs (ibid:224). Van Parijs adds two further ethical 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV +H UHIHUV WR WKH µ5DZOVLDQ¶ SRVLWLRQ EHLQJ WKH DYHUDJH UDWH RI WD[DWLRQ
required to maximise the level of replacement income (defined as the average expected 
LQFRPHZKHQLQFRPHLVQRORQJHUVHFXUHGE\HPSOR\PHQWDQGWKHµXWLOLWDULDQ¶SRVLWLRQ
being the average rate of taxation which maximises total national income. The labels are 
XVHG WR UHIHU WR WKH µERXQGDU\ EHWZHHQ HFRQRPLFDOO\ YDOXDEOH DQG HFRQRPLFDOO\
damaging social policy (U) and the boundary between the normal and prohibitive range 
RIW5¶LELG7KHXVHRIWHUPLQRORJ\LVVOLJKWO\PLVOHDGLQJDV9DQ3DULMVKLPVHOI
LQGLFDWHV5DZOV¶VPD[LPLQFULWHULDGRHVQRWDSSO\WRLQFRPHDORQHDQGOLNHZLVHLWLVWKH
maximisation of welfare as opposed to the mere maximising of income that utilitarians 
are concerned with (ibid:225-6). These considerations are important when examining the 
reconceptualisation of the efficiency and justice criteria when evaluating proposals for 
social policy reform. However, when discussing the current criteria, social policy is said 
WR EH SURPRWLQJ MXVWLFH ZKHQ WKH µ5DZOVLDQ¶ SRVLWLRQ LV UHDFKHG 7KDW LV WKH OHYHO RI
taxation remains stable at the point where replacement incomes are maximised in terms 
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of meeting basic needs. This is a sort of middle ground between the libertarian position 
and the egalitarian position; 
The conjecture is then that deliberate changes in the field of social policy can 
occur only if they bring us nearer to a situation in which all inequalities which 
do not benefit their victims, and only those have been abolished. 
(ibid:226) 
9DQ 3DULMV WKHUHIRUH FRQFOXGHV WKDW H[SDQVLRQDU\ SROLF\ ZKLFK KH TXDOLILHV DV µVRFLDO
GHPRFUDWLF¶UHIRUPZLOOEHSURPRWHGZKHQLQFUHDVHVLQQDWLRQDOLQFRPHFDQEHDVVXUHG
that is the policy is deemed to be economically valuable. Contractionary policy, which he 
TXDOLILHVDVµQHR-OLEHUDO¶UHIRUPZLOOLQYROYHGHOLEHUDWHUHGXFWLRQVLQWKHDYHUDJHWD[UDWH
when existing mechanisms are creating replacement incomes in excess of what is deemed 
socially just (op cit). The problems facing contemporary capitalist societies is when the 
actual average rate of taxation is believed to be somewhere between these two points. 
Any future reform implies a trade off between justice and efficiency, that is economic 
growth or increasing replacement incomes. However lack of confidence in the ability to 
secure future economic growth will inhibit expansionary reform whilst the absence of 
sufficient political pressure to address the unfair distribution of wealth will prevent 
contractionary reform. Given this impasse any future developments in the field of social 
policy will require an appeal to alternative modes of justification. For Van Parijs, the 
current political, social and economic climate demands a second marriage of the 
principles of social justice and economic efficiency. The CBI concept, according to Van 
3DULMV µSURYLGHV WKH IRXQGDWLRQ IRU D QHZ DQG PRUH SURJUHVVLYH XQLRQ E\
UHFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJERWKRIWKHSDUWQHUVWRWKHPDUULDJH¶0DQ]D 
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Considering the argument that a CBI would foster justice, Van Parijs draws on an 
earlier statement made that emphasis so far has been on maximising incomes. In his 
ensuing analysis he illustrates the often contradictory nature of anti-poverty policies. 
Traditionally it has been argued that the main weapon against poverty is paid 
employment, and as discussed earlier this view has dominated contemporary debates on 
the future of social security policy. As previously stated the commitment to full 
employment institutionalised the right to work and as such was an effective policy 
instrument in combating individual poverty. Macroeconomic policy was thus perceived 
to be securing access to jobs for the majority of citizens hence the justice criteria should 
logically focus on the income side of the equation, for those individuals suffering a 
temporary or indeed permanent loss of such access. Further policy developments 
therefore secured a minimum income for the jobless poor but recent criticism has been 
directed at the actual level of this minimum income. The poverty lobby argues that 
average replacement incomes are woefully inadequate. However, by drawing on his 
earlier discussion Van Parijs reminds us that; 
For reasons of both justice and efficiency...the lowest net wages should 
noticeably exceed the replacement income paid to the jobless. But the higher 
these wages, the harder it is for the poorly skilled people to find a job. It 
follows, it seems, that there is a fundamental conflict between the two 
objectives of an effective strategy against poverty. The better it does on the 
income side, the worse it seems bound to do on the job side. 
(ibid:228) 
By stipulating a criteria of justice which solely concentrates on maximum replacement 
incomes the practice of judging the desirability or otherwise of a particular social policy 
is far too narrowly focused. Much more useful criteria would encapsulate not only the 
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justice perceived to be achieved by granting a minimum income but also the questions of 
justice arising from individual labour market activity. With the onset of mass long term 
unemployment, the right to work can no longer be claimed as a product of modern 
capitalist development. As such any consideration of the improvements in social justice 
said to result from social policy reform can no longer ignore the work element. It is in 
this area that Van Parijs provides a strong case for a CBI along the lines of separating 
work from income, whilst also demonstrating the advances to be gained from a CBI in 
terms of individual freedom.   
The right to an income, the right to work and the right not to work are all factors 
worth serious consideration when appraising the fairness of social policy. All individuals 
by nature have different preferences for work and leisure derived mainly from their desire 
to consume. The ability to consume is currently determined largely by income earned or 
income received from state benefits. The conditional nature of those benefits means that 
recipients must at least demonstrate a willingness to work.  Hence income is directly 
linked to work. Anti-poverty policies aimed at increasing the incomes of those at the 
lower end of the income scale, within the current economic climate, has necessitated the 
switch in emphasis from universal benefits to means-testing. The results being that those 
with access to limited economic resources are categorised by society as being 
disadvantaged and hence deserving of public assistance. Justifying income redistribution 
in this manner puts pressure on recipients to make all possible efforts to secure income 
from alternative sources, the most obvious being the labour market. However, this 
becomes increasingly difficult in light of rising replacement incomes for those 
individuals only afforded access to traditionally low paid jobs. Correspondingly pressure 
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is put on tax-payers to argue for value for money. The result is that only those who are 
willing to earn their income are viewed as deserving, whereas those individuals wishing 
to forgo income for more leisure time are penalised. Surely such a system is unjust in that 
LWGLVFULPLQDWHVµDJDLQVWWKRVHZLWKDOHVVHUWDVWHIRUFRQVXPSWLRQ¶LELG7KHULJKWWR
work combined with maximising replacement incomes can no longer be considered the 
appropriate criteria with which to measure justice. Income must be separated from work 
in order to justify the provision of economic resources to those individuals not afforded 
access to jobs suitable to their personal lifestyles or skill level. In doing so account will 
be taken of the marginalisation within the labour market of vast numbers of individuals.    
Freedom on the part of the individual to choose not to engage in paid work, or 
indeed to refuse the offer of paid work as personal circumstances dictate, should be 
incorporated into any discussion of social justice. A CBI would allow for such freedom to 
be exercised. Those with preferences for paid work would be more able to participate in 
activities with little financial gain and those with preferences for leisure would not be 
IRUFHG LQWR µMXQN MREV¶ +HQFH ZLWK UHVSHFW WR MXVWLFH D &%, HQKDQFHV ERWK DFFHVV WR
jobs, therefore fulfilling the primary objective of anti-poverty policies, and access to 
activities other than paid work, a new and more appropriate objective; 
Although it does make sense to formulate justice in terms of a maximin 
criterion, what is to be maximined cannot be income alone. It must, rather, be 
something like the real freedom (as opposed to the sheer right) to do whatever 
RQHPLJKWOLNHWRGRZLWKRQH¶VOLIHLQFOXGLQJFRQVXPHget a job and perform 
enjoyable activities. Introducing a basic income and pitching it at the highest 
IHDVLEOH DEVROXWH OHYHO«ZRXOG SUHFLVHO\ PD[LPLQ VXFK UHDO IUHHGRP DQG
hence provide what justice demands. 
(ibid:229) 
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Turning to the question of the efficiency criteria, Van Parijs provides a theoretical 
explanation as to how a CBI could promote economic growth. If, as previously 
suggested, the CBI is to be pitched at the highest possible level to answer the justice 
criteria then the prohibitive MTRs required to finance such a policy could arguably lead 
to a reduction in factor supply and hence reduce the national product
3
. Any policy which 
permits the freedom to choose between those activities assumed to be economically 
productive and those activities attributed no economic value, at least within the capitalist 
structure, will be perceived to threaten the very survival of capitalism itself. Similar to the 
existing economic criticisms of minimum wage proposals arguments against a CBI would 
point to the inflationary effect on wages and the subsequent effects on demand for labour. 
National productivity would decline and as economic profits were subject to higher and 
higher rates of taxation the negative impact on investment activity would ultimately result 
in contractions in national output. 
Focusing on the negative impact on overall economic performance of high MTRs is 
an indication of partial analysis. A more useful approach would be to examine the results 
of a CBI in terms of labour market flexibility and the resolution of economic conflict 
within capitalist systems (ibid :232). The arguments for a CBI with regard to the fostering 
of overall flexibility have been well documented (Standing, 1986; Van Parijs, 1996; 
Stroeken, 1996; Meade, 1989:part III). The granting of unconditional income guarantees 
                                                 
3
 This is of course in relation to declared factor supply and taxable national product as Van Parijs 
points out. Many critics of a CBI scheme point to the effects such a policy would have on activity in the 
µXQGHUJURXQG HFRQRP\¶ WKHUHE\ VHULRXVO\ HURGLQJ SXEOLF UHYHQXH IURP WD[DWLRQ 6XFK DUJXPHQWV DUH
grounded in a belief in the disincentive effects of high MTRs and therefore demonstrate an analytical bias. 
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provides the pre-UHTXLVLWHILQDQFLDOVHFXULW\UHTXLUHGLQWDNLQJµHFRQRPLFULVNV¶+HQFHD
favourable environment is created for engaging in entrepreneurial activity. The 
opportunity costs of re-training and/or periods of study are significantly reduced hence 
making them more economically attractive. In addition, the introduction of a CBI would 
free up labour market practices in general as individuals would be ultimately protected by 
a secure, unconditional income. For Van Parijs, this would diminish the need for 
UHJXODWLRQV µVXFK DV UHVWULFWLRQV RQ SDWWHUQV RI ZRUNLQJ WLPH RU HYHQ PLQLPXP ZDJH
OHJLVODWLRQ¶LELG,QKLVHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVRIDKRZD&%,VFKHPHFRXOGVHUYHWR
transform the nature of paid work, PurG\GHPRQVWUDWHVKRZµD%, V\VWHPSURPRWHV WKH
HOXVLYH GRXEOH REMHFWLYH RI UHGXFLQJ MRE WLPH DQG UHGLVWULEXWLQJ ZDJHG ODERXU¶
(1988:223). Utilising indifference curve analysis, Purdy argues that the introduction of a 
CBI will alter the budget constraints faced by individuals and subsequently, assuming 
both the gross hourly wage rate and preferences between free time and income remain the 
same, they will now opt for shorter working hours. Purdy demonstrates that although this 
may lead to a welfare loss for some individual workers, it is not a necessary outcome 
when the overall impact on household income and attitudes to working time are 
FRQVLGHUHG ,Q DUJXLQJ KLV FDVH KH GLIIHUHQWLDWHV EHWZHHQ µPDVFXOLQH¶ DQG µIHPLQLQH¶
preferences with regard to relative valuations of free time and income. Those workers 
LOOXVWUDWLQJ µIHPLQLQH¶ SUHIHUHQFHV µUHYHDO D JUHDWHU ZLOOLQJQHVV WR JLYH XS LQFRPH LQ
UHWXUQ IRU PDUJLQDO JDLQV RI IUHH WLPH¶ 3XUG\  )RU WKHVH ZRUNHUV WKH
intoduction of a CBI would create the same inducement to opt for shorter working hours 
                                                                                                                                                 
That is, no account is taken of the balancing effect of incentives to participate in the labour market arising 
from the institutionalisation of a minimum income guarantee.  
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DVIRUWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµPDVFXOLQH¶GHILQHGFDWHJRU\RIZRUNHUV+RZHYHUDVWKLVµIHPLQLQH¶
group display different preferences they start from an equilibrium position where they; 
...were overemployed: they experience the gain from shorter working hours as 
outweighing the loss from reduced income. Thus even if labour supply 
preferences are taken as given, BI may still yield static welfare gains by 
loosening institutional constraints on possible patterns of job time and 
enabling some workers to achieve a more preferred balance of their time - and 
income - budgets. 
(ibid:225) 
Purdy adds weight to his analysis by indicating that preference orderings do not remain 
VWDWLFDQG LQZKDWKH UHIHUV WRDV µWKH WUDQVLWLRQ Irom welfare state capitalism to basic 
LQFRPHFDSLWDOLVP¶LWLVKLJKO\OLNHO\WKDWDWWLWXGHVWRZRUNLQJSDWWHUQVZLOOEHDIIHFWHGE\
the transitional process; 
%HIRUH %, FRXOG EH LQWURGXFHG PDMRU FKDQJHV LQ VRFLHW\¶V SROLWLFDO DQG
ideological balances would have to occur, and these would be consolidated 
and perhaps augmented once the new system was in place. As the work ethic 
UHWUHDWHG µIHPLQLQH¶ WLPH YDOXHV ZRXOG JDLQ JURXQG RYHU µPDVFXOLQH¶
priorities. 
(ibid:226) 
Purdy, however does point out that his case for a CBI, based on the potential such a 
package has for promoting shorter worker hours and more jobs, depends on the gross 
hourly wage remaining unchanged. Reductions in the labour surplus combined with the 
WHPSWDWLRQ IDFHG E\ ZRUNHUV WR µFODZ EDFN¶ DQ\ income loss suffered as a result of 
reductions in working time will lead to an upward pressure on wages. For Purdy three 
circumstances will enhance the risk of wage inflation (ibid:228). Firstly, organised labour 
will find their bargaining position strengthened due to the overall increase in employment 
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levels. Secondly, the introduction of a CBI will serve to restructure existing wage 
UHODWLRQVKLSVE\DXWRPDWLFDOO\IDYRXULQJIRUPVRIµWRLOUHGXFWLRQ¶7KDWLVLQDGGLWLRQWR
promoting reductions in work time the existence of a CBI in a free market economy will 
UHVXOWLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHµZRUNHUVZLOOWHQGWRVKXQLQWULQVLFDOO\XQUHZDUGLQJWDVNVDQG
VHHN RXW WKRVH ZLWK ORZHU WRLO UDWLQJV¶ LELG 7KXV WKH &%, VHUYHV WR GLVWRUW
equilibrium positions with regard to relative wages reflecting the relative disutilities of 
different jobs. In theory, wages will be forced upwards, but in the presence of segmented 
labour markets the converse may be true; 
For it has to be remembered that the starting level of BI provides only the 
barest subsistence living: the purely material incentives to labour market 
activity remain strong. In addition the removal of the poverty, unemployment 
and idleness traps releases on to the market a fresh stream of workers whose 
endowments of skill, work experience and character are generally poor. If the 
labour market is segmented, and if entry into desirable, but inaccessible core 
jobs is denied, this increased supply of low quality labour flows into the 
periphery. There is, therefore, a risk that sectoral labour gluts will actually 
worsen pay and conditions in high toil jobs. 
(ibid:237) 
Thirdly, due to the restructuring of existing tax and benefit transfers, necessitated by the 
introduction of a CBI, some individual workers may find that their actual net weekly 
LQFRPHZLOOIDOO7KHOLNHOLKRRGRIVXFKLVPRUHSUREDEOHLQWKHFDVHRIµKLJKHUSDLGDQG
LQJHQHUDOEHWWHURUJDQLVHGZRUNHUV¶LELG7KXVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRID&%,LVGLUHFWO\
associated with the risk of wage inflation and abaWLQJ VXFK D QHJDWLYH HIIHFW µGHSHQGV
upon the willingness of organised workers to under-utilise their bargaining power in the 
LQWHUHVWVRIVRFLHW\DVDZKROH¶LELG 
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It is this very consideration that would explain reluctance on behalf of the trade 
union movement to embrace the CBI concept. That is, it serves to erode their respective 
bargaining power and transfers such directly to the individual. This is not to say that there 
is no longer a role, and indeed a very important one at that, for organised labour but 
rather as Van Parijs states; 
The sort of flexibility which modern technology increasingly requires could 
therefore acceptably be traded by the labour movement against the income 
security provided by basic income. 
(1992:232) 
Working conditions, health and safety practices and wage differentials remain on the 
agenda and the labour movement could readily afford to concentrate efforts in these areas 
DVWKH\ZRXOGQRORQJHUKDYHWRH[SHQGUHVRXUFHVILJKWLQJIRUWKHLUPHPEHUV¶ULJKWWRD
minimum acceptable income. In arguing that basic social rights may be subsumed, and 
unjustifiably neglected, by the emphasis on income rights implied by a CBI, Deakin and 
Wilkinson draw attention to the importance of work-related rights; 
Rights to work which are additional to the right to income involve the right to 
engage in productive work which improves the living standards of the 
community, and to have such work valued according to its worth. This raises 
a number of issues which have been highlighted by the European 
&RPPXQLW\¶V 6RFLDO $FWLRQ LQLWLDWLYHV - the widening of access to training 
and education, the right to a basic income within work through minimum 
wage and comparable worth legislation, the use of parental rights legislation 
to achieve a more even balance between the demands of paid work and non-
wage caring, and the harmonisation of basic terms and conditions between the 
IXOOWLPHDQGµIOH[LEOH¶ZRUNIRUFHV 
(1992:59) 
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Consideration of these factors demonstrates the continued and crucial role for organised 
labour in a CBI society and points to the benefits of viewing a CBI proposal as part of a 
package of social reform measures, rather than a policy to be implemented in isolation. 
7KHVHFRQGFRPSRQHQW WKDW LV WKHUHGXFWLRQRIFRQIOLFWRI9DQ3DULMV¶VDUJXPHQW 
regarding the economic value of the CBI is not as well documented and is more 
speculative in nature. The assignment of property rights in advanced capitalist economies 
LV EHFRPLQJ LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLIILFXOW GXH WR WKH µVSUHDG RI VLJQLILFDQW HQYLURQPHQWDO
externalities and the increase in the share of wealth held in the form of information, rather 
WKDQPDWHULDOJRRGV¶LELG7KHLQDELOLW\WRUHO\RQWKHPDUNHWPHFKDQLVPWRHQVXUH
that the market price reflects the true value of a particular activity results in economic 
uncertainty and sharp conflicts of interest.  If this trend is allowed to persist unregulated 
then economic chaos will ensue and the survival of market economies will be seriously 
questioned. For Van Parijs; 
...the only option open to forestall economically damaging chaos consists in 
reducing what is at stake in the market game - that is, in making an increasing 
SDUWRIPDWHULDOZHOIDUHGHSHQGRQVRFLHW\¶VRYHUDOOSURGXFWLYLW\UDWKHUWKDQ
on their individual contribution. A basic income is the most natural way of 
institutionalising this solution. 
(ibid:233) 
Although Van Parijs indicates in a foot note that he derives this argument mainly from a 
suggestion made to him by Samuel Bowles, the prominent U.S. economist, it would 
appear that his line of reasoning resembles that of the some of the earlier supporters of 
minimum income guarantees. Those who argued for social dividends, set at rates 
compatible with economic growth, and justified in terms of the dividend being a 
reflection of each individuals contribution to the national wealth.  
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The potential for increased flexibility and the ability to establish a direct economic 
link between individual welfare and the overall productivity of the economy provides a 
powerful rebuttal to the criticisms of a CBI based on the negative consequences of 
increasing MTRs. Considerations of economic efficiency have thus been redefined taking 
into account the changing nature of capitalist societies. In adopting this panoramic 
approach a case could be made for the potential of a CBI to reduce the actual tax burden. 
A more flexible and less conflict ridden market economy would be more readily 
equipped to efficiently deal with the demands of post-industrial development and as such 
economic growth is a more likely case scenario than it is today. Output growth would 
increase the total income available for taxation and hence the CBI could be financed with 
no changes in the overall tax rate. 
The second marriage of justice and efficiency becomes a distinct possibility. 
However, Van Parijs, whilst providing the theoretical tools, does not imply, if his 
arguments are accepted, that the introduction of a CBI scheme will be secured. On the 
contrary, he argues that he has merely stated the case for a CBI within the traditional 
parameters of social policy evaluation, reworking these parameters to bring them up to 
date. Success will depend ultimately on political will. The confidence to implement such 
a radical reform can, Van Parijs believes, be gained with due regard to the economic 
DGYDQWDJHVEXWWKLVFRQILGHQFHµLVYHU\VHQVLWLYHWRZKHWKHUDEDVLFLQFRPHLVSHUFHLYHG
DVDIDLUZD\RIGLVWULEXWLQJSDUWRI WKHVRFLDOSURGXFW¶LELG7KHUHLVERXQGWREH
controversy surrounding the implementation of a policy which distributes income to 
individuals who are perceived to be making no contribution to the national product 
whatsoever. This is a crucial point and is the subject of many a discourse on what 
  
 326 
constitutes productive activity. Within this debate the attraction to the CBI concept is 
evident and will be explored in the following section. However, in summing up, this 
particular contribution made by Van Parijs serves to illustrate that the tradition of 
attempting to justify social policy in terms of both ethical and economic value can be 
applied to the CBI policy proposal with positive results. He adds to his analysis though 
by explaining that the questions of justice and efficiency are inextricably linked when it 
comes to practical policy making. 
7.6 The Full Employment Fallacy: The Reactive Approach 
Apparently, the politico-economic system can live with mass unemployment, 
but it is rather more doubtful whether it can live with a social security crisis 
as well. 
(Standing, 1992:55) 
The explicit rejection of full employment and the adoption of economic policies 
aimed at promoting the micro-flexibility of the labour market has attracted many theorists 
to the CBI proposal, viewed as a mechanism of protecting individual income security in 
WKH PLGVW RI µVXSSO\-VLGH¶ HFRQRPLFV 6WDQGLQJ 86,1992, Gray, 1988; Deakin & 
Wilkinson, 1991; Meade, 1989,1990; Manza, 1992; Block, 1990). In recent decades 
advances in technology and changes in consumption patterns have had quite significant 
effects on the level and quality of employment in all modern capitalist states. The notion 
RIDµSRVW-LQGXVWULDO¶VRFLHW\HPHUJLQJLQWKHV 
...portrays a new world where technicians, professionals, and managers 
predominate; where old-fashioned manual labour disappears; where 
FRQVXPHUV¶DSSHWLWHVDUHGULYHQWRwards services. 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990:191) 
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In this new world concern regarding the ability of the economy to adapt at a micro level 
has resulted in a revival of economic doctrines devoted to improving the efficiency of 
individual markets. Whilst there is surplus labour in the traditional manufacturing sector, 
the demand for labour in the low-productivity service industries is increasing. These jobs 
however, tend to be low paid with little in the way of employment rights. Rigidities 
existing within individual markets such as minimum wage legislation have been blamed 
for the failure in securing an aggregate equilibrium. The excess supply of labour in the 
declining trades has not been allowed to move freely into the newly expanding industries 
and hence emphasis has switched from aggregate demand to the supply side of the 
equation. Arguments favouring less government regulation in all areas of the economy 
and the supremacy of the free market have gained considerable ground, particularly in the 
U.S. and Britain. The result being a range of policies aimed at promoting the flexibility of 
both labour supply and wages. However, as Standing indicates, the trend towards greater 
labour flexibility has in fact served to accentuate income inequality and labour market 
fragmentation (Standing, 1992:54). The decline in manufacturing in recent decades has 
meant that not only have some individuals witnessed a marked reduction in demand for 
their services, but also efforts to retain income security for those still in work has often 
involved a trade off between job security and pay rises. The limiting of the power of trade 
unions in the name of enhancing flexibility has served to further erode the employment 
rights of those already suffering from the adverse effects of market fluctuations. On the 
other hand, those believed to be benefiting from the shift in demand from manufactured 
goods to the services have been hindered both in terms of employment rights and income 
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security as employment protection mechanisms disappear at precisely the same time as 
market forces place downward pressure on wage rates.   
Hence, the free operation of the labour market, whilst providing income and job 
security for professionals and those with the skills appropriate to new technology, has 
resulted in increased experiences of joblessness and limited access to employment which 
is full time, regular, and pays sufficient to achieve an acceptable standard of living for 
many individuals. The effects of such developments would not be quite so dramatic if 
existing systems of social security were not so heavily dependent upon the principles of 
full employment and social insurance; 
The industrial proletariat were the backbone on which the social security 
system was erected, yet as industrial manual workers have been displaced 
form full-time jobs they have been most prone to labour-force marginalization 
DQGH[SRVXUHWRWKHµXQHPSOR\PHQWWUDS¶ 
(Standing, 1992:54) 
Furthermore, as Deakin and Wilkinson argue; 
With deregulation, the social insurance system has come under pressure from 
two directions: in the first place from legislation which has undermined the 
contributory principle; and in the second place, form the related decline in 
full-time, regular work, a phenomenon described by Mückenberger (1989) as 
WKH µHURVLRQ¶ of the standard employment relationship as the basis for wage 
regulation and social reproduction. 
(1992:52) 
The fact that throughout Europe increasing numbers of individuals are dependent 
upon transfer payments, either as a sole source of income or as a means of raising their 
income from work to a level deemed essential for economic survival, raises questions as 
to the efficiency of supply side policies when combined with an outdated system of social 
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security. Bearing in mind the points made earlier regardLQJ WKHHPHUJHQFHRI WKH µQHZ
SRRU¶DQGWKHGLVWLQFWLRQPDGHEHWZHHQH[FOXVLRQDQGPDUJLQDOLVDWLRQZKHQVWXG\LQJWKH
causes of poverty it becomes clear that future anti-poverty measures must account for the 
inter-dependence of labour market policy and the benefit structure; 
...with chronic labour market surplus conditions and the spread of non-
regular, non-full-time forms of employment, the contributions base has been 
eroded at the top (by undeclared income, by high-income earners taking pay 
in non-monetary terms, etc.) and at the bottom (by the loss of regular full time 
jobs etc.). Selective, means-WHVWHG EHQHILWV KDYH FUHDWHG µSRYHUW\ WUDSV¶ DQG
µXQHPSOR\PHQW WUDSV¶ WKDW KDYH DFWHG DV GLVLQFHQWLYHV WR UHJXODU ZDJH
employment and contributed, almost certainO\ WR WKH JURZWK RI WKH µEODFN
HFRQRP\¶- which could be described as a perverse form of labour flexibility. 
(Standing, 1992:55)  
The labour market can no longer be considered the primary source of welfare and 
likewise existing social security mechanisms are fundamentally flawed in that they 
operate as safety nets when the income from work exchange fails. Given this comment 
any future reform must operate outwith the parameters of full-time paid work, 
supplemented by transfer payments when necessary, and rather must first redefine the 
relationship between social security and employment.  
Acceptance of neo-classical arguments regarding the negative impact government 
intervention has on the operation of the labour market and the threat this entails for the 
future of the capitalist mode of production has been illustrated by the fervent drive to 
deregulate the economy. The answer to mass unemployment and resulting poverty rests 
within the framework of traditional micro-economic analysis. The primary rationale 
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behind deregulation policy was to free up the workings of the market by purposefully 
removing any artificial obstacles; 
In practice, the fulfilment of this strategy has required the state to intervene to 
bring even greater coercion to bear upon the low paid and unemployed, in an 
DWWHPSWWRPDNHWKHPVXEMHFWWRWKHµGLVFLSOLQHV¶RIWKHODERXUPDUNHWZKLFK
the welfare state was said to have mitigated. In the process neo-liberal 
policies have in fact intensified some of the central weaknesses of the welfare 
state; the incomplete coverage of employment protection and social insurance 
legislation, and its gender bias; the over dependence on means-testing, 
resulting in intrusion by the state into the privacy and autonomy of benefit 
recipients; the inability of welfare regulation and the tax system to cope with 
deep structural inequalities and forms of social discrimination. 
(Deakin and Wilkinson,1992:56) 
It would appear that the advances made in the immediate post war years in terms of 
recognising the inter-relationship of social and economic policy were overlooked. 
Economic policy has since re-emerged as dominant over social policy. However, with 
evidence pointing to the fact that the free market does not operate as efficiently as 
traditional economists would lead us to believe, at least where the labour market is 
concerned, prospects for reform along the lines of harmonising social policy with claims 
IRUHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\ LQSDUWLFXODUDµUHMHFWLRQRI WKHGLVMXQFWLRQEHWZHHQHTXLW\DQG
efficiency which underlies deUHJXODWLRQ SROLFLHV¶ 'HDNLQ 	 :LONLQVRQ  DQG
reassessing the role of the state become more fashionable. 
The recurring theme of separating income from work is to be found in the 
contemporary literature arguing for a CBI;  
«LI WKH ODERXUPDUNHW FDnnot generate income security, as presumed in the 
FUHDWLRQRIWKHSRVWZDUVRFLDOFRQVHQVXVWKHQWRDOORZWKHµODERXUPDUNHW¶WR
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operate efficiently social policy should decouple income security from the 
labour market    
(Standing, 1992:57) 
Standing is attracted to a CBI as it allows for genuine income security as a right of 
FLWL]HQVKLS+HDUJXHV WKDW WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRID&%,ZKLFKKH OLNHQV WR WKH µVRFLDO
GLYLGHQG¶ LQ WKDW LW UHSUHVHQWV D VKDUH RI WKH QDWLRQDO SURGXFW ZRXOG HQFRXUDJH ODERXU
flexibility. Secure in the knowledge that an adequate income will be provided, individuals 
will be more willing to enter into co-operative, work and profit sharing ventures. This he 
DUJXHV FRXOG SURYH WR EH WKH EDVLV RI D QHZ µVRFLDO FRQVHQVXV¶ LQ WKH PDNLQJ LQ What 
income security is guaranteed whilst at the same time creating a favourable environment 
for wealth creation. Thus the basis for promoting a CBI rests on claims of promoting a 
PRUH µDFWLYH VRFLHW\¶ $OWKRXJK D GHFRXSOLQJ RI LQFRPH IURP ZRUN LV HQYLVDJHG, 
citizenship rights remain inextricably linked to the traditional wage-employment 
relationship; 
...the new argument for BI rests on its ability to better respond to and 
facilitate structural economic changes which have affected both the nature of 
work and the labour market within a social context in which (paid) work 
SOD\V DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ SHRSOH¶V OLYHV LQGLYLGXDOO\ DQG DV
members of society - as citizens. 
(Saunders,1995:15) 
The CBI therefore forms the basis of a new approach to labour market policy. If it is 
generally agreed that deregulation is insufficient to meet the demands imposed by 
modern labour market processes, an alternative approach would involve returning to the 
full employment model of the post war consensus era. However; 
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Within this model, social protection was linked to functions of selection and 
integration in the labour market; selection in the sense that only those 
(predominantly male) workers who satisfied the dual criteria of length and 
regularity of employment were protected against social and economic risks: 
and integration, in the sense that the standard model provided a set of hidden 
LQFHQWLYHV RU µFRQVWUDLQWV¶ WR SXUVXH FRQWLQXRXV ZDJHG HPSOR\PHQW DW WKH
expense of (under-valued) non-waged work. Apparently full employment co-
existed with deep segmentation of the labour market according to satus, with 
particular reference to gender and marital status, age and race. 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1992:57) 
Furthermore, the scope of governments to engage in a macro-economic approach to 
managing employment levels has been diminished by the imposition of various external 
fiscal constraints, and even if this was not the case, it seems highly unlikely that such an 
approach would yield positive results due to structural change in labour markets. As Gray 
indicates; 
Even to the extent that the state sector could expand, textile mill workers 
cannot necessarily become construction workers nor miners become nurses; 
there is a very real problem about re-training, gender bound occupational 
categories and geographical mobility. 
(Gray, 1988:122)  
Gray, therefore, argues for work-sharing and in so doing advocates a form of CBI as a 
tool for ensuring income does not suffer drastically as a consequence of new working 
arrangements. Again calling foU WKH µQHHG WR EUHDN ZLWK WKH ZDJH UHODWLRQ DV WKH PDLQ
VRXUFHRILQFRPH¶LELG 
Neo-liberal arguments regarding the role social security plays in distorting the 
operation of the labour market have found reasons to celebrate the CBI proposal (see for 
example Brittan, 1988; Brittan and Webb,1990). Brittan states in the opening chapter to 
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Beyond the Welfare State: An Examination of Basic Incomes in a Market Economy that 
WKHDUJXPHQWKHPDNHVZKLFKLVVXSSRUWHGE\:HEE¶VVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLVLVHVVHQWLDlly a 
µSUR-market and pro-FDSLWDOLVW¶RQH&RQFHUQVUHJDUGLQJWKHGLVLQFHQWLYHHIIHFWV
of current social security provision, increasing incidences of poverty and the mass 
unemployment evident since the 1980s are recurring themes which are voiced by Brittan 
in his attempt to illustrate the economic desirability of a CBI (1988,1990). The need to 
re-examine the relationship between income and work is believed to be crucial to any 
discussion regarding the future direction of economic and social policy in all advanced 
capitalist countries. Brittan points out that so far, at least in the social security and income 
guarantee debate, little attention has been paid to the various sources of income other 
than that derived from wages and salaries; 
In 1988 income derived from work, including self-employment and 
HPSOR\HUV¶ FRQWULEXWLRQV DFFRXQWHG IRU  SHU FHQW RI SHUVRQDO LQFRPHV
This still leaves a large remainder, of which 11 percent was accounted for by 
rents, dividends and interest, i.e. property incomes, and 14 per cent by social 
security and related grants. Moreover there is very important income in kind 
from property, whether the value of owner occupied housing or the amenity 
value of land, as well as income from household and other unpaid work, not 
included in the personal income statistics. 
(1990:6) 
Furthermore, concentration on supplementing income from work does not recognise the 
fact that in many instances poverty is indeed not caused by low pay. Reference is made to 
the fact that minimum wage measures, by way of being work related, merely serve to 
increase the income of the wage earner within a particular household and therefore do not 
address the composition of individual households and the consequent differing demands 
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for economic resources (ibid:7)
4
. The provision of a minimum guaranteed income 
independent of any work test provides the pro-marketeers with a policy instrument by 
which to separate pay from work and ensure that the market can operate unhindered by 
the necessity for jobs to provide at least sufficient income to meet individual needs. Put 
another way, the market clearing rate of pay may, in some cases, actually fall below what 
is considered essential for even the most minimalistic lifestyle. A CBI would allow 
workers the opportunity to µSULFHWKHPVHOYHVLQWRMREV¶DQGµVXFKPDVVRZQHUVKLSZRXOG
also make tolerable the distributional effects of the less drastic shift in the relative 
UHZDUGV RI ODERXU DQG FDSLWDO¶ ZKLFK LV EHOLHYHG WR EH D QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ LQ WKH
endeavour to restore full employment (ibid:5). The switch from contingent benefits to a 
CBI would result in a system that supplements the incomes of the working poor and the 
unemployed alike. Therefore, those who are currently marginalised in the trajectory of 
post-industrial employment will be able to take up offers of employment without losing 
benefits and subsequently being forced into abject poverty.   
A CBI is justified in that it recognises the inefficiency of both the labour market 
and the social security system in securing incomes that are above the conventional 
minimum for large numbers of the populace. By removing the relationship between 
employment and income security a CBI acts to provide room for activities essential to the 
                                                 
4
 On a similar note a case could be argued for a CBI in terms of addressing individual poverty which 
arises from an unequal distribution of resources within households. This issue is of particular relevance 
when discussing the potential a CBI has in promoting gender equality. However, it is unlikely that Brittan 
is referring specifically to this, nor would he be concerned with such issues given his explicit emphasis on 
market mechanisms and promoting the efficiency of the capitalist system. He merely wants to ensure that 
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survival of capitalism; such as engaging in low paid work, entering a retraining scheme 
or full time education and engaging in ventures with no guarantee of immediate financial 
success. Brittan argues that; 
Classical economists who rightly argue for market rewards to factors of 
production usually fail to face the problems of those whose work has a low 
market value. The challenge for economic and social policy is to find a way 
of obtaining as much as we can of the benefits of an American-style labour 
market, without incurring the cost of American-st\OHSRYHUW\«7KHFDVHIRULW
(a basic income) is increased manifold by the practical need to find a way of 
re-establishing a fully functioning labour market with a market-clearing rate 
RISD\RQDKXPDQHEDVHZKLFKZLOO LPSURYHWKHSRVLWLRQRI5DZOV¶VµOHDst 
DGYDQWDJHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHSHUVRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQGULYLQJKLPRUKHUWRWKHZDOO 
(Brittan, 1988:301) 
A further justification is that a CBI conforms to the ideology of the New Right in that it 
represents minimal state commitment to social welfare. There would no longer be the 
need for legislation determining minimum wage levels as the labour market would be 
allowed to operate freely and the administrative burden of current social security 
structures could be considerably reduced. Brittan & Webb find little to distinguish the 
CBI proposal from an NIT model, which is mainly due to their emphasis on markets and 
questions of efficiency. Arguing in a similar vein to Friedman, the authors illustrate their 
primary motivations for reform and their failure to consider issues of social justice. 
Minimum income guarantees are praised for their ability to guide the economy towards 
full employment and hence reinstating the traditional relationship between work and 
income. Although providing insight into the ability of a CBI to appeal to a diverse 
                                                                                                                                                 
families receive a means of subsistence equivalent to their particular needs. How that income is then 
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political audience, the limited analysis serves to present the concept in such a way that 
benefits to be achieved in terms of promoting individual autonomy are denied. 
In conclusion then, the separation of income from work is an inherent feature of the 
arguments in support of a CBI discussed above. In this sense such a strategy can arguably 
be viewed as representing a radical approach to social security policy, but it is 
worthwhile noting that the separation envisaged is assumed to be a limited one. The aim 
is, ultimately to provide individuals with an alternative source of income to paid 
employment. However, although this will serve to offset the damaging economic effects 
witnessed by the decline in traditional forms of employment, in terms of both equity and 
efficiency, an equally, if not more important purpose is to promote a wider range of 
options for forms of work (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1992:58). Thus the emphasis is on 
addressing structural change in the labour market and the CBI proposal emerges as an 
appropriate policy tool. 
7.7 Independence versus Dependence: The Radical Approach 
The intriguing consequence of the basic income is that it would put the 
worker in the same position as the capitalist: it gives him/her independent 
means. 
(Walter, 1989:108) 
*LYHQ WKH µQHZ ZRUOG¶ RI SRVW-industrial production and the resulting changes in 
patterns of employment it follows that systems of income distribution are radically 
altered from that which existed in the post war era of mass production and mass 
consumption. With the returns to capital outweighing the returns to labour owners of 
capital profit at the expense of owners of labour. The gap between rich and poor widens 
                                                                                                                                                 
distributed is another matter.  
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to a point that threatens the very survival of the capitalist structure. Attempts to redesign 
modern capitalist societies in light of this change have followed two main courses of 
action (Jordan, 1986:265). The first is that adopted by the social democratic governments 
of the industrial world. Efforts to sustain full employment and industrial production have 
been pursued with the traditional relationship between work and incomes in mind. 
Economic policy has largely been concerned with controlling wages (both in work and 
out of work), investment and prices so as to protect the real levels of income and 
investment from the effects of worldwide reductions in demand and increased 
competition from abroad. Social policy on the other hand has served to expand the state 
sector as an employer and provider of services in order to counteract the effects of tight 
monetary controls on private sector incomes and investment;  
Those societies in turn have experienced difficulties associated with the 
attempt to maintain full employment and industrial production, resulting in 
wasteful investment and declining productivity, falling rates of growth per 
capita disposable incomes, and in some cases (e.g. Poland) an actual fall in 
real standards of living. 
(ibid:265) 
In terms of income distribution, then, as there is less to distribute, modern capitalist states 
slide further into recession and citizens suffer correspondingly from reduced access to 
economic resources. The second strategy has been to go down the market-oriented route. 
Prices and incomes would be determined by the unfettered operation of the free market 
wherever possible whereas the public sector was characterised by low wages, minimal 
EHQHILWV DQG SROLFLHV GLUHFWHG DW SURPRWLQJ WKH ZRUN HWKLF DQG WUDGLWLRQDO µIDPLO\
OLIHVW\OHV¶7KHLQWHUDFWLRQRIHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOSROLF\VHUYHVWRFRQWradict the overall 
goals of free market ideology in that low wages coupled with means-tested benefits erode 
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work incentives whilst emphasis on the role of the family as a provider of welfare 
promotes private dependency rather than individual liberty. Distribution of national 
income remains highly unequal and in fact the growing divide is exacerbated by free 
market policies. For Jordan, neither system of distribution can claim to adequately secure 
individual freedom in an era witnessing significant changes in employment patterns and 
individual lifestyles. He is thus drawn to a CBI, arguing; 
«WKDWWKHUHLVDWKLUGDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHVHWZRVWUDWHJLHVDQGRQHZKLFKFRXOG
be tried under either major economic system. It rests on the notion of 
distributing the basic income which individuals need for subsistence, and a 
new definition of the rights and duties of citizenship. It, thus, transcends both 
the market and central planning as fundamental distributive principles, and 
substitutes a notion of individual autonomy, around which designs for both 
market-orientated and planned societies could be developed. 
(Jordan, 1986:266) 
Although Jordan is driven by the notion that post-industrial society will not provide 
sufficient jobs for those who want them and that flexibility in the labour market is 
paramount to the objective of economic efficiency, he views a CBI as a mechanism by 
ZKLFK µIUHH DQG HTXDO FLWL]HQVKLS IRU DOO¶ FDQ EH VHFXUHG LELG )UHH FKRLFH DERXW
whether to work or not would be granted to all citizens. More importantly the provision 
of an independent income for all would allow for free and equal choices in terms of living 
DUUDQJHPHQWV DQG WKHGLYLVLRQRIGRPHVWLFGXWLHV$&%,ZRXOG µWKXV DEROLVKERWK WKH
dependence of women on men, and also the conditions surrounding dependence of 
FLWL]HQV RQ WKH VWDWH¶ LELG -RUGDQ UHLWHUDWHV WKH WKHPH RI HFRQRPLF HIILFLHQF\
combined with the rights of citizenship throughout his work when discussing the CBI 
proposal (1987;1988). However he is not alone in his claims.   
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The prospects for a CBI to fulfil the dual objective of economic efficiency and the 
preservation of individual freedom in a rapidly changing socio-economic climate has 
been expressed by many social theorists in recent years (Galbraith, 1994; Purdy, 
1988,1989; Walter, 1989; Parker, 1993; Miller, 1983).  Advocates of a CBI who stress 
the potential of unconditional, universal income guarantees in securing individual 
autonomy raise, not only the issue of crisis in current social security systems, but also the 
need to reconceptualise the relationship between individual and society to meet the 
demands of substantial social, political and economic change. Modern democratic states 
claim equal freedom for all citizens but such claims are open to criticism when many 
LQGLYLGXDOV DUH GHQLHG WKH HFRQRPLF PHDQV ZLWK ZKLFK WR HQMR\ WKHLU µHTXDO IUHHGRP¶
Furthermore, the concentration on paid employment as the primary source of independent 
economic resources has led to policies aimed at promoting the right to work and 
subsequently has placed emphasis on the route to freedom being secured through formal 
labour markets. This has denied the right of citizens to determine and shape the course of 
their own lives particularly those normally occupied in unpaid activities. The welfare of 
vast numbers of citizens depends to a large extent on the care provided informally by 
relatives or friends within the domestic domain. Such caring activities are normally 
undertaken by women. By providing freedom from want for all citizens and further 
ensuring financial independence throughout the lifecycle, a CBI secures the equal 
freedom for all but also recognises unpaid caring work as economically valuable. This 
QRWRQO\DGGUHVVHVWKHµZDJHVIRUKRXVHZRUN¶GHEDWHEXWPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\SURYLGHs all 
men and women with the financial independence crucial to the goal of promoting gender 
justice. The role of women and a CBI has been raised in the contemporary literature and 
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attention drawn to the positive advantages in terms of recognising the duties and 
responsibilities of women as mothers, wives and carers (Parker, 1993; Miller, 1983; 
Walter, 1989; Jordan, 1988; Withorn, 1990). Thus, the CBI proposal has an important 
part to play in discussing a feminist critique of social policy. In particular the 
disadvantaged position women currently experience in the labour market and in existing 
social security arrangements has provided the spur for renewed interested in the 
minimum income guarantee proposal. 
However, the need to formulate social policy which explicitly recognises the value 
of unpaid work, and provides for a more flexible approach to be taken towards 
participation in the labour market, can undoubtedly be perceived as representative of a 
continuum. That is, arguing for a CBI on the basis that it provides a framework for 
formally recognising non-waged work is reflective of a view that citizenship rights 
remain tied to participation in, rather than independence from, the labour market. For 
Shaver, the emphasis on participation in the reform process LVLQGLFDWLYHRIµVRFLDOSROLF\
developments adapting citizenship to its post-LQGXVWULDOFRQWH[W¶ $OWKRXJK WKH
boundaries may be extended to include non-traditional forms of employment, such as 
unpaid caring or voluntary work, which are now recognised as important contributory 
factors in the promotion of social welfare, the obligations and rights of citizenship are 
still determined by individual demonstrations of productive capacity. An indication of the 
implicit focus on active participation is given when Chamberlayne talks of the 
Green/SDP response in West Germany to the perceived crisis in welfare;   
In the Green/SDP debate it was argued that a generous social wage would 
promote flexibility and human creativity and further gender equality by 
providing a secure economic base for all, including home carers. It would 
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IDFLOLWDWH WKH HQG RI µZRUN IRU ZRUN¶V VDNH¶ DQG µGHDG MREV¶ IUHHLQJ PRUH
human resources for caring activities and linking citizenship with social 
usefulness rather than paid employment. Not that social usefulness would be a 
condition of the social wage; advocates of the social wage argued that it was 
µQDWXUDO¶ WR EH VRFLDOO\ XVHIXO DV ZDV VKRZQ E\ WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI
housework by women, without the external discipline of the labour market. 
(Chamberlayne, 1992:10) 
Thus, social security policy in the post-industrial welfare state serves to promote a wider 
range of work options, and although explicit forms of conditionality may be removed, the 
basis of receipt does not represent a radical rethinking of the rights of citizenship 
whereby the right to an independent income would be based on community membership 
DORQH 7KH LPSOLHG QRWLRQ WKDW SURYLVLRQ RI LQFRPH VHFXULW\ LV EDVHG RQ WKH µQDWXUDO¶
REOLJDWLRQRIFLWL]HQVWRSXUVXHµVRFLDOO\XVHIXODFWLYLWLHV¶PHUHO\VHUYHVWRWUDQVIRUPWKH
conditional basis of benefits from one based on paid employment to one based on 
legitimate participation.  
Arguing for a CBI within this framework serves to detract from one of the principal 
defining features of the proposal, the notion of unconditionality, and fails to recognise the 
moral and ethical benefits to be gained from such a proposal in promoting real freedom 
of choice in how people live their lives. Whilst there are gains to be made in terms of 
social policy development by formally recognising the social welfare value of unpaid 
work, the practice of equating citizenship with participation is limiting in that it ; 
..still defines worth through work. Citizenship is supposed to mean something 
more than this, to signal the social and moral equality of all persons as 
members of the social community. It is not meant to be conditional upon 
performance. Citizenship is meant to be more than simply welfare rights. It is 
also supposed to be a foundation for participation in democratic government, 
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LQSDUHQWV¶DQGFLWL]HQV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVLQORFDOFRXQFLODIIDLUVLQSDUOLDPHQWDU\
SROLWLFVDQGLQVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV LQFOXGLQJWKHZRPHQ¶VDQGHQYLURQPHQWDO
movements.  
(Shaver, 1995:11) 
Furthermore, as Shaver indicates, basing entitlement to income maintenance payments on 
µSDUWLFLSDWLRQGHILQHGDVZRUNZKHWKHUIRUORYHRUPRQH\LQYROYHVDQLQWHQVLILFDWLRQRI
VRFLDO FRQWURO H[HUFLVHG E\ WKH ZHOIDUH VWDWH¶ LELG 7KH SUDFWLFH RI KDYLQJ WR
categorise and continually reDVVHVVWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVGHHPHGWREHµVRFLDOO\XVHIXO¶ZRXOG
bestow a great deal of power, not to mention administrative difficulties, on the state. It 
would also entail a degree of intrusion into the private lives of individuals for the 
purposes of determining eligibility thus acting to threaten the respective levels of 
personal autonomy individuals are able to exercise in their life choices. The CBI is cited 
precisely for its potential in minimising these factors. However, the contemporary debate 
has increasingly focused on the issue of participation, alongside questions concerning the 
actual levels of payment, for purposes of political expediency. Thus the radical nature of 
the policy becomes subsumed by the practice of appealing to the rational taxpayer. 
7.8 Modified Versions: The Practical Approach 
As discussed earlier, the main objections to the CBI proposal are the prohibitive 
costs involved of implementing the scheme and the negative effects on work incentives 
within the traditional labour market. In an attempt to address these concerns supporters 
have advocated various modified schemes that incorporate either work tests or cost 
controls. It is argued that in the process of doing so the proposal becomes neither a 
µFLWL]HQV¶QRUDµEDVLF¶LQFRPHDQGWKXs the focus on reform switches from a progressive 
radical approach to a conformist practical one.  
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Hermione Parker (1989), after conducting extensive research into the costing of a 
full CBI scheme in Britain, concluded that the costs involved were too expensive both 
politically and financially. Parker proceeded to cost a modified scheme which entailed a 
partial CBI (half the current IS rate) due unconditionally to each adult, supplemented 
with various income tested benefits to provide for special needs and housing costs. 
Further envisaged in the Parker scheme is a reformed SF which would pay grants instead 
RIORDQVDQGZRXOGEHYLHZHGDVDµVDIHW\QHWRI ODVWUHVRUW¶3DUNHU)RU3DUNHU
the only condition for receipt of the partial CBI would be legal residence but a work test 
would be incorporated into the scheme for housing benefit and the new Social Fund. The 
Parker proposal, therefore in attempting to make a CBI more politically and financially 
feasible given the current political and economic climate departs from the main 
advantages of a true CBI. The amount paid would have to be supplemented by means-
tested benefits for the majority and receipt is not granted as of a right of citizenship due 
to the fact that a work test still prevails. Within such a scheme complexity of 
administration, the stigmatization of those in receipt of the necessary supplements and an 
increasing reliance on mean-tested benefits could not be avoided, thus departing from the 
main advantages of a CBI. 
Professor Tony Atkinson of the London School of Economics is an active supporter 
of a CBI scheme (Atkinson, 1988;1989;1993). However, like Parker, he too remains 
concerned about the cost and in particular the high tax rates required in financing a full 
CBI. In a paper jointly written with Holly Sutherland, Atkinson, using TAXMOD, 
analysed the distributional consequences of the tax-benefit integration with a partial CBI 
(Atkinson & Sutherland,1988). They conclude that the results from the TAXMOD 
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analysis illustrate that a partial CBI could be introduced in Britain without having major 
GLVWULEXWLRQDOFRQVHTXHQFHV7KDW LV WKHUHZRXOGEH µUHODWLYHO\ IHZIDPLOLHVZKRZRXOG
H[SHULHQFH D ODUJH JDLQ RU ORVV DQG IRU D TXDUWHU WKHUH ZRXOG EH QR FKDQJH¶ LELG
1988:17). This is obviously an advantage for purposes of electoral support given that 
appeal to as wide a base as possible is essential and wide scale redistribution would lose 
many votes from the middle and upper income voters. Atkinson and Sutherland argue 
that a partial CBI; 
...may be seen as a compromise solution or as the first stage along the route to 
a full basic income. The latter takes account of the important consideration, 
that, in terms of practical policy making, what is relevant is not just the 
destination of reform but the process of transition by which a full scheme 
could be approached. 
(ibid:7)   
Atkinson & Sutherland therefore provide justification for a partial CBI in terms of a 
necessary precursor to a full CBI. In his later work Atkinson goes on to examine the 
unconditional nature of a CBI and the possibility of gaining political support for such a 
scheme given the institutionalisation of social insurance in Britain (Atkinson, 1993a, 
1995a:ch15). Atkinson maintains that the reason a full CBI has not yet been seriously 
considered by policy makers as a workable solution for the reform of social security is 
due to the widespread public support for social insurance and the absence of any work 
test as a condition for receipt. He goes on to draw comparisons with the political support 
gained in France for the 5HYHQXH0LQLPXPG¶,QVHUWLRQ (RMI). This scheme, intended as 
form of safety net provision, involves targeting benefits to those claimants eligible and 
who enter into negotiation with the state in establishing a contract, which will ensure the 
claimants obligation and efforts to re-enter the labour market (Whitton, 1993). For 
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Atkinson, then, the necessary political support could be achieved by compromising on the 
issue of unconditional entitlement and by developing a two-tier system in the sense that 
the CBI would supplement rather than replace existing social insurance schemes. His 
proposed solution is a Participation Income that would replace means-tested social 
assistance. Payment would be dependent upon acknowledgement by the beneficiary that 
receipt bestows upon the individual a duty to make all possible efforts to contribute to the 
SURGXFWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQVZHDOWK$WNLQVRQGRHVQRWOLPLWWKHREOLJDWLRQWRµFRQWULEXWHWR
ZHDOWKFUHDWLRQ¶WRSDLGZRUNEXWUDWKHUVSHDNVRID µVRFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQ¶D,WLVLQ
this sense that he borrows from the Social Contract as proposed by Rhys Williams. 
However, as discussed earlier, the Social Contract gave way to the widely acclaimed 
Beveridge plan, which set the agenda for social security provision in post war Britain. 
Atkinson may believe his scheme, perhaps, would be more attractive in today's political 
climate and indeed he refers to the importance of continuity throughout Europe (1993a). 
However, as Euzéby (1994) points out, the French experience with this form of contract 
has not been at all successful. For Euzéby, prevailing socio-economic conditions have 
rendered the RMI inefficient, in that, the right to work can no longer be guaranteed in a 
labour market witnessing the growtK RI FRPSXWHULVDWLRQ DQG WKH µWUDQVIHU RI ODERXU
LQWHQVLYHDFWLYLWLHVRYHUVHDV¶ 
)XUWKHUPRUH $WNLQVRQ¶V SURSRVHG 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ ,QFRPH LV VXEMHFW WR VLPLODU
criticisms as those identified above. That is, the scheme implies an administrative burden 
being imposed upon the state, and the operation of such represents a strong element of 
social control creeping back into the system. As previously indicated one of the main 
purposes of a CBI is to avoid such characteristics of state income maintenance schemes. 
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7KHUHIRUHYLHZLQJ$WNLQVRQ¶V3DUWLFLSDWLRQ,QFRPHDVDQDFFHSWDEOHURXWHWRDIXOO&%,
is problematic in that it represents a policy proposal which institutionalises some of the 
worst aspects of existing systems, particularly those with a gender bias. That is, the types 
of activities that would be subject to examination for purposes of determining their social 
usefulness, such as informal unpaid work, are primarily conducted by women. (Jordan, 
1988:119; Hantrais and Letablier, 1996:110-111; Lewenhak, 1992, Human Development 
Report, 1995; Lister, 1997:130-33). 
Anne Gray views her modified version of a full CBI, mentioned above, to be an 
appropriate mechanism for defending the introduction of workfare and for securing an 
acceptable level of income for the majority in light of mass unemployment and the 
weakened power of the trade unions (Gray, 1988). The unconditional universal benefit 
88%SURSRVHGE\*UD\LVWREHSDLGWRHDFKLQGLYLGXDORYHUWKHDJHRIµUHJDUGOHVVRI
employment status or position ZLWKLQDKRXVHKROG¶DWD UDWHVXIILFLHQW WRHQVXUH WKDWQR
individual is financially worse off than under existing income maintenance measures 
 ,Q DUJXLQJ IRU D88%*UD\¶V DQDO\VLV UHOLHVKHDYLO\RQ WKH SRWHQWLDO RI DQ
increased monetary social wage to empower labour in the sense that low paid work could 
be more readily refused. However, she does make reference to the effects her proposal 
ZRXOGKDYHRQWKHSRVLWLRQRIZRPHQLQWKHKRXVHKROGE\VWDWLQJWKDWDµ88%IDFLOLWDWHV
the re-appropriation of non-wage labour as useful time, in place of the wasted and 
VWLJPDWLVHG WLPH RI XQHPSOR\PHQW¶  7KLV YDOXDEOH LQVLJKW LQWR KRZ D &%,
could serve to promote gender equality is disappointingly overlooked in the search for a 
model which would safeguard against unscrupulous employers taking advantage of the 
CBI to reduce wage levels. Gray advocates a gradual implementation process by 
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introducing what she refers to as a Universal Hourly Benefit (UHB) (Gray, 1993). This 
benefit would represent a retainer in that a certain percentage of social security 
entitlement would not be lost when an individual took up employment and would be paid 
alongside wages. Gray argues that this amount could be increased over the years, 
eventually becoming a full CBI. The UHB, therefore, acts on the supply side by building 
µLQFHQWLYHV WR VHHNKLJKKRXUO\ZDJHV LQWR WKH LQFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHV\VWHP UDWKHU WKDQ
DFFHSW ORZ ZDJHV EDFNHG XS E\ EHQHILWV¶ LELG 7KLV W\SH RI UHDVRQLQJ UHIOHFWV DQ
awareness of the dangers inherent with any form of state support which effectively 
subsidies low wages and hence draws upon the historical experience of schemes such as 
the Speenhamland system of poor relief. This is a crucial point when considering the 
actual operation of a CBI scheme. It demonstrates the need to view the reform process as 
encompassing a range of complementary measures, such as national minimum wage 
legislation, rather than accepting the CBI as an isolated tool for remedying all of the 
perceived problems of existing incoPH PDLQWHQDQFH VFKHPHV +RZHYHU *UD\¶V
arguments follow from an exclusive focus on the impact a CBI would have on the 
operation of traditional labour markets and as such represents a partial analysis.  
The contributions to the contemporary debate made by Bill Jordan, a sociologist 
and long time advocate of the CBI proposal, are particularly enlightening for the purpose 
of this study in that he vocalises issue relating to gender and emphasises social 
citizenship rights (Jordan, 1986;1987;1998). However, in discussing the implementation 
RI D &%, KH GUDZV XSRQ +HUPLRQH 3DUNHU¶V ZRUN LQ DQDO\VLQJ WKH FRVWV LQYROYHG DQG
agrees with her conclusions. That is, he argues that the high tax rates required to finance a 
IXOO &%, µZRXOG QRW EH FRQVLGHUHG D SROLWLFDOO\ Ieasible level of taxation in a strongly 
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liberal and market-RULHQWDWHGVRFLHW\ OLNH%ULWDLQ¶ -RUGDQ+H IXUWKHUSRLQWV
to the problem of predicting the effects on work incentives and the subsequent 
consequences for labour supply if a full CBI were to be implemented immediately 
LELG-RUGDQWKHUHIRUHVXSSRUWV3DUNHU¶VFRPSURPLVHVROXWLRQDQGUHJDUGVVXFKDVD
µSUDFWLFDOSURSRVDO IRU WUDQVLWLRQDO UHIRUPZKLFK LQWURGXFHVD UDGLFDOQHZSULQFLSOHEXW
stays within the parameters of traditional pROLF\FRQVWUDLQWV¶LELG+HUHLWHUDWHVKLV
position on transitional schemes by referring to attempts that have been made to cost an 
adequate CBI. In doing so he specifies the possible positive distributional aspects of a 
transitional scheme; 
The most careful and responsible calculations have been made by Hermoine 
Parker and Holly Sutherland,
5
 based on detailed study of household budgets 
and the real costs of various needs (unlike actual social welfare provision) and 
the attempt to minimise sudden gains and losses in a transitional period 
between the final provision of basic incomes and the present system. Parker 
and Sutherland aim to set out various options for transition to a basic income 
scheme that improve incentives for those at present excluded from labour 
markets, but do not leave individuals and households suddenly exposed to 
new risks, or significantly worse off than they are at present. Their proposals 
are broadly revenue-neutral in the short to medium term, though obviously 
there are gainers (single-earner households with children, and women 
generally) and losers (mainly higher-income households, and men)...These 
distributive consequences stem from their assumptions (for instance, about 
the need to retain a means-tested housing benefit as a residual feature of the 
system, for a small minority of households with low earnings and high 
housing costs) rather than from intrinsic features of the basic income principle 
itself.  
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(Jordan, 1998:179-181) 
It would appear then that Jordan is advocating a process of reform which would draw on 
variations of the CBI model in accordance with the relative weightings attached to 
meeting the demands of different groups of gainers or losers. The type of scheme 
introduced would therefore depend upon how policy makers prioritise the distributional 
impact on taxpayers and beneficiaries. However, the problems associated with means-
testing, contingency based entitlement and inadequate levels of benefit remain inherent 
within such transitional schemes and as such the broader range of benefits associated 
with a CBI model are not realised. For Jordan, though, the plan offers real scope for 
moving towards a society in which the social rights of citizenship could be granted to 
each individual and is one that does not radically conflict with existing attitudes towards 
work nor does it require a profound transformation of traditional economic orthodoxies.  
In considering the prospect of a CBI society, Jordan maintains that, as a proposal 
for income maintenance reform a CBI can be justified by appealing to its capacity for 
promoting equal autonomy for all citizens. Whether or not the policy is desirable when 
work incentives are considered is another question. In fact Jordan agrees with the 
criticism that a CBI, operating in isolation; 
«FDQQRWVXSSO\WKHPRWLYDWLQJIDFWRUVWKDWZRXOGOHDGWKHP>FLWL]HQV@WRGR
the work that is necessary for social reproduction, or provide them with the 
opportunities to contribute to the common good in the ways required for 
human flourishing. 
(1998:181) 
                                                                                                                                                 
5
 -RUGDQUHIHUV WR WKHLUDUWLFOHLQ&LWL]HQ
V ,QFRPH%XOOHWLQ1R µ:K\D&, LVEHWWHU
than Lowering InFRPH7D[WR´ 
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This does not imply a rejection of the CBI proposal. Firstly, as a means of promoting 
distributional justice it is to be applauded, and as indicated, the implementation process 
can de designed to ensure flexibility in terms of redistributional impacts. Furthermore, 
any negative views expressed with regard to costs, framed in terms of the prohibitive 
burdens being imposed on the taxpayer, are based on restricted perceptions and thus 
prove misleading; 
The basic income is a pure transfer, and involves less expenditure of 
resources - staff time, buildings, material - than any other conceivable system 
of income transfers. It is not like a redistribution of goods and services, or a 
collective infrastuctural good. Hence it does not reduce the total volume of 
resources available for the production of goods and services, as taxes raised 
for those kinds of public expenditures, do. 
(ibid:179) 
6HFRQGO\ DOWKRXJK D &%, PD\ QRW EH D µVXIILFLHQW¶ FRQGLWLRQ IRU VRFLDO MXVWLFH LW LV D
µQHFHVVDU\¶RQHLELG,QWKLVVHQse Jordan appears to continue with the tradition of 
emphasising the operational effects on the labour market by arguing that complementary 
PHDVXUHV DUH QHHGHG WR µPRWLYDWH DFWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ DQG SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG SURYLGH
opportunities for fulfilling work¶LELG+RZHYHUXSRQIXUWKHUUHDGLQJRI-RUGDQLW
LVDSSDUHQWWKDWKHDGRSWVDPXFKEURDGHUYLHZRIµDFWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶
WKDQWKDWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOPHWKRGRIGHILQLQJµZRUWKWKURXJKZRUN¶
,QGHYHORSLQJKLVµUDGLFDO¶DJHQGDIRUDSROLF\SURJUDPPHGLUHFWHGDWDGGUHVVLQJVRFLDO
exclusion, Jordan identifies the CBI as a crucial component. In doing so, Jordan stresses 
WKH UHOHYDQFH RI HFRQRPLF DFWLYLW\ LQ WKH µVRFLDO HFRQRP\¶ DQG SURYLGHV D YDOXDEOH
insight into how a CBI could form an integral part of localised economic regeneration 
strategies (ibid:181-188). It is with respect to this particular line of argument that 
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-RUGDQ¶V DQDO\VLV SURYHV FRQGXFLYH LQ GHYHORSLQJ D IHPLQLVW HFRQRPLFV SHUVSHFWLYH RQ
the CBI concept, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
7.9 Conclusion 
The exploration of the literature contained within this chapter, and chapter six has 
demonstrated the wide range of support voiced in favour of a CBI and the diverse range 
of perspectives employed in justifying the proposal. Whilst the aforementioned analysis 
should not be considered an exhaustive review of the existing literature, the main 
components of both historical and contemporary debates, focusing on a minimum income 
guarantee, have been discussed with a view to demonstrating the prevalence of a biased 
and limiting analytical framework. Whether the policy has been proposed as an 
alternative to existing strategies, or as a response to demands imposed by the onset of 
capitalist development, or indeed the future sustainability of capitalist structures given the 
dynamics of modern socio-HFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVWKHFDVHKDVEHHQPDGHWKDWµUDGLFDOLVP¶
KDVJLYHQZD\WRµUHIRUPLVP¶)XUWKHUPRUHWKHFRQFHUQIRUSROLWLFDODFFHSWDELOLW\DQGWKH
tendency to operate within the limits of traditional models of full-time male waged 
labour, with the subsequent emphasis on the superiority of the labour market in providing 
welfare for the majority, has resulted in a situation whereby the real benefits of a CBI are 
being sadly overlooked. It would appear that the current political and economic climate 
dictates a continued emphasis on reducing expenditure with a renewed commitment to 
enacting social security reforms that act to support contemporary labour market 
processes. This narrow approach to the reform agenda can only be assumed to bring with 
it more of the same rather than embracing a radical rethinking of income maintenance 
policy overall. 
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3XUG\ LQ KLV µUDGLFDO DSSURDFK WR ODERXU HFRQRPLFV¶ SURYLGHV D FRPprehensive 
account of the benefits to be gained from a CBI; 
Specifically basic income would help nudge society gently along four new 
evolutionary paths; 1) personal income would be decoupled from 
employment; 2) the total amount of time the collective labourer devotes to 
waged work would be reduced and redivided; 3) the economy would be re-
organised around the concept of ecological sustainability; and 4) dependent 
and alienated forms of production and consumption would be phased out in 
favour of independent and emancipated patterns of working and living. 
(Purdy, 1988:201) 
Repeated reference to paths one and two are to be found in the existing literature and 
although path three is relegated to the periphery in terms of mainstream debates 
(Fitzpatrick, 1999:ch9), increasing interest in environmental and green issues may serve 
to redress this imbalance. However, path four has not yet been fully appreciated and it is 
in this area that questions of gender inequality are most relevant. It follows then that for 
the debate to progress it is essential that these issues are explored. 
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&KDSWHU&RPPRGLILFDWLRQY¶V1RQ-Commodification - A Feminist     
Economics Perspective in Support of a Citizens Basic Income 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided evidence of how a CBI proposal has emerged in 
recent decades as a radical proposal for state welfare reform. However, despite the wide 
and varied base of support for the proposal, which has produced a range of convincing 
arguments in favour a CBI, to date no government has yet adopted it. The apparent lack 
RISROLWLFDOZLOOWRLPSOHPHQWD&%,KDVEHHQFRQVLGHUHGDJDLQVWDEDFNJURXQGRIµFULVLV¶
in state welfare provision, in particular the perceived problems associated with the 
funding and operation of social security systems. Implementing a CBI entails radical 
reform of existing patterns of welfare delivery. The institutionalized relationship between 
work and welfare, upon which modern welfare states are premised, is brought into 
question. Thus, a central focus amongst the most prominent CBI theorists has been 
identified as a need to reassess the foundations of modern welfare capitalism in light of 
the apparent unsustainabilty of full employment. Evidence has been presented of the 
ineffectiveness of existing social security measures designed in accordance with the 
functioning of traditional labour markets. A CBI is proposed as a model for reform of 
income maintenance policy that effectively dissolves the formal relationship between 
work and income. Thus the model, it is claimed, provides policy makers with a tool to 
support contemporary labour market structures as well as fulfilling a necessary welfare 
function of the state. This crucial integration of economic and social policy is one of the 
main attractions of a CBI scheme leading advocates to commend it as a means of 
promoting both social justice and economic efficiency. 
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However, the tendency to emphasise the effects on labour markets following the 
introduction of a CBI, evident within the existing literature, is indicative of an 
androcentric bias. Although the role of women in society is central to social policy 
reform the existing literature is disturbingly void of any comprehensive treatment of 
women. No genuine discussion has taken place regarding the valuing and nature of 
ZRPHQ¶VOLYHVDQGZRUN,WLVDUJXHGWKDWWKHQHJOHFWRIWKLVFUXFLDODVSHFWRIWKHUHIRUP
agenda follows from a tacit acceptance of the leverage of traditional economic practices 
in the research process. Social policy reform must take account of gender inequalities and 
not just those relating to the traditional labour market. However, as long as the principles 
associated with conventional economic theory dominate the method of approach the 
nature of such inequalities will never be fully understood. The analytical framework must 
therefore be adapted to ensure that, rather than focusing on a predetermined set of issues, 
welfare reform debates are deemed to be more inclusive in that all relevant issues are 
incorporated. 
The purpose of this chapter then is to draw further attention to the bias inherent 
within the current debate and to subsequently develop a feminist economics perspective 
on the CBI proposal. It is argued that such a perspective makes a positive contribution to 
the literature and debates on a CBI in two ways. Firstly, the case is made that issues of 
gender justice are subordinated to those concerning economic efficiency. Providing 
evidence of this fact serves to negate the arguments made thus far with regard to social 
citizenship rights and the CBI. That is, the process of prioritising efficiency goals, which 
are based on a particular concept of economic efficiency, leads to an exclusive notion of 
social citizenship rights. Within that context, arguing for a CBI on the grounds of its 
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potential to promote social justice is misleading in that it is the citizenship rights of a 
specific category of individuals, those who are considered in terms of their quantifiable 
productive outputs, which are promoted. Secondly, in developing a feminist economics 
perspective attention is drawn to the opportunity provided by a CBI to redefine work. It is 
argued that attempts at justifying a state supported unconditional minimum income 
guarantee can follow one of two possible routes. Paying people in exchange for nothing 
can be justified on the grounds that much economic activity remains invisible, and 
WKHUHIRUH ZKDW DSSHDUV WR EH µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶ PD\ DFWXDOO\ WXUQ RXW WR EH H[DPSOHV RI
productive activity. Overcoming this problem normally involves assigning appropriate 
market values in cases where they are not immediately apparent. This can be referred to 
DVWKHµFRPPRGLILFDWLRQ¶URXWH0XFKRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHVRIDUFDQEHFODVVLILHGLQWHUPVRI
this approach. This further demonstrates the prevalence of an androcentric bias akin to 
that found in neo-classical economic theory. An alternative approach would be to justify 
the CBI as a mechanism for formally recognising those activities with a welfare 
enhancing function, but which are not produced or consumed within a market determined 
framework. Rather than attempting to indicate the worth of such activities by computing 
their respective market values, the practice associated with the application of mainstream 
economic analysis, this approach allows for the inclusion of all socially valuable 
activities without having to categorise them in terms of a work/non-work dichotomy. 
7KLVURXWHFDQEHUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµQRQ-FRPPRGLILFDWLRQ¶URXWHDQGLWLVFODLPHGWKDWLW
strengthens existing arguments in support of a CBI by allowing for a better understanding 
of the nature of womens lives and work. 
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,Q GHYHORSLQJ D µQRQ-FRPPRGLILFDWLRQ¶ DUJXPHQW LQ IDYRXU RI D &%, VFKHPH WKH
purpose is not to engage in further debate on the possible advantages and disadvantages 
of the proposal as a tool for social security reform. The intention is rather to contribute to 
existing debates in a positive way by reconceptualising notions of work in modern 
capitalist societies and demonstrating how this could impact on gender roles within the 
economy. It is claimed that adopting this particular perspective facilitates a richer 
awareness of the potential a CBI has for promoting both economic efficiency and gender 
neutral social citizenship rights. Although economic considerations remain a crucial 
feature, by shifting the focus away from narrowly defined concepts of efficiency, as 
defined by traditional economic theorising, a more realistic vision of the nature of 
economic and social interaction emerges. Furthermore, the role a CBI could play in 
µQXGJLQJ VRFLHW\ JHQWO\ DORQJ¶ 3XUG\¶V IRXUWK HYROXWLRQDU\ SDWK LV GHPRQVWUDWHG LQ
practical terms. That is, reforming state welfare systems in accordance with a CBI 
scheme creates a favourable environment for the future development, and sustainability, 
RI µLQGHSHQGHQW DQG HPDQFLSDWHG SDWWHUQV RI ZRUNLQJ DQG OLYLQJ¶ 7KLV ZRXOG KDYH
particular advantages for women and therefore a CBI is to be applauded for the 
contribution it makes in the promotion of gender equality. However, the creation of such 
an environment is also considered to be a crucial feature of effective strategies designed 
to combat the problem of social exclusion. It is therefore argued that a CBI scheme 
presents as a welfare reform strategy which is appropriate in addressing a range of 
modern social problems. Thus, the insights to be gained from developing a feminist 
economics perspective, in the study of the CBI proposal, serves to reinforce existing 
supporting arguments.  
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This chapter will begin by setting out a feminist perspective on the relationship 
between work and income in societies where production and consumption exchanges are 
predominately determined by market based structures. Attention will be drawn to the 
QDWXUH RI µZRUN¶ LQ VXFK VRFLHWLHV DQG KRZ WUDGLWLRQDOO\ WKHUH KDV EHHQ D WHQGHQF\ WR
attDFK µYDOXH¶ WR WKRVH DFWLYLWLHV GHPRQVWUDWLQJ D SURGXFWLYH DQG WDQJLEOH RXWSXW
Subsequently, activities producing output that is not easily measurable are assigned a 
lesser value. Categorising work in this way leads indirectly to gender inequalities in that 
PXFKRIWKHZRUNZRPHQSHUIRUPIDOOVZLWKLQWKHµOHVVHUYDOXH¶FDWHJRU\7KLVZLOOOHDG
WR GLVFXVVLRQ IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH QDWXUH RI ZRPHQV¶ OLYHV DQG ZRUN DQG WKH VWUXFWXUHV RI
constraint that serve to inform their choices. A further section will outline, in practical 
policy terms, drawing upon an exemplary local economic regeneration strategy, how 
FXUUHQW UHVWULFWLYHGHILQLWLRQVRI µZRUN¶FRXOGEHEURDGHQHG WR LQFOXGHDZLGHUUDQJHRI
activities. It will be argued that the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) model presents as 
an opportunity to engage in debate on the reconceptualisation of work in modern 
capitalist society. A further section will link the experience of the ILM model in 
operation with the CBI proposal, claiming that a common framework can be identified 
for separating work from income. That is, the ILM model could serve as a mechanism for 
supporting the case made for a CBI in that it provides real evidence of the economic and 
social value of work undertaken outwith the confines of traditional market based 
exchanges. Thus, there exists a practical strategy that demonstrates the relevance of the 
non-commodification route in tackling the problem of social exclusion. However, a final 
section will indicate that similar to the debate focusing on the a CBI proposal, the ILM 
model has been subsumed by an approach which emphasises the formal labour market. 
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That is the ILM model has been viewed first and foremost as an active labour market 
strategy rather than a radical approach to local economic regeneration. The conclusion 
will be drawn that the separation of income from work envisaged within the literature on 
both CBI and the ILM model is a temporary one and thus the full advantages to be gained 
from either strategy in promoting gender justice are not realised. 
8.2 Reconceptualizing Work and Income - A Feminist Perspective 
Conceptually work is usually distinguished from leisure. The implication is that the 
cost of time spent engaging in activities clearly defined as work can be measured in terms 
of the associated sacrifice of leisure time. This is not to say that all of those activities we 
deem enjoyable are categorised as leisure and activities involving pain, toil or a sacrifice 
of enjoyment as work. Work may be something we enjoy but it is distinct from leisure in 
that it is not done solely for its own sake but must also be purposeful. Any activity which 
GLVSOD\VµWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIXVLQJXSWLPHDQGHQHUJ\IRUDQH[WULQVLFSXUSRVH¶FDQEH
defined as work, in that desirable end results are created through a process of working 
which involves an opportunity cost of lost leisure time (Himmelweit, 1995:3). These end 
results are not only produced for the enjoyment or satisfaction of the individual carrying 
out the activity but also have a use value which can be shared by others. It is therefore the 
productive purposeful aspect of any activity that defines it as work.  
For André Gorz, conceptualizing work in this way is a feature of modern industrial 
capitalism; 
So long as commodity production remained marginal and the great majority 
of needs were covered by domestic production and the village economy, the 
QRWLRQ RI µZRUN¶ DV VXFKFRXOG QRW WDNH KROG 3HRSOH µSURGXFHG¶
µFRQVWUXFWHG¶ DQG µSUHSDUHG¶ WKLQJV WKH\ µODERXUHG¶ µWRLOHG¶ µGUXGJHG¶ DQG
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µDWWHQGHGWR¶DZLGHYDULHW\RIVSHFLILFµRFFXSDWLRQV¶ZKLFKKDGQRFRPPRQ
measure between them within the framework of the domestic community. 
And responsibility for the various activities was assumed by the husband, the 
wife, the children or the older members of the family according to an 
immutable division of labour. These activities were gendered...and thus there 
was no common denominator between them. They were not interchangeable, 
and could not be compared and evaluated in terms of a single yardstick. The 
WHUPµZRUN¶UHIHUUHGQRWWRDFUHDWLYHRUSURGXFWLYHDFWEXWWRWKHDFWLYLW\LQ
so far as it entailed pain, annoyance and fatigue. 
(1994:53) 
The dominance of commodity production and consumption over subsistence production 
brought about by the development of capitalist modes of production results in the 
depersonalization of work activities. This leads Gorz to assert that the modern notion of 
work refers to; 
...the name of an activity fundamentally different from the activities of 
subsistence, reproduction, maintenance and care performed within the 
KRXVHKROG7KLVLVQRWVRPXFKEHFDXVHµZRUN¶LVDSDLGDFWLYLW\EXWEHFDXVH
it is done in the public domain and appears there as a measurable, 
exchangeable and interchangeable performance; as a performance which 
possesses a use-value for others, not simply for the members of the household 
community carrying it out; for others in general, without distinction or 
restriction, not for a particular, private person. 
(ibid:53) 
This socialization of productive activities means that the worker becomes separable from 
the resulting output. Producing goods and services for exchange in the public domain 
renders the direct relationship between the person carrying out the task and the actual 
output irrelevant. Activities are interchangeable between workers, and outputs become 
measurable in terms of their use value to others. In modern terms the concept of work is 
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associated with any impersonal activity which results in output that can be measured and 
presented as a commodity for sale or exchange in an impersonal public market place. 
0DQ\RIWKHDFWLYLWLHVIUHTXHQWO\SHUIRUPHGE\ZRPHQDUHµLQYLVLEOH¶LQWKHVHQVH
that there is no tangible output. Consequently these activities do not meet the criteria 
ZKLFKZRXOGDOORZWKHPWREHODEHOOHGµZRUN¶$OWKRXJKPXFKSURJUHVVKDVEHHQPDGH
in the valuing of domestic work which subsequently illustrates the significance of 
ZRPHQ
V¶ SURGXFWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH HFRQRP\ VHH IRU H[DPSOH WKH +XPDQ
Development Report, 1995) little has been done to quaQWLI\ µSURYLVLRQLQJ¶ IXQFWLRQV
within the family. Many non-physical exchanges or services performed in the household 
contribute positively to individual welfare. Examples include the transfer of knowledge 
or skills; providing a safe and loving environment; expressing and acting on concern for 
the health and emotional needs of other family members and organising the distribution 
and allocation of resources within the family unit. Many of these activities are essential 
for human survival, particularly when considering the care of children (Nelson, 1993:32). 
Non-material sources of human satisfaction influence intra-family power structures and 
directly impact on the economic position of women. The fact that they remain in the 
periphery of the economics discipline is possibly because quantifying them would be a 
technically difficult thing to do. However, it is more likely due to the fact that such 
DFWLYLWLHVDUHQRWYLHZHGDVµLPSRUWDQW¶VLPSO\EHFDXVHWKH\DUHSHUIRUPHGE\ZRPHQ 
Humans are born of women, nurtured and cared for as dependent children, 
socialized into family and community groups, and are perpetually dependent 
on nourishment and shelter to sustain their lives. These aspects of human life, 
whose neglect is often justified by the argument that they are unimportant or 
LQWHOOHFWXDOO\XQLQWHUHVWLQJRUPHUHO\µQDWXUDO¶DUHQRWMXVWFRLQFLGHQWDOO\WKH
DUHDVRIOLIHWKRXJKWRIDVµZRPHQ¶VZRUN¶ 
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(Nelson, 1996:31) 
7KH µSURYLVLRQLQJ¶ DVSHFWV RI KXPDQ OLIH WKDW 1HOVRQ WDONV RI DUH IXQGDPHQWDO LQ
influencing the behaviour of women. Furthermore, the dichotomy of work/non work has 
had detrimental effects on inequalities within households.  
Market based economies have an inherent tendency to value productive activities 
by the notion of opportunity cost. The increased participation of women in the formal 
labour market has resulted in attempts to measure lost production in the home in terms of 
the equivalent market wage and vice versa. The process of commodifying domestic work 
has resulted in the production of substitute goods which can be purchased in the market 
place. This can be achieved with relative ease when the producer and consumer are 
impersonal agents, performing their respective roles separately and autonomously. The 
same can not be said about provisioning activities. This fact is further demonstrated when 
considering the needs that are satisfied by work/non-work activities; 
As marketed substitutes become available for more and more of those 
GRPHVWLFDFWLYLWLHVWKDWFRXQWDVµZRUN¶WKHDSSDUHQWLPSRUWDQFHof the needs 
they satisfy increase relative to those remaining needs which are not 
perceived to be so readily met by the market. These tend to be the needs 
whose satisfaction requires activities which are inseparable from the person 
performing them, including caring and self-fulfilling activities. These are the 
needs that remain invisible, of apparent marginal significance to the economy, 
and thus their importance to the actors within it easily ignored. 
(Himmelweit, 1996:10) 
The redistribution of work from the domestic realm to the market has indirectly 
resulted in the devaluing of the time and efforts women spend fulfilling both their own 
DQGRWKHUVDIILOLDWLRQQHHGVWKDWLVµWKHQHHGRIKXPDQEHLQJVWREHORQJDQGWREHORYHG¶
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(Nelson, 1996:73). Individual needs and desires are therefore socially constructed via the 
process of commodification. The principles of production and consumption dominate and 
those activities which do not fit neatly into the model become undervalued by society in 
general. Individuals who exhibit a preference for pursuing non-marketable provisioning 
activities are labelled as non-ZRUNHUVRUµLGOHUV¶VXIIHULQJIURPWKHQHJDWLYHFRQQRWDWLRQV
WKLVLPSOLHV$ZLWW\EXWLOOXVWUDWLYHUHWRUWZRXOGGUDZXSRQWKHROGDGDJHµUHODWLRQVKLSV
are KDUGZRUN¶ 
As Nelson suggests in her observations on the provisioning aspects of human life, 
TXRWHG DERYH LW LV FOHDU WKDW WKH XQGHUYDOXLQJ RI µXQ-FRPPRGLILDEOH¶ QHHGV GRHV QRW
render them less important in terms of their contribution to individual welfare. However 
in a male/work dominated society women continue to shoulder a disproportionate share 
RIWKHVHµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHSURFHVVRIFRPPRGLILFDWLRQKDVXQGHUPLQHGWKHLU
position. The choices that women make are influenced by this process and hence the 
SUHIHUHQFHLVWRSHUIRUPµZRUN¶WKDWLVVRFLDOO\YDOXHG7KLVVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRIQHHGV
has obvious consequences in terms of the sharing of domestic responsibilities between 
men and women. Policies aimed at promoting equal sharing which ignore the social 
constraints imposed on choice will ultimately fail.  
A CBI scheme which incorporates the recognition of equal rights of citizenship has 
the potential to re-orientate socially constructed preferences. This potential, however, will 
remain latent unless the scheme is accompanied by a reconceptualisation of work and a 
better understanding of the sexual division of labour in determining the distribution of 
family duties. Insights can be gained from the current work of feminist economists to 
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incorporate theories of the social construction of gender into their, traditionally male 
dominated and defined, discipline; 
Feminist theory suggests that the definition focusing on choice, which looks 
at human decisions as radically separated from physical and social 
constraints, and the definition stressing material well-being, which ignores 
non-physical sources of satisfaction, are not the only alternatives. What is 
needed is a definition of economics that considers humans in relation to the 
world. 
(Nelson, 1993:32)  
By considering humans in relation to the world and not just the world of work gender 
specific constraints, that inform and influence choice, can be identified. The tendency to 
SRODUL]HWKHDQDO\VLVEHWZHHQZRUNDQGµQRQ-ZRUN¶UHVXOWVLQDIDLOXUHWRIully understand 
and recognize the contributions women make to family life.  
1DQF\ )ROEUH D SURPLQHQW IHPLQLVW HFRQRPLVW GHILQHV FRQVWUDLQW DV WKH µDVVHWV
rules, norms and preference that delimit what people want and how they can go about 
getting what thH\ ZDQW¶  6KH JRHV IXUWKHU WR H[SODLQ WKDW GLVWLQFWLYH VHWV RI
constraints can help shape collective identities and subsequent collective action. Women, 
a group defined by gender; 
...have some similar assets (their reproductive and sexual endowments), are 
subject to similar rules (many rights and responsibilities are gender specific), 
are governed by similar norms (such as ideals of femininity), and express 
some similar preferences (such as enjoyment of caring relationships). 
(ibid:55) 
This is not to say that all women share these similarities. The point Folbre makes is that 
VRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGFROOHFWLYHVWUXFWXUHVRIFRQVWUDLQWIRVWHUVµJURXSLGHQWLW\DQGFUHDWHV
FRPPRQJURXSLQWHUHVWV¶ZKLFKLQWXUQSURYLGHQDWXUDODOOHJLDQFHVFRQGXFLYHWRSRZHrful 
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forms of collective action (ibid:57-8). All four categories of constraint work together to 
form this collective action. Therefore, the removal of one would not necessarily eliminate 
the constraints imposed by the others on a particular group. Granting a CBI to men and 
women effectively removes basic economic constraints. However to assume that the 
removal of asset constraints would result in equal outcomes ignores the influence of 
rules, norms and preferences in the processes of co-operation and conflict between 
genders.  
The emphasis on viewing a CBI as a tool for supporting more flexible forms of 
working implicitly encourages women to enter the realm of paid work. Constraints on 
choice in this area are effectively removed by providing independent income security. As 
women gain in terms of rights and increasingly enter the labour market their jobs become 
an important source of identity. Furthermore, the continual process of substituting unpaid 
work, normally performed by women in the home, with goods and services which can 
now be purchased externally suggests that cultural identifications associated with family 
labour diminish in importance. The existence in the market place of relatively cheap 
substitute goods, produced and consumed impersonally, further devalues the work that 
women continue to do within the family. All of this assumes that women have suddenly 
switched from a preference for affiliation, that is, the need to be part of a collective 
loving family unit and to take on all of the rights and obligations that entails, to one for 
promoting their own autonomous self interested needs. This begs the question of who 
now should shoulder the responsibilities of caring for children and families?  
Much research (e.g., reviewed in Bergman, 1986) suggests the stylized fact 
WKDW ZLYHV¶ LQFUHDVHG DJHQF\ KDV EHHQ SHUPLWWHG QRW VR PXFK E\ KXVEDQGV
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taking on affiliative work, but by decreases in wives standards of living, 
particularly in regard to time for rest and recreation. 
(Nelson, 1996:74) 
If work is associated with productive outputs then surely affiliative work is 
productive, measurable by the positive contributions it makes to individual welfare. 
However the personal nature of such activities renders them difficult if not impossible to 
measure. If such activities are continually devalued within market based economies it is 
unrealistic to assume that by removing or altering one aspect of the social constraints 
imposed upon women, that is access to economic resources, the result will automatically 
be equal sharing between men and women of affiliative work. Individual preferences 
within market based economies will be influenced directly by the value attached to 
activities producing identifiable and exchangeable output. Individuals may therefore 
demonstrate a SUHIHUHQFHIRUµYDOXHGZRUN¶RYHUµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHV7KHUHLVWKHUHIRUH
no reason to assume that men will alter their preferences and whilst women may be 
LQIOXHQFHGWRSXUVXHµVRFLDOO\YDOXHG¶DFWLYLWLHVWKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWRDVVXPHWKDWWKH\ZLOO
do so at the expense of sacrificing their existing preference for affiliation. Men will 
FRQWLQXHWRHQJDJHLQµYDOXHGZRUN¶DQGZRPHQZLOOQRZHQJDJHLQERWKZRUNDQGµQRQ-
ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHV7KHWHQGHQF\WRFRPPRGLI\DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\YDOXHDOOKXPDQDFWLYLW\
results in unduly restrictive social citizenship rights, particularly those related to income 
security. Thus policies aiming to achieve gender equality must take account of gender 
based social structures of constraint and explicitly recognise the positive welfare 
FRQWULEXWLRQRIµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHV7KHTXHVWLRQUHPDLQLQJLVKRZFDQWKLVWHFKQLFDOO\
be achieved. 
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8.3 A Possible Solution: Intermediate Labour Markets  
Attempts to resolve this question may benefit from examining a particular local 
economic deveORSPHQWVWUDWHJ\WKHµLQWHUPHGLDWHODERXUPDUNHW¶PRGHO7KHFUHDWLRQRI
,/0 SURJUDPV SURYLGHV XVHIXO LQVLJKWV LQWR WKH YDOXH RI µQRQ-ZRUN¶ DFWLYLWLHV LQ
sustaining local economies. Broadly defined these programs provide temporary jobs, 
offering a combination of training and employment, for long-term unemployed people. 
Participants are remunerated at a level between state benefits and the current market 
determined rate for the job. The main purpose of such programs is to combat social 
exclusion by providing the long-term unemployed with a link to the formal labour 
market. However, an equal emphasis is placed on the nature of the work. It is this aspect 
of the ILM model that proves interesting in developing a gender sensitive case for a CBI, 
in that it provides a framework for reconceptualizing work. 
:LWKLQ WKH ,/0 PRGHO WKH SURGXFW RI WKH ZRUN XQGHUWDNHQ PXVW KDYH µHLWKHU D
direct social purpose or is trading for a social purpose where that work or trading would 
QRWQRUPDOO\EHXQGHUWDNHQ¶)LQQ,/0VDUHUHODWHGWRWKHQRWLRQRIDµVRFLDO
HFRQRP\¶E\DWWHPSWLQJWR 
...build capacity and stimulate the activities of not for profit organisations 
(community businesses; voluntary organisations; co-ops; friendly societies) to 
help them identify and organise jobs with a social purpose as well as develop 
new markets in which the private sector would not invest.  
(Finn, 1996:26) 
Local economic activity which is organised around principles of community ownership 
and control; production and exchange for social gain; and the promotion of social 
entrepreneurship is an important, if not the main source, of job creation in deprived 
QHLJKERXUKRRGV'HILQLQJVXFKDFWLYLW\DVSDUWRIDµVRFLDOHFRQRP\¶WDNHVDFFRXQWRIWKH
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fact that the economic relationships evolving in this sector are very different in nature 
from those which exist in the mainstream economy. It follows that the nature of work in 
the social economy is distinct from traditional employment patterns as it is organised and 
structured within a different economic system; 
Work within the social economy is varied and should not be idealised, but can 
serve to illustrate work for a social gain, through more inclusive and 
participative models of organisation, greater recognition of the contribution of 
volunteering, explicit value-led motivation, and beneficial social or 
environmental impact.  
(Mayo, 1996:151) 
The distinguishing features of work created and organised at a local level, in 
communities where the market economy has failed to produce sufficient jobs, are made 
explicit within the ILM model. ILMs should therefore not be confused with compulsory 
µZRUN-IDUH¶SURJUDPVZKHUHSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHUHTXLUHGWRZRUNIRUWKHLUEHQHILWV$OWKRXJK
entry into employment is a desired end result, equal emphasis is placed on creating 
quality jobs, which promote self-reliance and have a community-based function. The 
ILM is primarily a model for encouraging local economic activity and contributing to the 
urban regeneration process. Furthermore it is a model which demonstrates the personal 
and social benefits to be derived from alternative ways of organising and doing work. 
The principle of ILMs has been put into practice by the Wise Group of companies 
in Glasgow, a city in Scotland recognised by European funding bodies as experiencing 
ZLGHVSUHDGDUHDVRIPXOWLSOHXUEDQGHSULYDWLRQDQGPRUHUHFHQWO\WKHµ*ODVJRZ:RUNV¶
programme. Both organisations, through a series of local partnerships and the creative 
use of existing resources, have acted to promote and support job creation projects which 
meet community needs (Finn, 1996:25). The Wise Group initially provided training and 
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employment for unemployed people in insulating the homes of elderly, disabled and low 
income households within Glasgow. Projects now include local environmental 
improvements, the provision of energy conservation advice and the installation of home 
security devices. Glasgow Works, a pilot scheme which builds on the ILM model, 
supports a number of projects which have been identified as significant in improving the 
quality of life in Glasgow. Projects supported fall within the following broad themes; 
...working in a beautiful city; growing up in safety - µD FKLOG IULHQGO\ FLW\¶
health and well being - µSURPRWLQJ KHDOWK\ OLIHVW\OHV¶ DQG FXOWXUH DQG
heritage - µD&LW\ZLWKDJUHDWSDVWDQGDJUHDWIXWXUH¶ 
(ibid:31) 
Many of the project activities are non-marketable, mainly because people are too poor to 
pay for them, and can be categorised within the provisioning functions, discussed above, 
primarily undertaken by women in the household economy. Examples include the 
provision of after school childcare; the employment of community health workers to 
advise on diet and fitness; and a theatre group developing productions for schools on 
young peoples issues, such as sex education and drugs.  
The experience of these projects indicates that goods and services previously 
SURYLGHGLQWKHµLQYLVLEOH¶KRXVHKROGRUFRPPXQLW\HFRQRP\DUHFUXFLDOHOHPHQWVLQWKH
XUEDQ UHJHQHUDWLRQ SURFHVV 0DQ\ µQRQ-ZRUN¶ DFWLYLWLHV QRW QRUPDOO\ associated with 
monetary gain, can be identified as fundamental ingredients in the daily functioning of 
local economies. The motivation to engage in these activities must therefore be driven by 
considerations other than financial reward. In this instance FROEUH¶V DUJXPHQW GHWDLOHG
above, regarding the role played by distinctive sets of constraints in determining 
collective identities and collective action, are pertinent. Individuals, or groups of 
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individuals, living in areas deprived of economic resources experience a set of common 
constraints which are determined by the environment in which they live. Communities 
where most, if not all, individuals are experiencing poverty can become united by a sense 
of shared deprivation. This is particularly the case if that poverty has been the result of a 
common experience such as the closure of a factory, coal mine or steel works which 
represents the removal of the major employer in the area. When the economic base of a 
community is dominated by a particular industrial production process residents sharing 
daily work and life experiences, which are similar, become bound by a common 
µRFFXSDWLRQDO FXOWXUH¶ 7KLV FRPPRQ FXOWXUH LQ WXUQ IRUPV WKH EDVLV IRU FROOHFWLYH
identities. The removal of that economic base does not necessarily imply that collective 
identities are also removed. Rather, it can be argued that the structural unemployment 
associated with the demise of traditional industries, occurring in concentrated local areas, 
can reinforce the collective identities experienced by individuals residing in those areas. 
Similar to the case made by Folbre about women, these individuals find themselves 
governed by a set of similar assets (limited economic resources and employment 
opportunities); rules (the rights and responsibLOLWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµPDOH
bread-ZLQQHU PRGHO¶ RI IDPLO\ IRUPV QRUPV LGHDOV RI FRPPXQLW\ DQG ZRUNLQJ FODVV
µVROLGDULW\¶ DQG SUHIHUHQFHV WKH HQMR\PHQW RI µEHORQJLQJ¶ WR DQ DUHD ZLWK D VKDUHG
FXOWXUDO KHULWDJH ZKLFK µGHOLPLWV¶ ZKDW Whey want and influences how they go about 
getting what they want. As previously argued, these socially constructed collective 
structures of constraint promote common group interests which in turn form the basis for 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ0DQ\µQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLties may therefore be the result of this collective 
action in operation.  
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What the ILM model does then is provide a valuable insight into the role played by 
community and family relationships in sustaining the welfare of individuals living in 
areas deprived of economic resources. Shared experience as members of a community 
leads people to engage in activities which are certainly productive, even though their 
output is not easy to measure, and which offer rewards not associated with traditional 
forms of work and pay. The ILM framework provides a basis for formally recognising 
these activities and taking account of the contribution they make in promoting economic 
and social welfare. It therefore proves a useful tool in developing a more inclusive 
definition of work which includes voluntary and community based activities. It is for this 
reason that the ILM model supports the case for a CBI. Linking arguments for a CBI with 
the experience of ILMs could be a mechanism for curbing the tendency to commodify 
wherever possible. However, in practice this has not been the case in that the focus has 
EHHQRQDVVLJQLQJµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHVZLWKPDUNHWYDOXHV 
8.4 Work and Income Separated - A Reprieve? 
7KH SURFHVV RI FRPPRGLI\LQJ µQRQ-ZRUN¶ DFWLYLWLHV PHDQV WUDQVIRUPLQJ WKese 
functions into activities which are directly associated with the receipt of payment, 
FRPPHQVXUDWH ZLWK WKH WDVN XQGHUWDNHQ 7KHVH DFWLYLWLHV WKHQ EHFRPH D µPHDQV WR DQ
HQG¶UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJXQGHUWDNHQIRUWKHXWLOLW\YDOXHWREHGHULYHGIURPSHUIRUPLQg the 
DFWLYLW\ LWVHOI 7KH YDOXHV DWWDFKHG WR µQRQ-ZRUN¶ DFWLYLWLHV DUH QRZ GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH
amount of spending power allowed by the rate of payment. By re-emphasising the value 
of paid work, the commodification process means that the receipt and spending of money 
becomes the prominent factor informing daily activities. This effectively serves to 
transform social relations in communities where prolonged periods of limited access to 
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the formal labour market has led to the emergence of alternative patterns of production, 
consumption, and distribution. The balance between different modes of production and 
distribution is tipped in favour of the traditional work and pay relationship. Thus the 
focus switches from issues of promoting a sense of belonging, caring, and collective 
responsibility, to issues of market based values and transactions in the resource allocation 
process. Commodification, therefore, forces alternative forms of social formation into an 
inferior position relative to modern capitalist relationships. This is similar to the 
processes inherent within neo-classical economic theory. That is, the practice of 
analysing, and understanding, issues is primarily determined by a process of exploring 
how such are located within the dominant theoretical framework. If necessary, the 
analytical process then evolves to ensure that that this direct link can be made. The 
Glasgow experience with the ILM model has illustrated that this would appear to be the 
GHVLUHGUHVXOWLQWKDWWKHIRFXVLVRQIRUPDOLVLQJµQRQ-woUN¶DFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQDWUDGLWLRQDO
labour market framework. 
The Glasgow ILM model was analysed by the Commission on Social Justice (CSJ), 
an independent review body set up by the British Labour Party in 1992. The task of the 
Commission was to examine the dynamics of socio-economic relationships in Britain in 
DQ DWWHPSW WR GHYHORS D SDFNDJH RI SXEOLF SROLF\ UHIRUPV ZKLFK ZRXOG µHQDEOH HYHU\
individual to live free from want and to enjoy the fullest possible social and economic 
RSSRUWXQLWLHV¶ &RPPLVVLRQ RQ Social Justice, 1994:412). The CSJ reported that the 
Government should actively encourage the development of ILMs in areas of urban 
GHSULYDWLRQDVSDUWRIDµQHZVWUDWHJ\WRKHOSWKHORQJ-term unemployed earn their way 
RXWRISRYHUW\¶ LELG)RU WKH&SJ, the ILM model is first and foremost an active 
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labour market measure, which effectively provides a stepping stone to the formal labour 
market for unemployed people living in areas with very few jobs. However, the CSJ also 
reported that organisations like the Wise Group can; 
«RYHUFRPH D UHDO PDUNHW IDLOXUH ZKHUH WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU FDQQRW WUDQVODWH
needs into economic demand or where potential customers simply cannot 
afford to pay for private services. 
(ibid:179)  
7KHUHIRUH ,/0V SURYLGH µHQRUPRXV SRWHQWLDl for the creation of new markets in 
ZKLFKVRFLDOHFRQRP\RUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHWKHPDLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RSFLW7KHHPSKDVLVLV
on encouraging market based transactions for previously non-marketed goods and 
services. This will provide direct access to paid work in disadvantaged areas and 
LQGLUHFWO\ FRQWULEXWH WR D µPXOWLSOLHU¶ HIIHFW E\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH VSHQGLQJ SRZHU RI
previously unemployed people. The process of commodifying and imposing market 
YDOXHVRQµQRQ-ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHVFRQWLQXHV:LWKUHJDUGWRWKH,/0 experience, the bias in 
favour of commodification also serves the purpose of ensuring that the formal labour 
market and paid work command supreme, and indeed almost exclusive, positions within 
the urban regeneration process. 
A similar process of privileging paid work has taken place within the current 
confines of the CBI debate. Paid work remains the prominent source of income for most 
individuals in a market economy. Income is derived either directly from employment or 
indirectly from state welfare payments representing compensation for loss of income via 
the formal labour market. As discussed in chapters two and three, contemporary social 
security schemes have been designed with the primary purpose of supporting the labour 
market by remedying market failure. The analysis of formal labour market processes is 
  
 373 
therefore essential to any debate centred on social security reform. However, radical 
shifts in socio-economic conditions call for radical redirections in policy. The dynamics 
of modern labour markets have served to limit the effectiveness of benefit structures that 
act to support, and indeed encourage paid work.  
The success of employment strategies based on a policy goal of full employment, 
or rather the goal of ensuring equal rights for every citizen WRDPHDQLQJIXO µSDLG¶ MRE
will largely depend on the degree of control national governments can demonstrate in 
managing the macro economy. The process of economic globalisation has curtailed this 
level of control. Combating unemployment requires a rethinking of policies premised on 
the traditional model of market determined work and pay arrangements and a belief in the 
positive relationship between economic growth and employment. Attempts to transform 
social and economic relationships in deprived neighbourhoods by imposing a set of 
market based values on those relationships effectively serves to privilege the worker with 
DµMRE¶RYHUWKHXQSDLGZRUNHU5HJHQHUDWLRQVWUDWHJLHVZKLFKHPSKDVLVHWKHEHQHILWVRI
employment fail to take account of the social benefits to be derived from community 
based initiatives which promote, both alternative approaches to work and alternative 
mechanisms for rewarding socially valued activities. Rather than acting exclusively as a 
prescription for remedying particular market failures policy should be directed at 
supporting and promoting a diverse range of community based economic activities which 
could operate alongside traditional employment arrangements. An opportunity exists to 
reconceptualise work in view of modern socio-economic conditions. A CBI is a radical 
policy option in that it provides the framework to do so by challenging the traditional 
relationship between work and income. 
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8.5 Work and Income - A Possible Divorce? 
A CBI would effectively displace the economic necessity to enter into employment 
for many individuals. The question of work incentives has therefore been a central focus 
amongst CBI theorists. However, the debate thus far can be criticized for remaining 
firmly grounded within a traditional productivist model. Although within the existing 
CBI literature reference is frequently made to the potential the policy has for separating 
work from income, the implication is that such a separation is partial or indeed temporary 
(Van Parijs, 1996:64). As indicated in chapter five, to justify a CBI solely or mainly by 
reference to the need for a flexible labour market is to ignore or discount the 
characteristic social experience of women. The introduction of a CBI may or may not 
improve work incentives but this issue becomes less crucial in attempts to justify the 
SROLF\ LI WKH IRFXV ZDV VZLWFKHG WR LVVXHV RI UHFRJQL]LQJ DQG YDOXLQJ µQRQ-ZRUN¶
activities.  
,Q DGGUHVVLQJ WKH FULWLFLVPV RI D &%, IRU H[DFHUEDWLQJ WKH µIUHH-ULGHU¶ SUREOHP
attempts have been made to justify the policy by recognizing the value of productive 
leisure activities; 
D VRFLHW\ LQ ZKLFK WKRVH OLYLQJ TXLHWO\ RQ WKHLU FLWL]HQ¶V LQFRPH LQFOXGHG
not only those who would find it difficult to get a paid job, but also a lot of 
people who have the ability to get such a job but choose not to - the budding 
poet, the passionate bonsai-grower, the hyper-political activist. 
(Dore, 1996:62) 
6XFKDUJXPHQWVGUDZDWWHQWLRQ WR WKH LPSOLFLWGLVWLQFWLRQGUDZQEHWZHHQµLGOHQHVV¶DQG
leisure in modern capitalist society. The activities Dore mentions can be classed as leisure 
activities in that they are not paid and it is assumed that those engaging in such activities 
do so because they derive enjoyment from the activity. However such activities are also 
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productive, both for those who perform them and for the wider community. They are not 
undertaken for pecuniary gain, but they nevertheless contribute to individual and social 
well-EHLQJ7KHSRLQW LV WKDW OHLVXUHDFWLYLWLHV WKHPVHOYHVKDYHEHHQFDWHJRULVHG WR µILW¶
with the mRGHUQQRWLRQRIµZRUN¶ 
One can be said to be working in a garden or on a piece of knitting or on a 
painting or perhaps even on a stamp-collection or an ant farm. But we can 
almost never work at taking a stroll or carousing with friends in a bar (as 
Oscar :LOGHREVHUYHGµ:RUNLVWKHFXUVHRIWKHGULQNLQJFODVVHV¶$PHULFDQ
society has perhaps internalized the productivist ethic of political economy 
more fully than any other, and hence to the extent that these latter activities 
are describable as exercises in idleness, they are more or less deplored. 
(Gagnier and Dupré, 1995:106-107) 
Personal leisure activities which are not related to others and display a tangible output are 
EHLQJ µVRFLDOO\ YDOXHG¶ LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ DV SDLG ZRUN :KLOVW D VHSDUDWLRQ LV PDGH
between income and traditional employment, justifying a CBI within this framework 
serves to reinforce the notion that all sources of income derive from engaging in 
µSURGXFWLYH¶ DFWLYLWLHV ,GOHQHVV per se is condemned and it would prove extremely 
difficult to justify any policy that promoted idleness given the importance modern society 
DWWDFKHVWRWKHµZRUNHWKLF¶7KXVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIQHR-classical economic analysis in the 
research process is further demonstrated in that leisure activities are considered in terms 
RIWKHLUSRVVLEOHHFRQRPLFYDOXHDQGWKXVDUHXQGHUVWRRGZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRKRZWKH\µILW¶
within a model of market based exchange.  
-XVWLI\LQJD&%,DVUHFRJQLWLRQRIµVRFLDOO\YDOXHG¶DFWLYLWLHVLVOLPLWHGLQWKHVHQVH
that many activities normally performed by women are invisible. Furthermore the 
FRQWLQXHG HPSKDVLV RQ FRPPRGLILFDWLRQ DQG FRPSXWLQJ PDUNHW YDOXHV IRU PDQ\ µQRQ-
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ZRUN¶DFWLYLWLHVVHUYHVWRLQIRUPIXWXUHLQFRPHPDLQWHQDQFHSROLF\ZLWKLQWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
confines of work and pay. For policy to address gender bias inherent within current 
income maintenance mechanisms it is essential that the rationale for implementation 
divorces itself from the polarization of work-non/work activities. Any future social policy 
reform that accepts and recognizes the worth of those invisible activities predominantly 
performed by women, without requiring the formal measurement of outcomes, will 
facilitate a gender neutral conception of citizenship. 
8.6 Conclusion 
It has long been recognized that the source of independent income in a market 
economy is an important if not crucial role of the formal labour market. The continued 
reliance on paid employment as the predominant source of individual welfare narrows the 
range of policy options and produces restrictive definitions of justice and efficiency. State 
supported income maintenance schemes are based upon a framework of rewards and 
punishments and carry an obligation to work, or at least to engage in activities deemed to 
be socially valuable. By pursuing their affiliative needs, which are intangible and often 
LQYLVLEOHWRHYHQWKHPRVWGLUHFWEHQHILFLDULHVZRPHQDUHIRUFHGLQWRWKHUHDOPVRIµQRQ-
ZRUNHUV¶ ZLWK QHJDWLYH FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKHLU ULJKWV WR DQ LQGHSHQGHQW LQFRPH ,Q
support of his vision of a society ZKLFK µSURYLGHV DFFHVV WR LQFRPH DQG WRPHDQLQJIXO
ZRUNSDLGRUXQSDLGIRUDOOFLWL]HQV¶0D\RDUJXHVWKDW 
«WKHUHLVDSUHVVLQJVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFQHHGWRUHYHUVHWKHORZVWDWXVDQG
conditions of unpaid work, given the increasing stress and personal cost to 
those doing it. Unpaid work is an essential base on which the rest of our lives 
rest. 
(1996:146-7) 
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A fuller understanding of the effects of gender division, both in constraining 
ZRPHQ¶VRSWLRQVDQGLQVKDSLQJWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHVUHLQIRUFHVWKHFDVHIRU a CBI as a right 
of social citizenship and strengthens the case for decoupling income from work, however 
defined. At the same time, it counters the androcentric bias of conventional arguments for 
a CBI and offers a more balanced and attractive vision of the prospective marriage 
between justice and efficiency in which flourishing households and resilient communities 
are safeguarded from the capitalist commodification process. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion - The Way Forward?  
9.1 Introduction: Challenging the Existing Analytical Framework 
6RUU\ZKRLVWKLVµ0DUNHW¶EORNH":KRHOHFWHGKLPWKHQ"/LVWHQWKHPDUNHW
is something we have created for our own purposes, not some law of physics 
as unchangeable as the ebbing of the tides or the waning of the moon...The 
market is our servant, something we have created - if it is causing poverty and 
destitution then we must interfere to stop it doing those things. 
2¶)DUUHOO 
A CBI scheme is often perceived of as a panacea for the failings of current social 
security systems. However, arguments in favour of a CBI have traditionally been contrived 
within a fixed set of parameters associated with a particular view of the principles of 
economic organisation. That is, a CBI is considered a model for social security reform that 
conforms to market based structures of exchange and as such contributes positively to the 
efficient functioning of capitalist economies. Accepting the supremacy of the market in 
determining the nature of modern socio-economic relationships has resulted in convincing 
theoretical arguments in support of a CBI. However, such arguments are limited in that the 
emphasis remains centred on possible labour market effects following the introduction of a 
CBI. The first purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the confining nature of the current 
debate. The second purpose was to examine the CBI proposal from a different perspective. 
This involved initially identifying, and subsequently questioning, the existing dominant 
approach employed in the analysis of income maintenance policy. The process of doing so 
has provided the background for the development of a feminist economics perspective on 
the CBI proposal. By casting doubt on the notion that all interactions can be explained, 
and thus predicted, by appealing to a model of the economy which is premised on the 
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dominance of market based structures, a feminist economics perspective allows for a more 
inclusive conception of human relationships. Thus, the capitalist model of economic 
organisation is identified as comprising part, albeit an important one, of a bigger picture. 
However, the tendency to privilege the economic structures associated with capitalism, in 
the analytical process, is central to neo-classical economic theory. It has been argued that 
this particular and limiting view of the world serves to constrain policy debates. In order to 
break free from such constraints, and thus move the welfare reform debate forward it is 
essential that existing barriers are identified and deconstructed. That is, rather than accept 
the dominant analytical framework µDV XQFKDQJHDEOH DV WKH HEELQJ RI WKH WLGHV RU WKH
ZDQLQJRIWKHPRRQ¶, a more informative approach would be to accept that it is µVRPHWKLQJ
ZHKDYHFUHDWHG¶and thus can be µLQWHUIHUHG¶with. The challenge therefore, in arguing for 
a CBI, is to identify the limiting nature of traditional approaches in the study of income 
maintenance policy, and to present an alternative approach that incorporates more 
inclusive and realistic observations on the nature of human relationships. 
9.2 Understanding Income Maintenance Policy 
The relevance of neo-classical economic theory in the study of income transfer 
schemes is undeniable. Based on the notion of competitive markets, populated by rational, 
autonomous, utility maximising actors, neo-classical theory provides a positive analytical 
framework for justifying the transfer of income between individuals, and within groups of 
individuals. Within this framework, income maintenance policy is viewed as a necessary 
component of state activity in the promotion of economic efficiency. However, while the 
application of this particular theoretical stance provides a rationale for income 
maintenance policy, it also serves to inform the actual design of policy. That is, income 
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maintenance measures are understood in terms of the impact they have on the workings of 
the market economy, in particular the world of paid work. It has been argued that the focus 
on neo-classical theory leads to limited conceptions of the nature and functions of income 
maintenance policy.  
The emphasis placed on the strive for economic efficiency and the subsequent 
prioritisng of this objective above all else is an inherent feature of the neo-classical 
approach to policy analysis. It is claimed that this represents a biased and exclusive 
theoretical perspective and, when applied, results in  policy designed in accordance with a 
view of how the world should operate. Following from this critique of the subjective 
nature of the neo-classical approach, the treatment of income maintenance policy within 
this framework is exposed to the influence of value judgements. Policy is therefore 
understood, and evaluated, in terms of the role it performs in an asuumed economic world, 
rather than in the real economy. This approach to policy is restrictive in that it fails to 
adequately account for the multiplicity of objectives associated with the provision of 
income maintenance in modern capitalist economies. Thus, the orthodox economic 
approach to the study of income maintenance policy tends to obscure our vision of the 
broader picture. In order to develop a more inclusive understanding of income 
maintenance policy it is considered essential that statndard economic practice embraces a 
feminist economic perspective. 
Feminist economics seeks to identify the prejudices central to neo-classical theory 
and to remove them where possible or desirable. This leads feminist economists to 
question the basic features of economic method and to re-evaluate the models and tools of 
analysis employed in the application of neo-classical theory. The first step, therefore, in 
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developing a feminist economics perspective in the study of income transfer systems is to 
provide evidence of how inherent biases, entrenched in mainstream economics, act in 
determining the nature of policy. This is not always immediately obvious in that the 
assumptions and axioms which form the basis of neo-FODVVLFDOHFRQRPLFWKHRU\µVHHPVR
REYLRXVDQGQDWXUDO WRPRVWHFRQRPLVWV WKDW WKH\DUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGYDOXHV¶.XLSHUDQG
Sap, 1995:5). That is, the existence of bias is rendered invisible by the dominant value 
structure. Therefore, the claim made by traditional economists that their discipline is a 
positive value free science is to be treated with caution. The mainstream economic 
approach is itself defined by a set of value positions on what is worthy of study and on the 
methods to be employed. Subsequently these positions inform policy debates which 
LPSOLHVD µKLGGHQ¶DJHQGD8QGHUVWDQGLQJSROLF\ZLWKLQ WKLV IUDPHZRUNPHDQV WKDW WKHUH
will be a continual privileging of the ideals associated with neo-classical economic theory. 
It follows that the process of opening up debates, to include a more representative range of 
perspectives on the purpose and design of policy, involves separating the dominant 
theoretical framework from real world phenomena. Thus, it is argued that the approach to 
study should begin by exploring the actual nature of policy, alongside an examination of 
the problems such policy is intended to address. Equipped with a better understanding of 
the functions, and range of objectives, associated with income maintence measure, policy 
makers are better served by theoretical perspectives as opposed to being dominated by 
such 
In order to distinguish theory from policy, the initial chapters provided an outline of 
the prevailing influence of neo-classical economics in the design of income maintenance 
policy, combined with an inquiry into the modern social problems of poverty and social 
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exclusion. This served to illustrate the ineffectiveness of current measures in meeting modern 
demand. The case was made that the reform agenda continues to be driven by an assumed 
acceptance of the neo-classical construct. That is, income maintenance policy, both in a 
historical and contemporary sense, is understood primarily in terms of its direct relationship 
to the workings of a market-oriented economic system. Such a specific and limited 
understanding subsequently influences the understanding of possible reform options. The 
contribution of theory to the understanding of the purpose and nature of policy is not denied. 
However, what is in question is the appropriateness, and indeed usefulness, of the continued 
and exclusive application of a particular theory, which in itself is representative of a value 
based paradigm.  
Introducing a CBI within this exclusive theroetical framework points to the possible 
benefits to be derived from such a reform proposal. However, it only provides part of the 
picture in that the issues traditionally ignored within mainstream economic theory are 
subsequently neglected in the policy analysis process. Situating the position of women in 
society within a neo-classical analytical framework fails to account for the significant role 
played by gender differences in determining the outcomes of policy. Thus, gender as a 
variable is effectively discounted and policy is considered with regard to is impact on what is 
assumed to be an homogenous population. It is claimed that as long as this particular 
approach dominates in the process of understanding income maintenance policy, the full 
potential benefits, particularly those relating to women, of a CBI will remain peripheral to the 
debate. Thus, in demonstrating an androcentric bias the favoured analytical framework 
imposes on reform debates. A particular set of ideals and beliefs regarding the purpose of 
policy are implicitly assumed and thus reform proposals are considered with specific 
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reference to such. Moving the debate beyond such confining parameters necessitates that an 
alternative approach to study is adopted.  
9.3 Why Feminist Economics and the CBI Proposal? 
The changing nature of socio-economic relationships is a crucial feature of welfare 
reform debates. Poverty and the related concept of social exclusion can no longer be 
explained, if indeed they ever could be, in terms of limited incomes. The causes and 
consequences of material deprivation in advanced capitalist societies are varied and wide-
ranging. The process of analysing such draws attention to the prevalence of gender 
inequalities. Men and women have very different experiences of deprivation, which can 
largely be attributed to gender divisions of labour both within the household and the 
workplace. A central focus of feminist economic theory has been to comprehend and to 
subsequently promote an awareness of the causes and consequence of gender inequalities. 
It follows then that adopting a feminist economics approach in the analysis of social 
security provision will aid in understanding the functions and outcomes associated with 
any particular policy. That is, the approach to study does not set out with a predetermined 
set of objectives in mind, but rather the focus is on exploring real world economic 
phenomena and then assessing policy in terms of its impact on such.  
It is argued that unless we can adapt the theory, policy will remain static and thus 
ineffective in adapting to the changing needs of modern capitalist society. That is, if the 
way we interpret and understand the world remains driven by an attachment to neo-
classical economic theory, we will never fully understand the true nature of deprivation. In 
considering the CBI proposal much can be gained from employing a a feminist economics 
perspective. Feminist economists criticise those traditional economists who attempt to 
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research the family without changing the tools of analysis. Within such attempts it is 
JHQHUDOO\ DVVXPHG WKDW JHQGHU GLYLVLRQV DUH VRPHKRZ µQDWXUDO¶ UDWKHU WKDQ VRFLDOO\
constructed. Such assumptions stem from an unyielding attachment to the principles of self 
interested, rational, utility maximising individuals, which serve to define the neo-classical 
approach. In analysing the CBI debate the feminist economists critique proves relevant. 
Arguments in favour of a CBI have been dominated by an exclusive focus on the 
operational nature of modern labour markets. Similar to neo-classical approaches in 
analysing the family, assumptions are being made about the nature of social and economic 
exchange in contemporary society. The welfare function of paid work is emphasised and 
thus any policy which may be construed as representing a possible threat to that function 
will be implicitly rejected. It is argued that by assuming that choices made with regard to 
WKH ZRUOG RI ZRUN DUH VRPHKRZ µQDWXUDO¶ LQ WKDW WKH\ DUH primarily determined by 
financial considerations follows from an adherence to the neo-classical construct. 
&RQVLGHULQJ WKDW VXFK FKRLFHV PD\ EH µVRFLDOO\ FRQVWUXFWHG¶ JLYHV ZD\ WR D EURDGHU
conceptual understanding of the role income maintenance performs in a modern socio-
economic environment.  
Feminist economic theory encompasses the notion of socially constructed 
preferences. In terms of welfare reform it is therefore considered crucial that feminist 
economics is embraced as much of what policy is trying to address results from socially 
constructed inequalities. Considering a CBI in terms of its wider remit, that is the 
provision of social security rather than income maintenance is indicative of an approach 
which moves beyond traditional economic analysis regarding the role of policy. Thus, the 
application of feminist economic theory in this particular area proves enlightening in that 
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allows for a richer awareness of both the function of policy and the true nature of the 
problems policy is designed to address. Developing a feminist economic perspective on 
the CBI proposal makes a positive contribution to the debate in that serves to demonstrate 
the potential a CBI has in promoting gender neutral citizenship rights. 
9.4 Gender Blind or Gender Neutral - The Relevance of A CBI to the Welfare Reform 
Agenda 
This purpose of this thesis was not to contribute to debates about implementation. 
Questions regarding the actual level the CBI should be set at and the corresponding levels 
of tax required to finance such a pURSRVDO DORQJVLGH TXHVWLRQV RI KRZ µFLWL]HQVKLS LV
determined remain unresolved. However in terms of dissemination it is worth noting an 
important point regarding the current policy agenda. The mainstreaming agenda, which 
refers to the systematic integration of gender equality into all areas of public policy, is now 
considered a defining feature of the policy making process. The future operation of 
European Structural Funds will be strongly influenced by the EU's policy of 
mainstreaming and the UK government have on several occasions stated their firm 
commitment to mainstreaming, specifically with reference to spending decisions (Rees, 
2000: Rake, 2000). The political will to promote gender equality has thus been 
demonstrated on both an international and national level but the issue yet to be resolved is 
how best to put this will into practice. 
A CBI presents as a policy that promotes gender neutral rights of citizenship.  
However, it has been argued that this potential will never be fully realised as long as 
reform debates remain constrained by traditional notions regarding the relationship 
between work and pay. That is by continually assuming that income should derive from 
work, however that work be defined, the reform agenda will remain focused on the 
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operation of capitalist determined labour market structures. A CBI explicitly incorporates 
the notion that income should be derived from rights of citizenship. Such an approach to 
policy provides for an account of the different social experiences of men and women in a 
market based economy. A CBI therefore, has the potential to shift the focus away from a 
µJHQGHUEOLQG¶DSSURDFK WRVRFLDOVHFXULW\SURYLVLRQDQG WRSURPRWHUHDO IUHHGRPIRUDOO
5DWKHU WKDQ µDGG &%, DQG VWLU¶ WKH DERYH DQDO\VLV KDV VHW RXW WR DGDSt the analytical 
framework employed in the policy process to incorporate a feminist economics 
perspective. In doing so it is argued that the stage is now set for an informed discussion on 
the feasibility of a CBI in modern welfare states. 
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